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 Introduction: About Space as a Media 
Product
Alena Strohmaier and Angela Krewani
Keywords: Media practices, mapping, cartography, movements, agencies, 
Middle East, North Africa
Bourj Al Shamali, South of Lebanon, red balloons in the sky. In 1948, 7000 
refugees f led or were expelled from their homes in Tiberias and Safad in 
historic Palestine, now Israel; second- and third-generation refugees (22,000 
registered) currently form the majority of the population in the camp. The 
ancestors of Bourj Al Shamali’s population led an agricultural existence that 
has now been completely lost; the camp residents have increasingly grown 
detached from the land. Al Houla Association, one of the local NGOs working 
in the camp, which also serves as the base for the local camp committee 
working to improve conditions in the camp, began exploring the possibility 
of launching an urban agriculture pilot project and creating a green space 
in the camp.1 For this initiative, a map of the camp was needed to discuss 
potential locations and to visualize potential water sources. However, it 
turned out to be diff icult to f ind a map of Bourj Al Shamali, even though 
it has been in existence for over 60 years. With the complex politics of the 
region, the maps that do exist are withheld by international organizations 
that justify their discretion in the name of security and do not share them 
with the camp inhabitants or with the local camp committee. On internet 
maps, only the main street is marked, and on Google Earth, the very low-
resolution images of the area obscure the space, the narrow streets, and 
the buildings. Therefore, in 2015, the inhabitants themselves launched an 
initiative in cooperation with the local camp committee to map the area. 
1 See: Greening Bourj Al Shamali. An Initiative that Aims to Green and Improve the Living 
Conditions in a Refugee Camp in South Lebanon: http://bourjalshamali.org/
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The solution was a reusable latex/chloroprene balloon measuring at one 
and half metres wide, a 300-metre-long line, swivel clips for attaching the 
balloon and the camera, rubber bands for making a camera cradle, reusable 
Velcro for closing the balloon, some carabiners to attach things together, 
and a camera that can be set on an automated mode to take images every 
few seconds. Everything was tied up, the helium-filled balloon rose up in 
the air, and after a flight of 10–20 minutes, it could be brought down again.2
Technology, digital media, and activism brought this project into being. 
However, the balloon mapping alludes to more enduring concerns that 
arose from the need to capture one’s own space as a map. In its use of 
digital media, bottom-up cartography, and citizen science, the balloon 
mapping of Bourj Al Shamali offers a signif icant point of departure for any 
discussion of contemporary media and mapping practices in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region. Aspects of media, mapping practices, 
and the construction of spaces are interrelated and reflected into each 
other. Space is not a given, but produced in activities such as the balloon 
mapping of Bourj Al Shamali. Without media, the dimensions of space 
can hardly be experienced. Bruno Latour claimed, in reference to central 
perspective in painting, space could be a mobile medium in itself: ‘in linear 
perspective, no matter from what distance and angle an object is seen, it 
is always possible to transfer it and to obtain the same object at a different 
size as seen from another position’ (1990, p. 27). Besides this European linear 
perspective, diverging combinations of space and media can be considered 
valid, such as the song lines of the Australian Aborigines, which combine 
the constitution of spaces and places with their song lines – in this manner, 
orally constructing their cultural-geographical spaces (Winkler 1997).
When viewed against this background, media could always have been 
conceptualized as spatial agents, since most media – traditional and ana-
logue ones as well as new and digital ones – inscribe themselves into spaces 
or help to construct and communicate these spaces. The history of the 
letter connects to the history of post, combining media with the crossing of 
spaces (Siegert 1993). The Hollywood genre of the western or the road movie 
recounts the conquest of the vast spaces of the American West with the 
media of the stagecoach, Bible, and law while completely ignoring the native 
inhabitants of the region. Some media carry their conceptualized spaces in 
their name: viewing into the distant spaces – ‘tele’ ‘visioning’ – addresses 
television as a window opening up into distant spaces. Other media have 
2 See: Balloon Mapping Guides: http://bourjalshamali.org/2016/10/12/balloon-mapping-guides-
in-arabic-and-german/
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brought about new constellations of spaces and places, particularly the 
digital mobilization that offers new access to the spatial dimension, since 
it recombines spatial and medial aspects. Locative media – smartphones, 
GPS devices, tablets, and others – combine local and virtual elements. 
Adriana de Souza e Silva conceives spaces as inherently mobile, relating 
to the def inition of ‘augmented space’ (Manovich 2005) as a connection of 
virtual and material aspects, ‘mobile spaces are networked spaces defined by 
the use of portable interfaces as the nodes of the network’ (De Souza e Silva 
2006, p. 266). The idea of networked spaces offers a theoretical framework 
for the ‘nomad existence and the spatio-geographic aspect’ (De Souza e 
Silva 2006, p. 267). Accordingly, a nomad moves within predefined spaces 
and routes. De Souza e Silva connects to this concept of the nomad and 
rekindles it in the light of mobile media:
Mobile technology users take the nomadic concept one step further, 
because not only their paths are mobile but also the nodes. With the 
f ixed Internet, and f ixed landlines, computers and telephones were 
primarily connected to places. Conversely, cell phones represent movable 
connection points, accompanying their users’ movement in physical 
spaces. (2006, p. 267)
Technologically, the application of mobile phones is supported by 3G to 
5G mobile networks, which are often not operated by governments, but 
by commercial companies. The prevalence of mobile media demands a 
modif ied conceptualization of space. De Souza e Silva concludes: ‘I regard 
space as a concept produced and embedded by social practices, in which 
the support infrastructure is composed of a network of mobile technologies’ 
(2006, p. 271). Following De Souza e Silva’s references to the nomad as the 
new inhabitant of networked spaces, the features of these new spaces have 
to be reconsidered.
An additional consequence resulting from mobile media is a different 
aspect of media participation.3 The idea of participatory culture is also 
recasting the way in which citizens, like the inhabitants of Bourj Al Shamali, 
engage with their surroundings and in political life. This is especially the 
case with the media upheaval away from broadcast mass media towards 
more individualized mobile media practices. This generates a shift in the 
connection between political power relationships and regimes of knowledge. 
Thus, mobile media practices constitute reconfigured spaces that provide 
3 See also: Giaccardi 2012; Jenkins, Ford, and Green 2013.
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both knowledge about spaces as well as knowledge through spaces. Hence, 
this book is centrally concerned with how space is not, as Henri Lefebvre 
famously stated, a social but rather a media product. In the following, we 
shall elaborate to what extent cartographies, movements, and agencies 
play a decisive role in both media and mapping practices in perpetually 
producing and creating space in and of the MENA region.
Media Practices
A few months into the popular uprisings in the MENA region, the promises 
of social media, including its ability to inf luence a participatory govern-
ance model, grassroots civic engagement, new social dynamics, inclusive 
societies, and new opportunities for businesses and entrepreneurs, 
became more evident than ever. Arguably, social media tools and their 
inf luence on online and off line identities played a critical role in the 
MENA region before and after the popular uprisings, which tested the 
conceptual suitability of classical and traditional ideas of space. At the 
same time, digital and especially mobile media were a crucial factor in 
the reconf igurations of the production and circulation of the images of 
these popular uprisings:
to the extent that there would appear to be an ineluctable logic to these 
developments, it is all the more crucial to observe how the rhetoric of 
revolution effects a subservience of the aesthetic to the spectacle of 
conflict, not to mention the claims and counter-claims of politics and 
the often ideological expectations of historicization. (Downey 2014, p. 18)
The Green Movement in Iran in 2009 and the simultaneous waves of popular 
uprisings across the Arab world in 2011 were strongly documented by so-
called citizen journalists; in other words, private persons or amateurs with 
digital or mobile cameras who disseminated their images via social media. 
These videos soon circulated beyond social media: between 2010 and 2015, at 
least 20 documentary f ilms were made both inside and outside the MENA 
region, consisting partly or entirely of this kind of internet footage. The 
documentary f ilms reassemble the videos by shortening, recontextualizing, 
and adding intertitles or voice-overs. The origin of the source material 
featured in these documentaries is often partly or sometimes completely 
unknown; the original clips had often gone viral and become iconic in the 
social media landscape. The videos are presented in a new framing and 
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with novel meanings through the revised narrative and aesthetic contexts 
of the f ilm.4 These videos have also appeared in art installations, such as 
Rabih Mroué’s lecture performance The Pixelated Revolution from 2012 and 
Birgit Hein’s Abstract Film from 2014. Non-profit media collectives, such as 
the Egyptian Mosireen and Syrian Abounaddara and Bidayyat collectives 
have used them as well. Finally yet importantly, they have been stored in 
digital open-access and open-source archives, such as the Syrian Archive, 
the Yemeni Archive, 858 – An Archive of Resistance, and the Public Access 
Digital Media Archive (Dang and Strohmaier 2018).
What these different appropriation processes have in common is 
that they pursue the visualization of crises in documentary and in post-
cinematographic forms. In this context, post-cinema does not mean the 
pure accumulation of new media forms triggered by the changes of f ilm as a 
material object of photochemical recordings. Nor is it limited to the cinema 
as a cultural and architectural institution in the digital age. Rather, the term 
enables a view that perceives media reconfigurations as interlocking cultural 
phenomena (Hagener, Hediger, and Strohmaier 2016, pp. 1–12). The theoretical 
f ield of post-cinema thus makes it possible to pursue such interactions 
on three levels: f irst, at the level of the specif ic technical and aesthetic 
possibilities of the audiovisual of so-called citizen journalists; second, at 
the level of the representation of norms and conventions that emerge in 
their media processing; and third, at the level of geopolitical aspects and 
positionalities, such as the Western view on popular uprisings. Artist and 
theorist Hito Steyerl proposed, with what she calls ‘circulationism’ (Steyerl 
2014), that the importance of images lies no longer in the art of making 
them, but in the art of their post-production, distribution, and acceleration. 
On another note, media scholars Ramon Lobato and James Meese use the 
concept of ‘circumvention’ (Lobato and Meese 2016, p. 9) to analyse the 
geo-blocking of videos to emphasize the subversive potential of users of 
streaming platforms. Therefore, media practices, this book argues, mean 
more than the triad of production, distribution, and reception; instead, media 
practices designate not only forms of technical and economic dissemination 
but also a holistic view of various media practices that build on each other, 
are interwoven, networked, and, at times, contradictory.
In this context, it is important to note that as other world regions, the MENA 
region is not a well-defined, closed, and homogeneous area. On the contrary, it 
4 For recent research on cinematic appropriation processes of protest videos in the MENA 
region since 2009, see: https://www.uni-marburg.de/de/fb09/medienwissenschaft/forschung/
forschungsprojekte/mena-f ilm
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is actually a region that is subject to continuous reconfigurations and for which 
numerous designations exist, such as the Orient, the Levant, and the Near or 
Middle East.5 At the same time, economic, cultural, social, and political inter-
relations and processes of exchange unfold in very different regional contexts, 
which intersect with established spatial ideas. Political scientist Claudia Derichs 
equates such a shift to what she calls a ‘new areas studies current’ (2015, p. 33). 
It demarcates an open concept of the notion of ‘area’ as itself not hermetically 
sealed or self-contained. Her main argument is that how ‘area’ is understood, 
how it is defined, and what it designates is subject to historical and cultural 
processes. She refers in this context to Arjun Appadurai, who claimed that 
‘we need to recognize that histories produce geographies and not vice versa’ 
(2010, p. 9). Likewise, social and regional scientists Anna-Katharina Hornidge 
and Katja Mielke argue that ‘area’ should not be understood as a singular or 
hermetic unit per se, but as a dynamic category (2015, p. 14). This development 
in area studies itself, and the accompanying change from an inflexible to an 
open understanding of ‘area’, therefore emphasizes structures that conceive 
of the MENA region not as a homogeneous and unified space but rather as a 
set of interdependent and interrelated places which are in a constant process 
of reconfiguration (Ouaissa, Pannewick, and Strohmaier 2021, pp. 1-21).
Following these approaches, the underlying assumption of this book is 
that mobility and movement increasingly challenge static political, socio-
cultural, ethnic, and religious boundaries. An open and flexible concept of 
‘area’ is crucial for our understanding of what we would like to call mobile 
media spaces, which bring about varied and amorphous modes of producing 
space. Therefore, this book promotes a transregional perspective on the 
circulation of ideas, narratives, and images, without being limited to f ixed 
metageographies. Thus, the second argument is that media do not provide 
simple technological tools or equipment, but mobile media spaces which 
work over time and beyond different world regions, including diaspora 
formations (Strohmaier 2019). Mobile media spaces undermine, defy, and blur 
state-centred notions of territory as well as notions of nation and political 
communities based on territorially f ixed states. Therefore, the starting 
point for an examination of media as a factor of spatial production, which 
is based on social conditions and practices in the broadest sense, needs to 
include precisely the conditions of media and their transmission between 
academia and the public, between centres and peripheries.
‘Mapping’ has become a buzzword in this context. Digital cartography 
modif ies conventional cartography by conflating it with forms of digital 
5 See also: Culcasi 2010; Culcasi 2012.
iNtroduc tioN: About SPAcE AS A MEdiA Produc t 15
communication practices. Web spaces combine conventional cartography 
with the communication structures of social networks and the archive 
functions of computer hard drives. These new hybrid forms of digital spaces 
merge with mobile mapping practices.
Mapping Practices
With the start of the Cold War and the f irst attempts at space travel, efforts 
were undertaken to study the Earth from outer space, following from the 
military tradition of using either moored balloons or airplanes to produce 
photographs of landscapes from an elevated vantage point. Older satellites 
worked partly with photographic stills or moving pictures, and the resulting 
f ilms were physically transported down to Earth in capsules. More modern 
technology worked in a manner similar to television. A television camera 
was used, and its images were stored on magnetic tape until the satellite 
had passed by a receiving station and the images could be passed as electric 
signals. This kind of technology was used in satellite transmissions until 
the end of the 1970s. At that point, photography was replaced by a new 
technology, which recorded and stored light using a sensitive electrooptical 
technique – just as in the video camera, which was to be developed later 
(Dyring 1992, p. 29). In cartography, there has been a long-standing tradition 
of collaboration between media and the military. In War and Cinema, French 
media philosopher Paul Virilio uses media theory to highlight the parallels 
between war and cinema, working with a tightly woven technological 
analogy between the apparatus of war and the f ilm camera:
It was in 1861, whilst travelling on a paddle-steamer and watching its 
wheel, that the future Colonel Gatling hit upon the idea of a cylindrical, 
crank-driven machine-gun. In 1874 the Frenchman Jules Janssen took 
inspiration from the multi-chambered Colt (patented in 1832) to invent 
an astronomical revolving unit that could take a series of photographs. 
On the basis of this idea, Etienne-Jules Marey then perfected his chrono-
photographic rif le, which allowed its user to aim at and photograph an 
object moving through space. (1986, p. 19)
Nonetheless, Paul Virilio’s argument fails to address some important aspects 
of the origins of visual traditions and of the discursive attributions of media 
apparatuses. In addition to the technical inscriptions of images, formative 
visual traditions and routinizations of images exist, which function as 
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more than just technical inscriptions. In this way, his ideas conf irm the 
persuasive power of images, which has emerged in the course of a long 
historical process.
Over the last few years, cartography has received a considerable amount of 
renewed interest. Notably, with the introduction of Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS), cartography has merged with social media platforms and 
communication structures. Geobrowsing has emerged as a new name for 
this conflation. Apart from being an innovative aspect of communication in 
social networks, geobrowsing includes a variety of traditional media forms, 
particularly with regard to the transformation of the imagery of the Earth. 
Traditional cartography, specific forms of film and photography, and the satel-
lite image are important predecessors of geobrowsing applications. Traditional 
cartography and digital satellite imagery were produced to document the 
shape of the Earth and the features of landscapes; these images nonetheless 
carry within them fixed visual conventions and meanings which, as Denis 
Cosgrove puts it, ‘have drawn upon and reconstituted a repertoire of sacred 
and secular, colonial and imperial meanings, and […] these representations 
have played an especially significant role in the self-representation of colonial 
and post-colonial nations’ (1985, p. 46). In this sense, cartography and the 
possession of the landscape occurred in parallel, while the application of 
geometry often made the acquisition of actual space easier.
In this context, the visual zoom function provided in Google Earth is 
based on the visual and epistemic history of the images of the Earth in 
cartography and satellite photography. With the introduction of Google Maps 
and Google Earth, both released in 2005, cartographic images of the world 
have experienced a surge on social media platforms. Although a variety of 
GIS had previously been in use, Google Maps and Google Earth brought about 
a new quality and a broader popularization within GIS systems, which can 
be described with respect to their popular proliferation, as Michael Jones, 
Chief Executive Off icer of Google Earth, stated in 2007:
What’s happening now […] is that instead of just GIS experts talking to 
each other, or experts making maps for regular people, regular people 
are talking to each other, and they are making maps for each other. And 
that’s very important […] the story of the where is very important. (cited 
in Crampton 2010, p. 25)
Contrary to classical GIS, Google Maps and Google Earth, and later Open-
StreetMap and Wikimapia, allow for the combination of social media with 
cartographic systems and thus take cartographic competence away from the 
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experts. Contemporary cartographic systems can be installed on personal 
computers or on smartphones. Data can be stored on a server and the client 
computer merely requires a browser to enter cartographic systems. Data 
and modules are loaded onto the client server on demand (Abend 2013, 
p. 150). These innovations made the general use of cartographic systems 
even easier, but not less controversial.
Image-related conventions and structures of mapping practices transform, 
so this book’s third argument, means to enable them to function in adjacent 
discourses beyond technologies. Accordingly, images become nodal points 
for a multitude of different discourses. Taking for granted that geographical 
and national spaces are always mediatized spaces, the turn towards social 
media has nevertheless changed the understanding of space, which has 
become fragmented and individualized. This is reflected in the manifold 
approaches in this book towards space as a media product, which encloses 
a variety of practices such as digital cartography, gamification, video activ-
ism, cinema, parkour, data mining, oral transmission, and audiovisual 
representations.
Cartographies, Movements, Agencies
The following contributions are informed by the idea that the fragmentation of 
spaces brings about new forms of media and mapping practices and are, at the 
same time, a product of these practices. Therefore, the book features multiple 
voices that share collective and individual stories within larger contexts 
of political and social challenges, enabling a plurality of interdisciplinary 
perspectives. This displaces binaries such as the division between the public 
and private sphere or the nation and the citizen in a collage structure that 
embraces disjuncture, heterogeneity, plurality, and dialogue. The contributions 
in this book provide compelling perspectives that privilege context over text. 
They engage different levels of creative abilities, participation, and viewpoints 
in dynamic iterative relationships. They circulate and reorganize scattered 
media remnants across different platforms and within different communities. 
In so doing, they create a more nuanced and shared construct to reimagine 
how we might understand space as a media product in the MENA region today. 
The book mirrors three different aspects of media-generated spaces. The first 
part, labelled ‘Cartographies’ relates to historic and contemporary practices; 
the second part, ‘Movements’, addresses the media and spatial activities of 
cinema, migration, and parkour; and the third part, ‘Agencies’, discusses the 
viable interest of global and local groups in specific areas.
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The f irst part starts with a discussion of historic cartographic practices 
in the last century of the Ottoman Empire. Nour Nicole Dados focuses on 
the early period of cartographic practices in the MENA region (up to the 
20th century) to consider how surviving maps and notes, in conjunction 
with other textual sources, can be used to develop a historical account 
of subjectivity and the production of social knowledge. She uses textual 
and cartographic material about Beirut to consider the ways in which the 
practice of mapping not only expands our geographical ‘memory’ of the city 
but also allows us to reflect upon specif ic urban histories.
Aspects of the cartographic organization of social groups also play a role 
in Christian Bittner and Georg Glasze’s exploration of patterns of exclusion 
and inclusion in OpenStreetMap and Wikimapia, especially in the examples 
of the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. These mapping platforms have proven that 
geographical information and maps can be generated via crowdsourcing by 
cartography amateurs. Yet several studies have excavated powerful exclu-
sion mechanisms in such Web 2.0 cartographies, showing that privileged 
demographic groups often produce user-generated geographical content. 
Besides these strategies, the cartographic systems themselves are not neutral 
actors within these activities.
Frederik von Reumont’s examination of cartographies within the 
Western Sahara takes a closer look at the connection between identity, 
territory, and borders as well as their construction via mapping processes. 
His analysis of different web maps voices the rootedness in dominant 
political world views and contrasts them with the perspectives of the parties 
of the opposition (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and Morocco). The 
delineation of borders is here directly linked to territorial identity and 
nation-building. This demonstrates the important role of web maps and 
other digitally disseminated maps in the def inition of identity and (self-)
governance.
Besides cartography’s social and political partiality, its gamification rep-
resents a further step towards its becoming virtual. Janina Schupp analyses 
the evolution of digital training cartographies and critically investigates the 
growing gamif ication ensuing in these representations of Middle Eastern 
battlef ields. The mapping capability – offered by the resulting simulation 
game 73 Easting – to visualize the battlef ield from any position and point 
in time revolutionized military exercises. With ongoing conflicts in the 
MENA region, these digital training cartographies have matured over the 
years and are now linked to real bodies and vehicles through digital and 
mobile technologies during live training in artif icially constructed Iraqi 
and Afghan villages.
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The following part, on ‘Movements’, focuses on the media impact of 
political movements and events, which are informed by audiovisual media 
and/or are represented throughout manifold media practices. In this part, 
space is not exclusively related to mapping practices and cartography, but 
it is understood as being brought about through cinematic strategies on 
the one hand and bodily as well as representational strategies on the other 
hand. In this manner, media practices interact with real locations and 
geopolitical discourses. Interestingly, these processes are not restricted to 
specif ic media but can occur in a variety of media configurations. Cinema 
seems to be the most obvious form of constituting social and political spaces, 
but these processes extend to other forms such as print media and parkour.
This section starts with Hamid Nacify’s examination of the emergence 
of ‘internet cinema’ by focusing on Iran in the late 2000s, particularly since 
the 2009 disputed re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president. 
Ahmadinejad’s re-election unleashed the opposition Green Movement, 
undergirded by this internet cinema. Iran provides an example of the use 
of the new internet-driven digital global media in support of democratic 
ideals that, soon after the Green Movement, rocked many authoritarian 
regimes of the MENA region.
In her contribution, Katarzyna Ruchel-Stockmans investigates the pos-
sibilities of documenting historical events through mobile video footage. The 
so-called Arab Spring appeared on the news in countless video testimonials 
shot by participants and bystanders. Viewers all over the world could watch 
distant events immediately after they were recorded and uploaded on social 
media. Yet the sheer amount of such visual data, combined with the untranslat-
ability and poor quality of the footage, often delivered opaque and ambiguous 
material. She compares Peter Snowdon’s The Uprising (2013) to Harun Farocki 
and Andrei Ujică’s Videograms of a Revolution (1992), and questions the possible 
shift in knowledge produced and performed by the amateur video-makers.
Whereas Naficy and Ruchel-Stockmans deal with documentary forms, 
Alena Strohmaier provides a close reading of Mohamed Diab’s feature 
f ilm Clash (2016), through which she foregrounds the idea of the truck as a 
cinematic space predicated on its ability to accommodate movement, both 
in a literal and metaphorical sense. The analysis allows for a discussion of 
cinematic spaces of the so-called ‘Arab street’ created by both mise en scène 
and cinematography that go against the more prevalent images of street fights 
and mass demonstrations as seen in documentaries. Her main argument is 
that cinema challenges and inverts traditional spaces of social upheavals, 
such as streets and squares, in their capacity to be spaces of knowledge and 
solidarity, in negotiating them as enhanced media-sensible spaces.
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The last two chapters of this section turn away from the realm of moving 
images towards print and everyday media practices in urban spaces. Ines 
Braune follows the idea of a mediated constitution of spaces, placing her 
considerations within the context of everyday urban practices of parkour in 
Morocco. Furthering de Certeau’s concept of reclaiming urban spaces, she 
introduces this movement as a corporeal practice of claiming urban spaces.
Regarding print media, Ayça Tunç Cox analyses the varied ideological 
aff iliations subscribed to differing interpretations of the coverage on Syrian 
refugees in Turkey. She examines the coverage in Hürriyet, a mainstream 
conservative paper; Cumhuriyet, the nationalist Kemalist representative of the 
Turkish press; Yeni Şafak, a right-wing Islamist paper; and Birgün, a left-wing 
paper. Moreover, she focuses on certain periods that raised momentous public 
interest: the three days following the outbreak of the Syrian crisis; the three 
days following the discovery of baby Aylan’s body washed ashore; and the 
three days following the European Union’s three-billion-euro fund for Turkey.
The third and last part of the book, ‘Agencies’, aims to broaden the concept 
of space to agencies and artistic interventions into political structures and 
processes. These agencies can relate to visual media representations such as 
the media representation on YouTube, but it can also cover political unrest 
or be applied to def ine a state or nation.
The book’s third part starts with Angela Krewani’s exploration of the 
media coverage of the Arab Spring and the ensuing reactions of Western 
media communities. Focusing on interactive documentaries and websites, 
her contribution clearly demonstrates the extent to which media featured 
individualized coverage of major events. Digital media in particular have 
merged with cartographic competencies to provide topical information. 
Compared to the informational range of classic print media and television, 
these digital platforms and digitally distributed art forms create new and 
interactive forms of media participation.
Whereas Angela Krewani focuses on the site of visual representation 
of images, Laila Shereen Sakr looks at the digital practice of data mining. 
She presents a basic genealogy of the existing literature on the 2010–2012 
era of the Arab Spring within Middle East and media studies. The aim of 
her analysis is to map the plurality of patterns, stories, ideas, and analyses 
networked across media forms. Her contribution is designed to refute the 
possibility of a monolithic narrative about contemporary Egypt and situates 
the study within the growing scholarship on social media and political 
change, introducing key concepts in design research methodology.
Annabelle Sreberny and Gholam Khiabany explore in their contribution 
how contemporary Iranian politics exist through media and how these 
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politics are played out through political geographies. They investigate 
three powerful spatial dynamics at work in the analysis of Iran’s political 
orbit. The f irst is the classic remit of the international relations between 
states. The second is the mainstream remit of political analysis, the national 
dialogue – sometimes open, often constrained – between the state and its 
inhabitants. The third is the cross-border space between the state and its 
citizens who – as diaspora, exiles, and migrants – live in other countries.
Also concentrating on the visual politics of an ethnic community, Se-
bastian Maisel underlines an increased exposure to sacred knowledge as 
well as a re-intervention of religious dogma in Yezidi culture by unorthodox 
scholars, intellectuals, and politicians. He argues that their use of technology 
to spread deliberate knowledge has contributed to the development of new 
forms of identity and loyalty among Yezidi groups in Syria and Iraq.
Finally, Andrea Fischer-Tahir shows that colonial images of Kurdish bodies 
and of Kurdistan’s geography still have use value in identity discourses 
shaped by the aid of social media, which witnessed the simultaneity of modes 
of representation, multiplied the possibilities of translocating knowledge, 
and promoted Kurdish national aspirations for a nation state.
Across the MENA region today, these varied, empirical, theoretical and 
interdisciplinary contributions show there is not only a development of a 
critical f ield of digital media, but also a proposition of alternative platforms 
for social and political engagement. In an attempt to rearticulate the re-
lationship between media and mapping practices, while also addressing 
new and social media, this book nevertheless abides by one relatively clear 
point: space is a media product. The overall focus of this book is accordingly 
not so much on the role of new technologies and social networks as it is 
on how media and mapping practices expand the very notion of cultural 
engagement, political activism, popular protest, and social participation. 
To this end, space is produced, created, re-conf igured, reproduced, and 
recreated, which testif ies to its status and role as a cultural media and 
mapping practice in itself.
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1. Mapping Empire: Knowledge 




Many studies of the nineteenth century Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region have been concerned with the economic, social and political influence 
exerted by European colonial governments through the accumulation of 
knowledge about the region and its subsequent military domination. The 
case of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century demonstrates that 
European techniques of knowledge production were also strategically adopted 
by ruling elites outside the colonial metropolises. Ottoman adoption of 
European technologies and techniques were politically entwined with the 
empire’s territorial claims against nascent nationalisms and a calculated 
move towards knowledge-based forms of government administration in the 
quest to hold onto power. Cartographic and demographic methods used by 
the Ottomans produced new assemblages of territory and population that 
profoundly reshaped the objective of government and the conduct of imperial 
administration. Statistics and geography became the choice tools of social 
progress and advancement, underpinning the numerous reforms of the 
nineteenth century aimed at rationalisation and centralisation.
Keywords: Ottoman Empire, maps, historical knowledge, Beirut
Mapping Empire
Studies of the nineteenth-century Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region have focused on the economic, social, and political influence ex-
erted by European colonial administrations through the accumulation 
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of knowledge about the region and its subsequent military domination. 
However, the case of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire demonstrates 
that emergent techniques of knowledge production were not geographically 
bound in their origin and development, and were strategically adopted by 
ruling elites outside the colonial metropolises. The inter-imperial knowledge 
networks between the Ottoman and European empires, essential to these 
developments, remain underexplored. Writing this history requires thinking 
about ‘the connected world of empires’ (Çelik 2008), and the ‘overlapping 
territories’ and ‘intertwined histories’ (Said 1995), in ways that may not be 
‘unidimensionally hierarchical’ or ‘reducible to core-periphery relationships’ 
(Go 2013; 2016). This would allow for the recuperation of a ‘multidirectional 
communication pattern that dismantles the one-way vector of European 
influence on Ottoman modernizing reforms’ (Çelik 2008, p. 5).
The epistemic shifts in the social sciences of the nineteenth century were 
the product of a convergence of technologies and techniques developed 
over more than two centuries of colonial expansion (Said 1995; Chakrabarty 
2000; Connell 2007; Go 2014). The dominant tendency to see these develop-
ments as originating within European society overlooks the centrality of the 
dynamics of empire (Connell 2007) and the contribution of non-Europeans 
(Chakrabarty 2000; El-Shakry 2007). Raewyn Connell’s study of the history 
of sociology demonstrates the signif icance of the imperial relationship to 
the development of the discipline (Connell 2007). Connell’s database study of 
early scholarship reveals that the relationship between metropolis and colony 
was far more important to the development of the early social sciences than 
internal changes within European society (Connell 2007). The representation of 
modern knowledge formations within the social sciences as a strictly European 
phenomenon has been extensively critiqued for systematically omitting the 
contribution of non-Europeans in the universalization of modern disciplines 
(Chakrabarty 2000; El-Shakry 2007). In the case of inter-imperial knowledge, 
it also means that the ‘unexpected circulation of influences’ between the 
Ottoman and European empires has been overlooked (Çelik 2008, p. 5).
European methods for surveying territory and population in the nine-
teenth century were entangled in the instrumentalization of knowledge as a 
technique of government (Foucault 1975; 2007). Similarly, the Ottoman adop-
tion of these technologies and techniques was no less politically entwined 
with the empire’s territorial claims against nascent nationalisms and a 
calculated move towards knowledge-based forms of government administra-
tion in the quest to hold on to power. The cartographic and demographic 
methods adopted by the Ottomans in the nineteenth century produced new 
assemblages of territory and population that began to profoundly reshape 
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the objectives of government and the conduct of imperial administration. 
When Beirut’s status as a provincial capital was abolished in 1865 as a result 
of the new Provincial Law, for example, the bureaucrats in Istanbul argued 
that the decision was based on statistics and geography (Hanssen 2005).
Statistics and geography were central to the numerous reforms of the 
nineteenth century aimed at centralization, rationalization, and bureaucra-
tization. New methods of survey and analysis in geography and demography 
led to greater precision in the representation of territory and made possible 
detailed inquiries and statistical analyses about the empire’s population. The 
new maps were not just important representational tools, but also critical 
planning instruments for building the empire’s infrastructure of roads and 
rail and port networks, and for linking the administrative provincial units. 
Similarly, methods of social survey introduced after 1831 systematically 
captured far greater detail about the population than earlier census data 
(down to eye colour, complexion, and physical marks). This was combined 
with the expansion of the state registration system across three institutions 
and the expansion of the census workforce of population off icials (Karpat 
1985, pp. 28–29). Ottoman bureaucrats and imperial subjects participated in 
the production of knowledge about the empire’s territory and population by 
adapting new social science techniques to local conditions. These exercises 
were part of a broader (though not necessarily equal) transactional global 
circulation of knowledge increasingly shaped by emerging discursive forma-
tions across the social sciences and the creation of discrete disciplinary units.
Disciplinary Formations and Cartographic Knowledge Production
The authority of modern disciplines, and their claim to positive, scientif ic, 
and objective knowledge, is founded upon the erasure of the complex and 
heterogeneous history of their emergence (Foucault 2002; 1972). Cartography, 
like other modern disciplines, began shedding its pre-modern roots in 
the seventeenth century and, by the end of the nineteenth century, had 
established itself as a systematized knowledge formation (Foucault 1980; 
de Certeau 1988). Prior to the seventeenth century, geography was always 
‘something more’ than ‘merely positive knowledge’ (Said 1995, p. 55). Pre-
modern maps were a performative record of the journey and documentation 
of an itinerary. Cartographic representations were secondary to their ac-
companying texts. In a passage from Walking in the City, Michel de Certeau 
laments the moment of the discipline’s disengagement from ‘the itineraries 
that were the conditions of its possibility’ (de Certeau 1988, p. 120):
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Each of the [medieval] maps is a memorandum prescribing actions. The 
tour to be made is predominant in them […]. This drawing outlines not the 
‘route’ (there wasn’t one) but the ‘log’ of their journey on foot – an outline 
marked out by footprints with regular gaps between them and by pictures 
of the successive events that took place in the course of the journey (meals, 
battles, crossings of rivers or mountains, etc.): not a ‘geographical map’ 
but ‘history book.’ (de Certeau 2001, p. 120)
The treatise of Moroccan-born Sicilian geographer Muhammad al-Idrisi, 
Nuzhat al-mushtaq fi ikhtiraq al-afaq (Diversions for him who longs to travel 
the world), offers one example of mapping as a history book of itineraries. 
In the treatise, commissioned by the Sicilian King Roger II in 1154, Idrisi 
incorporates geographical knowledge from the Ancient Greeks with his 
own observations, as well as accounts of merchants and travellers (Edson 
and Savage-Smith 2004). Idrisi’s grand map of the world – the mappae 
mundi referred to as the Tabula Rogeriana (Figure 1.1) – is considered one 
of the most important surviving pre-modern maps. Like other cartographic 
records from the Middle Ages, the map was not intended to be used without 
its accompanying itineraries, textual commentaries, and detailed regional 
maps, which included a smaller map of Sicily (Figure 1.2).
While borders on pre-modern maps were ‘designated in terms of rivers, 
littorals and some vague notion of where one people ends and another begins’ 
(Brummett 2007, p. 28), from the seventeenth century, dotted demarcation lines 
and shaded areas denoting ownership became common features as expanding 
colonial empires produced new forms of knowledge with territory as their 
strategic objective (Brummett 2007, pp. 32–33; Fortna 2002). Early modern maps 
were increasingly restricted to trade and military concerns as the itinerant 
features of pre-modern maps gave way to demands for scientific rigour and 
topographical detail (Brummett 2007, p. 50). The itineraries of Idrisi and other 
medieval cartographers vanished. The map, in its modern sense, became a 
privileged site for ‘scientif ic’ knowledge that was distinctly separate from 
topographical city or town views. In the same historical moment of geography’s 
establishment as a science, drawings and engravings of city views proliferated. 
Extensive collections of landscapes and panoramas made in this period presage 
the emergence of monochrome photography (Brummett 2007, pp. 32–33).
City views, as a distinct and separate category of visual representation, 
were made popular by European travellers. The panoramic engravings and 
sketches of Constantinople by Antoine Ignace Melling are one example 
of this break in technique with earlier itinerary-type maps (Figure 1.3). 
European by birth, Melling worked as an imperial architect in the palace 
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of Sultan Selim III for almost eighteen years. His drawings and engravings 
attest to the creative elements that came to characterize city and town 
views, now f irmly separated from the science of geography.
However, the separation was never complete. The production of maps in 
the nineteenth century included many narrative-driven ‘educational’ tools 
that not only surveyed the space of empire, but also visually communicated 
the imperial project. Visual mappings from earlier periods also continued 
to be reproduced and consumed as instrumental sources of geographical 
evidence. City views of Beirut drawn by W.H. Bartlett and referred to in 
the travel memoirs of John Carne (1836) reappear in a geographical survey 
of Beirut’s ancient gates in 1921. The author, Comte du Mesnil du Buisson, 
makes a sketch of an earlier city view of Beirut and uses it to study changes 
to the city’s spatial organization over time (Figure 1.4).
While the separation of map and view was never complete, the division 
was part of a broader reorganization of ‘the sciences of nature (the inquiry 
and the table)’ and ‘the human sciences (examination, discipline)’ into 
separate and distinct f ields (Foucault 2002). As Foucault’s archaeological 
excavation of the modern disciplines demonstrates, the emergence of sys-
tematized knowledge formations – ‘disciplines’ – entailed the erasure of their 
pre-modern histories (Foucault 1980; 1972). What Foucault does not address 
however, is that the erasure of disciplinary prehistories also reconstituted 
the new knowledge formations as exclusively European (Chakrabarty 2005; 
Connell 2007; El-Shakry 2007). The North became the geographical reference 
point for the production of all knowledge (Connell 2007; Connell et al. 2017; 
Figure 1.2: idrisi, Map of Sicily, Source: Edson and Savage-Smith 2004, p. 89.
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Connell and Dados 2014). Idrisi’s treatise and other works produced in the 
pre-modern era attesting to a global circuit of knowledge production are 
either co-opted into the Northern canon, dialectically positioned to illustrate 
the superiority of European knowledge, or assigned to the dustbin of history.
Techniques of Science and Government in the Late Ottoman Period
When the Danish Vice-Consul Julius Löytved presented a map of Beirut to the 
last Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1876, the European military presence 
in the Ottoman territories was growing, nationalist sentiment was brewing 
all the way from the Balkans to Mount Lebanon, and Beirut had already been 
surveyed and mapped several times by the French and the British. Therefore, 
the Löytved map was more than a gift; it was highly sought-after empirical 
knowledge that communicated power and sovereignty. The techniques and 
technologies utilized in the Löytved map had been developing over decades. 
These rapid advances in knowledge production in the social sciences had 
Figure 1.3: Melling’s bosphorous c. 1800, Source: Pamuk 2005, pp. 58–59.
Figure 1.4: Panorama of beirut in 1835, drawn after w.h. bartlett, Source: Mesnil du buisson 1921, p. 236.
34 Nour NicolE dAdoS 
been quickly patronized by the Ottoman state several decades earlier as the 
imperial administration worked actively to contain the growth of geography 
as a pedagogical tool and to monopolize the production of maps.
The late Ottoman period attests to a variety of these complex cultural 
exchanges that continued despite the shifts in disciplinary boundaries 
that were instrumentalized in the consolidation of European imperial 
power. The hegemonic diffusion of Western cultural and political power 
can be readily observed in the MENA region well before the Mandate period 
(Said 1995; Makdisi 2000), but this did not mean that the Ottomans were 
passively coerced into adopting Western techniques of government. The 
Ottoman reform programmes of the nineteenth century, many of which 
were modelled after European examples and adapted imported knowledge 
and technologies, were not driven by acquiescence to the West but by the 
quest to retain sovereignty over the empire’s territory and populations 
(Karpat 1985; Çelik 2008; Evered 2012). The practice of adopting Western 
technologies to meet the needs of the Ottoman state was the norm rather 
than the exception – it had been common practice since the f ifteenth 
century. The celebrated works of Piri Reis, known for their ‘portolan style’ 
after the chart-making methods of the Venetians, like the later work of 
Katib Celebi, are examples of the long tradition of appropriation in this 
arena (Rogers 1992; Soucek 1992).
With the establishment of the War College (Harb Okulu) in 1834, the 
military took responsibility for map production, and maps depicting the 
empire in its entirety were displayed in every school classroom (Fortna 2002, 
pp. 182–186). Military cartographers were trained in Western map-making 
techniques both locally and in England, France, and Prussia, and experts 
and map-making equipment were imported from Europe (Fortna 2002, 
p. 182). However, while cartographic and representational techniques had 
long been arenas of cultural exchange, in the nineteenth century, they 
began to reshape how territory was administered and even conceived. It 
was not only the techniques of spatial representation that were learned but 
also their application as techniques of government.
European rivalry for territory in the 1830s and 1840s would have added to 
the urgency to update the empire’s administrative organization. Between 
1839 and 1842, the British Army’s Royal Engineers produced precise topo-
graphical maps of Beirut that could be used for military purposes (Davie 
1987). These were not the semi-detached maps of previous decades nor the 
scholarly or worldly sketches of Western travellers, which would have been 
produced from memory, but military maps surveyed by ‘military engineers, 
with state of the art instruments’ (Davie 1987, p. 3).
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Along with many other War Off ice documents of that period, these 
maps can now be viewed at the National Archives in Kew, but in 1841, they 
would have been classif ied military documents, and the convergence of 
technologies and techniques that produced them would not have been widely 
available. ‘Containing all the information required for military operations 
in the area and for policing an occupied town’ (Davie 1987, p. 3), the military 
surveys of the city were instrumental in the 1841 British bombardment that 
ended the reign of Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha in Beirut and facilitated its 
return to the Sultan (Salibi 2003, p. 157; Davie 1987; Chevallier 1971). With 
Beirut in their grip again thanks to the British, the Ottomans would have 
been acutely aware of the power vested in new European technologies and 
techniques of survey, and the danger of the empire’s continued reliance on 
old-world representations.
While Ottoman cartography pre-dates the nineteenth century, geographi-
cal representation and territorial administration had always remained two 
separate things. Unlike the French and British practices of using the army 
to administer colonial provinces, Ottoman imperial administration was 
almost exclusively done by bureaucrats (Çelik 2008). Up until the Tanzimat 
Reforms (1839–1876), the organization of localities was equally bureaucratic: 
long tabled lists rather than cartographic representations documented the 
empire’s territories (Karpat 1985; Hanssen 2005; Çelik 2008). In the 1830s, 
this began to change as European advances in technology, administration, 
and education were carefully studied. This was most keenly observed during 
the reform periods in the nineteenth century: the Tanzimat era (1839–1876) 
and the Hamidian era (1876–1901) (Çelik 2008, pp. 13–14):
Prior to the tanzimat, a place’s demarcations and administrative belonging 
were ranked in pyramid-shaped lists from the capital down to the smallest 
hamlet unit, the nahiye. While Ottoman cartography had a long legacy, 
tanzimat maps of the Ottoman Empire represented a break in technique. 
(Hanssen 2005b, Ft74, p. 41).
The impact of European techniques of government on the Ottomans was 
partly a product of the power of cartographic representation in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries (Çelik 2008, p. 10; Hanssen 2005b, pp. 40–42; 
Fortna 2002, pp. 165–201). Following the post-1789 programme of the French 
state engineered by Armand Mattelart, the organization, classif ication, and 
documentation of imperial space were strategically realigned (Çelik 2008, 
p. 7). Mattelart’s project ‘of mastering space’ centred on maps (Çelik 2008, 
p. 6), which were ‘a projection of a rational system in which everything should 
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communicate’ (Çelik 2008, p. 7). The map as a scientif ic survey of space 
was reimagined as a tool of territorial administration. Zeynip Çelik writes:
In 1790, with the goal of replacing the former provinces of the Old Regime, 
characterized by intersecting administrative districts and judicial and 
religious units, with a unif ied set of administrative units, the French 
National Assembly divided France into eighty-three departments, which 
in turn were divided into districts and communes. Eighty years later, 
the 1871 Ottoman Law on the General Administration of Provinces 
(Idare-yi Umumiye-yi Vilayet Nizamnamesi, based on an 1864 ‘vilayet 
law’, or ‘law of provinces’) established administrative divisions and 
uniform principles of management and reform that would be pursued 
throughout the empire. Modeled after the Code-Napoléon, it reorganised 
the imperial territories into twenty-seven vilayets (provinces), each 
governed by a vali (governer-general) appointed by the capital. (Çelik 
2008, pp. 7–8; emphasis and translations in original)
The Provincial Law (Vilayet Law) of 1864, which led to the 1871 reforms, was 
similarly a uniform, empire-wide administrative reorganization based on 
‘the sum of twenty years of provincial inspection tours, petitions, rule by 
councils and model provinces’ (Hanssen 2005, pp. 39–40). Provincial capitals 
became the centre of administrative power, and their governors were directly 
appointed by the Sultan. The law had a direct impact on Beirut, which lost its 
provincial capital status. The announcement of Damascus as the new capital 
of the vilayet led to an outcry amongst Beirut’s notables, and a petition was 
sent to the Sultan (Hanssen 2005b, pp. 40–41). To justify his reform proposal 
to the imperial government, the mastermind of the initial Vilayet Law of 
1864, Rushdi Pasha, declared that his proposal ‘was based on statistics’ and 
‘on a map of Syria, and on recourse to those with an understanding of true 
information about geography’ (Hanssen 2005b, pp. 40–41).
As the British and French military presence in the region grew, so, too, 
did the Western cultural influence through education and the influence of 
missionary schools (Fortna 2002, pp. 50–60; Hanssen 2005, pp. 149–151; Salibi 
2003, pp. 161–162). By the 1880s, missionary and millet schools1 catered to 
almost the entire Christian and Jewish population of the empire, leaving the 
1 A millet school was an educational institution that was under the authority of its respective 
confessional community, or millet. These institutions came to prominence in the nineteenth 
century as minority communities of the Ottoman Empire had greater means and motivations 
to establish them.
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Ottoman state school system to be perceived as entirely Muslim (Evered 2012; 
Fortna 2002, p. 76). The influence of foreign schools created problems for the 
Ottomans. In addition to the growing European presence, there was concern 
about the ‘dangerous ideas’ discussed behind the walls of these institutions, 
particularly about geography (Fortna 2002). In response to this, and as part of 
the process of state modernization, the Ottomans introduced the Education 
Act of 1869. The state was to create a centralized and compulsory education 
system modelled after the French example (Evered 2012). Many minority 
communities, with long-established and high-quality private schools, found 
themselves in direct conflict with the state.
Education and pedagogy remained central concerns through the following 
decades as the empire struggled to maintain legitimacy and control of its 
territories. Geography remained a key site of contestation: it communicated 
both the power of the state and the challenges to it. In response to the 
Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), a large three-dimensional topographical 
map depicting the empire’s war with Russia was produced to educate the 
public (Fortna 2002, pp. 166–167). The empire’s defeat in that war, and the 
outcomes of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, started chipping away at its outer 
edges. Borders were increasingly politicized as geography became a defining 
principle of group identity among nationalist movements (Anderson 2003). 
Nationalist organizing within the empire’s borders was met with increasing 
repression. The Armenian and Greek population suffered the worst of this 
repression, which culminated in the Hamidian massacres perpetrated by 
Ottoman troops and Kurdish irregulars between 1894 and 1897.
Statistics and the Birth of the Population
In the late nineteenth century, the production of knowledge about the 
empire’s subjects rapidly expanded with the introduction of modern statistics 
that completely overhauled older census methods employed primarily for 
taxation purposes. The development of new methods in the social sciences 
redefined the boundaries between the known and the unknown as the object 
of government shifted from territory to population. Signif icantly weakened 
through a series of military defeats and the rising influence of European 
military power and scientif ic knowledge, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire 
were particularly interested in developments in government administration. 
European resources were widely translated and circulated. They informed 
the numerous Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century aimed at ration-
alization, centralization, bureaucratization, and secularization.
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The Tanzimat Reforms, enacted through a series of statutes following the 
major decrees of 1839 (Edict of Gülhane) and 1856 (Reform Edict on Religious 
Freedom) had attempted, with varying degrees of success, to move towards 
centralization and rationalization (Evered 2012; Karpat 1992). The most 
signif icant reforms of this period were those designed to bolster a single 
national identity by applying the law equally to all citizens regardless of 
religion or ethnicity. The so-called millet system, which had organized people 
into subordinate religious communities with degrees of autonomy, was 
abolished. Ottomanism was to become the unifying identity of the empire. 
An anthem, flag, and state banknotes were introduced. Centralization was 
bolstered with numerous public works, the establishment of bodies such as the 
Ministries for Health and Education, and the foundation of state-run training 
academies and codes of conduct for civil servants and some professions.
When the Tanzimat Reforms came to an end with the appointment of 
Abdulhamid II in 1876, they had not fully realized their objectives. The decla-
ration of equality among Ottoman subjects was greeted with varying degrees 
of enthusiasm, but its application was limited. Neither the declaration of 
equality nor the shift in state education policy (following the Education Act 
of 1869) could fully mitigate the influence of foreign and millet schools or the 
rise of nationalism. After decades of learning separately, and learning to be 
governed separately, the millet system had become entrenched in the social 
psyche of the empire’s subjects. The state’s consignment of its minorities to 
‘benign neglect on the fringes of an imperial Ottoman imaginary’ (Makdisi 
2000, p. 37) was no longer possible.
As cartographic techniques adopted for the organization of territory merged 
with new statistical and demographic methods for the government of popula-
tion, the administration of territory became inseparable from the demographics 
of population. The original Ottoman population counts, prior to the first modern 
government census conducted in 1831, were designed to gather information 
for tax purposes. Census data was gathered only for the male population; the 
government was not interested in collecting data on the female population or 
on the geographical distribution of religious or ethnic groups (Karpat 1985, p. 9).
Under the Tanzimat Reforms, centralization and rationalization placed 
the larger portion of responsibility for population health and the provision 
of education and other services with the imperial government. Manage-
ment replaced organization as the dominant tendency, and social science 
methods were the tools of choice to create the ‘bureaucratic blueprints for 
the restructuring of society’ (Karpat 1992, p. 134).
By 1868, the Ottoman government had established the Off ice of Sta-
tistics. Population bureaus measured birth and death rates in different 
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localities (Karpat 1992, p. 137) as the Provincial Law of 1864 and the later 
1871 reforms charged local provincial administrations with the welfare of 
the population. By 1874, the Off ice of Statistics had expanded to become 
the General Directorate of Statistics, and the central government pondered 
the systemization of data collection and the creation of a new population 
registration system (Karpat 1992, p. 137). Increasingly, in the off icial view of 
the imperial government, statistics were the choice instrument of progress 
(Karpat 1992, p. 138). Conversations between Sultan Abdulhamid II and the 
United States ambassador Samuel Sullivan Cox saw bags full of surveys and 
reviews collected from the American embassy and translated.
The content of the data collected in the later nineteenth century was 
significantly different from what had been captured by earlier state censuses. 
As the reform period wore on, deeply variegated demographic statistics 
were sought to capture the numerical density of non-Muslim populations:
The Porte began to embrace the European concept of functional govern-
ment and service to society. Consequently, it felt the need to reassess its 
human and natural resources. Moreover, the rising national consciousness 
among the Christian groups had manifested itself in the form of a variety 
of demands eg. for the establishment of national churches and schools – as 
well as in claims for independence and territory, often supported by data 
ignoring other groups: hence there arose the necessity of learning the 
exact number of each major Christian ethnic group. These humanist-
functionalist-nationalist considerations were manifest in the census and 
the registration system implemented in 1881/82–1893. This census used 
several ethnic-confessional categories for the Christian population, but all 
the Muslims continued to be counted as one homogenous group, despite 
the ethnic and linguistic differences among them. (Karpat 1985, p. 9)
The concern with organizational matters in the early part of the nineteenth 
century was fast giving way to inescapable administrative dilemmas, as 
the signing of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 saw the establishment of several 
independent principalities within the empire. The independent principalities 
in the Balkans were established following the intervention of the Great 
Powers at the Congress of Berlin that effectively reversed the Russian gains 
of Ottoman territory from 1877. However, the claims of opposing groups to 
territory in the Balkans were not fully resolved. This was particularly the case 
in Macedonia, which had been returned to the Ottomans under the Treaty of 
Berlin (1878). Statistical campaigns by competing groups made strategic use 
of numbers to bolster their claims. The empire was a key proponent of these 
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campaigns, constructing population statistics that showed ‘a clear Muslim 
(i.e. Ottoman) majority in Macedonia’ and that could be used to bolster 
‘governance through demographic discourse’ (Evered 2012, pp. 72–73). In 
the case of Beirut, the loss of the city’s provincial capital status to Damascus 
following the implementation of the Provincial Law of 1865 was attributed 
in no small part to the statistical data about the sectarian composition of 
the region (Hanssen 2005, p. 45).
Although intended as a tool for exerting control, power, and sovereignty, 
population surveys in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire 
also undermined the claims of the central government. Since statistics 
could be used ‘to justify or negate territorial claims and ambitions’ (Evered 
2012, p. 81) by any group, and not just the central government, the science 
of demography was also bitterly contested. By the late nineteenth century, 
the use of population data had become an important component of imperial 
and nationalist claims. The Hamidian massacres of Armenians between 
1894 and 1896, following decades of refusal by the imperial government 
to implement concessions granted to the Armenians under the Treaty of 
Berlin, also followed decades of competing petitions regarding population.
Conclusion
The rise of Ottoman translations of Western knowledge peaked at the same 
time as the expansion and patronage of the social sciences. While the new 
knowledge was intended to augment economic growth and bring social 
prosperity, neither followed. Historian Kemal Karpat, who has written ex-
tensively about Ottoman statistics, attributes this to the ‘misappropriation 
of western scientif ic products’ (Karpat 1992, p. 144). According to Karpat, 
the Ottomans did not fail in the practical application of statistics, but in 
developing a theoretical framework to justify their use – in short, failing 
to see that the organizational methods of the European social sciences 
were not simply tools for the management of society, but ‘actually provided 
scientif ic bases for the political ideologies that challenged the established 
order and called (implicitly) for new social organization’ (Karpat 1992, 
pp. 142–144).
According to Foucault, statistics began to develop in the seventeenth 
century as an apparatus of knowledge:
Etymologically, statistics is knowledge of the state, of the forces and 
resources that characterise a state at a given moment. For example: 
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knowledge of the population, the measure of its quantity, mortality, 
natality; reckoning of the different categories of individuals in a state 
and of their wealth; assessment of the potential wealth in circulation, of 
the balance of trade, and measure of the effects of taxes and duties, all 
this data, and more besides, now constitute the essential content of the 
sovereign’s knowledge. (Foucault 2007, p. 274)
Nevertheless, this knowledge raises diff iculties, including the technical 
issues of administrative size and the logistics of collection. More than 
this, it is the ‘problem of the secret’ and the ‘problem of the public’ that 
mean that this knowledge has to be managed in particular ways so that 
it is not fully in public view, but is public enough to appear to be the data 
on which the sovereign acts (Foucault 2007, pp. 275–277). As disciplinary 
institutions such as the police, prisons, hospitals, and asylums gradually 
replace the power of the sovereign, statistics as an apparatus of knowledge 
also changes in function, becoming at once more purposeful as a technique 
of power and more transparent as a scientif ic method (Foucault 2007; 1975). 
Rather than being directly located within the state, statistical methods 
are localized within institutions that make up the state. While Karpat’s 
conclusion regarding Ottoman oversight about how Western scientif ic 
methods could be used to challenge the state is important, the different 
trajectory in the development of state institutions as conduits of social and 
scientif ic knowledge is also a factor.
The late Ottoman period attests to many complex cultural exchanges 
that continued despite the consolidation of European imperial power in the 
MENA region. European techniques of knowledge production in cartography 
and demography were strategically adopted by the Ottomans and used 
to bolster the empire’s territorial claims against nascent nationalisms. 
The practice of adopting Western technologies to meet the needs of the 
Ottoman state was the norm rather than the exception. Statistics and 
geography became the choice tools of the government in its quest for power, 
economic prosperity, and social stability. In statistics and geography, the 
reforms of the nineteenth century found social science models that could 
be used for the rationalization and centralization of the state. Although 
intended as a tool for exerting control and safeguarding sovereignty, maps 
and population surveys in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman 
Empire also undermined the claims of the central government and led to 
open contestation and confrontation.
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2. Who Maps Middle Eastern Geographies 
in the Digital Age?  Inequalities in Web 
2.0 Cartographies in Israel/Palestine
Christian Bittner and Georg Glasze
Abstract
Cartographic practices have long been the domain of professionalized and 
centralized actors from governmental or commercial spheres. Inspired by 
the emergence of mapping practices in the age of Web 2.0, however, new 
forms of mapping may offer a bottom-up alternative. Indeed, the mapping 
platforms Wikimapia and especially OpenStreetMap have proven that 
geographical information and maps can be generated via crowdsourcing 
by cartographic amateurs. Yet, several studies have excavated powerful 
exclusion mechanisms in such Web 2.0 cartographies, showing that 
user-generated geographical content is often produced by privileged 
demographic groups. This chapter will explore these patterns of exclusion 
and inclusion in OpenStreetMap and Wikimapia in the examples of the 
Gaza Strip and Jerusalem.
Keywords: Cartography, Israel, OpenStreetMap, Palestine, volunteered 
geographical information, Wikimapia
Introduction
The idea of a neutral and objective presentation of geographical features on a 
map has been the underlying and constitutive myth of modern cartography 
from its formation in Renaissance Europe and largely until today. However, 
the writings of the so-called critical cartography approach have challenged 
this myth since the late 1980s. They have shown that all mapping practices 
are embedded in specif ic sociotechnical contexts and thus are always 
Strohmaier, A. and A. Krewani (eds.), Media and Mapping Practices in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Producing Space. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021
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related to questions of social inequalities, politics, and power. The practices 
of modern cartography, critical cartography writing argues, have been 
dominated by governmental and commercial actors and thus shaped by the 
interests of these privileged actors. Against the backdrop of this critique, the 
emergence of new Web 2.0 mapping practices, which enable the collaboration 
of many cartographic amateurs, has been welcomed as a game changer – an 
opening and democratization of cartography.
In Israel and Palestine, the nexus of elitist cartographies and open, 
collaborative mappings is especially controversial, because the manifold 
dimensions of the conflict between two opposing nationalist ideologies 
heavily affect cartographies in Israel/Palestine. This chapter analyses and 
discusses how the dimensions of this conflict are being dealt with in the 
open, collaborative, and international online mapping projects OpenStreet-
Map (OSM) and Wikimapia.1
Modern Cartography and Its Critics
While humans from all parts of the world have made maps since prehistoric 
times (Delano-Smith 1994), the roots of modern cartography lie in Renais-
sance Europe, when maps became constitutive elements of the emerging 
nation states (Branch 2014; Kagan and Schmidt 2007). Deeply entangled 
with political power, maps were not only used for territorial governance, tax 
collection, or demographic monitoring (Black 2008); they also contributed 
to the formation of national identity (Winichakul 1994). Yet the application 
of maps was not limited to the domestic sphere of those emerging European 
powers. To the contrary, maps played an important role for imperialism 
and colonialism, as extremely valuable tools for exploring, conquering, and 
exploiting distant lands and peoples (Stone 1988). As such, cartography has 
also contributed to the ways the West imagines other regions of the world 
(Roberts 1985, pp. 194–202, cited in Hall). One example is the region we know 
today as the ‘Orient’, ‘Arab World’, ‘MENA’, or ‘Middle East’ (Culcasi 2010).
Of course, this region (as far as we want to think of it as such) has not only 
been constructed from the outside, but is also a strong point of reference 
from the inside, for anti-imperialist counter-narratives such as the ‘Arab 
Homeland’, which are likewise accompanied by respective cartographic 
representations (Culcasi 2012). As we will see below, the case of Israel and 
1 The empirical data this chapter is based on reflects the status of 2017.
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Palestine can also be conceived of as such a contested cartographic ‘bat-
tlef ield’ (Leuenberger and Schnell 2010, p. 833), though on a smaller scale.
Thus, it is fair to say that maps have long been entangled with political 
power in many dimensions. Ironically, even today, the most common stance 
towards cartography is that of an unpolitical technology for representing 
geographical features of the Earth’s surface. Maps are widely accepted as 
depicting the world in an objective manner through geometric accuracy and 
scientif ically approved symbologies. Accordingly, a positivist and scientistic 
perspective on maps has been – and largely still is – the predominant para-
digm in cartographic literature since the 1950s, when cartography became 
a technical academic discipline (Robinson 1952; Robinson 1953), guided by 
the theoretical framework of the map communication model (Robinson 
and Petchenik 1976; Morrison 1977).
Since the late 1980s, however, several authors who emphasized questions 
of power, politics and ethics inherent in all maps and map-making practices 
have shaken this positivist understanding of cartography. The historical 
geographer and cartographer Brian Harley was highly influential among 
those critics. In a series of publications, Harley developed a social construc-
tivist perspective on cartography that constitutes a radical departure from 
the cartographic mainstream (Harley 1988a; 1988b; 1989; 1990). Drawing 
on Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, Harley conceptualizes maps as 
rhetorical and power-laden texts (Harley 1989). Power in map production, 
Harley states, is exerted not only externally, through the interests of funding 
governmental or commercial institutions, but also internally, through 
design decisions led by unquestioned assumptions of the cartographer. 
Harley demonstrates how maps are imbued with societal norms, values, 
and hierarchies, by selecting and emphasizing certain (powerful) aspects 
of the social world while omitting and silencing (marginalized) others. 
Thus, maps do not merely represent physical structures of the geographical 
world, but rather reproduce and naturalize specif ic spatio-social orders and 
hence serve the interests of powerful elites. Consequently, Harley calls for 
critical map analyses to unmask the hidden agendas and interests behind 
them – an agenda he terms the ‘deconstruction’ of the map (Harley 1989).
Harley has often been characterized as the starting point of an academic 
movement that was later labelled critical cartography (Crampton and Krygier 
2005; Glasze 2009; Wood 2002). However, critical cartography is more than 
just an academic exercise and can be understood as a combination of both 
theoretical critique and the promotion of alternative mapping practices 
(Crampton and Krygier 2005). Thus, beside interrogating political dimensions 
of maps, critical cartography also pursues at least three general avenues 
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of practical intervention (Bittner and Michel 2014): (1) counter-mapping, 
which aims to map the world from marginalized perspectives (Rundstrom 
2009); (2) map art, which breaks from and experiments with established 
cartographic conventions and rules (Wood 2010, pp. 189–230); and (3) 
participatory mapping, which aspires to open map-making practices for 
all kinds of excluded actors (Bittner and Michel 2018).
Lately, these critical mapping practices have benefitted from technological 
disruptions towards digitized and internet-based forms of cartography. 
Since the 1970s, the craft of map-making has undergone several dramatic 
changes. The emergence of the computer, digitization, and remote sensing 
satellites have enabled the development of GIS and map design software. 
Cartography has become a data-driven practice and classic paper-and-ink 
map production has been largely replaced. Since the early 2000s, the spread 
of Web 2.0 technologies as well as the open-source and open-data movements 
have brought about another alteration of cartographic practices. Professional 
GIS and mapping software, which was only available at a high cost a few 
years ago, can now be downloaded for free under open licences. Mostly 
non-cartographic web developers and software engineers have created new 
mapping technologies, such as web mapping services or data visualization 
libraries. All of this has enabled new ways to create, process, and visualize 
geographical information. Citizens themselves, with the help of crowd-
sourced mapping platforms, are now generating further geographical data, 
which has long been withheld by governmental land surveying offices. While 
all three dimensions of practical critical cartography (counter-mapping, 
map art, and participative cartography) have certainly benef itted from 
these developments, it is probably the domain of participatory mapping 
that has undergone the most radical innovations, thanks to the advent of 
online and user-generated forms of cartography.
User-Generated Cartographies
In recent years, ever more sophisticated online production modes of maps 
and geographical information have reconfigured traditional actor constel-
lations and power distributions in the realm of cartography. Increasingly, 
internet users, instead of governmental bodies or commercial map publish-
ing houses, generate maps and their underlying geographical data via 
crowdsourcing. This development can also be framed by the more general 
shift towards user-generated digital content in the digital sphere. Traditional 
mass media and the early internet of the 1990s were characterized by 
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rather static content that were provided centrally for more or less passive 
recipients. Such a clear distinction between producers and consumers of 
information became increasingly diff icult in the so-called Web 2.0 (O’Reilly 
2005), which is ref lected in neologisms such as ‘prosumer’ (Ritzer and 
Jurgenson 2010, following Toff ler) or ‘produser’ (Budhathoki, Bruce, and 
Nedovic-Budic 2008). Today, ‘consumers’ without much prior knowledge or 
prerequisites generate and modify all kinds of media on innumerable web 
platforms. As a result, the ‘cult of the amateur’ (Keen 2007) put pressure on 
established models of income generation and division of labour in many 
media industries. Examples encompass the blogosphere vis-à-vis profes-
sional journalism, video-sharing platforms vis-à-vis the television industry, 
or Wikipedia vis-à-vis printed encyclopedias. From this angle, the f ield of 
cartography is just another setting of these reconf igurations. A vast and 
growing number of mapping platforms have radically lowered the entry 
barriers to participate in the creation, modif ication, and usage of maps and 
geographical information. Among them are not only commercial enterprises 
such as Google Maps or HERE WeGo, which pursue crowdsourcing strategies 
to lower their expenses for updating and maintaining map data, but also 
initiatives that operate fully on a non-prof it basis, or at least offer their 
products under open licences.
Probably the most successful example of such a non-prof it initiative 
is OpenStreetMap. At f irst glance, OSM appears to be a map, or rather 
an interactive digital map service with functionalities similar to Google 
Maps or Bing Maps. All these online map services have in common that 
every geometric feature on the maps is actually a mere visualization of 
a corresponding object in a geographical database. In the case of OSM, 
this database contains, at the time of writing, more than 440 million lines 
(‘ways’, in OSM terminology) and over four billion point objects (‘nodes’, 
in OSM terminology). However, what makes OSM radically different from 
its commercial competitors is that this mass of data is freely accessible to 
anyone and that an online community of more than 700,000 mappers2 
created it on a voluntary basis. Accordingly, OSM describes itself as ‘a map 
of the world, created by people like you and free to use under an open 
license’ (OpenStreetMap 2017). Founded in London in 2004, OSM’s goal was 
to provide freely available geographical data, which were hardly released 
2 This f igure is actually debatable: 700,000 users have made at least one contribution to the 
OSM database. While the number of assigned user accounts is much higher (over 4 million), 
the number of active long-term contributors is much lower, between approximately 15,000 and 
20,000 (according to statistics from Neis 2016).
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by British (or other national) map agencies at the time. In 2006, the newly 
established OSM Foundation became the project’s legal representation, 
coordination centre, and infrastructure provider. Yet membership is neither 
restricted nor mandatory for an OSM user account, and contributors are 
rather self-organized through a tiered system of local and regional map-
ping communities and with the help of mailing lists, forum threads, and 
documentary wiki pages.
The mapping agenda of OSM follows the ethos of a ground truth, which 
has a twofold meaning. First, it favours mappers operating on the ground: 
local experts who contribute spatial data about places and regions they are 
familiar with. Second, ground truth indicates that things should be mapped 
according to their (physical or political) appearance on-site (Glasze and 
Perkins 2015). This effectively means that OSM reproduces the rationale of 
topographic maps. It strives for a high level of geometric precision and a 
strong correspondence between the map and the physical landscape. The 
data therefore fulf ils high standards of consistency and positional accuracy, 
and an increasing number of geo-services and navigation tools are built 
upon OSM. However, the ground-truth ethos also precludes other possible 
mapping purposes, such as f ictional mapping or political contestations. If a 
feature is disputed, such as an ambiguous place name, then OSM generally 
prefers the name that is either present on signs on the ground or that is 
most commonly used among the local population. Due to this ground-truth 
approach, OSM generally tends to reproduce the status quo, to naturalize 
current orders, and not to subvert them in the spirit of counter-mappings. 
Furthermore, far from being a form of map art, OSM largely follows common 
cartographic conventions for aspects such as map orientation, projection, 
or symbologies. However, even though OSM can hardly be seen as a form 
of counter-mapping or map art, the project has received much sympathy 
from critical cartographers (e.g. Crampton 2009; Dodge and Kitchin 2009). 
This is only comprehensible in the light of its radical participatory approach, 
and OSM stands for nothing less than revolutionized actor constellations 
of map-making practices. It is not only the most participatory mapping 
enterprise that has ever been undertaken; it is also enormously successful. 
At the time of writing, OSM’s map data outstrips the products of commercial 
or governmental providers in levels of detail or richness for many parts of 
the world. Most of the more densely populated regions in Germany, for 
example, contain not only obvious map features such as roads, street names, 
or prominent landmarks but also footpaths, bicycle lanes, and all kinds of 
amenities like shops, playgrounds, benches, waste bins, or postboxes, often 
even with collection times attached.
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Despite the undeniable strength of OSM’s community-based approach 
for building a global map database, the above reference to dense regions in 
Germany also points to pronounced inequalities in OSM, in respect to both 
data coverage and participation patterns, broadly following the structural 
cleavages of a digitally divided world (Wessels 2013). Several studies have 
uncovered socio-demographic biases in the user base of the project (Bud-
hathoki and Haythornthwaite 2012; Steinmann et al. 2013), resembling those 
of other user-generated data platforms by skewing ‘toward a more wealthy, 
more educated, more Western, more white and more male demographic’ 
(Crampton et al. 2013, p. 132). Since many OSM users focus on mapping their 
local surroundings, and since many of them live in privileged urban neigh-
bourhoods of the Global North, there are also strong geographical biases in 
the data. Such regional inequalities of data density have been studied on 
all scales, whether between different city neighbourhoods (Bittner 2017a), 
urban and rural areas (Haklay and Ellul 2010), wealthier and less prosperous 
countries (Quattrone, Mashhadi, and Capra 2014), and different continents 
(Neis and Zipf 2012) or world regions (Neis, Zielstra, and Zipf 2013; Graham, 
Sabbata, and Zook 2015). Thus, in contrast to homogeneous and standardized 
map series that are usually produced by governmental surveys, OSM data 
is characterized by stark contrasts and inequalities. In some regions, the 
seemingly continuous map of OSM obscures the fragmented, patchwork-like 
mosaic of the heterogeneous stories, actors, and data sets it consists of. 
Although OSM is in many respects the largest and most comprehensive 
online mapping project, it is not the only one.
Another prominent platform for generating map data collaboratively is 
Wikimapia. Wikimapia was founded in Moscow in 2006 and has, at the time 
of writing, more than 2.5 million registered user accounts, although, like 
on OSM, only a minority of those belong to active contributors (Wikimapia 
statistics 2017a). Unlike OSM’s ground-truth ethos, Wikimapia is committed 
to the agenda ‘let’s describe the world’, which aims less at accurate geometric 
representations of the material world and more at rich semantic descriptions 
of places. Accordingly, the place is the central object in Wikimapia’s data 
structure, represented by hand-drawn polygons of all sizes, from single houses 
to entire regions. Textual descriptions, category assignments, pictures, or com-
ments can enrich these polygonal places. Thus, Wikimapia is generally more 
about semantics than about geometry. To date, almost 25 million such places 
have been added to Wikimapia, making the platform one of the richest sources 
of spatial descriptions on the web (Wikimapia statistics 2017b). Moreover, 
Wikimapia’s epistemological approach is much more open and adaptable 
to alternative forms of mapping than the ground-truth mantra of OSM. 
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Referring to the three avenues of intervention aspired to by practical critical 
cartographies, we can f ind numerous examples of both counter-mappings 
and map art within Wikimapia (Bittner 2017c). Surprisingly though, unlike 
OSM, Wikimapia has received little academic attention so far, and not much 
is known about the biases, power distributions, or inequalities of the project.
In general, the participatory bottom-up approach of user-generated 
cartographies like OSM or Wikimapia bears enormous potential for local 
empowerment, articulations of marginalized voices, and overcoming power 
imbalances between those who map and those who are being mapped. This 
is particularly relevant in the postcolonial context of the Middle East, and 
especially in the contested region of Israel and Palestine. In the following, we 
will therefore explore to what extent social inequalities in the region of Israel 
and Palestine are reproduced or subverted by collaborative cartographies 
such as OSM and Wikimapia.
Web 2.0 Cartographies in Israel and Palestine
In Israel and Palestine, any cartographic product is deeply intertwined with 
the manifold dimensions of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. 
Although identities and factionalisms are highly complex and inconsistent 
among Israelis as well as among Palestinians, the fact remains that the ter-
ritorial aspirations of the two opposing nationalist ideologies (Zionism and 
Palestinian nationalism) are rather incompatible (Wallach 2011). Long before 
Israel was founded, maps had been utilized to assist the Zionist aspirations 
for a Jewish national state in Palestine. Those maps nurtured a geographical 
imagination of the region as an uninhabited and deserted land, awaiting and 
welcoming the return of the Jewish People (Long 2008; Bar-Gal 2003). After 
the First Arab-Israeli War in 1948–1949 and the founding of the State of Israel, 
the young state invested large sums into a Hebrew map of the country, erasing 
and replacing thousands of Arab toponyms (Azaryahu and Golan 2001). After 
the Second Arab-Israeli War and the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, 
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights in 1967, borders on 
Israeli maps started to be redrawn, incorporating occupied areas into the 
state territory (Bar-Gal 2004; Collins-Kreiner, Mansfeld, and Kliot 2006).
The geography of the region today, especially of the Palestinian ter-
ritories, is highly fragmented and marked by numerous processes of border 
drawing, disengagement, and segregation. In this setting, political facets of 
map-making become more than obvious. Which borders are delineated? 
Which places are depicted; which are omitted? In what language are they 
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labelled? Which font styles are used? Aspects of map design that seem to 
be rather aesthetic questions in many parts of the world turn out to be 
strong political statements in Israel/Palestine. Unsurprisingly, maps are 
repeatedly scandalized and at the centre of heated public disputes, such 
as over the recent labelling of Palestine on Google Maps (Dewey 2016) or 
about the usage of misleading historical maps by the US television network 
MSNBC (Wootliff 2015).
How, then, are these conflictive dimensions dealt with in open, international 
mapping projects such as OSM and Wikimapia? Do Palestinian and Israeli 
mappers combat for authority in ‘edit wars’ such as happened on Wikipedia 
(Rettig Gur 2010)? Alternatively, does the integrative approach of collaborative 
mapping platforms bear a chance for Israelis and Palestinians to cooperate 
in a joint mapping effort? In the following, these questions will be discussed 
with the help of two exemplary case studies of the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem.
OSM in the Gaza Strip
As described above, OSM prefers data to be contributed by local communities; 
for example, by people on-site who are familiar with the area and its specific 
local context. While this model has been successful in large parts of the 
Global North, including Israel, Palestine can be considered an example of the 
opposite: to date, no local OSM community has emerged, and contributions 
to the map have mostly been the result of three external interventions. The 
f irst occurred during the First Gaza War between the Israeli army and the 
Palestinian group Hamas in 2008–2009. During the f ighting, international 
aid organizations demanded accurate geographical information on the Gaza 
Strip in order to coordinate their relief efforts, because such data simply 
was not available at the time. Thereupon, a campaign was initiated among 
international OSM members to map the Gaza Strip remotely from satellite 
imagery, providing timely geodata to the humanitarian sector. While the 
OSM map of the Gaza Strip had been almost empty before the war, most of 
the larger roads were added to the map after this initiative was f inished in 
March 2009. Secondly, in September 2009 the map of the Gaza Strip underwent 
another sudden leap when the US NGO JumpStart International generated an 
open-licence geodata set of the Palestinian territories. They had hired local 
employees (mostly students from Palestinian universities) who recorded GPS 
data from field surveys in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This data was 
then cleared and processed by staff members and subsequently donated to 
OSM as one bulky data import. While this data donation literally brought 
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the previously orphaned West Bank onto the OSM map overnight, it also 
entailed signif icant improvements to the Gaza Strip map. After this data 
import, however, there was not much activity on OSM in the Palestinian ter-
ritories. On the West Bank, most activity occurred in the Jewish settlements, 
which were edited by Israeli mappers. In the Gaza Strip, there was hardly any 
activity on the map for years, until the third external mapping intervention 
took place in the summer of 2014 during the Second Gaza War. In the course 
of ongoing air strikes by the Israeli military, the aid organizations Global 
Shelter Cluster Committee and Terre des Hommes Lausanne kick-started 
an OSM campaign to map all the buildings of the Gaza Strip to generate a 
database for damage assessment and rebuilding efforts. A great number of 
international mappers (predominantly from Europe and North America) 
participated in this initiative, and in terms of data quantity, this third mapping 
intervention was by far the largest one. As a result, the Gaza Strip is one of the 
most densely mapped places on OSM in the whole Middle East. However, in 
contrast to the general policy of OSM, this is not the outcome of a long-term 
effort by an eager local OSM community. Instead of local empowerment and 
cartographic emancipation, the OSM map of the Gaza Strip tells a story of 
development aid and humanitarian relief activities. It is bitterly ironic that 
the OSM map representation of Gaza seems to become more nuanced and 
sophisticated with every round of violence and devastation on the ground. 
In some respects, we can also think of OSM in Palestine as a continuation 
of postcolonial cartographic traditions, not only because the OSM standard 
map is, aesthetically, a Western representation, following the principles of the 
topographic map but also because the map, as we have seen, is largely created 
from a distance and mostly by Western contributors, with the help of the 
‘view from nowhere’ of satellite imagery (Dodge and Perkins 2009). OSM in 
the Gaza Strip then, has not subverted the postcolonial relationship between 
those who map and those who are being mapped; rather, it has reproduced it.
OSM Jerusalem
The city of Jerusalem is a focal point of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. After 
the First Arab-Israeli War in 1948–1949, the city was divided into a Western, 
Israeli part and an Eastern, Jordanian part. In the Second Arab-Israeli War of 
1967, the Israeli army conquered and occupied East Jerusalem as well as the 
West Bank (then in Jordan). In 1980, Israel declared the reunited city as its 
capital. After 1967, highly disputed Jewish Israeli neighbourhoods were built 
in the Eastern part of Jerusalem. Today, the city is highly segregated between 
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Jewish and Arab neighbourhoods, and the authorities in many respsects – for 
example, building permits, public services, or infrastructure development 
(Wari 2011) – generally favour Jewish communities. Thus, the ethno-religious 
segregation lines of the city largely mirror socio-economic stratifications as well.
This fragmentation is also discernable in OSM. Browsing the OSM map 
view, Arab neighbourhoods – with many details missing, such as footpaths, 
house numbers, amenities, or road names – appear emptier than Jew-
ish districts. Such map data inequalities between different districts can 
also be analysed more systematically: Figure 2.1 presents a map showing 
the statistical districts of Jerusalem, colour-coded with the predominate 
population group in blue (Jewish Israeli), and the minority group in green 
(Arab Palestinian) districts. The Arab Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem 
account for about one-third of the city’s population (Jerusalem Institute for 
Policy Research 2015). The cartogram distortion by population numbers 
(Figure 2.2) gives an impression of the spatial distribution of both groups. In 
OSM data, however, Arab neighbourhoods are strongly underrepresented in 
terms of data density (Figure 2.3).3 Why is that the case? Is it coincidence? A 
consequence of discrimination among mappers? Of unequal access barriers? 
Of disinterest among Palestinians? The mere map or the database behind it 
does not provide answers when it comes to these contextual questions. In 
2013, one of the authors conducted a series of f ield interviews with sixteen of 
the 40 most active OSM mappers in the region of Israel and Palestine. These 
interviewees were all Jewish Israeli citizens, and there was no indication 
of signif icant mapping activity by Palestinians on OSM. As stated above, 
OSM prefers contributors to map the areas they are most familiar with. 
Since Palestinians are absent from OSM, their neighbourhoods often lack 
representatives who feel entitled or competent to contribute to the map. 
The actual reasons for the absence of Palestinians from OSM, however, 
remain somewhat unclear. There was no evidence for acts of exclusion 
or repulsion of Palestinian mappers from within the OSM community. 
To the contrary, Israeli OSM users repeatedly welcomed the idea of joint 
cross-border mapping efforts, and they assisted the bulk import of data for 
the Palestinian territories to OSM that was donated by the NGO JumpStart 
International in 2009. One delegate of this NGO, who was also a highly 
active OSM mapper, even made some effort to kick-start a local Palestinian 
community, but without much success.
3 The presented cartogram of OSM data in Jerusalem is based on data from 2015. Since then, 
many buildings have been added in the Arab parts of the city, which would relativize the 
differences between Arab and Jewish neighbourhoods to some extent.
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From a socio-economic perspective that is sensitive to the manifold 
manifestations of digital divides, it is tempting to interpret the f inding of 
contributing Israelis and absent Palestinians as a result of unequal access 
barriers to the digital sphere. While we acknowledge the explanatory power 
Figure 2.1: Statistical Areas of Jerusalem.
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of this approach to some extent, socio-economic status is probably not 
a predetermining factor here. In addition, even despite the principally 
inviting atmosphere of OSM for Palestinians, there might be plausible 
reasons for them not to join the project. As one of the authors has argued 
Figure 2.2: Statistical Areas of Jerusalem, population cartogram.
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elsewhere (Bittner 2017b), the conservative approach of OSM to stick to ‘facts 
on the ground’ produces exactly the kind of map that is hard to accept (and 
unlikely to be promoted) from a Palestinian point of view. The resulting 
map uncritically represents highly debated features such as refugee camps, 
the Israeli separation barrier, and Jewish settlements in the West Bank, 
Figure 2.3: Statistical Areas of Jerusalem, cartogram of openStreetMap content.
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while omitting Arab localities that were destroyed and abandoned in the 
course of the war of 1948–1949. Thus, we should keep in mind that the 
epistemological stance of a certain mapping project itself could predetermine 
who is likely to contribute. In the case of OSM, the epistemology of sticking 
to the facts on the ground reproduces spatial orders and leaves the power 
Figure 2.4: Statistical Areas of Jerusalem, cartogram of wikimapia content.
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relations behind them unquestioned, while at the same time marginalizing 
contestations and counter-hegemonic articulations. In this light, it is not 
such a surprise that Palestinians are absent from OSM. From a Palestinian 
point of view, the factual situation itself may be perceived as wrong and 
so every map that sticks to these facts is itself a wrong map, or at least not 
one that should be supported.
OSM and Wikimapia in Israel/Palestine
If OSM’s agenda works in fact as an exclusionary mechanism that keeps 
Palestinians from OSM, other mapping approaches should lead to different 
data distributions. Indeed, if we turn to Wikimapia, a different picture 
emerges. The Wikimapia map of Jerusalem seems to be largely an Arabic 
or Palestinian project. In contrast to OSM, data density is generally higher 
in Arab Palestinian than in Jewish Israeli neighbourhoods (Figure 2.4). 
This impression is also underpinned by the ratios of Hebrew and Arabic 
languages in the data: while OSM in Jerusalem contains much more textual 
information in Hebrew script than in Arabic, the opposite holds true for 
Wikimapia (Bittner 2017a).
Examining such spatial inequalities on a more general level, the f inding 
that OSM is more of a Israeli project and Wikimapia more of a Palestinian 
one is reaff irmed by the data distributions on a regional scale (Figures 2.5 
and 2.5a). On OSM, Israel is generally mapped in higher detail than Palestine 
(if we leave aside the sparsely populated desert covering the south of Israel 
and the special case of the Gaza Strip, which has been discussed above) 
(Figure 2a). Although Wikimapia contains much less data in general than 
OSM, the spatial distribution of these data obviously follows different 
patterns. On Wikimapia, the Palestinian territories have been edited in 
more detail than the area of Israel (Figure 2.6 and 2.6a).
As illustrated above, Wikimapia privileges a qualitative approach to 
representing the geographical world by describing places. If we browse 
along the Wikimapia map in Palestinian cities such as Nablus or Hebron, 
we notice a vast number of polygons, often with rather sloppy geometries, 
representing single houses whose owners are named in the descriptions. 
While this kind of personal information is very common in the Palestine 
map on Wikimapia, it can hardly be found in Israel. Furthermore, there are 
traces of edit wars on some disputed features on Wikimapia. Har Homa, 
for example, a Jewish Israeli neighbourhood in East Jerusalem that might 
be considered an illegal settlement from a Palestinian point of view, has 
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Figure 2.5: Spatial distribution of oSM content in israel/Palestine.
Figure 2.5a: legend.
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Figure 2.6: Spatial distribution of wikimapia content in israel/Palestine.
Figure 2.6a: legend.
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often been altered back and forth, bouncing between pro-Palestinian and 
pro-Israeli descriptions. In contrast to Wikimapia, OSM’s data structure 
is not built for rich semantic descriptions of places, and the community 
generally rejects personal information such as names of residents on the 
map. This illustrates how Wikimapia and OSM enable very different forms 
of mapping practices, and each arguably meets the demands of different 
social groups.
Conclusion
Modern cartography has been a tool to exert and manifest political power, 
which is particularly virulent in a postcolonial regional context such as the 
Middle East. Recently, however, classic power structures in cartography 
have been shaken by the advent of collaborative Web 2.0 mapping platforms 
such as OSM and Wikimapia. Instead of governmental surveys or big com-
mercial publishing houses, online communities of enthusiastic volunteers, 
people without formal cartographic expertise devoting their leisure time 
to contribute geographical data, produce these maps. In the era of Web 
2.0, similar reconf igurations of actor constellations for other media and 
their societal implications have often been discussed, especially during 
the Arab Spring, when questionable terms such as ‘Twitter Revolution’ or 
‘Facebook Revolution’ were frequent in public debates. Notwithstanding 
the actual impact of social media for those uprisings and the remaining 
question as to the Arab Spring’s outcome, shifting access barriers to the 
production and dissemination of information seems to bear the potential 
to subvert established power (im)balances. In the case of cartography, the 
opening of cartographic tools and practices resonates with interventions of 
critical cartographers, who have questioned the elitism and conservatism 
of traditional cartography for a long time. The promise of the so-called 
democratization of cartography comprises a fostering of local empower-
ment and emancipation, giving a (cartographic) voice to marginalized and 
exploited groups and actors, and subverting the power imbalances between 
those who map and those who are mapped. In this chapter, we have reviewed 
some of these promises in the examples of the mapping platforms OSM 
and Wikimapia within the regional context of Israel and Palestine. Since 
the question of territory is a crucial point of contention between Zionism 
and Palestinian nationalism, maps in this context are highly politicized by 
nature and have often been employed as tools to rhetorically delegitimize, 
silence, or annex the other side. In this context, and in face of the current 
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power balance between Israel and Palestine, we might expect the Web 2.0 
mapping platforms to be a key vehicle for Palestinian spatial narratives.
Yet, as the case studies of OSM in the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem suggest, the 
mere possibility to take part in cartographic practices does not automatically 
cause Palestinians to do so. To the contrary, OSM in the region is largely 
driven by an Israeli mapping community, and the map of the Palestinian 
territories is mostly the result of external initiatives by the international 
development and relief sector. Thus, OSM in Palestine does not stand for 
local empowerment or the emancipation of marginalized groups, even 
though the Gaza Strip has become one of the most detailed sections of the 
Middle Eastern OSM map. Rather, we could think of it as a continuation of 
postcolonial mapping traditions, as spatial knowledge generated by Western 
actors and for a Western audience.
As we learned from OSM in the highly segregated city of Jerusalem, the 
absence of Palestinians from OSM can lead to strong distortions of map 
content along socio-spatial cleavage lines. Palestinian neighbourhoods of 
Jerusalem contain significantly less data than Jewish ones, which is why the 
map presents much more of an Israeli city of Jerusalem than a Palestinian one.
At f irst sight, these results correspond with general discussions of the 
digital divide, which marks the gap between those who can participate 
in digital media and those who remain behind manifold access barriers 
along socio-economic fault lines. Israelis, notwithstanding f ierce domestic 
social inequalities, certainly enjoy in sum more socio-economic privileges 
than Palestinians do and it is surely no coincidence that the Israel OSM 
community consists predominantly of young, educated males of Jewish 
descent (Bittner 2017b).
However, as the counterexample of Wikimapia illustrates, socio-economic 
structures are by no means a determining factor for participation patterns 
in online mapping platforms. On Wikimapia, Palestinian areas are generally 
mapped in higher detail than Israeli ones, both at the local scale of Jerusalem 
as well as on the regional level of Israel and the Palestinian territories. This 
distribution not only subverts general socio-economic structures, it even 
reverses them.
Addressing the reasons for the differences between Wikimapia and 
OSM, we suggest considering the epistemological stances of both map plat-
forms. While OSM pursues an agenda of creating a geometrically accurate 
representation of the world according to facts on the ground, Wikimapia 
rather seeks to collect semantic descriptions of places. We argue that OSM’s 
approach inherently tends to reproduce spatial orders and leaves the power 
imbalances that underly these orders unquestioned, which results in a map 
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that is hard to accept and probably unworthy of support from a Palestinian 
point of view. Wikimapia’s agenda, however, is generally more open for 
confrontational, playful, or even artistic forms of mapping.
In conclusion, we may aff irm that collaborative online mapping is cer-
tainly challenging established ideas, power (im)balances, and production 
chains in the domain of conventional cartography. Without question, this 
development bears great potential to overcome postcolonial cartographic tra-
ditions and to empower marginalized voices. Yet the digital sphere is neither 
a power vacuum bare of hierarchies and gatekeepers, nor is it detached from 
socio-economic inequalities of the world. Depending on the local context, 
these intervening variables can distort patterns of exclusion and inclusion 
signif icantly. Moreover, we have to acknowledge that mapping is not a 
uniform practice and accordingly that a map can take very different forms 
of spatial media. We have seen that OSM’s focus on geometric accuracy is 
fundamentally different from Wikimapia’s aim for semantic richness. Hence, 
we should also keep in mind that each form of cartographic practice would 
receive approval or consent from different individuals and social groups.
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3. Taking the Battle to Cyberspace : 
Delineating Borders and Mapping 
Identities in Western Sahara
Frederik von Reumont
Abstract
Examining the case of Western Sahara, this chapter takes a closer look 
at the connection between identity, territory, and borders, as well as 
their construction in mapping processes. Analysing different web maps, 
I will show their rootedness in the dominant political world views and 
contrast them with the perspectives of the parties of conflict (Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic and Morocco). The results show signif icant 
differences between proprietary and crowdsourced web maps as well as 
the cartographic representations authored by the factions. The delineation 
of borders is directly linked to territorial identity and nation-building. 
This demonstrates the important role of web maps and other digitally 
disseminated maps in the def inition of identity and (self)-governance.
Keywords: Cartography, Western Sahara, Google, Wikimapia
Introduction
From a historical perspective, I consider maps as tools for institutions 
to sustain and demonstrate power over a territory (Harley 1989). Culcasi 
states that ‘elite classes (whether they were ministers, monarchs or the 
state) have traditionally controlled the production and distribution of 
maps’ (Culcasi 2012, p. 1104). The arrival of new technologies, however, 
made the map-making process and, at the same time, the distribution of 
maps, available to a much wider audience. This made possible a certain 
culture of counter-mapping, taking advantage of these new technologies 
Strohmaier, A. and A. Krewani (eds.), Media and Mapping Practices in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Producing Space. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021
doi 10.5117/9789462989092_ch03
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and making the mapping processes available to the subaltern or oppressed 
groups and individuals. Following Culcasi, any form of mapping that goes 
against the norm of an established mapped perspective can be considered 
counter-mapping in a ‘broader or more subtle’ sense (Culcasi 2012, p. 1105). 
One of the key technologies in counter-mapping has been the use of the 
internet. However, the internet has also been one of the key technologies 
to spread the view of the powerful. Wood called Google Maps ‘a faithful 
servant of the state, if ever there was one’ (Wood 2010, p. 38). The battle about 
name places such as the Persian versus Arabian Gulf has led to popular 
internet hoaxes (Wikipedia 2019). Although there is a comical component 
involved, the goal is obviously to maintain sovereignty of interpretation. 
The internet offers a wide variety of maps and thus constructs of the world. 
This is especially visible in disputed areas of conflicts in the context of the 
nation state.
In the following, I argue that this battle is not only about the maps 
themselves, but that the maps are used to shape reality by using the strong 
connection between the map and what it represents: the territory. In the 
case of Western Sahara, I will show how maps mirror current differing world 
views and how they are used as a means to construe and thus construct 
reality.
The Role of Maps in Forming National Identities
The vast majority of map users seem to assume that maps are truthful 
representations of the Earth’s surface. This results in the perception of 
a strong link between the map and the reality it represents. Anderson 
shows how mappings change the imagination of the territory. Their 
inf luence can be far-reaching to the point that they shape the language 
used to talk about territory. Maps can shape the linguistic expression of 
these new imaginations by coining a different vocabulary. As a powerful 
incarnation of the ‘map as a logo’ (Anderson 1983, p. 175), maps can also 
shape the imagination of the nation state. The map as a logo is ubiquitously 
disseminated and can ‘form a powerful emblem of […] nationalism’ (An-
derson 1983, p. 175). Anderson directly links the case of a brutal territorial 
struggle (in this case, Indonesia) to the depiction of the corresponding 
logo map def ining the imagination of the territory of the nation state 
(Anderson 1983, footnote). The often quoted ‘power of maps’ (e.g. Wood 
1992) then resides in the ability to impose non-material concepts – such 
as borders delineating an independent nation state – to a tangible thing 
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belonging to a material reality, namely terrains or territories. The power 
of maps results from their strong connection to the real world. In the 
map, we can equip a piece of land with an idea. Conversely, we can apply 
an idea or idealist world view directly to a representation of the real. 
The power of maps is to convince their users that this is there, and thus 
maps ‘aff irm the existence of the things on them’ (Wood 2010, p. 34). 
Despite the efforts of critical and post-representational cartography to 
deconstruct the map and question its relation to reality, this does not 
seem to have great impact outside academia. Maps are still largely seen 
as representations of reality. In this sense, map readers take borders that 
are inscribed in the map’s visuals as realities, even when they are not 
visible in the f ield (in reality) or are weakly enforced, by a lack of fences 
or guards, for example. Then the map is all the more important, since 
it is the only proof or documentation of a status of reality that should 
only ideally be attained but does not exist (yet). The map is, at the same 
time, documentation and expression of an unreal ideal. In this sense, it 
is a document of utopia.
The role of borders in a map is to define a group of persons by the means 
of terrain. Maps group individuals by the territory they occupy, more or 
less arbitrarily, and those groups’ occupation of the territory is naturalized 
and de-historicized. Ultimately, the nation state embodies its belonging to 
the territory. The role that maps oftentimes assume in this situation is to 
stabilize this unstable idea, ‘to give the elusive idea of the state concrete 
form’ (Wood 2010, p. 31). Maps give states the appearance of ‘facts of nature, 
as real enduring things, things like mountains’ (Wood 2010, p. 33). The 
coherence of the power exerted by states over a certain territory would 
be ‘very hard to imagine without the intercession of the map’ (Wood 2010, 
p. 34). Using these mechanisms, the map ‘turned the f iction […] into a fact’ 
(Wood 2010, p. 34). This capacity of maps, along with the suppression of 
alternative perspectives, ‘substantively underwrites the reproduction of 
the social relations of power’ (Wood 2010, p. 35). Referring to Winichakul 
and Anderson, Wood argues that, early on, state leaders saw the merit 
of the map as something that turns the idea of the state into a geo-body, 
a mappable and thus real thing that can – e.g. as a logo – be used to pin 
identity to territory. This was the case in early American portraits; maps of 
America in the background of these portraits identify the sitter as American. 
By ‘assuming […] the prior existence’ (Wood 2010, p. 32) of the relationship 
between people and territory (e.g. the geo-body), the state obscures its 
origins in history and thus naturalizes itself as something ahistorical and 
almost mythical. Once established, however, the connection of the people 
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with the land they live on is not only folkloric in the sense of a mythical 
connection between person and land. It has real effects on the livelihoods 
of individuals and peoples as soon as a governing law is executed by a ruling 
power. In the era of the nation state, law is tied to territory. Thus, just a 
step over the border, whether imagined or not, can, in extreme cases, be 
a matter of life and death. This seems to be felt throughout communities 
that consider themselves deprived of the right to self-determination or 
self-governance.
Self-governance in the UN sense means the formation of or the voluntary 
integration into an independent nation state with a sovereign government. 
The United Nations has considered Western Sahara a non-self-governing 
territory since 1963. No administering power has been named for this 
territory since Spain ended its presence there (United Nations 2019). The 
United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (United Nations Mis-
sion for the Referendum in Western Sahara, MINURSO) with the goal of 
monitoring the ceasef ire between the conflicting parties and carrying out 
a referendum concerning self-governance. One main issue on which the 
parties disagree is the identif ication of eligible voters. Persons from three 
groups have been identif ied, including persons living outside Western 
Sahara as refugees (MINURSO 2019). For the factions themselves the 
situation is much clearer.
Morocco apparently considers Western Sahara territory as the ‘southern 
provinces of the Kingdom of Morocco’ (Corell 2015, p. 1). Although Morocco 
participates in UN peace talks, it has repeatedly displayed diff iculties 
agreeing to certain proposals. Although there is no off icial statement 
on the website of the Moroccan government, a featured map speaks an 
uncompromising language as to the ownership of the territory. The Moroc-
can government established a Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs 
(CORCAS), and its websites leave no doubt that Morocco claims the territory 
of Western Sahara as part of the kingdom.
The proclamation of the government of the Saharawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (SADR), by contrast, claims ‘the land of Saguiat el-Hamra and Rio 
de Oro’ for the people of Western Sahara, already relating to the topography 
of the territory, namely the major rivers. It states that the Polisario Front, 
responsible for ‘raising the flag of liberation’, is carrying out the will of the 
Saharawi people to ‘self-determination’ (Lahlou 1976), while Morocco is 
accused of ‘illegally and forcefully’ occupying Western Sahara (Bashir 2017). 
Morocco is further accused of trying to outnumber the Saharawi population 
on its own territory by the means of ‘over 120,000 settlers who are the eyes 
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and ears of the oppressor’ (Bachir 2017). The means of conveying the faction’s 
respective messages are often maps.
Analysing Internet Mappings
In the following, I will analyse mappings presented on the websites of the 
three main stakeholders in the conflict of Western Sahara: the United 
Nations, Morocco, and the Polisario Front/the government of SADR. I will 
also consider mappings of the most popular internet platforms globally – 
Google Maps, Yandex, as well as the OpenStreetMap and Wikipedia – as 
representatives of open, crowdsourced platforms.
United Nations
The United Nations has a single map version it refers to when discussing 
Western Sahara (Figure 3.1). This map is placed on the website of the 
peacekeeping mission (MINURSO). The map accentuates the territory 
of Western Sahara in a light yellow colour, while the rest of the land 
masses are coloured in a darker brownish tone. An outline marking its 
borders with neighbouring states in dots and dashes further def ines the 
territory. Morocco is depicted in the same brownish colour as the rest of 
the world outside Western Sahara, and the boundary between the two 
is the same as that between independent states. The territory is labelled 
‘Western Sahara’ with capital and lower-case letters, while the names of 
the neighbouring states are written out in all capital letters. Besides roads 
(paved and unpaved), cities, rivers, wadis, and the locations of MINURSO 
activity, the map also displays the berm. The berm is a heavily mined 
strip in Western Sahara stretching over the entire length of the territory 
from south to north, into Morocco. It separates the Moroccan-controlled 
part of the territory from the scarcely inhabited part that is controlled 
by the Polisario Front. The map also indicates f ive locations where the 
berm is permeable. According to this map, another f ive roads cross the 
berm where it is impenetrable. The symbol representing the berm is a 
thick, solid orange line that is only interrupted where the passing points 
are located.
The rather muted colours of the map and its reduced artistic design 
suggest a matter-of-fact attitude towards the disputed political situation. 
The colour scheme, use of symbols, and lettering are all typical of the 
corporate design of UN maps. However, the demarcation of the territory 
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of Western Sahara makes clear that it is not considered part of Morocco. 
The lettering of the territory’s label using lower case letters indicates the 
lack of clarity in the current situation. In addition, the distinct demarcation 
stressing the existence of the berm may be interpreted as a controversial 
political statement. A statement added to the map relativizes these political 
assertions: ‘The boundaries and names shown and the designations used 
on this map do not imply off icial endorsement or acceptance by the United 
Figure 3.1: the MiNurSo map representing the uN perspective on the conflict.
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Nations’. (Figure 3.1). The statement is italicized but uses the smallest font 
size on the map.
Morocco
The off icial website of the Moroccan government provides a kind of 
blueprint map for matters concerning Western Sahara (Figure 3.2). This 
is a map displaying the Moroccan territory, including Western Sahara in 
a brownish-beige colour with a solid white border, making it stand out 
against neighbouring states. The map shows no inland border. It features 
no additional information as to the topography or administrational units. 
The only label we can f ind within the territory designates the capital 
Rabat with a label and a point symbol using the colours and the star of 
the national f lag.
This map suggests Morocco, including Western Sahara, is a homogenous 
monolithic whole without any possible f issures. All the maps on the different 
websites of the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) use 
this blueprint and f ill it with different information on Western Sahara such 
Figure 3.2: the main map of the official site of the Moroccan government. Source: Map of Morocco.
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as geology, climate, infrastructure, and so forth. The maps always show the 
established whole, even though the topic is Western Sahara. Western Sahara 
is always visualized in the context of the undisputed territory of Morocco, 
even when the map does not display any data for this part of the country 
(Figure 3.3). The website also features a map using this blueprint, which 
is supposed to show the situation before the establishment of the Spanish 
‘protectorate’ or ‘before colonization’ (Figure 3.4), apparently attempting 
to establish the geo-body. The map is also used as a ‘map as a logo’ for the 
website’s favicon, displayed in the browser tabs that contain the title of 
the website.
CORCAS also features a detailed road map of Morocco including 
Western Sahara (Figure 3.5). Interestingly for a road map, the berm is 
not shown. The road layout differs considerably in some parts from the 
Figure 3.3: Moroccan maps always show western Sahara including Morocco’s undisputed territory. 
Source: Sahara Portal.
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situation shown in the UN map. Some roads that cross the berm in areas 
that the UN map marks as impenetrable are left out (Agwanit–Zbayra and 
Agwanit–Agailas), while others are left in (Zug–Tichla, Agwanit–Guelta 
Zemmur, Mahbas–Tindouf).
The undisrupted road network impressively shows the coherence between 
the territories, merging them into one. This tight network, tying together 
the two regions, ends abruptly at the national borders to Mauritania, whose 
existing roads are coloured in yellow, which is not in use for the Moroccan 
roads, rendering them almost invisible against the brownish background 
marking Mauritania. The lack of connections between Morocco and 
surrounding countries, and the use of a very different colour scheme for 
the roads within and outside of the Moroccan claimed territory, visually 
Figure 3.4: Even if the map’s data focusses on western Sahara only, Morocco’s undisputed territory 
is always part of the map. Source: Sahara Portal.
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emphasize the unity of Western Sahara and Morocco and their communal 
border to the neighbouring states.
Another interesting map on the CORCAS website is an interactive web 
map using Google Earth satellite imagery; this map displays important 
cities in Morocco and in Western Sahara using Morocco’s national f lag as 
icons (Figure 3.6). Also on display in this map are the Western Saharan 
refugee camps and the government-in-exile site in Tindouf (Algeria) 
marked with illegible icons and the Algerian f lag, respectively. One of 
the photos shows an armed, dark-skinned f ighter in a desert landscape, 
and another shows light-skinned men behind a fence, apparently im-
prisoned. In the map, all the borders of Morocco and Western Sahara 
are omitted completely; only the ones between Mauritania and Algeria 
are designated.
The photos of warriors and prisoners in the Tindouf camps are the only 
photos in a map whose topic is supposedly the cities of Western Sahara. This 
is especially striking since the cities themselves are not endowed with any 
Figure 3.5: road map of Morocco from the corcAS website. Source: Sahara Portal.
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illustrations at all. Therefore, besides stressing the union of the territories of 
Western Sahara and Morocco, this map also seems to contain an accusation 
against Algeria, an ally of the Polisario Front. The pictures of warriors and 
prisoners can be interpreted as an allusion to Moroccan prisoners of war in 
the Tindouf camps (Usher 2003). The close proximity of the pictures to the 
Algerian flag in the map places the responsibility for these irregularities 
on Algeria in a quite literal sense.
The Polisario Front
The maps featured on websites related to the Polisario Front or SADR usually 
also speak unequivocally.
The off icial site of the Ethiopian mission to the Western Saharan govern-
ment, in its section about the geography of the territory, uses the UN map 
described above. It is an exact copy of the map, though in a comparatively 
low resolution. This makes some parts, especially the smaller font sizes, 
Figure 3.6: the map from the opening page of the corcAS. Source: Sahara Portal.
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illegible. The use of the UN map underlines the objectivity of the state-
ment the map makes, the source of the map justifying its internationally 
accepted correctness. The small size conveniently renders the relativizing 
statement illegible. A second map on the same site makes the statement of 
an independent Western Sahara even clearer (Figure 3.7). In it, the territory 
appears in a bright yellow, the only distinguishable shape in the map besides 
the continental outlines. All other countries are marked only by their names 
as labels; no further borders are displayed.
The maps on the website also tend to show the hostile role of Morocco, not 
only towards Western Sahara. In the history section of the website, a map can 
be found that shows the member states of the African Union (AU) in green 
(Figure 3.8). Non-members are presented in grey, which is only Morocco, isolat-
ing it from the rest of Africa, conveniently ignoring the fact that Morocco joined 
the AU in January 2017. The colonial ambitions of the ‘oppressor’ Morocco 
are documented with the help of a map showing ‘Great Morocco’ (Lakhal 
2016) as encompassing not only Western Sahara but also Mauritania as well 
as parts of Mali and Algeria (Figure 3.9). In this map, Morocco is presented 
in a light colour, making it stand out against the other African countries, 
Figure 3.7: A map from the geography section of the Ethiopean mission.
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Figure 3.8: Morocco as an outsider on the African continent. Source: Saharawi Mission.
Figure 3.9: Morocco as an outright threat to other African nations claiming territory of several 
countries. Source: Saharawi Mission.
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including Western Sahara, which are coloured in a darker tone, emphasizing 
their belonging together. The borderline of ‘Great Morocco’ is symbolized in 
a heavy, light red dashed line, interpretable as a symbol of danger.
The website also makes use of the ‘map as a logo’ in its header. This is a 
flash animation showing a small-scale map with Western Sahara at its centre. 
The territory in the map radiates an animated green ray of light similar to 
a lighthouse or a ship’s radar screen. The animation and contrasting colour 
scheme immediately draw the eye to Western Sahara, courageously holding 
its ground in the face of danger.
The website of the Saharan Delegation in Spain (Delegación Saharaui 
para España) features, along with the MINURSO map, an animated map 
showing the history of Morocco’s construction of different berms in six stages 
throughout the 1980s. The animation illustrates the gradually diminishing 
influence of the Polisario Front over the territory of Western Sahara, as it 
is literally pushed aside by Moroccan forces. This gives the impression of a 
very aggressive strategy enforced by the Moroccan military.
The importance of the role of maps in the context of defining a territorial 
identity is, however, underlined not necessarily in the use of maps but in the 
attacking of maps that show the opponent’s perspective. Western Sahara 
Resource Watch (WSRW) is, according to its own definition, ‘an international 
network of organizations and activists researching and campaigning the 
companies working for Moroccan interests in occupied Western Sahara’ 
(WSRW 2007a). Numerous articles can be found here that criticize the use of 
maps displaying Western Sahara as part of Morocco. Two recent examples, 
published in 2018 on the WSRW website, are the cases of HeidelbergCement 
and Vigeo Eiris, two transnational companies operating in Western Sahara. 
HeidelbergCement owns a cement factory in Western Sahara, and as WSRW 
points out, ‘[o]n all maps on HeidelbergCement’s website, Western Sahara 
is illustrated as being part of Morocco’ (WSRW 2007b). Continuing that 
‘[n]o country in the world, nor the UN, consider Western Sahara as part of 
Morocco’ and quoting the Court of Justice of the European Union which 
‘clarif ied the status of the territories of Morocco and Western Sahara to be 
“distinct and separate”’ (WSRW 2007b). Where can this be better illuminated 
than on a map? In the case of Vigeo Eiris, WRSW states that ‘[t]he map on 
the front page of www.vigeo-eiris.com ignores the UN and EU position on 
Western Sahara and includes the territory as part of Morocco’ (WSRW 2007c).
These carefully considered attacks on the use of maps on the web dem-
onstrate how important maps are in the definition of world views. It seems 
to be feared that the meaning of the maps will proliferate into economic 
and exploitative practices of international companies.
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Non-Faction Media
An important question seems to be whether these mapped-out discourses 
have any influence on the mappings created by media that are not off icially 
part of the conflict. In the following, some highly frequented providers of 
information are analysed; namely Wikipedia, Google Maps, Yandex, and 
the OpenStreetMap.
Wikipedia
In this analysis, I concentrate on the English-language articles in Wikipedia 
concerning Western Sahara and Morocco because they are the longest, 
contain the most maps, and are probably the most frequented of all the 
different language articles available. The two topmost maps in the English 
Wikipedia article on Morocco are probably also the most visible ones. Their 
purpose is to provide a general orientation to the reader. The f irst map 
shows mainly Africa and Europe in shades of grey. Morocco is coloured in 
dark green while Western Sahara is coloured in light green. An explana-
tory text below the map states that Western Sahara is ‘a territory claimed 
and mostly controlled by Morocco as its Southern Provinces’ (Wikimedia 
2017). Below that map, the reader f inds a map showing Morocco as a white 
space with some cities inscribed in it. Here, Western Sahara is distinctly 
separate from Moroccan territory. This map is attributed to the UN Off ice 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Additional maps of Moroccan 
climate1 and ethnolinguistic groups2 are constrained to this ‘internationally 
recognised’ territory of Morocco. A map titled ‘Western Sahara’ is based on 
the map in use by the UN peacekeepers,3 MINURSO, using more or less the 
same rhetoric: Western Sahara is a clearly distinct territory separated from 
Morocco by colour and borderline. Immediately below this map, however, 
there is another one showing the ‘Regions of Morocco’ (Figure 3.10). This 
rather colourful map is subtitled ‘the 12 off icial administrative Regions of 
Morocco’. It shows Morocco and its boundaries, including Western Sahara. 
No separation of the two territories is indicated.
1 Wikimedia Commons, Online Resource: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Morocco_K%C3%B6ppen.svg.
2 Wikimedia Commons, Online Resource: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Morocco_
ethno_1973_all_v2.svg.
3 Wikimedia Commons, Online Resource: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Westernsaharamap.png.
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The article on Western Sahara features most prominently the map based 
on the MINURSO map that is also used in the article on Morocco.4 The 
description below the map lists as ‘country’ both Morocco (‘as its “southern 
provinces”’) and the SADR (‘in the free zone’). Further maps put forward 
in the article include a British historical map of the Western Sahara region 
from the nineteenth century that shows no borders.5 There is also a map 
showing the situation in north-western Africa in the year 1912, in which 
French colonies and ‘French Morocco’ are displayed in shades of green, 
4 Wikimedia Commons, Online Resource: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Westernsaharamap.png.
5 Wikimedia Commons, Online Resource: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Western_
Sahara_1876.png.
Figure 3.10: wikipedia also features this map of Morocco contradicting most other maps on the 
website where Moroccan territory is concerned. Source: wikimedia commons.
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whereas Spain and its colonies, including Western Sahara, are coloured in 
a contrasting red tone, clearly separating Western Sahara from Morocco 
(Figure 3.11). The colouration ties Western Sahara and even the southern 
part of Morocco called ‘Cape Juby’ in this map to Spain, whereas Morocco is 
associated more closely with the green-coloured French colonies. Another 
map shows the progression of Moroccan military forces into the territory in 
the 1980s and the ‘system of the Moroccan Walls’, including the current berm 
Figure 3.11: these maps emphasize western Sahara as separated from Morocco. Source wikimedia 
commons.
Figure 3.12: these maps emphasize western Sahara as separated from Morocco. Source: wikimedia 
commons.
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(Figure 3.12). This map divides a clearly separate territory of Western Sahara 
into a colourful patchwork of occupation zones similar to the animated 
map described in the section about the Polisario Front’s mapping practices.
These maps stressing Western Sahara’s distinction from Moroccan territory 
are followed by a series of four maps, titled ‘4 ways to show Western Sahara’. 
The maps show Western Sahara and Morocco ‘separately’, Western Sahara 
as ‘disputed territory’, Western Sahara as separate only in the parts de facto 
controlled by the Polisario Front, and Western Sahara ‘as part of Morocco’.
Web Maps
Google Maps shows Western Sahara as a separate territory with mainly solid 
lines to indicate national borders (Figure 3.13). However, the line marking 
the border to Morocco is dashed. This seems to suggest that the territory of 
Western Sahara or the border between the two territories is under dispute.
Figure 3.13: google’s version of the conflict.
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The community-based and mainly crowdsourced OpenStreetMap shows 
the berm as the border between Morocco and the SADR, using the same 
symbolization as for any other national border (Figure 3.14). This establishes 
SADR as an independent state, but only on parts of the claimed territory. 
A dispute is not indicated.
The Russian web map provider Yandex changed policies during the 
process of writing this paper. Up to mid 2017, the Yandex map did not feature 
Western Sahara at all. Its database yielded no results for Western Sahara. 
The territory was not marked on the maps and was completely integrated 
with Morocco. This has now changed, and Western Sahara’s border with 
Morocco is indicated with a line style identical to other national borders; the 
city of Laayoun is – judging from the font size and weight – designated as 
capital of the territory. In addition, the lettering of the place label ‘Western 
Sahara’ is not distinguishable from other independent nation states’ labels. 
No dispute is indicated.
Figure 3.14: openStreetMap’s version of the conflict.
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Results
Most maps on the platforms analysed can be easily assigned to one of the 
three actors’ viewpoints. The maps of the factions themselves are clearly 
distinguishable and easily interpretable according to their mostly obvious 
purposes. They are designed to speak an uncompromising language, making 
their points of view as clear as possible. The maps’ strongest visual statements 
are commonly made through colourization, often using contrasting colours 
and the deployment or the omission of the map symbol delineating the 
border between territories. A more subtle difference is the display of the 
berm, a wall built by the Moroccan military separating the parties of conflict 
on the ground within the territory of Western Sahara. The berm is a physical 
manifestation of a factual limit of power. Crossing it may result in death 
because of anti-personnel landmines. The berm is mostly shown by maps 
from the Polisario Front’s point of view, stressing Morocco’s behaviour as 
occupational. It is never visible in maps following the Moroccan perspective, 
demonstrating the unity of Morocco and Western Sahara.
Websites that do not belong to one side or the other seem to struggle with 
the representation of Western Sahara, apparently trying to avoid any political 
statement. However, they never succeed in showing a completely unbiased 
representation. Sometimes their maps offer many different perspectives 
simultaneously – in some cases even contradicting each other. This is evident 
in the case of Wikipedia. The articles on Western Sahara and Morocco 
are each biased towards the respective perspective. Although Wikipedia 
mostly features maps that attempt to represent the UN point of view (which 
might be considered a bias in its own right), at least one map clearly follows 
the Moroccan perspective, displaying Western Sahara as the ‘Southern 
Provinces’. The article on Western Sahara makes use of a historical map 
that alludes to the status pre-dating the established nation states, attacking 
Moroccan views of a naturalized unity. This is admittedly a very subtle bias, 
and the strategy in this article seems rather to avoid a political stance in 
this matter. The maps attempt this not by endorsing a seemingly objective 
point of view, but by showing different options for mapping Western Sahara. 
However, by rendering each option equally valid, no party of the conflict 
will be able to agree with this compromise. A concordant point of view is 
not achieved.
At other times, the struggle shows in policy changes over time. Yandex, 
for example, applies opposing concepts at different times. Another solution 
in the contest for neutrality seems to be to present the area as ambiguously 
as possible, such as in the case of Google Maps. The dashed line between 
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Morocco and Western Sahara leaves the question unanswered as to whether 
Western Sahara belongs to Morocco. Yet another strategy is to attempt a 
representation not of the political ideas defining a territory but the factual 
realms of power, such as in the OpenStreetMap. Here the berm represents 
a factual border that fully mirrors neither the Moroccan nor the Western 
Saharan claims, but a factual division of the control over the territory. 
However, this statement is so unpolitical that it suggests a resolved situation 
for a highly disputed war zone. This is, in effect, not unpolitical at all.
Discussion
In the case of Western Sahara, where there has been a long-lasting ceasefire, 
the battle over the territory continues on the internet – and maps play an 
important role in these disputes. The factions use maps to try to produce 
certainty about the shapes of the nation state. They are supposed to establish 
valid perspectives and to refute the opposition. In the age of the internet, this 
battle might have intensif ied. An abundance of maps can be produced and 
distributed, and their visualized messages can be made quickly accessible 
in a cognitive sense. Nevertheless, the possibility of proliferation of maps is 
always also an opportunity for the opponent and has to be closely watched.
Anderson’s theories about the role of maps in the imagination of the 
nation state still hold ground, as outlined at the beginning of this chapter. 
However, in recent times, researchers have considered maps processes rather 
than unchanging immutable entities (e.g. Kitchin and Dodge 2007). This 
relativizes the claim to the absolute truth of a map and reveals its inherent 
perspectives. In the struggle to establish enduring truths, the processual 
characteristics of web mapping emerge. A mapping is the expression of ideas 
that are considered valid at a certain time and by certain people. Internet 
mappings, in their abundance and topicality, make that point clear to the 
astute user of the different channels of the internet. Caquard describes the 
tension of the map in the era of the internet between being an instrument to 
resist power and to reaffirm power. Both are possible at the same time using 
the same platforms depending on the political position of the map authors 
(Caquard 2011). This might entail a generally more critical or even sceptical 
reading of maps, which might deprive the map of its striking power. In any 
case, internet mappings have replaced the state as sole reference point for 
defining territories and nations with the arrival of Web 2.0 (Caquard 2014). 
This makes it even more important to deliver clear messages. As Culcasi 
shows, counter-mappings may reflect a difference between the self-chosen 
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definitions of the territory and the externally imposed ones (Culcasi 2012). 
Analysing mappings of the internet, as in this case, yields interesting insights 
into the perspectives of ‘the other’, which might not necessarily be explicitly 
expressed in words. These wordless perspectives in turn reveal ideals and 
utopias of non-state actors that could not have been expressed and delivered 
before the era of the internet. The sovereignty of the nation state has become 
vulnerable in the area of dissemination of territorial interpretations.
References
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, revised edition (London: Verso, 1983).
Radhi Bachir, ‘Western Sahara: Self-Determination Delayed’, Pambazuka News, 
Online Resource: https://www.pambazuka.org/democracy-governance/western-
sahara-self-determination-delayed (accessed 11 November 2020).
Karen Culcasi, ‘Cartographies of Supranationalism: Creating and Silencing Ter-
ritories in the “Arab Homeland”’, Political Geography, 30 (2011), pp. 417–428.
Sébastien Caquard, ‘Cartography I: Mapping Narrative Cartography’, Progress in 
Human Geography, 37(1) (2011), pp. 135–144.
Hans Corell, The Responsibility of the UN Security Council in the Case of Western 
Sahara, Online Resource: http://www.embajadasaharauimexico.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/hans-Correll-international-judicial-monitor.pdf (accessed 
11 November 2020).
---, ‘Cartography II: Collective Cartographies in the Social Media Era’, Progress in 
Human Geography, 38(1) (2014), pp. 141–150.
John Brian Harley, ‘Deconstructing the Map’, Cartographica, 26(2) (1989), pp. 1–20.
Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge, ‘Rethinking Maps’, Progress in Human Geography, 
31(3) (2007), pp. 331–344.
Bir Lahlou, Proclamation of the First Government of the Saharawi Arab Demo-
cratic Republic, Online Resource: http://www.arso.org/03-1.htm (accessed 
11 November 2020).
Malainin Lakhal, Morocco’s Colonialist Agenda Must not Succeed, Online Resource: 
http://saharawi.net/en/?p=694 (accessed 11 November 2020).
Maroc, Map of Morocco, Online Resource: http://www.maroc.ma/en/content/
map-morocco (accessed 11 November 2020).
MINURSO, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara: Back-
ground, Online Resource: https://minurso.unmissions.org/background (accessed 
11 November 2020).
Sahara Cities, Western Sahara Cities, Online Resource: http://www.sahara-villes.com/
en/WesternSaharacities/tabid/228/Default.aspx (accessed 11 November 2020).
tAKiNg thE bAt tlE to cybErSPAcE 93
Sahara Portal, Before Colonisation, Online Resource: http://www.sahara-online.
net/Default.aspx?tabid=710 (accessed 11 November 2020).
Saharawi Mission. Ethiopia-African Union, Geography, Online Resource: http://
www.sadr-emb-au.net/geography/ (accessed 11 November 2020).
The United Nations and Decolonization, Non-Self-Governing Terrorities, 2019, 
Online Resource: https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt (accessed 
11 November 2020).
Sebastian Usher, Polisario Releases Moroccan POWs, Online Resource: http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3200039.stm (accessed 11 November 2020).
Western Sahara Resource Watch, About Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW), 
2007a, Online Resource: https://wsrw.org/en/about-us (accessed 11 November 2020).
Western Sahara Resource Watch, What is Heidelberg Cement Doing in Occupied 
Western Sahara?, 2007b, Online Resource: https://wsrw.org/en/archive/4124 
(accessed 11 November 2020).
Western Sahara Resource Watch, Vigeo Eiris Goes Back On False Claim, 2007c, 
Online Resource: https://wsrw.org/en/archive/4095 (accessed 11 November 2020).
Wikipedia, Persian Gulf Naming Dispute, 2019, Online Resource: https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Persian_Gulf_naming_dispute (accessed 11 November 2020).
Denis Wood, The Power of Maps (London: Routledge, 1992).
---, Rethinking the Power of Maps (New York: Guilford Press, 2010).
About the Author
Frederik von Reumont is a research fellow and PhD candidate at the Insti-
tute of Geography Education at Cologne University. Trained in geography 
as well as cartography, he is interested in the potential of digital and other 
maps in critical geo-education. In his research, he currently focuses on the 
use of comics to convey geographical meaning. He experiments with the 
combination of maps and comics to try to exploit the cognitive advantages 
of both modalities.

4. Wargaming the Middle East: The 
Evolution of Simulated Battlefields 
from Chequerboards to Virtual Worlds 
and Instrumented Artificial Cities
Janina Schupp
Abstract
Shortly after the end of a tank combat during the Gulf War, a team of US 
Army historians, scientists, and engineers f lew to Iraq to gather detailed 
data of the battle. The collected information was used to create an exact 
virtual simulation of the combat for training. The mapping capability 
– offered by the resulting simulation game 73 Easting – to visualize the 
battlef ield from any position and point in time revolutionized military 
exercises. With ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, these digital training 
cartographies are now linked to real bodies and vehicles through digital 
and mobile technologies during live training in artif icially constructed 
villages. This chapter analyses this evolution and critically investigates 
the growing ‘gamif ication’ ensuing in these representations of Middle 
Eastern battlef ields.
Keywords: Wargames, Middle East, interactive battlespace, live simulations
In war the experienced soldier reacts in the same way as the human eye 
does in the dark: the pupil expands to admit what little light there is, 
discerning objects by degrees, and f inally seeing them indistinctly. By 
contrast, the novice is plunged into the deepest night. […] It is immensely 
important that no soldier, whatever his rank, should wait for war to expose 
him to those aspects of active service that amaze and confuse him when 
he f irst comes across them. (Clausewitz 1989, p. 122)
Strohmaier, A. and A. Krewani (eds.), Media and Mapping Practices in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Producing Space. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021
doi 10.5117/9789462989092_ch04
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The act of playing at war is deeply engrained in human history and has per-
sisted to the present day in both professional and hobby culture. Wargaming 
allows the participant to become an active part of a warfare situation and 
thus ‘provides a unique learning experience that leads to a deeper and more 
personal understanding and appreciation of warfare than can be attained by 
any other method short of actual participation on the f ield of battle’ (Perla 
2011, p. 19). Wargaming is a unique tool for grasping the complexity of war, 
understanding the effects of modern weapons and strategies, and preparing 
soldiers for deployment on the battlef ield. Thus, war games improve logical 
thinking under intense circumstances and enhance personal comprehension 
of combat. The war game, however, provides this new knowledge and skills 
at the price of compressing the complexity of reality:
The war game gives us a chance to play at one of the most terrible creations 
of the hand of man, a creation capable of destroying all we have ever built 
and, at the last, the very world on which we live. It also gives us a chance 
to reduce the terrifying dimensions of this monster of our own making 
to a more human scale. […] Its weaknesses lie in its inability to re-create 
the actual physical conditions under which such decisions must be made 
or the actual consequences, of those decisions. Then again, perhaps those 
too are strengths. (Perla 2011, p. 277)
Environments and humans have to be reduced and compressed to their most 
crucial features to be accommodated as components of a game or model of 
reality. These compressions widen the gap between the experience of a real, 
original space and the perceptions generated by its artif icial doppelgänger. 
What is left out and what is considered relevant enough to be included in the 
artif icial reproduction are both equally important factors to consider and 
have an impact on the distortion of reality. As Roger Dean Smith describes,
real systems are extremely complex and a determination must be made 
about the details that will be captured in the model. Some details must be 
omitted and their effects lost or aggregated into other variables that are 
included in the model. In both cases, an inaccuracy has been introduced. 
(Smith 2009, p. 11)
Violence, pain, death, and guilt are the most evident realities of conflict 
that fall victim to this process of simulation, as their reproduction is often 
hindered by technological limitations or judged less relevant for the train-
ing of strategy and tactics. In addition, the association between war and 
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game also reveals a fundamental enjoyment in the competition of such a 
compressed and so-called sanitized war – a feeling that has been purposely 
reinforced by militaries up to the present day. As H. G. Wells’s miniature 
wargaming manual Little Wars expresses:
Here is the premeditation, the thrill, the strain of accumulating victory 
or disaster – and […] no shattered f ine buildings nor devastated country 
sides, no petty cruelties, none of that awful universal boredom and embit-
terment, that tiresome delay or stoppage or embarrassment of every 
gracious, bold, sweet, and charming thing, that we who are old enough 
to remember a real modern war know to be the reality of belligerence. 
(Wells 1913, p. 97)
However, war games reduce not only the destruction and emotional extent of 
real war but also the representation of actual urban spaces and populations 
that will be encountered in future conflicts. The artif icial constructs devel-
oped for training purposes are based on – and in turn produce – imaginary 
cartographies, which are often several degrees removed from their real 
geographical counterparts.
Preconceived notions that Western militaries have about the terrain 
and population of the Middle East can influence the artif icial training 
cartographies produced to grasp foreign countries. According to Edward 
W. Said, such an imagined or ‘imaginative geography’
legitimates a vocabulary, a universe of representative discourse peculiar 
to the discussion and understanding of Islam and of the Orient. […] We 
need not look for correspondence between the language used to depict 
the Orient and the Orient itself, not so much because the language is 
inaccurate but because it is not even trying to be accurate. What it is 
trying to do […] is at one and the same time to characterise the Orient 
as alien and to incorporate it schematically on a theatrical stage whose 
audience, manager, and actors are [the Western world]. (Said 1978, p. 71)
The application of such an imagined Middle Eastern geography and Oriental-
ist language in military simulations thus functions as ‘an accepted grid for 
f iltering through the Orient into Western consciousness’ (Said 1978, p. 6). 
The resulting military simulations in turn transfer these imaginative con-
structs of the Middle East to the soldiers during training. The cartographies 
encountered by soldiers during the training hence shape their expectation 
and imagination of these foreign countries even before deployment.
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Throughout history, technological progress has determined the ways 
in which these imagined geographies of enemy territories were produced 
by Western militaries. This chapter will trace the technologies used for 
spatial simulation throughout history in order to reveal the evolution of 
these artif icial and imagined cartographies built by Western militaries 
and their effect on the perception of the Middle East.
A Historical Introduction: Early Terrain Representation from 
Abstraction to Map Use
Tracing back the origins of mapping geographical spaces and humans in 
wargaming is an almost impossible task, as warfare has influenced games – 
and vice versa – long before this phenomenon was documented (Allen 1987; 
Perla 2011; Lewin 2012; Creveld 2013). The f irst known ancestor of today’s 
wargaming practices is the game Wei Hai, c. 500 B.C.,1 frequently credited 
to the Chinese general Sun Tzu (Perla 2011, p. 29), which later developed into 
the Japanese game Go. While Wei Hai relied on coloured stones to represent 
armies, a more elaborate four-sided board game with miniature soldiers, 
elephants, and cavalry appeared in India around the sixth century under 
the name Chaturanga. Chaturanga is often claimed to be the ancestor of 
modern chess, which in turn marked the beginning of Western military 
wargaming. Chess represented its contemporary state of warfare, with kings, 
towers, and knights mirroring the components of conflicts at the time.
Chess and its wargaming ancestors and descendants have thus always 
reflected contemporary warfare practices, and war games have increasingly 
aimed for accuracy in relation to real warfare and geography. However, the 
terrain of the battlef ield was still visually reduced to a grid of squares with 
colour coding, and no spatial or geographical features were attributed to the 
simulated combat space. The main diff iculty of early wargaming was thus 
the accurate mapping of terrain specif icities and of the spatial positions 
of military elements, such as soldiers, machinery, and provisions. Only 
important military f igures were personif ied, while the general population 
was not captured by the simulation. These strong reductions, resulting 
from the f inite technological means available, communicated a limited 
impression of foreign lives and environments.
1 Wei Hai is variously dated in publications as originating in 3000 B.C., 1000 B.C., and 500 
B.C. Since Sun Tzu lived around 500 B.C., this approximate date is used here.
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In the mid eighteenth to mid nineteenth century, wargaming was 
primarily expanded in Germany. Early progress in terrain representation 
was made by Johann C.L. Hellwig in 1780, followed by Georg Venturini 
in 1797, who both extended the board (to 1666 and then 3600 squares, 
respectively), introduced different colours to differentiate terrain condi-
tions, and included pieces to represent bridges, wagons, or fortif ications, 
amongst other features. In Prussia in 1812 the most prominent early war 
game, the Kriegsspiel, was invented by civilian war counsellor Baron George 
Leopold von Reiswitz. The Kriegsspiel exchanged the rigid chessboard 
for an open table with several topographical terrain pieces that could be 
rearranged at will to create different landscapes. The terrain squares were 
made of wood and painted plaster and represented streets, villages, rivers, 
or forests. The simulated terrain thus became not only more detailed but 
also three-dimensional to reflect the heights of mountains. The concept 
of spatial representation developed by Reiswitz was a typology of spatial 
features that could, in their combination, create an imagined landscape 
or approximately reproduce the real geography of a deployment terrain. 
Reiswitz himself called the selection of shapes ‘types’, ‘since, like the let-
ters of printing works, which serve to reproduce writing, these types and 
their combination can reproduce a spatial area’ (Reiswitz 1812, p. 11).2 The 
Kriegsspiel also created a variety of playing pieces detailing the particulari-
ties of different military units; for example, artillery or cavalry, and the 
comprehensive effects of weaponry and movements. While his game had 
little success at f irst, his son Lieutenant George Heinrich Rudolph Johann 
von Reiswitz developed a revised version in 1824, which rose to fame. 
The main adaptation was again the terrain representation, which, in the 
revised version, was f inally able to use accurate topographic maps instead 
of fabricated typologies, and employed rulers and dividers to calculate 
distances of shots and troop movement. The Kriegsspiel pioneered many 
design characteristics and war game processes that have become core 
components of war games to the present day.
The tracing of early wargaming history shows that the mapping of 
enemy terrain in war games has always depended on and adapted to the 
technologies of representation available during each period. Thus, the later 
rise of computers deeply influenced the accurate mapping of terrains and 
simulation of combat activities in war preparation.
2 ‘Typen […] weil eben so wie die Buchstaben in der Druckerey, dazu dienen eine Schrift 
nach zu bilden, durch diese Typen und ihre Zusammenstellung eine Gegend nachgebildet wird’ 
(translation by the author).
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The Computer Age: Battlefield Cartographies Go Virtual and 
Interactive
Earlier military war games allowed for the testing of strategies, but as soon 
became apparent, military combat also requires a coordinated interaction 
and cooperation of the individual soldiers in one unit. Modern war f ighting 
is ‘rooted in each individual’s performance with his weapon system’, but ‘its 
scope is far greater’, including ‘the coordination of that individual’s activities 
with others in the crew, and that crew’s interaction with other crews’ and 
so on, and to ‘be successful at warf ighting combatants must master these 
interactions at all levels’ (Thorpe 1987, p. 1). As war games increasingly 
changed focus from the omniscient viewpoint of the commander to the 
limited viewpoint of the individual soldiers on the battlef ield, simulation 
developers looked for ways to create shared simulated environments to 
train skills and teamwork at these lower levels. With the rise of computer 
technology, commercial video games began not only to provide cheap, 
high-performing technology but also created new elements that could be 
conveniently transposed for such training – especially from f irst-person 
shooter games, which emerged in 1974 with the Maze Game (Greg Thompson 
et al.) and Spasim (Jim Bowery). These games created a feeling of being an 
active agent in a battlef ield space and enabled the player/soldier to acquire 
an embodied combat experience. The US Army hence discovered computer 
games as a ‘new and better means for training’, especially since ‘people in 
those arcades are volunteers’, even ‘paying for the use of the machines, and 
two-thirds of these games are military in nature’ (TRADOC Commanding 
General Starry, cited in Ludvigsen 1981, p. 16). The new aim of the military 
thus became to tap into the spatial-mapping capabilities and the natural 
appeal of video games from the beginning of the 1980s.
When Atari released the arcade game Battlezone in 1980, the US Army 
immediately requested a prototype military version (Schachter 1983, p. 
xii). The game, designed by Ed Rotberg, uses vector graphics to create a 3D 
wireframe view of a battlef ield with mountains, which is navigated from a 
f irst-person perspective located inside a tank. The game hence ‘provided an 
environment where the player had complete freedom of movement over the 
ground in any direction’ (Poole 2000, p. 125). Early versions even had a mock 
periscope attached to the cabinet frame to be used as a tank ‘viewfinder’ 
and thus generated the ‘feel of a genuine battlezone: limited vision, nasty 
surprises, panicky adjustments while the enemy tank wheels slowly round 
to get you in its sights’ (Halter 2006, p. 123). The military version, named the 
Bradley Trainer, was conceived as a training resource for soldiers operating 
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the Bradley Fighting Vehicle – since real training was highly costly and 
video games offered great potential to develop ‘incredible hand, eye, and 
brain coordination’ (Reagan, cited in Halter 2006, pp. 117–118). The military 
version of Battlezone in the end only existed in two copies and was never 
used for training. However, it highlighted the turn of the military’s interest 
towards entertainment technologies. The increasingly sophisticated com-
mercial simulation games introduced useful elements for military training, 
especially terrains navigable from a f irst-person perspective, training in the 
use of virtual weaponry, restricted battlefield intelligence, and competition 
between players through networking technology, all while creating the 
pleasure and excitement of using these features over and over again.
The Simulator Network (SIMNET) project by Jack Thorpe subsequently 
created the f irst military network for simulators in 1983, when the net-
working of more than one simulator or game terminal became possible 
through the early forms of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
(ARPANET), which later became the internet (Miller and Thorpe 1995).
With the SIMNET project, simulator design shifted from a tradition of 
f idelity to an emphasis on interaction between players and use of entertain-
ment effects for a new sense of immersion in a collective virtual battlef ield. 
Instead of building an accurate replica, the project explored ‘how much 
reality was needed to fool people into believing they were actually f iring 
on targets’ and incorporated ‘some of the attractiveness of video game 
technology into the drudgery of military drills’ (Voss 1993, p. 10). For SIMNET, 
Robert Jacobs invented the concept of ‘selective f idelity’ – also referred to as 
a ‘60 percent solution’ (Voss 1993, p. 11). Instead of replicating the tank interior 
accurately – like previous flight simulators, which had reproduced all cockpit 
details – only elements fundamental to the execution of tasks were recreated. 
Other elements, such as switches, were simply shown as pictures or painted 
on. Instead, a focus was placed on employing entertainment technologies to 
simulate a believable battlef ield environment and atmosphere that triggers 
soldiers to think they are in an actual battlef ield. For example, in an early 
prototype, a graphic video f ilmed in the US Grafenwöhr training centre 
was employed to simulate the shooting and crash of the tanks, and screens 
became defunct to simulate damage. As McDonough notes: ‘We basically 
turned the tank gunnery into a video game’ (cited in Voss 1993, p. 11). The 
crews looked out onto the virtual battlef ield through television screens 
that were mounted in the position of the usual tank lookout windows. The 
magazine Wired, as a result, named SIMNET the f irst creation of cyberspace, 
stating that ‘William Gibson didn’t invent cyberspace, Air Force Captain 
Jack Thorpe did’ (Hapgood 1997, p. 116).
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To describe how engaging this new shared mapping of a battlef ield with 
enemies and foes felt, developer Jim McDonough describes a situation that 
occurred during tests: ‘The hatch in the SIMNET simulator doesn’t open. 
[…] One commander got so excited while looking through his commander 
observation point, […] he bashed his head against the top of the simulator, 
forgetting that he was in a simulator’ (cited in Voss 1993, pp. 12–13).
The SIMNET project was one of the early military simulations that 
deliberately integrated video gaming techniques for virtual, interactive bat-
tlef ield mapping. During the conception of SIMNET, a prototype computer 
display was also developed to allow an impartial observer to f ly over the 
battlef ield and look at the position of units. The observer could even switch 
to the perspective of a specif ic tank, thus embodying its view. This display 
technology allowed the f irst virtual and interactive mapping of real Gulf 
War combat a few years later.
73 Easting:3 Gulf War History Mapped as a Virtual, Interactive 
Battlespace
Shortly after the end of a successful tank combat during the Gulf War in early 
1990, a team of US Army historians, scientists, and engineers flew to Iraq to 
gather detailed data on the battle through interviews, terrain inspection, 
aerial photos, communication recordings, bunker locations, tank shots, 
and destroyed targets. The collected information was then used to create 
an exact virtual simulation of the combat for review and training, including 
geographical terrain, soldier and vehicle movements, communications, and 
use of weaponry. The 73 Easting battle simulation generated a ‘flying carpet’ 
together with a timeline function, which allowed commanders to examine the 
virtual version of the successful combat and understand the terrain and battle 
movements that had occurred. The reconstruction of the battle was played 
like a live SIMNET simulation and recorded. As Walter N. Lang describes:
It was designed to help commanders prepare for future battles and provide 
the ‘wherewithal’ for ‘time travel’ – that is to see the battle from any 
perspective at any time, many times, anywhere, in real-time or even 
faster than real time. […] Commanders can cruise a computer-generated 
battlef ield that shows the deployment and operations of both allied and 
3 The Battle of 73 Easting was named after its location on a north-south grid line of military 
area maps.
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enemy orders of battle in two-dimensional and three-dimensional views. 
The simulated battlef ield can be visually displayed from any viewpoint 
– air or ground – or the overall situation can be seen on a digitized map. 
(Lang 1991, p. 12)
Sounds of explosions and original radio transmissions of crews were also 
integrated, thus creating a multidimensional simulation of the battle, which 
allowed for fast-forwarding or rewinding the battle and inspecting specif ic 
events, movements, or use of weapons (Orlansky and Thorpe 1992, p. i.). Al-
ternative scenarios could be played to test out different courses of action, and 
various details could be f iltered out for analysis. The capability to capture 
and visualize the battlef ield and the historical as well as practice missions 
from any position and point in time was revolutionary and introduced new 
2D and 3D mapping into virtual training. As Jesse Orlansky and Jack Thorpe 
describe the achievement in their report:
[T]he product, a ‘moving picture’ permits observers to review what actually 
happened at any moment from any position or vehicle on any side of the 
battle. No previous battle has been recorded in greater detail or can be 
re-created dynamically for study, review and ‘what-if’ analyses. (Orlansky 
and Thorpe 1992, p. i)
However, the reception of the new technology was split. While the military 
applauded the new technological advancements of 73 Easting’s video game-
style virtual reality, the wider public saw the f irst risks of a virtualization 
and gamif ication of real combat with real death tolls. This was reflected 
in the technology magazine Wired:
The flesh of real young men was there inside those flaming tank-shaped 
polygons, and that f lesh was burning. That is what one knows – but it’s 
not what one sees. What one really sees in 73 Easting is something new 
and very strange: a complete and utter triumph of chilling, analytic, 
cybernetic rationality over chaotic, real-life, human desperation. […] This 
is virtual reality as a new way of knowledge: a new and terrible kind of 
transcendent military power. (Sterling 1993, p. 48)
While the move from tabletop to computer games brought the technologies 
for a more detailed spatial and temporal simulation of the Middle East, 
these elaborate and scientif ically precise cartographies did not provide a 
more humane representation of the foreign terrain and population. The 
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data gathered as the basis for the simulation signif icantly only focused on 
the terrain specif icities and Western combat movements that were deemed 
relevant for the battle. Meanwhile, the civilian population, socio-economic 
context, and political motivation of the enemy did not inform the simulation 
design. Led by analytical motivations, the design of the virtual simulation of 
Iraq focused on military manoeuvres and treated the foreign population as a 
calculable opposing force. The displacement of civilian lives and the misery 
resulting from the violence of war were omitted in the clean-cut virtual 
cartography. The view generated was thus a detached division between the 
victorious Western force and anonymous, dehumanized opposing players.
The Introduction of Commercial Video Game Spaces in Military 
Training
As 3D environments emerged in the entertainment sector in the 1990s, the 
US military, constrained by budget cuts, began to acquire and adapt an 
increasing number of computer games. The f irst 3D game to be altered for 
military use was Doom II (id Software 1994) in 1995. The game, originally 
based on four extraterrestrial marines combatting demons in outer space, 
came with a level editor that enabled the acquisition and easy modification 
of the game for marine use. The Marines Scott Barnett and Dan Snyder 
subsequently adapted the game to represent an urban environment with an 
opposing military force and a wealth of Marine logos. Player avatars were 
given the skin of a scanned ‘G.I. Joe’ action f igure, and battlef ield sounds, 
including military communication channels, were added (Richard 1999, 
p. 160). The original game producers ‘gave their blessing though they thought 
the idea of someone using their game to train soldiers was a joke’ (Kushner 
2004, p. 194). The rise of more detailed game designs and modification tools 
(such as level editors, scenario builders, and avatar skins) thus enabled a 
growing transferability of entertainment games into military use and fuelled 
the exchange between both industries:
[I]t is apparent that the entertainment industry has emerged as an in-
novative source of modeling and simulation technology. […] Though 
the two communities differ widely in their structures, incentives, and 
motivations, opportunities may exist for the entertainment industry 
and the defense modeling and simulation community to work together 
to advance the state of the art in modeling and simulation technology. 
(National Research Council et al. 1997, p. 13)
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One of the earliest products resulting from the newly invigorated collabora-
tion between commercial and military sectors was Full Spectrum Command 
(Institute for Creative Technologies 2003), a game simultaneously developed 
as a training simulation and as the spin-off game Full Spectrum Warrior 
(Institute for Creative Technologies 2004) for the Xbox. The game marked 
the ‘f irst military training application published for a commercial game 
console’ (Institute for Creative Technologies 2004). The narrative setting is 
an invented Middle Eastern country – ‘Zekistan’ in the commercial adapta-
tion and ‘Kazar’ in the army version. The game was developed in close 
collaboration with the Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, and motion 
captures of real soldiers were used for the avatars. The army’s participation 
was a big incentive for the commercial audience and contributed to large 
sales numbers: ‘It’s just real cool that you know this is made by the military’ 
(Sam Vongillen [a player], cited in Ross and Rackmill 2005).
At the same time, the US military also conceived its f irst game destined 
for the entertainment market: America’s Army (2002). To create a game on 
par with entertainment standards, a team of designers, programmers, and 
artists was recruited from video game companies, including Electronic Arts 
and Sony, and the game was built using the most advanced 3D engine at the 
time, the Unreal Engine 2 (developed by Epic Games for commercial FPS 
games). The game is programmed to restrict all players to the perspective 
of US Army soldiers, while they appear to others as the terrorist enemy. The 
game thus projects the army as an enlightened, heroic institution, while 
the enemy is here again often framed as the ‘other’ from the Middle East.
Although the game was initially meant for entertainment audiences 
to boost recruitment, it also offered the potential to extend the gaming 
pleasure to soldier training. The main advantage of entertainment games 
was thus perceived by the army as their capability to entice the soldier 
subconsciously into training through the immersion provided by games. 
This process was replicated in America’s Army, which was altered into an 
army training simulation and was also provided free of charge to US allies:
We want our systems as immersive as games. We want them entertaining, 
so that work is play and people don’t leave. In short, we want our training 
systems so immersive, soldiers forget to eat. (Zyda et al. 2004, p. 2)
Technology provided the tools for a more realistic cartography of Middle 
Eastern geographies and the simulation of populations. However, in contrast, 
the new generation of war games steered towards vagueness and additional 
abstractions. Since the Middle East was not concretely labelled as the enemy 
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in either Full Spectrum or America’s Army, the fabricated vague terrorist 
enemies and f ictional Middle Eastern-ized geographical settings generated 
blurred stereotypes. By avoiding a direct use of real geographical maps and 
concrete enemy imagery, the games thus extended the imagined geography 
of the Middle Eastern ‘other’ through a host of invented characteristics. 
Crucially, the emergence of these commercial military wargaming products 
further naturalized the idea that Western nations will face the inhabitants 
of the Middle East in future combats (Graham 2006, p. 128). Through the 
extended cooperation with the entertainment industry and the commerciali-
zation of these war games, the novel imagined cartographies created in the 
two games not only filtered into the soldiers’ imaginations of the Middle East 
but also into the imaginations of Western and even global civilian audiences.
Mapping at a Distance: Increased Terrain Size and Geographical 
Accuracy through Extended Virtual Worlds and Remote Sensing 
Technologies
With rising casualties from roadside Improvised Explosive Devices in the 
Middle East, training simulations had to be created specif ically for ‘convoy 
training, with some important urban elements’ – a feature not yet available 
in the limited terrains of America’s Army, in which ‘a soldier driving a virtual 
truck would drive to the edge of the virtual world in less than a minute’ 
(Curry et al. 2016, p. 14). Larger virtual interactive battlef ields of the virtual 
Middle East with diverse terrains were thus required, and avatars and 
missions needed to be modif iable, since multiple nations now shared the 
same software for training. Scenarios also had to be constantly customized 
to keep trainees on their toes. Solutions to these needs arrived with the 
commercial game Operation Flashpoint (2001) by Bohemia Interactive, 
which brought the f irst extensive terrains (25 km x 25 km terrain areas) 
and in-built model, terrain, and mission editors to the market. Bohemia 
Interactive adopted the entertainment game into the military version 
Virtual Battle Space (VBS) in 2004–2005. A second version, Virtual Battle 
Space 2 (2007–2008) was conceived with 200 km x 200 km terrains and 
became a worldwide success. The game was initially delivered to the US 
Marine Corps, but quickly also sold to the US Army, the British Ministry 
of Defence (MoD), and the Canadian Army (Bohemia Interactive Australia 
2012). Many NATO countries, including France, soon followed, and the VBS 
series has since become the most widely used training simulation software 
across the world.
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While the terrain size in war games was continuously expanded, the 
variety of atmospheres and natural, built, and human environments was 
also ref ined – including in the newest instalment Virtual Battle Space 3 in 
2013 and Virtual Battle Space 4 in 2020. The software now accurately maps 
a variety of climates, weather and lighting conditions, environments, and 
ambient lives, and calculates their influence on the virtual soldiers and 
vehicles. Notably, real geography can now be used as the basis for these 
virtual environments. Terrains can be imported from a variety of terrain 
generation software, such as TerraTools by TerraSim, making it possible to 
simulate and dissect any area of the world from satellite imagery. As Bruce 
Sterling already critically noted a few years prior,
what does this mean? It means that soon there will be no such thing as 
‘unknown territory’ for the United States military. In the future – soon, 
very soon – the United States military will know the entire planet just 
like the back of its hand. It will know other countries better than those 
countries know themselves. (Sterling 1993, p. 49)
A detailed knowledge of geographical specif icities can now be acquired by 
any soldier without ever having to set foot in the Middle East or make contact 
with the real population. Rather than research on the ground, technologies 
of remote sensing now serve as the basis for the simulated, virtual battle 
spaces. These resulting imagined geographies of the Middle East, although 
now anchored in reality, are notably forged from a detached perspective at 
a distance. As a result, the accuracy in terms of geography is heightened, 
while the accurate depiction and cultural understanding of the population 
fade into the distance. Other war games, such as the Bilateral Negotiation 
Trainer (BiLAT) by the Institute for Creative Technologies (2004–2008) 
aimed to bring in these cultural elements, but the majority of simulations 
prioritize geographical accuracy and environmental omniscience over 
human terrain mapping and cultural understanding.
The Integration of Movement and Kinaesthesia
Due to the hardware-bound video game simulators of previous decades, the 
soldier was limited to navigating these virtual worlds while actually sitting 
behind a desk and staring at a screen. Consequently, new developments 
have pushed in the direction of wearable gaming technologies for individual 
soldiers, specif ically through head-mounted displays and wearable sensors 
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so soldiers can physically enter and move in the replicated terrains. In early 
2011, the US Army invested $57 million into the creation of the Dismounted 
Soldier Training System (DSTS), the ‘f irst-ever, fully immersive virtual 
simulation training program for soldiers’ (Intelligent Decisions 2011). For 
the project, ex-game developers were hired ‘to leverage the capability of 
a multibillion-dollar gaming industry, basically cherry-picking the best 
available technology that is out there’ (Colonel Francisco Espaillat, cited in 
Burnett 2011). The f irst versions of the DSTS used the entertainment graphics 
engine CryENGINE 3, previously employed for the FPS game Crysis 2 (Elec-
tronic Arts 2011). In the simulation system, soldiers wear high-performance 
computers on their backs and helmet-mounted displays and stereo headsets 
to be audiovisually immersed in the virtual world. Meanwhile, they are also 
equipped with a range of motion sensors and a dummy weapon, allowing 
them to move within a designated ten-foot matted training area as their 
movements are projected into the virtual world. Due to the limited spatial 
radius, a joystick is used to recreate walking and running. Although freed 
from the computer desk, the physical movement of the player is thus still 
signif icantly reduced to each soldier’s ten-square-foot area in the gaming 
experience.
One company attempting to alleviate this problem is Motion Reality, 
with its military product VIRTSIM. Although their general approach – a 
stereo head-mounted display with 360-degree view – is similar, VIRT-
SIM innovatively integrates Motion Reality’s motion capture with 3D 
technologies that were previously used for James Cameron’s f ilm Avatar 
(2009). During the military exercise, ref lective markers are placed on 
the bodies of up to thirteen soldiers to track their movements and turn 
them into their own avatars. VIRTSIM thus enables soldiers to actu-
ally jump, run, or crawl through a basketball court-sized training hall 
while in the virtual world (Motion Reality 2015). A further addition is 
the reproduction of physical pain when struck by bullets or explosions 
through shock-delivering electrodes. It hence ‘immerses soldiers from 
head-to-toe, creating the closest possible experience to an actual mission’ 
(Miller, cited in Raytheon 2012).
The integration of the whole body allows the simulated cartographies 
of the Middle East to be more freely explored and hence perceived as more 
realistic spaces on a sensory level. The discrepancies between these authored 
versions and the real Middle East thus become increasingly cloaked for the 
military user, as the sensual immersion grows in authenticity.
However, although these virtual simulations have now reached an ex-
tremely high level of accuracy, they are yet unable to integrate and reproduce 
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real physical movement in the simulated battlef ield to a larger extent – and 
within touchable natural and built environments. These aspects are only 
currently available in live simulations in which soldiers now fully become 
their own avatars.
Live Simulations: The Transfer of the Visual and Virtual Mapping 
Heritage into Real Space
Over the years, and with ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, digital car-
tographies have matured and have been linked to real bodies, architectures, 
and vehicles through digital and mobile technologies during live simulations. 
These live simulations produce exercises during which soldiers execute 
their combat tasks inside purpose-built artif icial cities. Thus, live simula-
tions make every effort to engage the soldier in an environment that is as 
close to reality as possible, including the use of real equipment, recreated 
architecture, and role-played populations. One example of these physi-
cally reproduced Middle Eastern spaces can be found at the United States 
National Training Center (NTC) in the Mojave Desert in California. Here, 
the US Army built a range of Iraqi towns after the turn of the millennium 
and later adjusted these mock environments to also reflect Afghan spaces 
during the War in Afghanistan (2001–2014). Over thirteen mock towns and 
villages were constructed at the NTC over the years, and each of them was 
and is variably used as Iraq, Afghanistan, or other f ictive Middle Eastern 
settings. Role-players, both from Middle Eastern and Western backgrounds, 
generate a simulated Middle Eastern population that interacts with the 
soldiers during the training scenarios.
While previous war games separated the game terrain and avatars 
through technology from the real environment and soldiers, the new highly 
instrumented live simulations, conversely, turn players into their own 
avatars as they manoeuvre through the space of the game. In these modern 
live simulations, every movement and weapon use of the soldier is now 
mapped, documented, and remediated through a network of technologi-
cal devices during exercises. Akin to Virilio’s ‘logistics of perception’, the 
military motivation behind this evolution of training mapping is the will 
‘to see all, to know all, at every moment, everywhere’ and ‘forever rule out 
the surprise, the accident, the irruption of the unforeseen’ (Virilio 1994, 
p. 70). Modern military live simulation centres, one might argue, generate a 
twofold visual and virtual mapping of their combat geographies to monitor 
and optimize tactical procedures and individual combat performance. On 
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one level, a visual mapping of the battlef ield is produced through a range 
of camera types, including IP cameras and infrared cameras. The recorded 
footage is edited in the operational centre to produce short f ilms for after 
action review. On a second level, a virtual mapping takes place through a 
digital reproduction of the training terrain, which is generated in 2D and 
3D in the central operating system. The system obtains information on the 
battlef ield action through a range of sensors distributed all over the real 
architecture. Players are located outdoors via GPS and indoors through radio 
waves and are equipped with a sensor harness that links to the laser tactical 
engagement simulation system of the employed weapons and vehicles. 
The soldiers’ movements are constantly tracked in real time, while the 
path of their shots is registered by the harnesses and sensors mounted 
on buildings and vehicles. The central operating system then calculates 
building destructions, injuries, and deaths, which are signalled back to the 
soldier through a status report device – a sort of military player interface. 
All effects and movements are reproduced in a virtual version of the combat 
terrain with avatars paralleling the soldiers’ actions. However, this dual 
visual and virtual mapping system only serves to monitor the exercises, 
while the constructed actual space embodies the imagined geography of 
the Middle East.
The modern military live simulations have thus transferred the heritage 
of war game technologies from board games, maps, and cyberspace into 
one all-encompassing real space. The imagined cartography of the Middle 
East is now transferred into a real space that the soldier can occupy. At 
the NTC, soldiers, for example, spend around eighteen days immersed 
in these artif icial spaces during their training rotations (Tan 2015). As a 
result, these live simulations add realistic emotions and physical sensations 
to the training, such as cold temperatures, physical movements, hunger, 
stress, tiredness, and confusion. Thus, in a sense, they provide a more 
realistic emotional environment than virtual simulations and enable the 
transferral of wargaming into real three-dimensional, sensory-immersive 
mock cities, including ‘real’ populations. The ‘play space’ (Nitsche 2009, 
p. 16) is no longer situated in front of a computer screen and detached from 
the simulated Middle East, but instead, the soliders physically inhabit the 
f ictional cartography of the Middle East, and real space and imagined 
spaces are merged into one.
Technological innovations have always led to new perceptions of 
conf licts and a distancing from the physical and optical reality of the 
battlef ield. Communication evolutions such as the telephone allowed 
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orders from a distance; remote weapons, from guns to bombs, enabled 
impersonal attacks; surveillance became effectuated remotely through the 
invention of planes, drones, and camera lenses; and now the Middle East 
can be experienced in ‘laser tag’-style war games in Western countries. 
Terrain ref inement and soldier mapping has evolved, as this chapter has 
demonstrated, from the ‘f lat worlds’ (Connor) of tabletop and virtual war 
games to more recent live simulations, which have brought back real human 
bodies into the simulation of the Middle East in the form of role-players, a 
continuation of the war game tradition of reducing real human lives and 
geographical space into a simulatable, manoeuvrable imagined geography 
of the Middle East.
Two opposed tendencies can be found in the evolution of these imagined 
geographies: a significant distance from the actual reality of the Middle East 
persists, while the soldiers themselves lose their critical detachment from 
the simulation. The sensory and emotional engulfment in the imagined 
geographies that simulations consistently strive for obliterates the necessary 
distance to identify the abstractions, omissions, and compressions of the 
real Middle East that are performed by the simulations. The imagined 
geographies generated by the simulated Middle East in turn shape the 
expectations and imaginations of the soldiers that are then applied in future 
conflicts. These military mapping practices enlisted in the duty of war 
preparation hence demonstrate ‘the extraordinary power and performative 
force of colonial modernity’ (Gregory 2004, p. 4):
Its constructions of other cultures – not only the way these are understood 
in an immediate, improvisational sense, but also the way in which more 
or less enduring codif ications of them are produced – shape its own 
dispositions and deployments. (Gregory 2004, p. 4)
The simulated Middle Eastern spaces run the risk of being internalized 
by soldiers, especially since they often have no prior personal experience 
of the foreign land and culture. These engrained experiences then have 
the potential to turn into self-fulf illing prophecies during deployment, 
when soldiers encounter the real population and Middle Eastern spaces 
and perceive them through the experiential reading grid and imagined 
geography acquired through the training simulations. As Lippmann already 
warned, the ‘picture inside’ – in this case the picture created through the 
wargaming of the Middle East – ‘so often misleads men in their dealings 
with the world outside’ (1998, p. 30).
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5. Iranian Internet Cinema, a Cinema 
of Embodied Protest : Imperfect, 
Amateur, Small, Unauthorized, Global
Hamid Naficy
Abstract
This chapter examines the emergence of what I call ‘internet cinema’ by 
focusing on Iran in the late 2000s, particularly since the 2009 disputed 
re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president, which unleashed 
the opposition Green Movement undergirded by this cinema. Iran 
provides an example of the use of the new internet-driven digital 
global media in support of democratic ideals that, soon after the Green 
Movement, rocked many authoritarian regimes of the Middle East and 
North Africa.
Keywords: Internet cinema, Iran, Green Movement, amateur
The Emergence of a Citizen’s Medium
With the success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic took 
over the broadcast media and placed it under direct control of the ‘supreme 
leader’. Having gotten rid of one authoritarian regime with a monopolistic 
state-run broadcast media under the Shah, Iranians did not take this lying 
down. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, they engaged in a creative cat-and-
mouse game with the state to create thriving black markets for alternative 
media, particularly for video – by means of a mushrooming video club 
scene – and satellite television – by means of clandestine receivers at home 
and Persian extraterritorial satellite stations (Naficy 2012a, pp. 339–348). 
However, they did not stop there. In the 2000s, Iranians developed a third 
front in the struggle to create an alternative citizen-driven public medium. 
Strohmaier, A. and A. Krewani (eds.), Media and Mapping Practices in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Producing Space. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021
doi 10.5117/9789462989092_ch05
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This was emblematized by the emergence of the internet cinema with which 
Iranians worldwide challenged the Islamic regime’s broadcasting monopoly 
and mono-vocalism during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
particularly after his disputed re-election (Naficy 2012b, pp. 348–362).
This was a new, legitimate, artistic, and expressive form, regardless of 
its political uses. Iranian cosmopolitanism, the f inancial wealth of the 
country, and the widespread penetration of the internet and its various 
modalities of connectivity and interactivity drove the emergence of the 
internet cinema. In 2005, CIA off icers at the Open Source Center trolling 
the internet discovered that Persian/Farsi was among the top f ive languages 
in the blogosphere, offering valuable textual and audiovisual information 
and insight about Iranian people and their sentiments (Shane 2005). In 2008, 
a Harvard University study further showed that the Persian blogosphere is 
‘a large discussion space of approximately 60,000 routinely updated blogs 
featuring a rich and varied mix of bloggers’ that ranges from President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to students (Kelly and Etling 2008, p. 2). Still later 
studies showed that Iran has ‘the most internet users in the Middle East, 
approaching 30 million’ and that Persian is reported as the ‘fourth most 
popular Blogging language on the Internet’ (Shahab and Mousoli 2010).
However, as Sreberny and Khiabany rightly note, these f igures are 
ambiguous, as it is not clear how the number of bloggers is calculated and 
what constitutes an Iranian blog. If the physical location of bloggers is the 
criteria (counting only those inside Iran), the calculation would ignore 
the large number of bloggers in the diaspora; if the language of blogging is 
considered (Persian/Farsi), then all those Iranians, dual national Iranians, 
and non-Iranians who write in other languages are ignored (2010, pp. 35–36). 
However they are counted, Iranian bloggers formed a formidable presence 
in the blogosphere in particular and in cyberspace in general. Because of 
this presence and because of the strangling of other forms of journalism, 
the internet became a vital source of information and activism in the 2000s 
for all sides and a highly contested public diplomacy sphere. The 25-minute 
f ilm Iran: The Cyber-Dissidents (2006), produced by Vivien Altman and 
reported by Mark Corcoran for Australian Broadcasting Corporation, deals 
with this burgeoning phenomenon.
What I call ‘internet cinema’1 consists of the totality of the digital media 
connected by the internet – blogs, f ilms, social networks, and the sharing and 
streaming of videos – which have turned the internet’s virtual space into a 
vast online public sphere that, in turn, encourages discursive formations and 
1 This chapter is a modif ied version of a section from Nafcy 2012a, pp. 348–362.
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political activism in society, such as the Green Movement, which demand 
government accountability and democracy. The internet thus became 
social, not only in its virtuality but also in its actuality. The streets, in turn, 
became virtual, both in their powerful representations on the internet and 
in their power to represent. This movement posed the biggest challenge in 
the lifespan of the Islamic Republic of Iran, not only to its legitimacy but 
also temporarily to its existence.
Mainstream Western media and exiled Iranian media lauded the power 
of this new virtual and discursive space ad inf initum, which prematurely 
and erroneously dubbed the new protests a ‘Twitter Revolution’, ignoring 
the fact that technology and media by themselves do not make a revolution 
(Acuff 2010). In fact, Twitter played a relatively small role at the time inside 
Iran, partly because of government censorship, but it proved more effective 
outside the country in publicizing the events (Esfandiari 2010). While Twitter 
and Facebook were used admirably to exchange information, f ile news 
reports and images, and organize protests domestically and internationally 
(Hashem and Najjar 2010), the social space and the physical place remained 
high on the agenda of the protesters, emblematized by a street placard 
carrying the following slogan, addressed to the regime: ‘We’ll give you back 
the web sites and mobile phones, but we won’t give you the country’ (‘Seit O’ 
mobeil arzunitun, keshvar nemidim behetun’), referring, on the one hand, to 
the power of the government to shut down the internet and mobile phones 
and, on the other hand, to the power of citizens to withhold support and 
to f ight back.
The negative consequences of the shift in US and Iranian public 
diplomacies, from gathering secret information from enemy countries 
through espionage to collecting information from public sources in those 
countries, such as through the internet, for mobilizing soft power, was that 
it politicized, even militarized, all public spheres, including the streets 
and the internet. Both the people and the government in Iran became 
camera-shy in public places in major cities. If someone took out a camera 
to take a picture in the streets, both government agents and passers-by 
harassed the person – one fearing that the image would be uploaded to 
social networking sites or to oppositional sites, feeding the gathering 
anti-regime dissent; the other fearing government surveillance and future 
arrests. As a result, some of the early protest videos were f ilmed almost 
clandestinely, from private places like balconies and from inside apart-
ments and off ices, where the f ilmers were not exposed. Nevertheless, the 
government attempted to remove, impede, or block these public sources 
of information and to surveil, track down, imprison, and severely punish 
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the internet operators and users it considered to be aiding the dissidents. 
Ironically, the US sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, too, 
initially contributed to the suppression of the digital uprising of Iranians. 
Although the sanctions law, dating from the Clinton presidency, prohibited 
Americans from exporting goods and services to Iran, it allowed certain 
exceptions, among them ‘information and informational materials’ (Parsi, 
Elliot, and Disney 2010, p. 164). The problem was that internet technology, 
or any technology developed in the 1990s, was apparently not covered 
under this exception, with the result that companies such as Microsoft 
and Google denied their instant messaging to Iranians (MSN Messenger 
and Google Talk) because these depended on user downloads, which were 
interpreted as constituting not information but prohibited service. Even 
Twitter’s legal status came under question until the Obama administration 
removed the doubt, when in the aftermath of the 2009 elections, it asked 
Twitter to ‘forego routine maintenance in order to continue providing 
uninterrupted service to Iranians’ (Parsi, Elliot, and Disney 2010, p. 165). 
Six months later, the Iranian Digital Empowerment Act, spearheaded by 
Representative Jim Moran, which ‘authorized downloads of free mass 
market software by companies such as Microsoft and Google to Iran 
necessary for exchange of personal communications and/or sharing of 
information over the internet such as instant messaging, chat and email, 
and social networking’ (Parsi, Elliot, and Disney 2010, p. 166), was passed 
by the US Congress.
The regime’s impediments and censorship efforts did not deter the op-
position, either; instead, it encouraged a creative but sometimes deadly and 
violent game of cat and mouse – both on the internet and in the streets. 
Protesters found ever more ingenuous alternatives to stay in touch, recon-
nect, and coordinate actions, and they sought new strategies, internal and 
international, to create an alternative non-governmental mediascape to 
publicize their own activities and grievances, organize their protests, and 
pressure and punish the regime. Many resorted to proxies, which redirected 
them to banned sites, or used anonymizers, which concealed the identities of 
senders and recipients. Foremost among these anti-censorship software tools 
were Tor, Psiphon, Mixminion, Incognito, Freegate, and the purportedly more 
ingenuous programme Haystack, designed especially for Iran by American 
hacktivist Austin Heap (Dobson 2010). Many, too, took to the streets to 
agitate and to record events. One placard in a street demonstration around 
the time of the disputed 2009 election carried the pithy slogan, ‘My [mobile] 
phone, my medium’ (‘Telefon-e man, resaneh-ye man’), which summarized 
the def iance of the protesters against the state and its centralized ‘big’ 
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media, the broadcast media. Amplifying that message, another said ‘Every 
Iranian, a historiographer’ (‘Har Irani tarikhnegar’). A cartoon echoed these 
sentiments by depicting an Iranian woman wearing a crown of light and 
posing like the US Statue of Liberty, but instead of holding a lit torch, she 
holds up a mobile phone emanating waves.
This was the moment for the eff lorescence of a new ‘little medium’, 
the internet cinema, with its simple, ubiquitous equipment – a mobile 
phone or a consumer model digital camera or recorder – to replace the 
formerly powerful little medium of analogue audio cassette, which Ayatollah 
Khomeini had employed so effectively to energize the Islamic Revolution 
in the late 1970s (Naf icy 2011). This was a new era, necessitating a new 
medium, for a new cause. Indeed, each protester became a digital medium 
and a historiographer by taking to the streets, digital camera, mobile phone, 
or recorder in hand, defying the government’s threats of force and terror 
and its monopoly on the big media. Oppositional f ilm-making against the 
Islamic Republic of Iran took varied forms: documentaries, f iction f ilms, 
agitprop f ilms, animated f ilms, internet f ilms, and music videos. Here, I 
discuss the latter two.
Production, Distribution, Exhibition, Reception
Emboldened by their initial successes in publicizing the protests, internet 
cinema f ilmers began to record their videos from the turmoil in the streets, 
at ground level, instead of from the safety of the high-rise buildings and 
from behind windows and curtains as before. With this shift from the 
private to the public space, and from a distant view to a close-up view of the 
subjects, came other fundamental political and aesthetic changes in what 
was recorded. Social barriers and divisions, such as those separating genders, 
crumbled. Women therefore became such a strong and defiant presence both 
in the streets and on internet cinema’s community videos. Hamed Yusefi’s 
25-minute f ilm, The Aesthetics of Political Protest in Iran (Zibashenasi-ye 
E’terazat-e Siasi dar Iran), aired by BBC Persian on 22 July 2010, provides 
insightful analysis of these points.
In addition, instead of recording from the point of view of an outsider 
observing news events, community videographers began to record from 
the point of view of insiders, engaged in action. Their recording mode 
thus shifted from direct cinema’s f ly-on-the-wall observational f ilming 
of outside events to cinéma-vérité’s provocation-cum-recording of pro-
f ilmic events (Nichols 2001). As such, theirs was not a simple recording 
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of protests that someone else had organized, but an embodied form of 
protest in whose organization they themselves participated, with all the 
subjectivity, ambiguity, and hapticity – roughness, shakiness, and out of 
focus and chaotic aiming and muff led sounds – that these entailed. The 
result was unedited raw footage of affect, not edited f ilms of a polished 
presentation. These proved to be very powerful when uploaded onto the 
video sharing and social networking sites, bypassing government control 
and censorship.
Unlike traditional f ilms, which are highly planned affairs and involve 
industrial procedures, high-tech equipment, and numerous skilled 
personnel both in front and behind the camera, led by a hierarchical 
command structure, internet f ilms are often a result of individual 
amateur f ilmers from around the world sharing their spontaneously 
shot scenes on video sharing and social media sites. These unplanned 
scenes become f ilms not by the action of these f ilmers, but by the 
actions of others who may utilize the scenes f ilmed by disparate and 
unrelated f ilmers in constructing other longer f ilms of their own or by 
the actions of the viewers as they surf the net, visiting this or that social 
media platform. If the f irst kind of f ilm is a material, ‘produced’ f ilm 
consisting of scenes contributed by multiple f ilmers, the second kind of 
f ilm is an immaterial ‘received’ f ilm created by each viewer in the act 
of receiving or spectating multiple unrelated f ilm scenes. The result is 
not a single, authoritative f ilm in either case, as each f ilm is the result 
of the actions of one person, which, at least in the case of the received 
f ilm, will be entirely individual, personal, immaterial, and immanent 
to the spectating subject.
However, the affective power of these internet f ilms is often diluted 
when Western television channels broadcast them, for they often sup-
press the original Persian language soundtrack, replacing it with their own 
reporters’ voice-over narrations or commentaries. To be sure, the video of 
Neda Agha-Soltan’s on-camera death as broadcast by Western news media 
was very powerful, but this power came from its tragic content, timing, 
brief length (40 seconds), and the favourable semiotics of Agha-Soltan’s 
youth, beauty, fair skin, and Westernized veil and attire, which made her 
a subject with whom Westerners could easily identify (Sabety 2010; Afshar 
2010). Its power also came from the video’s powerful visuality, the way it 
clearly witnessed the last eye contact of the dying young woman with 
the camera, as life departed from her body. However, if viewers saw the 
original raw footage of her on the internet, without the foreign reporters’ 
voice-over intervention, they would hear the voices of the bystanders – all 
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male – gathered around her trying to console her, communicate with each 
other, and save her, as their voices rise into desperate cries, making the 
video much more compelling in its emotional and visceral impact. Here 
is my transcription of the bystanders’ utterances, some of which are not 
suff iciently audible:
– ‘Let’s get someone to carry her away…’ [to a hospital?]
– ‘Neda! Watch her eyes, watch her eyes.’
– ‘Her eyes are turning in.’
– ‘Neda, don’t be afraid, don’t be afraid.’
– ‘Oh, oh, oh, OH!’ [voices rise to desperate shouts]
–  ‘Press on her, press on her.’ [hands press on her chest, presumably the 
site of her gunshot wound]
–  ‘Neda, stay, stay, stay, STAY!’ [man’s voice rises to a frantic and horrifying 
shout]
– ‘Open her mouth, open her mouth.’2
This sort of affective internet cinema augured not only entirely new relations 
with its social subjects, such as Neda as described above, but also new rela-
tions of production, distribution, exhibition, and reception with its viewers. 
While the site of production of the internet cinema in its initial phases 
was primarily public places – either in the streets or underground – the 
site of reception was chiefly private places – homes and other private or 
semi-private locations. Production – f ilming – was ad hoc, spontaneous, 
amateurish, and without off icial permission, bypassing the strict govern-
ment approval and censorship apparatuses for public f ilming. As such, 
internet cinema is inherently an unauthorized, underground cinema. Its 
technology of recording is no longer optical and chemical, involving celuloid 
f ilm or videotape, but is entirely electronic and digital. This technological 
shift facilitates the globalized production, distribution, and reception of 
the internet cinema videos.
The production of this cinema occurred in two distinct phases. In the f irst 
phase, people with digital cameras recorded the events without editing and 
uploaded them to internet sites, hence my designation of these practitioners 
as f ilmers or videographers, not f ilm-makers. In the case of Agha-Soltan’s 
video, an anonymous person recorded the incident on a mobile phone. In a 
growing practice, a second phase evolved, during which others, who were not 
2 To see the video, go to: Neda Agha-Soltan Shot in Iran, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/
x9oltq_neda-agha-soltan-shot-in-iran_news.
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necessarily involved in the f irst phase, compiled, aggregated, repurposed, 
edited, and uploaded these internet videos to create other f ictional or non-
f ictional videos. This secondary phase turns multiple individual scenes 
recorded by disparate f ilmers into a single f ilm.
Distribution of internet cinema videos is simultaneously both individual-
ized and globalized. The digitized recording of events and their uploading 
onto social networking, video sharing, and video streaming sites as well as 
their publication by global news media outlets facilitates this globalized indi-
viduality or individualized globalization. In this way, ordinary videographers 
become not only extraordinary producers but also extraordinary distribu-
tors, who bypass the traditional commercial or governmental distribution 
systems with their complicated monopolistic techno-political economies. 
In the case of Agha-Soltan’s video, the anonymous f ilmer forwarded the 
video to the British newspaper The Guardian, the network Voice of America, 
and f ive other individuals. Signif icantly, according to The Guardian, one of 
these latter individuals – not the f ilmer – uploaded the video onto Facebook, 
showing the two-step production of internet f ilms. From that one posting, 
copies spread to YouTube and were broadcast within hours by CNN. This 
video was then used in, or served to inspire, numerous types of internet 
f ilms – f iction, documentary, music video, and animated f ilms. It is thus 
that this single video went viral and became simultaneously an icon, index, 
and symbol of the post-election protest and of the democratic aspirations 
of Iranians – the Green Movement – fulf illing all three def initions of the 
sign in Charles Sanders Peirce’s semiology.
The exhibition venue of the internet cinema vastly differed from other 
forms of cinema. It shifted from the stationary brick-and-mortar cinemas 
where people watch f ilms collectively according to a schedule, to small and 
mobile handheld devices, on which individuals with internet access can 
watch f ilms at any time, anywhere in the world. This meant that internet 
cinema’s exhibition was freed from both physical location and physical 
structure, becoming global and virtual. In short, in all its phases of pro-
duction, distribution, exhibition, and reception, internet cinema moved 
from professional and formal to amateur and personal forms, marking 
the ultimate triumph of modernity’s individuality in Iranian cinematic 
expression.
Because of their highly individualized production; their spontaneous, 
embodied, and amateur aesthetics; their small-scale, short length, and 
unedited raw footage; and their mobility, f irst-phase internet videos cannot 
satisfactorily be labelled as cinema. However, I am applying that term to 
them because they are a new form of audiovisual expression on their own, 
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and they spawn, in their second phase, other longer, more robust, and 
professional works, which are exhibited both on the internet and in the 
cinemas. The internet cinema thus added another type to the typology of 
cinemas that emerged in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Whatever the most 
accurate terminology, the fact remains that instead of being dismissed 
by the world on the grounds of their amateur, improvised aesthetics and 
brief bursts of raw footage of affect, internet videos gained an added value 
precisely because of those characteristics of imperfection, which were 
reminiscent of the Third Cinema’s aesthetics of gritty imperfection that in 
the 1960s and 1970s, had countered both the reigning oppressive political 
regimes in the world and mainstream cinema’s oppressive aesthetic regime 
of polish and perfection. In fact, the aesthetics of imperfection, smallness, 
and embodiment of these videos authenticated them fully, as intimate and 
defiant documents of their f ilmers’ presence on the ground, documenting, 
provoking, and protesting against a seemingly hegemonic and intractable 
state and its media.
International recognition of Iranian internet cinema of protest was swift, 
not only in the reiteration and transmedial dissemination of its videos but 
also in the awards received from f ilm festivals and media and journalism 
associations – another reason to call them internet cinema. For example, 
in 2009 Long Island University bestowed its prestigious journalism award, 
the George Polk Award for Videography, to the video of Neda Agha-Soltan 
in recognition of ‘the efforts of the people responsible for recording the 
death of 26-year-old Neda Agha-Soltan at a June protest in Tehran, Iran, 
and uploading the video to the Internet’.3
Internet f ilms, such as Agha-Soltan’s video, soon became the contents of 
other protest f ilms and videos made in different forms – f iction, documen-
tary, animated, and music videos – and some were used, reused, remade, 
remixed, homaged, signif ied upon, and repurposed so many times and so 
transmedially and rhizomatically in a meandering global chain reaction 
that they became viral and infectious, even though virality has usually 
been associated with comedy (Gurney 2011).4 One of these is The Green Wave 
(2010), which premiered internationally at the International Documentary 
Film Festival Amsterdam in 2011. Directed by Iranian-born German f ilm-
maker Ali Samadi Ahadi, the f ilm, according to its press book, is a ‘touching 
documentary-collage’ that illustrates the dramatic 2009 presidential election 
3 See: https://liu.edu/polk-awards/past-winners#2009
4 Neda, an animated version, offers a historical background of the incident: http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=wXN_yCSbUYk&feature=related.
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protests and expresses the feelings of the people involved in the Green 
Movement. Emblematic of internet cinema,
Facebook reports, Twitter messages and videos posted in the internet are 
included in the f ilm composition, and hundreds of real blog entries serve 
as reference for the experiences and thoughts of two young students, 
whose story is running through the f ilm as the main thread. The f ilm 
describes their initial hope and curiosity, their desperate fear, and the 
courage to yet continue to f ight.5
These f ictional storylines were animated using motion comic technique, 
and augmented by interviews with prominent human rights campaigners 
and exiled Iranians, such as Shirin Ebadi, Mohsen Kadivar, Payam Akhavan, 
Mehdi Mohseni, and Mitra Khalatbari.
These extended internet cinema f ilms, too, received international praise 
and prizes. For example, in November 2010 the International Documentary 
Film Festival Amsterdam recognized the importance of these internet f ilms 
when it gave its Unlimited Award to The Silent Majority Speaks (2010) by 
The Silent Collective, a 93-minute f ilm anthology consisting of fourteen 
f ilms made on mobile phones and similar devices by anonymous Iranians 
about the post-election protests and the state violence against protestors. 
The 5000-euro cash award given to the f ilm was an initiative of Hivos 
Cultural Fund, one of the NGOs that the Iranian intelligence ministry had 
identif ied as supporting a velvet revolution against the regime. The award 
was given to an Iranian women’s rights activist, Mahboubeh Abbasgholi-
zade, condemned in absentia in Iran to two-and-a-half years of prison and 
30 lashes, who dedicated her f ilm to the anonymous citizen f ilmers.6 In 
addition, in November 2010, the Foreign Press Association named Iranian 
journalist Saeed Kamali Dehghan, who regularly writes for The Guardian, 
‘journalist of the year’ for his coverage of the disputed presidential election 
and gave the top award for best TV Feature/Documentary f ilm to the 
HBO f ilm For Neda, which Anthony Thomas had co-directed with Kamali 
Dehghan (Batty 2010). All these are examples of the internet cinema in its 
various modalities.
5 The Green Wave press book: http://www.thegreenwave-f ilm.com.
6 ‘Jayezeh-ye Sinemai Bara-ye “Filmsazan-e Nashenas-e” Iran’, http://zamaaneh.com/
news/2010/11/post_14948.html.
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Hailing/Counterhailing
Music videos became one of the most powerful forms of the internet cinema, 
driven by the global popularity of the music video form, the emergence of 
dynamic Iranian rock music groups inside Iran and in the diaspora, and 
the continuing disenchantment of Iranians with their regime. These music 
videos became effective means of counterhailing the state and its repressive 
apparatuses. Blurred Vision, a Toronto-based rock band formed in 2007 by 
brothers Sepp and Sohl, who f led Iran with their family in 1986 (and do 
not reveal their last name to safeguard family members’ security in Iran), 
produced one of the more powerful music videos supporting the protesters 
of Ahmadinejad’s re-election. This video became very popular if not viral. 
On 30 January 2010, the band remade the famous Pink Floyd song ‘Another 
Brick in the Wall’, popular in Iran, into a clear-eyed new protest anthem, 
‘Another Brick in the Wall (Hey, Ayatollah, Leave Those Kids Alone!)’. In it, 
they intercut footage of their purported clandestine performance of the song 
inside Iran, f ilmed by a fan on a mobile phone, with those of street clashes 
f ilmed by anonymous f ilmers, and an overbearing Ayatollah character 
who orders the security police to shut down the performance. Within a 
short time, the music video had been played an impressive 383,394 times 
on YouTube; however, the brothers were more impressed by the responses 
from inside Iran.7 Sepp explained:
We get a lot of emails, especially from the younger guys, and I remember 
we were in London for a f ilm festival where we were there to receive an 
award for best video and Sohl was translating an email into English. And 
as he was translating he started crying. The email said, ‘It is you guys out 
there that can keep this going for us, that can keep our voice alive. We’re 
here sort of isolated from the rest of the world, we’ve been shut down 
and shut off from the rest of the world and all we can say is just keep our 
voice alive, keep going to allow us to reach this point of freedom. (quoted 
in Macedo 2010)
That YouTube was often shut down by the Islamic government made such 
a response all the more signif icant, since users had to go through extra 
steps to get around censorship (without censorship, the hits the video 
received would have been much higher). Not all the comments were positive, 
7 Blurred Vision’s Another Brick in the Wall’s music video is at: http://www.dailymotion.com/
video/xcp5ua_blurred-vision-another-brick-in-the_music.
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however, as some people accused the band of being involved in American 
soft-power public diplomacy against Iran, of being ‘backed by the CIA and 
the Pentagon and making a fortune off the U.S. government’, a charge the 
band denied, stating that it donates most of the song’s download proceeds 
to Amnesty International. ‘It’s an ethos of the band that awareness can 
change the world and music is our tool and platform to do that,’ said Sepp, 
‘and in my opinion it’s truly working because the dialogue has begun.’ 
(quoted in Macedo 2010)
‘Hey Executioner, Get Lost!’ (‘Hey Jallad, Gom Kon Gureto! ’) (2011) is 
another music video on the protest movement that tapped into Pink 
Floyd’s ‘Another Brick in the Wall’ song and quoted a line from Blurred 
Vision’s music video version of it, except ‘Hey Executioner’ is more in-
cendiary than its predecessor. It identif ies President Ahmadinejad and 
Supreme Leader Khamenei as the executioners in its title, urging them 
to leave a country that is no longer theirs. The video clips of the street 
demonstrations that accompany the lyrics include images of orderly 
protests, which are disrupted by police violence, causing the angry 
demonstrators to turn on the uniformed and plain-clothes police off icers, 
whom they beat up mercilessly and whose van they turn over. The video’s 
message is no longer protest but revolt, summarized in the lyrics, ‘We 
are full of anger, like the typhoon/ We are engaged in a relentless battle/ 
Listen to me my enemy, there is no place for you in my homeland/ Hey 
executioner, get lost’.8
Yet another effective counterhailing song, which spawned music videos 
on YouTube, was ‘Thorn and Riffraff’ (‘Khas O’ Khashak’), which Iranians 
produced to counter what Ahmadinejad had once labelled the thousands 
of demonstrators to his re-election, as ‘a few thorns and riffraff’. The song 
turns Ahmadinejad’s own words against him and his regime, addressing 
them in its refrain: You are the thorn and riffraff/ You are lower than dirt/ 
I am the aching lover/ Ablaze, bright, and full of fervor.9
Clearly, these music videos and many others like them, which incorporate 
internet cinema footage, are examples of citizens withdrawing their support 
from the regime, and they constitute one of the most effective peaceful 
means of combatting intolerant and undemocratic regimes. However, these 
videos took one step further from those that did not feature music video 
footage. All of them reversed the interpellation that Althusser describes in 
8 Hey Executioner, Get Lost music video is at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wR77TN1_
d8k&feature=player_embedded#at=60.
9 For Khas o Khashak, go to: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xtLp2VMYF5o.
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his famous illustration of a police off icer calling a citizen: ‘Hey! You, there’ 
(Althusser and Balibar 1971). By turning to respond to the police off icer call 
in that example, the passer-by is hailed and becomes a subject of the state. 
Instead of being hailed by the state and its agents (‘Hey! You, there’), in these 
videos it is the protesters and their global sympathizers and collaborators 
who counterhail the state, not only in the video’s titles but also in their 
frequent shouted refrains addressed to the regime: ‘Hey, Ayatollah, Leave 
Those Kids Alone!’, ‘Hey Executioner, Get Lost!’, and ‘You are the thorn and 
riffraff / You are lower than dirt’. It is in this power not only to withdraw 
consent but also to counterhail the state, of speaking truth to power, that 
internet cinema f inds its political fulf ilment.
The Iranian government moved to stifle this new form of cinema, both 
in its production and dissemination. It began arresting virtual and social 
activists and videographers, and it arrested an increasing number of bloggers, 
whose labour complemented the internet cinema, sentencing them to jail 
terms ranging from a few months to many years. In 2004 it arrested some 
20 bloggers and internet journalists (Tehrani 2008), and between 2000 and 
2006 Iran became the top censor of the internet in the Middle East (El Gody 
2007, p. 223), thwarting the democratic potential of the internet as well as of 
Iranians. Within a few years, Reporters Without Borders was able to label 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, along with thirteen other countries, as ‘enemies 
of the Internet’ (Shahab and Mousoli 2010). In September 2008, prominent 
Iranian Canadian blogger, Hosain Derakhshan (nicknamed blogfather, aka 
Hoder.com), was arrested inside Iran on a variety of charges, among them, 
collaborating with hostile foreign powers, including Israel. Derakhshan had 
been the editor of the Internet and Film section of Doniya-ye Tasvir (World of 
Pictures) magazine in Tehran and after emigrating to Canada, had introduced 
‘a simple but groundbreaking’ way to show Persian letters and characters 
on the internet, which contributed to the prominence of Iranians in the 
blogosphere. This charge of spying was apparently due to a well-publicized 
trip of his in 2006 to Israel (on his Canadian passport) whose aims were 
to show ‘his 20,000 daily Iranian readers what Israel really looks like and 
how people live there’, and to ‘humanize’ Iranians for Israelis (Theodoulou 
2008). A controversial f igure among the blogging community, he had toned 
down his anti-regime blogging and began supporting it, and he returned to 
Iran from his self-imposed exile, hoping to work inside the country. He was 
jailed for nearly two years before f inally being sentenced to an incredible 
nineteen and a half years of imprisonment on charges of ‘conspiring with 
hostile governments, spreading propaganda against the Islamic system, 
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spreading propaganda in favour of counterrevolutionary groups, blasphemy, 
and creating and managing obscene Web sites’ (Mackey 2010).
‘Like journalists, bloggers have been treated for months as if they are 
enemies of the regime’, Reporters Without Borders said. ‘But the authorities 
have now started to impose much harsher sentences on them. Bloggers 
involved in censorship circumvention are being particularly targeted as 
they help their fellow citizens to gain access to banned information.’10 
Internet censorship took many forms, not only imprisonment but also 
more subtle and structural forms, such as censorship laws and regulations, 
content f iltering, tapping and surveillance, infrastructural control, telecom 
control, and self-censorship (El Gody 2007, p. 231). Imprisonment, however, 
remained a common form of censorship. The Committee to Protect Journal-
ists reported that by February 2010, there were 52 journalists in Iranian jails, 
a record high that accounted for a third of all the journalists imprisoned 
in the world.11 A month later, Reporters Without Borders noted that
with some sixty journalists and bloggers behind bars and another 50 
forced to seek asylum elsewhere, the Islamic Republic of Iran has become 
the largest prison in the Middle East – and one of the world’s largest 
prisons – for journalists and netizens.12
Undeterred, some Iranian activists came up with another tactic: they took 
legal action against the Islamic Republic’s interests from outside Iran. 
In August 2010, jailed and tortured prominent journalist Isa Saharkhiz 
and his son, Mehdi Saharkhiz, f iled a lawsuit in the US Federal Court 
in Alexandria, Virginia, against Nokia Siemens Networks and its parent 
companies, Siemens AG and Nokia Inc., alleging their complicity in the 
Iranian government’s human rights violations through the spying centres 
that the companies had supplied. The journalist claimed that such centres 
had conducted surveillance, eavesdropping, and tracking of his mobile 
phone and other communications after the 2009 elections, resulting in his 
incarceration and torture. The plaintiffs demanded that Nokia Siemens 
Networks cease its support of the Iranian intercepting centres and use 
its connections within the Iranian regime to secure Saharkhiz’s freedom. 
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business practices such as the ones engaged in by Nokia Siemens Networks 
in Iran.13
In another tactic, International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran 
called for the removal of Ezzatollah Zarghami, Director General of Voice 
and Vision of the Islamic Republic (VVIR, aka IRIB, Islamic Republic 
of Iran Broadcasting), the state’s national broadcast monopoly, on the 
charge that in addition to its close cooperation with intelligence agents 
and interrogators, the VVIR, under Zarghami’s direction, had ‘system-
atically produced and broadcast programs aimed to target well-known 
personalities through attributing undue, libellous, and untrue matters 
to them’ (Zarghami 2010). This was a reference to the latest iteration of 
Identity and Armageddon shows, a new series called Sedition Documents 
that purported to offer documentaries about reformists such as Ataollah 
Mohajerani, Abdolkarim Sorush, Akbar Ganji, Shirin Ebadi, Fatemeh 
Haqiqatju, and Mohsen Sazegara, many in diaspora, aired on main VVIR 
channels during prime time. Having no access to them to interrogate 
and force them into incriminating show trials, these state-sanctioned 
documentaries smeared these individuals by digging up dirt in their 
private lives and by falsely presenting them as immoral and hostile to 
Islam and to religion (Siamand 2010). The campaign further demanded 
that the Iranian parliament and judiciary launch an independent inquiry 
into VVIR’s violations of the constitution and citizens’ rights on behalf of 
the defamed individuals who could not defend themselves in the court 
of public opinion because of the government monopoly of all broadcast 
media.14 Assessing the success or failure of these extraterritorial legal 
interventions in impeding Iranian government’s illegal attacks on its 
own citizens requires further research.
Public Diplomacy and Soft-Power Politics
The Iranian regime took a page from the US government’s soft-power public 
diplomacy rule book, went global, and began countering the US government’s 
funding of anti-Islamic Republic and pro-democracy NGOs inside and 
outside Iran. This included supporting and funding NGOs in the West that 
13 See: http://onlymehdi.posterous.com/tortured-prominent-iranian-journalist-sues-no.
14 ‘Iranian State TV Acts as an Arm of the Intelligence Apparatus’, http://www.iranhumanrights.
org/2010/08/iranian-state-tv-acts-as-an-arm-of-the-intelligence-apparatus/print/.
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engaged in cultural programming that favoured the Islamic Republic.15 
It also began a wide-ranging ‘campaign of harassing and intimidating 
members of its diaspora worldwide – not just prominent dissidents – who 
criticize the regime’ (Bandow 2009). This unprecedented action consisted 
not only of slowing down the internet speed, blocking social networking 
sites (Facebook, Twitter), video-sharing sites (YouTube), internet telephone 
services (Skype), and cutting email service inside Iran, but also of tracking 
the activities of Iranians on networking sites worldwide, creating fake sites 
for the protesters to rope in more victims, monitoring Iranian protesters in 
diaspora (900 were tracked in Germany), videotaping their public demonstra-
tions in order to harass them and their families at home, and sending them 
anonymous threatening emails to cease and desist from ‘spreading lies 
and insults’ (Fassihi 2009). All these measures may have been facilitated 
and enhanced by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ takeover of the 
telecom infrastructure.
It must be noted that the situation governing the internet in Iran is 
very complicated and conflictual not only within the opposing factions 
– pro- and anti-government – but also within each faction. For example, 
within the ruling faction, one faction bans Twitter while others turn to 
it as their favourite medium of communication with their cadres and to 
the nation. On 15 August 2018, Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, the attorney 
general, condemned the actions of some of the lawmakers to lift the ban on 
Twitter, calling it a ‘highway to corruption’ whose control is in the hands 
of ‘the enemy’. His deputy accused Twitter of having had a major hand in 
the ‘seditious’ Green Movement, which led to its banning soon thereafter. 
Despite that ban, not only ordinary citizens and social activists but also 
high-ranking off icials such as Abbas Ali Kadkhodai, the spokesperson for 
the Guardian Council, and even the supreme leader himself, Ali Khamenei, 
maintain their Twitter accounts and actively communicate with them.16 
15 One NGO that purportedly received such help was the Center for Iranian Studies in Toronto; 
see: ‘Is Toronto Cultural Centre Funded by Iran’s Mullah Regime?’, http://www.onlydemocra-
cy4iran.com/2010/04/15/is-toronto-cultural-centre-funded-by-irans-mullah-regime/. National 
Iranian American Council (NIAC) has also been accused of promoting Islamic Republic causes 
by some exiles, even though it has received funding from the US government and other American 
foundations, which would militate against such cross-funding. NIAC denies any aff iliations 
with the Iranian regime. See: ‘EDITORIAL: Voice of the mullahs: Public diplomacy takes a 
pro-Islamist tilt’, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/14/voice-of-the-mullahs/; 
http://english.iranianlobby.com/page1.php?id=22&bakhsh=JOURNAL; http://www.niacouncil.
org/site/PageServer?pagename=About_myths_facts.
16 See: ‘Dadsetan-e Koll-e Iran: Telegram va Instagram Bala Ijad Kardehand’, https://m.dw.com/
fa-ir/iran/a-45090089?maca=fa-IR-Whatsapp-sharing&.
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Kadkhodai went as far as to state that he does not consider using Twitter 
to be illegal.17 The cat-and-mouse game around social media continues at 
all levels and in all sectors of society.
In 2010, Ahmadinejad’s government attempted another tactic: it put on 
another charm offensive for the Iranians in diaspora who had previously 
been denigrated by the Islamic Republic leaders. It established the High 
Council of Iranians Abroad, which sought to attract thousands of professional 
Iranians and potential investors to visit, invest in, and return to Iran. It 
also sought to facilitate their travels by establishing a 24-hour hotline, 
establishing branch off ices of the council in Iranian provinces, supporting 
the creation of ‘Iran House’ branches in foreign countries, and organizing 
in Tehran a massive Grand Conference of Iranians Living Abroad, offering 
to pay for participants’ travel and accommodations.18 However, instead of 
‘polishing Iran’s image’, the grand conference, ‘ended up showcasing many 
of the country’s bitter internal divisions’ (Yong and Worth 2010), and the 
opposition was quick to post the participants’ names and pictures on the 
internet in an effort to ‘expose the double crossers’.19
Such politicization of digital media and the internet by the public diplo-
macy quartet of partners – Western powers, the Iranian regime, Iranian 
dissidents at home, and Iranian dissidents in diaspora – had the unfortunate 
result of deeply and structurally politicizing the Iranian domestic and 
diaspora media and internet cinema, whether their contents were political 
or not, degrading their professional impartiality and journalistic fairness, 
and undermining the media and civil society formations inside and outside 
the country, regardless of whether they had accepted American or Iranian 
governments funding or not, feeding Iranians’ penchant for conspiracy 
thinking. It also made Iranian or binational Iranian intellectuals, academics, 
artists, bloggers, f ilmers, f ilm-makers, and community activists, whether 
they were beneficiaries of public diplomacy funding or not, suspect to the 
Iranian and Western intelligence services or targets of their surveillance 
and recruitment, with serious consequences for their democratic aspirations 
and their lives.
17 See: ‘Sokhangu-ye Showra-ye Negahban Estefadeh az Twitter ra Gheir-e Qanuni Nemidanad’, 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-45202575?ocid=wspersian.chat-apps.in-app-msg.whatsapp.
trial.link1_.auin.
18 See: http://congress.iranianshouse.ir/; http://congress.iranianshouse.ir/.
19 ‘Barkhi Sherkat Konandegan-e dar Hamayesh-e Bozorg-e Iranian-e Moqime-e Kharej’, 
http://greenprotests.blogspot.com/2010/08/blog-post_05.html.
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The Arab Spring of 2011 appeared on the news in countless video testimoni-
als shot by participants and bystanders. Yet the sheer amount of such visual 
data, combined with the untranslatability and poor quality of the footage, 
delivers an often opaque and ambiguous material. Peter Snowdon’s f ilm 
The Uprising (2013) appropriates and reassembles this amateur footage. 
Compared to the 1992 f ilm Videograms of a Revolution by Harun Farocki 
and Andrei Ujică, The Uprising raises the question of a possible knowledge 
shift produced and performed by the amateur video maker. In an analysis 
of these f ilms, this chapter investigates the possibilities of documenting 
historical events through mobile video footage.
Keywords: Documentary, found footage f ilm, Syria, amateur
The act of self-immolation by the fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in 
December 2010 triggered a wave of demonstrations throughout Tunisia, 
mobilizing masses of people to oppose the failing government. The spirit 
of protest quickly spread to other countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Spontaneous demonstrations emerged and expanded not only in 
the streets but also through an unprecedented use of social media. As 
a result, virtually anyone in the world could instantly see the events by 
means of images and mostly mobile phone camera videos, recorded and 
uploaded to the internet on a massive scale from various epicentres of the 
protests. Many citizens turned into amateur journalists in protesting against 
Strohmaier, A. and A. Krewani (eds.), Media and Mapping Practices in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Producing Space. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021
doi 10.5117/9789462989092_ch06
140 K AtArzyNA ruchEl-StocKMANS 
authoritarianism, human rights violations, and dire living conditions using 
methods of civil disobedience combined with internet activism. There has 
been an intense debate about the role of the new media and electronic social 
platforms in sparking, maintaining, and spreading the revolutions of 2011 
(Boëx 2013a; 2013b; Khatib 2013). After initial enthusiasm about the ‘YouTube’, 
‘Facebook’, or ‘Twitter revolutions’, various commentators expressed their 
doubts about the actual impact of new media formats and social connectivity 
on the political events (Downey 2014; Harkin 2013; Hawkins 2014; Werbner 
et al. 2014). What is clearly novel and groundbreaking in this period of 
upheavals is the broad and instant availability of numerous audiovisual 
documents on the internet, making the participant-generated visuals the 
main source of knowledge about the revolutions and ensuing conflicts for 
the public outside of the region (Robertson 2015).
As Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green note in their book Spread-
able Media, there is a direct journalistic value to the spontaneously created 
online image archive (2013, pp. 41–44). Video activists using the internet 
bypass the normal news channels, creating a democratic peer-to-peer 
communication (Jenkins, Ford, and Green 2013). Yet this vast repertory 
of clips, photographs, and sounds def ies the more established forms of 
knowledge production, such as f ilm, documentary or journalistic report 
(Zabunyan 2016, pp. 7–36). This chapter aims to investigate the role of online 
video sharing from the post-2011 MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 
region, especially Syria, in building new models of historical knowledge 
production. It encompasses an analysis of three specif ic case studies: Peter 
Snowdon’s f ilm The Uprising (2013); the short f ilm series by the Abounad-
dara collective; and the Syrian Archive launched by Hadi Al Khatib. These 
recent phenomena can be seen as novel forms of historical representations. 
Instead of a conventional f ilm or documentary narrative, they stem from 
and react to the amateur video culture of sharing, tagging, commenting 
on, and appropriating visual material. Throughout this analysis, I trace 
a possible shift in knowledge production precipitated by civic resistance 
and alternative modes of information exchange. Mobile phone images as 
instruments in the hands of participants and eyewitnesses yield a form of 
knowledge that holds an emancipatory promise and at the same time is 
bound with new risks and challenges. The three case studies considered here 
allow to demonstrate the paradigmatic changes in visualizing dissent and 
conflict, while they avoid any authoritative elucidation of the events in the 
Middle East and North Africa. Approaching these new documentary formats 
through the perspective of art and media theories will allow to interrogate 
the ways in which these practices respond to crises (whether seen as political 
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upheaval or humanitarian emergency) while at the same time mobilizing 
and critically revising the newly emerging participatory cultures.1
Vernacular Videos by Citizen Journalists
Many commentators agree that the widespread protests of 2011 were marked 
by an unprecedented role of media activism, yet the debate about what this 
role precisely is still continues. As virtually everyone has a mobile phone at 
hand, it has become common to record an event and upload the videos or 
photographs to the internet (Haskins 2007; Maier-Rothe et al. 2014). During 
the upheavals in the MENA region, citizen journalism emerged as an attractive 
alternative to professional media. Accessible and uncontrollable, it was 
believed to offer a democratizing and emancipatory tool in the hands of the 
people. Soon enough, citizen journalism was also questioned for its partisan 
character. As a matter of fact, citizen journalists are mostly activists who 
are involved in the situations they portray, unlike professional journalists 
who are expected to keep an emotional and ideological distance from the 
subjects they cover. Moreover, citizen journalists are not professionals, and 
therefore the material they deliver is often fragmentary and inadequately 
contextualized for the public. At the same time, many clips found on the 
internet have to remain anonymous to protect the identity of their makers 
and therefore cannot be fact-checked. Videos appear and disappear in the 
mass of images uploaded and re-uploaded every minute on different social 
platforms. The sheer amount of audiovisual information makes it impossible 
to keep an overview of what is happening in different parts of the globe. There 
have been many different ways in which artists, film-makers, and researchers 
have responded to this evolution. This chapter is centered on three projects 
stemming from the online sharing of citizen-journalist videos. The first one, 
Peter Snowdon’s The Uprising (2013) was made shortly after the eruption of 
protests as a found footage film consisting of various videos published online. 
The second, known as Abounaddara, is an anonymous video art collective 
operating in Syria and broadcasting online since 2011. The third, the Syrian 
Archive, is a researcher-led project of collecting and verifying videos of 
human rights violations in Syria since 2014. Each of these documentary 
formats activate different forms of engagement with the video material as 
they reassemble the unruly online visuals in distinct configurations.
1 The research presented in this chapter is part of my long term investigation of participative 
media and knowledge production in and as artistic practice (Ruchel-Stockmans 2012; 2015; 2017).
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The Revolution Reimagined2
The British f ilm-maker Peter Snowdon was one of those who followed 
the 2010–2011 protests in the MENA region from the outside. Working in 
his studio in Belgium, he compiled a selection of videos he found on the 
internet during the events in the Middle East and North Africa. The result 
is a full-length f ilm entitled The Uprising (2013), which is based exclusively 
on found footage, devoid of any authorial commentary.
The Uprising (2013) consists of about one hundred clips of various origins 
found by Peter Snowdon on YouTube and other internet sources. Almost 
all videos relate to protests and upheavals in six Arab countries: Bahrain, 
Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia. Presented in sequences, the clips 
show various gatherings in public spaces, ranging from cheerful moments 
of conviviality to violent clashes between civilians and the police. They also 
include personal messages by vloggers or occasional speakers who address 
people in their countries, urging them to support the emancipatory struggle. 
Signif icantly, the f ilm refrains from a voice-over or intrusive editing. The 
various clips made by different and often anonymous people are stitched 
together regardless of their divergent origins. As a result, images of protesters 
in Bahrain connect visually with those from Egypt or Syria as if they were 
part of the same struggle. The only editing device used by Snowdon is the 
insertion of intertitles dividing the sequences into seven days. The f ilm 
begins with the intertitle ‘Seven Days Ago’ and ends with ‘Today’.
Peter Snowdon’s The Uprising (2013) started as a project of compiling the 
protest videos stemming from Egypt and other countries in the region.3 
As a former resident and journalist in Cairo who subsequently embarked 
on practice-based research in Hasselt, Snowdon was both personally and 
professionally connected to the region. His video selection was screened 
for different publics in both Europe and Egypt. Viewing large numbers of 
these clips for an extended period of time – and seeing the reactions of the 
audiences during the screening – the f ilm-maker decided to stitch the videos 
2 I compared The Uprising to two f ilms on the protests in Syria in an earlier article (Ruchel-
Stockmans 2017). Drawing on this earlier research, I consider it here in the context of participatory 
media and the cultures of online sharing.
3 In an interview, Snowdon explains he lived in Egypt as a journalist and activist prior to the 
protests. When the upheaval began, he had already moved to Belgium and could only watch 
the events unfold live on-screen. In fact, YouTube and social media were the only spaces where 
his friends and colleagues from Cairo could be contacted in the heated days of the protests. 
Telephone lines were inaccessible and it was diff icult to get in touch with the people caught in 
the revolution (Cohn 2014).
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together in one overarching visual narrative. Interestingly, the various and 
mostly anonymous videos nevertheless bear many characteristics that invite 
such a narrative, at the same time challenging the viewer with diff icult, 
opaque, and unsteady visual information.
Filmed with small mobile devices, these videos clearly show the pos-
sibilities and limitations of the technology involved in their making. Mobile 
phones become extensions of the human hand (and not so much the eye) 
as they are held in front of the body, often shoulder-high, and reflect the 
movements of the bodies that use them.4 In clips from mass demonstrations, 
we often get the perspective of one of the participants who looks from 
behind the backs of other people and who regularly has to move forward 
or even run away when the situation becomes more dire. These particular 
conditions of production have a paradoxical effect. On the one hand, we 
have a sense of being directly involved in the events portrayed as we are 
granted the viewpoint of a participant. On the other hand, however, the 
videos are often blurry, shaky, or pixelated, making it diff icult to discern 
or interpret the scene. Such ambiguous effects recall and at the same time 
complicate the analysis of media made by David Bolter and Richard Grusin 
(1999, pp. 19–50). In Remediation, Bolter and Grusin argue that all new media 
strive to provide an immediate experience of the world outside of the media. 
Yet the ‘improvement’ that each medium introduces is in fact created in an 
oscillation between transparency and opacity. A new medium attempts to 
create an experience of immediacy, yet at the same time reveals its own 
status as a mediation. In the case of the handheld, low-resolution, and shaky 
video images, which are spread by participants of sometimes geographi-
cally distant events, the immediacy is generated by the images’ manifestly 
mediated character. It is also impossible to forget that the poor quality of 
these images, low in information and formally def icient, is precisely what 
guarantees their authenticity and directness. They are authentic and direct 
in the sense that they are not edited, processed, or improved. This impression 
of unmediated, raw visual information is particularly strong when we are 
confronted with images from a camera operator who is hit by a bullet and 
falls to the ground. The camera falls too, showing the off-kilter perspective 
of the pavement and close-ups of bloodstained clothing.5
4 In this sense, it becomes relevant to revisit the media theory of Marshall McLuhan, who 
conceptualized media as extensions of man (McLuhan 1964).
5 The phenomenon of protesters who continue f ilming even when they are in the aim of snipers 
has been compellingly analysed by Rabih Mroué in his lecture-performance ‘The Pixelated 
Revolution’. See Rabih Mroué, ‘The Pixelated Revolution’, Image(S), Mon Amour. Fabrications 
(Madrid: CA2M Centro de Arte Dos de Mayo, 2013), pp. 378–393.
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Performativity and Peer-to-Peer Communication
Apart from the videos showing unrest and violence in the streets, The 
Uprising (2013) also contains other types of images. On several occasions, 
we see vloggers commenting on the current situation, appealing to other 
citizens or analysing media coverage about the protests. These images 
are more static, yet even here the handheld camera is often visible and 
image resolution is rather low. What is clear is that these messages are a 
form of peer-to-peer communication eschewing the habitual channels of 
information circulation. Such direct address can equally be found in some 
street scenes, in which protagonists demonstrate the intention to reach 
other citizens. As the clips from the middle of the protests are made by 
serendipitous passers-by, we often see individuals emerging from the crowd 
gathered in the street and expressing their discontent in front of the camera. 
The presence of the person f ilming seems to act as a trigger for many other 
participants to stage an address to the potential viewers of the video. In 
a negative sense, the sight of a camera also prompts aggressive reactions 
from the police or the military, who try to prevent protesters from f ilming. 
In several clips, there is a dialogue between the camera operator and the 
people in front of the camera. At one point, the security forces urge the 
protester holding a camera to stop f ilming. On other occasions, voices from 
the crowd encourage the videographer to continue recording so the world 
can see what is happening. In this sense, the act of f ilming can be seen as 
performative. Both media activists and those visible in the frame enact their 
performances of dissent in front of and for the camera (Ruchel-Stockmans 
2012; 2015). It seems as though the various originally disconnected videos 
were made as part of a large, overarching script for the revolutions.
The sense that there is one script designed by an unknown director was 
noted earlier in recent history. When the f ilm-makers Harun Farocki and 
Andrei Ujică embarked on a documentary about the 1989 revolution in 
Romania, they discovered vast archives of amateur videos in Bucharest that 
were recorded by various unconnected participants of the events. Having 
watched parts of the footage, they decided to reconstruct the chronology of 
the events without much editing of the images. In that period in Romania, 
long before internet and mobile phones became commonplace, there were 
already enough video cameras available for accidental participants to cover 
virtually all important episodes in the violent revolution. Amateurs, students, 
and activists went down to the streets to record the long-awaited change of 
the regime. Already at this point in history the footage shows performativity 
of the cameras discussed earlier. The main difference with the 2011 uprisings 
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lies in the analogue and offline character of the Romanian video archives.6 
The footage used for Videograms of a Revolution (1992) was largely unknown 
and inaccessible until the recent digitization of parts of these archives.
Image Operations
Since 1989, the conditions for viewing and accessing images of citizen 
journalists have changed signif icantly. Peter Snowdon had at his disposal 
the unruly and impenetrable, but principally open and accessible, archives 
of YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook. While Farocki and Ujică gave visibility 
to images habitually buried in archives, Snowdon reused clips that could 
generally be found in their original form by anyone connected to the internet. 
Many of these images also disappear, are removed, or are simply diff icult 
to trace, but their general status is that of open access. Analogue video and 
film required projection or a professional apparatus to be viewed. Electronic 
data can be viewed and processed on common and widely used devices. 
Short videos posted by citizen journalists in 2011 are normally viewed on 
the small screens of laptops, tablets, or mobile phones. It is a distinct form of 
viewing which does not require black box projection, concentrated attention, 
and time investment in a full-length f ilm. This distinction is analogous to 
the difference between a theatre performance and a broadcast, described 
aptly by the sound artist Lucas Derycke. Asked in an interview why he 
prefers a sound performance in a theatre to, for example, a radio or an 
online broadcast, he replies that a theatre performance takes the audience 
hostage for the entire duration of the performance (Derycke 2017). This mode 
of reception imposes, so to speak, concentrated and isolated viewing – or, 
for that matter, listening – of the piece. Clips found on social media invite 
participation by sharing, commenting, and even re-editing the audiovisual 
material.7 Transferring these clips onto a big screen alters these viewing 
conditions. The blurry and shaky videos are enlarged on a projection screen 
and viewed collectively in the darkened space of the cinema. The spectators 
in a screening are expected to watch the whole f ilm, while viewing small 
clips on the internet allows for pausing, replaying, or abandoning the viewing 
6 Politically, the differences between 1989 and 2011 are abundant. See: Guehenno 2011.
7 This different mode of viewing has already been recognized by Laura Mulvey with respect 
to video technology (Mulvey 2009, pp. 7–16). A video player or recorder allowed for pausing, 
replaying, or fast-forwarding f ilms, thus changing the modalities of moving-image reception. 
Online and mobile device viewing enhanced and multiplied these possibilities.
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of particular scenes. Peter Snowdon’s intention was to give homage to these 
activists and citizens who produced the videos, while he was also determined 
to make his f ilm available online after it screened in festivals. The question 
remains as to what particular consequences this transfer onto f ilm and its 
inclusion in a narrative might have on the original footage.8
The last sequences of the f ilm do not show mass protests directly and 
are devoid of the original soundtrack. We see a distant explosion or smoke, 
followed by a man raising a flag or followed by a view of a burning tank. The 
closing clip shows a storm somewhere in North America. We see menacing 
dark clouds gathering in the distance. Here the sound is re-edited so that an 
impassioned call can be heard inviting us, the viewers, to join the revolution. 
The female voice belongs to the eminent vlogger Asmaa Mahfouz who 
helped spark the protests in Tahrir Square (Wall and El Zahed 2011). It is 
the only moment of the f ilm when the diegetic sound is severed from the 
image. Looking at the images of the approaching storm, we hear the urge to 
participate in civil dissent. The f ilm therefore imparts the idea that it is not 
so much a political analysis or a conventional documentary about the series 
of revolutions in the Arab countries, but rather a vision of an uprising that is 
yet to come. This utopian tone of the closing scenes might seem at odds with 
the palpable videos showing actual people engaging in demonstrations and 
often risking their lives in the name of concrete social and political change. 
The subtle yet persistent inscription of the clips in the visionary f ilmic tale 
generates a distance from the visceral scenes shown in the footage.
A Man with a Movie Camera
A different approach to amateur video sharing can be found in the work 
of Abounaddara. Founded in Syria in 2010, Abounaddara is an anonymous 
f ilm collective whose members produce short videos from and about the 
war-torn country. Since 2011, the collective regularly released new videos 
on Vimeo and other social media channels. At the time of writing, there are 
about f ive hundred videos available online. In its statements and polemics, 
Abounaddara strives to portray a counter-image of the Syrian revolution 
and conflict. Against the propagandistic language of the state media and the 
spectacle-driven international news channels, the collective proposes what 
they have coined ‘emergency cinema’. In content as well as in its mode of 
production, the emergency cinema aims to counterbalance distorted, myopic, 
8 For watching the full movie see: https://theuprising.be/
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and unreliable journalistic reporting. It stems from the realization that most 
citizen journalism falls into the same trap: activists on the ground are asked 
by large news channels to provide certain types of footage, mostly to show 
spectacular violence, the violations of ceasefires, and stereotyped images of 
victims.9 These repetitive and conventional images, however, fail to convey 
knowledge and insight about the complex situation in Syria.
The alternative collection of short videos by Abounaddara bears many 
similarities with Peter Snowdon’s The Uprising (2013). Yet the videos also 
differ signif icantly from the footage spontaneously uploaded by various 
anonymous users of social media. Although any details on particular mem-
bers or even the number of contributors to the Abounaddara channel remain 
undisclosed, the collective name lends these f ilm-makers a recognizable 
identity. Abounaddara has been invited to f ilm festivals, conferences, and 
art events, and after winning the main prize at the Sundance Film Festival 
in 2014, it gained unprecedented visibility (Bayoumi 2015; Creswell 2016; 
Elias and Omareen 2014; Feinstein 2015; Holland 2014). Since then, it has 
also been awarded the Vera List Center Prize and has participated in various 
art exhibitions such as the Venice Biennale (2015) and documenta 14 in 
Kassel (2017). Signif icantly, it has also refused to participate in art or f ilm 
events that conflicted with its commitments and views. Although relying 
on volunteers and working in extremely harsh conditions, the collective 
managed to create a distinctive and recognized body of work.
The emergency cinema proposed by Abounaddara is marked by a plurality 
of voices. The length of videos varies between less than a minute and over 
ten minutes, but some videos are arranged into series connected by the 
same title.10 They often show ordinary street scenes and various occupations 
of ordinary citizens devoid of any commentary. A signif icant part of this 
output is observational footage of, for example, a young butcher, a street 
vendor, or a women’s hairstyling class. Often, people f ilmed in close-up tell 
their stories. Some faces are visible, while some are made unrecognizable 
by backlight or a colour f ilter. Occasionally, a montage of found footage is 
also used (e.g. Kill Them, 24 March 2015).
These sometimes confessional or impressionistic, and at times ironic or 
critical, videos relay various issues in Syrian society in a multivocal way, 
allowing different actors in the ongoing military conflict to defend their 
9 See especially Abounaddara’s video We Who Are Here (19 August 2016).
10 Examples of such series include The Team (October 2015), consisting of ten parts, and The 
Syrian Who Wanted A Revolution, which is an interview consisting of f ive parts, made on the 
f ifth anniversary of the Syrian revolution (March 2016).
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perspectives. There is no direct political commentary or analysis present 
in the shorts; rather, various individuals tell their stories or are shown in 
their daily activities. Similar to the many anonymous citizen-journalist 
videos posted on the internet, there is little background knowledge given 
in the videos or in the commentary on the Vimeo or YouTube channels. As 
a rule, there is no voice-over, although occasionally there are subtitles or 
text-frames providing often jarring or ironic commentary to the images 
in the style of Russian avant-garde f ilm. Taken from an Egyptian satirical 
magazine, the name Abounaddara, which is Arabic for ‘a man with glasses’, 
also alludes to the famous ‘man with a f ilm camera’ from Dziga Vertov’s 
1929 f ilm. Unsurprisingly, there are many parallels in their videos to the 
revolutionary f ilm practices of the 1920s.
Plural Identity and Collective Struggle
The many disparate short videos produced by Abounaddara often call 
to mind the postulates of Dziga Vertov for what he called ‘Kino-Eye’ and 
‘Kino-Pravda’ (Michelson 1984, pp. 14-21). The observational videos such as 
Just Do It (2016),11 The Butcher of Aleppo (2016),12 or And Yet it Moves (2016)13 
register everyday situations or activities of citizens without any visible 
involvement of the f ilm-maker. In his writings and manifestos, Vertov calls 
for a new ‘factory of f ilm footage in which life, passing through the camera 
lens, does not vanish forever, leaving no trace, but does, on the contrary, 
leave a trace, precise and inimitable’ (Michelson 1984, p. 45). Registering life 
as it is implies that scripts, costumes, and play-acting should be abandoned. 
Life should be ‘caught unawares’, without any pretence or masquerade 
(Michelson 1984, p. 41). Cinema becomes a prosthesis of the human eye, 
observing the chance occurrences it encounters.
Undeniably, these anonymous f ilm-makers do more than just roll the 
camera in a fortuitous place and time. It is clear that the members of 
Abounaddara make very deliberate choices. This is especially noticeable 
not so much in what they f ilm but rather in what they refuse to register 
on their cameras. The collective’s short videos programmatically avoid 
showing victims of war in the way that is common for mainstream news 
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way of representing people, especially when it comes to images of those 
victimized by war. They make this point clear not only verbally, in debates 
and statements (Abounaddara 2015; 2016; 2017b; Kiwan 2014), but also by 
visual means. In the half-minute-long video entitled Aleppo (2016), the frame 
remains white from beginning to end. Only two sentences appear on screen, 
condemning the live broadcasting of human tragedy on television channels 
worldwide. This is a counter-image whose blankness must strike the viewer 
as an intended decontamination of the news culture. Many human tragedies 
are present in the various short f ilms by Abounaddara. However, they are 
presented mainly through personal stories and oblique images addressing 
the viewer’s sensitivity and imagination. The main strategy in showing the 
reality of war through such visual means appears to be a microhistory of 
individual lives and human choices. For example, in Sons Without Fathers 
(2016), a man recounts situations of what he calls ‘sodomy’ among youngsters 
and how the community tries to create a makeshift justice system to f ight 
it. For an outside viewer, it might be hard to comprehend that a minor 
was executed for a sexual offence in a makeshift trial. No further details 
are given about the case. The complex and painful story is told from one 
particular perspective, without any comment or judgement. In Hassoun 
(26 June 2015), a young woman narrates a story about her younger brother, 
who was conscripted into the army. She talks about her trauma and, wiping 
away her tears, admits to being happy that he is no longer alive. Her story, 
f ilmed in a close-up and with a steady camera held by someone she knew 
and trusted, is also a form of counter-image to the news reports. It is a story 
of a premature and tragic death, but told in a personal account that reveals 
the conflicting emotions of the bereaved.
In several statements and articles, Abounaddara argues for f ilm as a 
public good that should not become a marketable product. It therefore 
insists on producing f ilms with little means, but with the uncompromised 
artistic freedom. The videos are available online, but nevertheless have a 
copyright notice at the end of each episode. An incident at the Triennale of 
Milan in 2017 has demonstrated that there are a host of new challenges for 
this open-source approach. Abounaddara was invited to participate in the 
exhibition Restless Earth, but declined the invitation because, in the group’s 
perception, its curatorial concept exclusively served the Western narrative 
of the refugee crisis. However, its videos were included in the exhibition, 
without the collective’s consent. When inquired for an explanation, the 
curator’s spokesperson argued that the videos were not exhibited as part of 
the show but only made available through the online streaming on monitors 
placed in the exhibition (Muñoz-Alonso 2015; Ryzik 2017). In response to this 
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violation of copyright, the collective decided to make their online channel 
unavailable for the duration of the exhibition (Abounaddara 2017a).14 As a 
result, the videos, which were previously freely accessible online, temporarily 
disappeared from the internet.
Recollecting Visual Evidence
The large collection of videos produced by Abounaddara was expressly 
removed from the internet as a sign of protest against the unauthorized use 
of the footage by an art institution. Apart from the copyright issues, this 
event poignantly reminds us of the ephemeral nature of online data. Many 
videos uploaded on social platforms are either deleted, hacked, or simply get 
lost in the avalanche of similar visual material. It has recently been noted 
by investigative journalists that large amounts of potential evidence of war 
crimes in Syria have been removed from YouTube as a result of the decision 
by the commercial platform to censor possible terrorist and propaganda 
content (Martin 2017). More often than not, politically sensitive material is 
subject to cyberattacks by parties involved in the conflict. The Syrian Archive 
was launched in 2014 as a response to that issue. It is a freely accessible, 
independent database of visual material from the post-2011 conflict in Syria 
intended to facilitate accountability and advocacy processes. The videos 
it gathers pertain to human rights violations and can serve as possible 
judicial evidence. The founder of the project, Hadi Al Khatib, notes that 
many participant and activist videos either get lost or are insuff iciently 
verif iable or contextualized to serve as evidence. The Syrian Archive is 
an endeavour aimed at preserving, verifying, and making available those 
vernacular videos which testify to human rights violations. It essentially 
saves visual material that appeared elsewhere or obtains videos directly from 
film-makers or activists on the ground. This means that the videos selected 
to be preserved have quite specific content. They make visible horrific events 
post-2011 in Syria. Unlike The Uprising (2013) and the Abounaddara f ilms, 
there are very few joyous or ‘ordinary’ moments preserved in the database. 
More importantly, the archive differs from the other two examples in that the 
videos it contains are provided with metadata, including the source, author, 
date, and time, as well as geolocation. The events shown in a given image 
can thus be historically located and identif ied within a larger narrative.
14 1 August 2017, https://m.facebook.com/notes/abounaddara-f ilms/our-f ilms-are-not-available-
nos-f ilms-ne-sont-pas-disponibles/1529777670416268
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The inconclusiveness and illegibility of many online videos was the 
main incentive for this archival approach. Videos and photographs can 
be uploaded by various users on different platforms, making it diff icult to 
navigate through the abundant but scattered resources. Especially in times 
of turmoil, the amount of visual data disseminated on the internet can rise 
exponentially, making it impossible to process all of the available material. 
Unavoidably, viewing or following of these videos will be selective. Online 
sharing platforms such as YouTube as well as search engines such as Google 
use ranking algorithms that determine the hierarchies of search results. 
Their logic and effectiveness is largely determined by the commercial goals 
of these platforms. Some content might simply land at the bottom of the 
ranking because its relevance or significance was not recognized. Moreover, 
as has been mentioned earlier, many visual data get lost. Some f iles may be 
deleted, hacked, or purposefully removed. Cyberattacks are increasingly 
part and parcel of military conflict, as is abundantly clear in Syria (Xynou 
and Al Khatib 2015).
Even if the relevant visual material is accessible and accurate, it is often 
diff icult to interpret what is seen. Some of the essential information often 
cannot be determined by only viewing the images, such as the identity of 
the people shown, the location of an incident, or the exact time when it 
happened. This issue is obviously not new. Images cannot easily be translated 
into words, and more often than not, there is a cleavage between what can be 
seen in an image and what can be said about it. W.J.T. Mitchell proposed to 
designate this gap between image and text as ‘image/text’, in which the slash 
is a sign of a problematic rupture (1995, p. 89). The Syrian Archive proposes to 
respond to that rupture by establishing a standardized scheme of metadata. 
Before adding new videos and photographs to the database, their credibility 
is checked and metadata restored or collected. The verif ication process is 
needed to establish whether the source – the maker, the organization, or 
individual who uploads the content to the internet – is credible as a source 
of information. The archive lists over three hundred credible sources who 
are already verif ied. New sources are added according to a transparent 
verif ication process which includes screening the upload history of a source 
and checking its credibility among the known contacts on the ground (the 
Syrian Archive 2017a). Subsequently, the videos or photographs from credible 
sources are subjected to a metadata scheme. In this process, the essential 
information is established about the contents of the visual material, including 
the actors, location, and time of the incidents. Some of this information, such 
as geolocation, can be gathered by comparing and cross-analysing various 
open-source databases. For example, satellite images available on Google 
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Earth can be used to establish the exact coordinates of the places shown in 
the visuals. The videos are subsequently categorized according to the type of 
violation they document. These categories include, for example, massacres 
and other unlawful killings, torture, hostage taking, use of illegal weapons, 
or sexual or gender-based violence. This might appear as a bureaucratic 
division of evils, but it is necessary to make the archive searchable. Inevitably, 
choices have to be made as to what is def ined as a human rights violation. 
The typology of offences chosen for the archive adheres to the standards 
developed by the Off ice of United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. The compatibility with these international standards ensures that 
the archive can be used by various actors in human rights work.
An example of how this collection of visual material can be put to work is 
demonstrated in the journalistic investigation of an alleged mosque bombing 
on 16 March 2017 near al-Jinah in Syria’s Aleppo governorate. The investigations 
were independently conducted by each Bellingcat, Forensic Architecture, 
and Human Rights Watch, but the organizations exchanged information and 
arrived at the same results.15 All multimedia content related to this incident 
and the investigations is stored in the Syrian Archive. Using open-source 
information, videos, and witness accounts of people on the ground, compared 
with official reports, the investigators could determine that the official version 
of the incident was not correct and that innocent civilians were targeted 
and killed while attending a ritual at a mosque (the Syrian Archive 2017b). 
The investigations were published online in the form of multimedia articles, 
but there is also a visual component to the publication. The researchers of 
Forensic Architecture created a short clip summarizing their investigation 
in which they rely on the amateur videos and photographs and reuse them as 
illustration of evidence in demonstrative text and image animations (Forensic 
Architecture 2017). It is therefore a new form of reporting, based on collabora-
tive open-source investigations and pursued independently of the mainstream 
press. At the same time, these reports are occasionally included in the news 
reporting of leading press and television stations in different countries.
The Syrian Archive collects, verif ies, and analyses selected citizen-
journalist videos to make the information they contain more accessible. 
The archive therefore generates knowledge on the conflict in Syria, but 
also facilitates knowledge production by other actors in the f ield. The in-
vestigation results already achieved demonstrate that this method of work 
15 Bellingcat is an organization founded by Eliot Higgins with the purpose of developing 
open-source intelligence investigations and tools. Forensic Architecture is an interdisciplinary 
research agency led by Eyal Weizman at Goldsmiths, University of London.
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returns to the tools and formats of investigative journalism yet avoids the 
mainstream media channels, creating alternative routes of communication. 
At the same time, the archive has its clear, self-imposed limitations. Aimed 
at facilitating accountability in times of prolonged military conflict, it 
preserves only the visual materials pertaining to perceived human rights 
violations. By default, it excludes the everyday, peaceful, or neutral footage 
that seems so signif icant for the message formulated in The Uprising (2013) 
and in Abounaddara’s f ilmic output.
Apart from storing verified visual data, the Syrian Archive has published 
its code open-source, so that other organizations or individuals can create 
their own databases.16 Not only the content, but also the methodology and 
computational tools developed for the archive are made available for other 
users. The project makes clear that new strategies and skills are increasingly 
needed to yield new and relevant knowledge out of the endless flow of data on 
the internet, especially in times of tumult such as in the post-2011 MENA region.
The Archive Project demonstrates that working with big data is one of the 
most acute challenges in the time of digital sharing culture. The significance 
of that challenge is confirmed by other researchers and artists who proposed 
alternative modes of gathering and presenting user-generated images of 
revolutions. In 2014 Lev Manovich and a team of researchers created The 
Exceptional and the Everyday: 144 hours in Kiev, a visualization of people’s 
images uploaded on Instagram during the upheaval on Maidan Square. 
The large zoomable photomontage that resulted from that project consists 
entirely of public images that appeared on Instagram on the particular 
days in February 2014 in the area of central Kiev.17 Gathering all images 
instead of selecting only revolution-related ones, the project demonstrated 
how the ordinary – the self ies, food, cats, and cityscape pics – coexisted 
with the images of burned trucks and agitated crowds on the main square. 
Manovich provocatively claims it is not artists today who make inspiring 
representations of a revolution, but data analysts who can rework and 
visualize images delivered by countless anonymous producers of images. 
Yet at the same time, Manovich relates his work to that of a painter. He 
visualizes data in a particular way but does not claim to show the truth of 
the revolution in Ukraine (Packer 2014). The Syrian Archive might perhaps 
also become a tool to transform the large mass of videos and photographs 
into a visually compelling, interactive narrative.
16 The Syrian Archive Toolkit can be found on the software-sharing site GitHub: https://github.
com/syrianarchive/toolkit.
17 The results of the project can be viewed on its blog: www.the-everyday.net.
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Conclusion
While the approaches of Snowdon, Abounaddara, and the Syrian Archive 
seem fundamentally divergent, they each develop methods of involvement 
with citizen-generated videos and photographs. Though each in a different 
way, they all revive the idea of ‘imperfect cinema’ proposed by Julio Garcia 
Espinosa – a cinema of little means and technical deficiencies, but a cinema 
that reflects the movement and energy of the collective (1979).
The found footage f ilm proposed by Snowdon does not reconstruct the 
chronology or genealogy of the 2011 revolutions, and neither does it present a 
political or social analysis of their deplorable outcomes. It selects and subtly 
alters the imagery created by various first-hand witnesses of the events, saving 
from oblivion the chosen clips out of thousands available. By arranging them 
in a narrative of a promised or awaited revolution, it condenses the energy of 
these protests and monumentalizes the common dream of the masses. The 
Uprising (2013) can be seen as a multi-authored film, in which the anonymous 
contributors can find themselves in the images of their fellow videographers. 
Made shortly after the first wave of protests, it offers an affective response to 
the crisis. Abounaddara adapts the practice of anonymous citizen journalism 
to its own idea of ‘emergency cinema’. Producing various short videos authored 
by diverse, unnamed film-makers, the collective enters into a dialogue with 
the common practices of mainstream media reporting in Syria. It gives voice to 
individuals from different sides of the conflict who share their often traumatic 
experiences. In other videos, Abounaddara comments on the political situation 
and ironically criticizes the one-sided and spectacle-centred mainstream 
news reporting on Syria. Some of its short f ilms include found footage and 
photography coming from citizen journalism, documentary, or commercial 
videos and films. This is therefore a multifaceted online presence that builds 
on the advantages of user-generated videos but also formulates a response 
to the risks of citizen journalism. The Syrian Archive, f inally, systematically 
selects and stores those online videos which pertain to human rights violations 
in Syria. It subsequently verif ies this footage and provides it with metadata. 
Such visual material can be used in accountability processes by various 
organizations and individuals.
The three ways of working with citizen videos and photographs presented 
in this chapter demonstrate that open-source visual material produced 
by often anonymous users, whether witnesses or participants in conflict 
situations, present both an unparalleled chance and a daunting challenge 
to knowledge production. Writing history appears as a plural, non-linear, 
and multilayered process in which crowd sourced images play a leading role.
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7. Cinematic Spaces of ‘the Arab Street’ : 




This chapter examines how cinema challenges and inverts traditional 
spaces of social upheavals, such as streets and squares, in their capacity 
to be spaces of knowledge and solidarity, in conceptualizing them as 
enhanced media-sensible spaces. Through a close reading of Mohamed 
Diab’s feature f ilm Clash (2016), I foreground the idea of the truck as a 
cinematic space predicated on its ability to accommodate movement, 
both in a literal and a metaphorical sense. This allows for a discussion 
of cinematic spaces of the so-called ‘Arab street’, created by both mise 
en scène and cinematography that go against the more prevalent images 
of street f ights and mass demonstrations as seen in documentaries 
about the popular upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa region 
since 2009.
Keywords: Cinema, inverted road movie, Egypt, the Arab street
Introduction
Films about the Egyptian Revolution 2011 and the ensuing protests in 2013 are 
mainly documentaries striking a balance between internet and mobile phone 
footage, such as videos made by citizen journalists, and f irst-hand material, 
such as interviews with talking heads.1 They often feature subjective camera 
1 Such as: 1/2 Revolution by Omar Shargawi and Karim El Hakim (2011); Tahrir 2011: The Good, 
The Bad And The Politician by Tamer Ezzat (2011); We Are Egypt by Lillie Paquette (2012); The 
Noise of Cairo – Art, Cairo and Revolution by Heiko Lange (2012); The Square by Jehane Noujaim 
Strohmaier, A. and A. Krewani (eds.), Media and Mapping Practices in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Producing Space. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021
doi 10.5117/9789462989092_ch07
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shots, clearly obtained from mobile digital cameras. In so doing, they strive 
to provide a comprehensive visual account of contexts and actors involved. 
These documentaries seem to be marked by what sociologist Ilka Eickhof 
calls ‘the wish to support the struggle for the one, truthful narrative of how 
things really were […] to regain f irm ground in some aims at supporting a 
cause based on serving a hype- and interest-driven attention economy’ 
(2016, p. 20; emphasis in original). They promise so-called real-life scenes 
of a revolution, which has been more complex and contradictory than the 
f ilms lead us believe.
The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 consisted of mass demonstrations and the 
occupation of the central Tahrir Square in Cairo, which became the emblem 
of the revolution. Millions of protesters from a range of socio-economic 
and religious backgrounds demanded the overthrow of Egyptian President 
Hosni Mubarak. The revolution started with calls for protests from online 
youth groups. Initially, these included liberal, anti-capitalist, national-
ist, and feminist elements, but it ultimately included Islamist elements 
as well. After Mubarak’s downfall, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate 
Mohamed Mursi (1951–2019) won the election and became Egypt’s new, and 
f irst democratically elected, president. However, in June 2013, marking the 
one-year anniversary of his inauguration, millions of Egyptians protested 
against him and his politics. As he refused to resign, both his opponents 
and his supporters took to the streets, which resulted in violent clashes.
Film-maker Mohamed Diab chose an alternative format to that of the 
documentary to narrate these political and social tensions of 2013. His inter-
nationally acclaimed feature film Clash (Eshtebak) (2016), officially selected by 
the 2016 Cannes Film Festival as the opening film of the ‘Un Certain Regard’ 
section as well as the Egyptian entry for the Best Foreign Language Film at 
the 89th Academy Awards, is based on a f ictional set-up: it shows a group of 
people from different political and social backgrounds detained in a police 
truck, brought together by fate during the turmoil that followed the ousting 
of former president Mursi from power in 2013. The film’s slogan states ‘conflict 
is on the inside’, emphasizing not the geographical location of the street or 
the square as the main public hubs of social and political struggle, but closed 
and coincidental spaces such as the inside of a police truck.
Through a close reading of the film, the goal of this chapter is to foreground 
the idea of cinematic spaces predicated on their ability to accommodate 
(2013); Cairo Drive by Sherief Elkatsha (2013); We Are The Giant by Greg Barker (2014); Art War 
by Marco Wilms (2014); The Trials of Spring by Gini Reticker (2015); Abdo – Coming of Age in a 
Revolution by Jakob Gross (2015); Yallah! Underground by Farid Eslam (2015); etc.
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movement, both in a literal and in a metaphorical sense. This allows for a 
discussion of particular cinematic spaces in relation to the notion of ‘the 
Arab street’ created by both mise en scène and cinematography in Clash 
(2016) that go against the more prevalent images of street f ights and mass 
demonstrations as seen in documentary f ilms. My main argument is that 
Clash (2016) challenges traditional spaces of social upheavals such as streets 
and squares. In so doing, I will demonstrate how this, what I would call an 
inverted road movie, shows spaces that are closed, yet mobile and fluid at the 
same time. Combining the f ilm analysis with theories from political science, 
this chapter follows an interdisciplinary approach to offer new perspectives 
on cinema’s possibilities to produce and negotiate mobile media spaces.
From Opinions to Movements
Laura Sharp’s summary of the connection between cinema and cartography 
as, on the one hand, cinema’s innate ‘mapping impulse’ (Castro 2009) and, 
on the other hand, a desire to re-humanize the map in cartography (Caquard 
and Taylor 2009) strives to encompass the multilayeredness of a rising 
research f ield. The geographer emphasizes different approaches, such as 
visual studies scholar Giuliana Bruno’s position of cinema as a ‘modern 
cartography’ with a virtual mobile gaze (Bruno 2002), and philologist Tom 
Conley’s broad subscription to a notion of affective, mobile geography of 
f lânerie (Conley 2007). She therefore positions cinematic cartography as 
a cognitive issue in which the viewer charts experiences and emotions 
onto mental maps of the world (Sharp 2018). Geographer Chris Lukinbeal, 
on his side, reminds us of sociologist Michel de Certeau’s two modes of 
spatial narration: the map and the tour (1988). With the former, one sees 
and orders places from above; with the latter, one narrates the embodied 
practice of going and doing. Where seeing from above is associated with 
maps as representations, the embodied going and doing is about practice 
and touring (Lukinbeal 2018).
Following these approaches, I argue in this chapter for the widely 
discussed notion of ‘the Arab street’ as not just a location or scene of the 
Egyptian uprisings, but as we shall see through the f ilm analysis, a mobile 
media space that includes a variety of media and mapping practices. In 
Arabic, ‘the Arab street’ (الشارع العريب) has a double meaning. It commonly 
translates to ‘public opinion in Arab nations’ (Collins English Diction-
ary 2013), however refers both to ‘the street’ as a geographical location in 
urban settings as well as to ‘the public’ as an opposition to off icials and 
162 AlENA StrohMAiEr 
governments. In the course of the popular uprisings of 2011, ‘the Arab street’ 
became a key symbol in its double meaning to designate both ‘the street’ 
and ‘the public’. However, political scientist David Pollock criticized already 
before 2011 the assumption of a uniformity of the Arab opinion ‘when in 
truth it varies considerably, within and among different Arab societies, 
and over time’, and further the assumption of a static relationship between 
Arab governments and public opinion ‘when in fact that relationship may 
be quite dynamic’ (1992, p. 11). This paved the way for a more f luid and 
multidirectional concept of ‘the Arab street’, as taken up by political scientist 
Asef Bayat, who differentiates between ‘street politics’ and ‘political streets’. 
For him, the ‘street’ designates in general
the chief locus of politics for ordinary people, those who are structurally 
absent from the institutional positions of power – the unemployed, casual 
workers, migrants, people of the underworld, and house wives. It serves 
as a key medium wherein sentiments and outlooks are formed, spread, 
and expressed in a remarkably unique fashion. (Bayat 2010, p. 211)
However, ‘street politics’ does not mean the mere appropriation of the 
geographical, physical street as a social space of rebellion:
Street politics […] is more than just about the conflict between the authori-
ties and the deinstitutionalized or ‘informal’ people over the active use 
of public space and the control of public order. Streets as spaces of f low 
and movement are not protesting, but where they extend their protest 
beyond their immediate circles to include the unknown, the ‘strangers’ 
who might espouse similar, real or imagined, grievances. (Bayat 2010, 
pp. 211–212; emphasis in original)
Ergo, ‘political street’ means, on the one hand, the symbolic and metaphoric 
manifestation of the street as a political momentum, but, on the other 
hand, also
the collective sensibilities, shared feelings, and public judgment of 
ordinary people in their day-to-day utterances and practices, which are 
expressed broadly in the public squares – in taxis, buses, shops, sidewalks, 
or more audibly in mass street demonstrations. (Bayat 2010, p. 212)
In this context, I would like to conceptualize ‘the Arab street’ as an effective 
power that goes beyond its geographical and physical state as a location, as 
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a mobile media space through which diverse political, social, and cultural 
practices, contrasting opinions and movements of and for a variety of people 
are negotiated. Mohamed Diab’s Clash (2016) foregrounds this through the 
spatial transformation revolving around the conversion of f ilmed locations 
into cinematic spaces and the use of a genre that in itself already accom-
modates mobility: the road movie.
The classic road movie as a f ilm genre dates back to the early days of 
cinema. Racing horses, moving cars, and incoming trains have generated 
f ilm images since the beginning of f ilm history. Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing that the road movie traditionally illustrates aesthetics and perceptions 
of modernity, as well as of identity quests. It is the movement between 
two places, which in itself appears as a way of life leading to individual or 
collective change. Road movies are mainly about being on the road. The 
f irst manifestations experienced the genre as a street f ilm in the 1920s: 
the street as a counter-world to the ideas of bourgeois everyday life. A f ilm 
such as Federico Fellini’s La Strada (1954) takes the street as a metaphor 
for life, a place of probation, a restless anchor in the world. Some heroes of 
the road movie f ind themselves on the street, f inding the restless move-
ment a condition of life, such as the heroes of Carlos Diegues’ f ilm Bye Bye 
Brazil (1979). Others voluntarily choose the aimlessness of the street as a 
condition of life, such as the protagonists in Stephen Eliot’s The Adventures 
of Priscilla, Queen of the Desert (1994); still others have to choose life on 
the street because they are on the run, such as the two heroines in Ridley 
Scott’s Thelma and Louise (1991). Furthermore, the motif of the street is 
reminiscent in many ways of the travelling abilities of some frontier heroes 
of the Western genre. Likewise, some gangster f ilms are road movies. The 
biker f ilm has also, since Laslo Benedek’s The Wild One (1953), designed 
the street as a place of special social group forms and styles. Finally, the 
trucker f ilm turns life on the country road into a generic core motif, as 
did Sam Peckinpah’s Convoy (1976), which interpreted the discontinuity of 
street life as the unpredictability of heroes – and as a condition for taking 
up the f ight against the institutions of society.2 Correspondingly, there are 
two main def initions of the road movie. The f irst one def ines the genre 
through the vehicle itself; as cinema scholar Timothy Corrigan states, 
‘road movies are, by def inition, movies about cars, trucks, motorcycles, 
or some other motoring self-descendants of the nineteenth century train’ 
(1992, p. 144). The second def ines it through movement, as road movies 
are about being on the move – about walking, driving, strolling, or racing 
2 See Lexikon der Filmbegriffe: https://f ilmlexikon.uni-kiel.de/.
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on the road. In the second def inition, the car functions as a prop. It is 
functional as a motif and brings the protagonists from A to B, is new and 
shiny, or old and shabby.
However, this functionality of the car has been increasingly challenged in 
f ilms of the Iranian New Wave, such as Abbas Kiarostami’s Taste of Cherry 
(Ta’am-e Gilas) (1997) and Ten (Dah) (2002), as well as Jafar Panahi’s Taxi 
(2015). In these f ilms, the car as a semi-private, semi-public space moving 
through the streets of Tehran opened new ways for political, social, and 
cultural negotiations. The car transformed from the key characteristic of 
the road movie into a space in and of itself as a means of spatial experience, 
both for the protagonists and for the viewers (Strohmaier 2016b). In this 
space, the characters act more freely, expressing what is burning in their 
souls and breaking taboos; however, they concurrently stay on the inside of 
the closed (and secured) space of the car. From the function as a prop, the 
car thus becomes a space for action, which tells of changes that question the 
sociopolitical situations of the characters, transforming the vehicle into a 
space inhenrently cinematic. In these f ilms the car is no longer an element 
in the f ilm, but an element of the f ilm itself (Strohmaier 2016a).
The specif icity in Clash’s use of the truck – as both a semi-public vehicle, 
moving through the streets of Cairo, and an enclosed, semi-private space, 
in which opinions are pronounced and negotiated – connects to the f ilms 
of the Iranian New Wave. However, none of the detained people and thus 
opinions can flee. At the same time, they are in constant exchange with a 
confusing and stirring outside. The f ilm’s main stance is, however, that ‘out 
there’ and ‘in here’ are increasingly indistinct. In that sense, Clash (2016) 
is an inverted road movie because it goes against the classical idea of the 
road movie as a life-changing and liberating journey, drawing attention to 
the capability of the truck as a mobile media space, inherently cinematic, 
opening up a multiplicity of dynamics of ‘the Arab street’.
Shifting the Focus
Inside – truck – day. Metal-grilled windows and a narrow door. From a 
frontal position, the camera shows the inside of a room reminiscent of a 
prison. Daylight is entering the room and we hear engine noises. The room 
starts to move after a few seconds, revealing that we are inside a truck. 
While zooming in, the camera does not leave its position but grows out of 
focus, leaving only the silhouettes of the window and the door. The room 
dissolves and has no clear borders or lines anymore (Figure 7.1).
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The focus, traditionally referring to the degree to which light rays coming 
from any particular part of an object pass through the lens, thus creating 
sharp outlines and distinct textures that match the original object, is 
arbitrarily challenged as an optical property of the f ilm. The variations in 
depth of f ield in the opening scene – through shallow focus, deep focus, 
and techniques such as racking focus – set the tone for the rest of the f ilm.
The image becomes sharp again and the f irst two people, Egyptian-
American journalists, are pushed into the truck. The police off icers accuse 
them of being spies and close the door. The truck starts to move again. One 
of the journalists has diff iculty breathing, reacting to the confined space 
he f inds himself in. As other people are pushed into the truck without 
any explanation, among them men, women, and adolescents supporting 
different parties, and the day wears on, the heat becomes unbearable inside 
the truck. The people start taking turns at the windows and the police 
off icers take pity on them, leaving the door open. However, the open door 
does not provide any rescue for the detainees; the only person that dares to 
leave, an elderly man, dies right away. Nevertheless, mobility and closeness 
do not contradict each other in this scenario. The closed space in the mise 
en scène consists of an interior location and closed setting that creates a 
mood of constriction and claustrophobia, and characters who are restricted 
in their movements. Tight shot composition, static framing, and barriers 
within the mise en scène and in the shots’ foreground suggest this closeness. 
However, the camera changes its position throughout the f ilm, constantly 
moving in this narrow space, changing its position in f ilming from above, 
from behind, from below, and through the windows and the door. The 
movement thus created is twofold: from the inside to the outside and from 
the outside to the inside, as the truck moves through the streets of Cairo, 
enabling manifold encounters.
The cinematic space, although created from supposed restriction, reveals 
various forms of dynamics. The image that is out of focus can mark the 
transition between movement and stillness, between dream and reality, 
Figure 7.1: Clash (2016), opening (00:00:18–00:01:28). 
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between subjectivity and objectivity (Ullrich 2002; Lauenburger 2019). At the 
same time, these images appear, as I argue here, as intermedial references 
to other media and other modes of production; for example mobile phone 
videos. A specif ic form of mobile phone video that circulated through social 
media in 2011 were videos showing snippers on rooftops who, once they 
perceived the f ilming, shot directly at the person holding the mobile phone. 
The artist Rabih Mroué stated in his lecture performance The Pixelated 
Revolution at the documenta 14 in Kassel in 2014: ‘one person is shooting 
with a camera, and the other with a rifle. One shoots for his life and the life 
of his citizens and the other shoots for his life and his regime’ (Mroué 2014). 
This disturbing yet powerful analogy, recalling Paul Virilio’s comparision 
of the camera as a weapon, is echoed in Clash (2016).
Inside – truck – day. As the truck moves through Cairo, it encounters 
protests. The camera on the inside of the truck shoots through a metal-grilled 
window on the side of the truck in a horizontal shot, showing the street 
full of protesters and police off icers. The next shot goes vertically through 
another metal-grilled window on the roof of the truck, showing a couple 
standing on their balcony watching the scene of the street from above. This 
principal repeats several times, the camera playing on the bird’s-eye view 
and worm’s-eye view in moving from one window to the other, in alternately 
showing the street full of people and people witnessing the protests from 
above. Some choose to close their window shades; some start f ilming with 
their mobile phones from the rooftop. In both cases, the outside appears 
sharp, clear, and in plain sight, whereas the position of the camera on the 
inside remains visible through the blurry contours of the metal grill and 
the dirty windshield, as well as through the blurry and fragmented body 
parts, such as hands and faces, of the detainees in the shots’ foreground. The 
sequence ends with a blurry worm’s-eye view towards the sky. The focus 
then shifts slowly from a distance to nearby, sharpening the metal grill in 
an extreme close-up (Figure 7.2).
Blurryness and sharpness, and more precisely the shifting between 
the two, are two essential categories for Clash’s construction of mobile 
media spaces. They enable the viewer to get a sense of what is inside 
and of what is outside the truck, but, more importantly, also a sense of 
inside and outside fading into each other. The spatial limitations of the 
truck separate the visible from the invisible, the interplay of in and out 
of focus, however, allows the cinematic spaces to emerge as a necessary 
medium of perception. The truck then becomes the new means of def ining 
the interwovenness of space and (in)visibility. In the zone between the 
visible and the invisible, a mapping practice takes place. By moving away 
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from clear, sharp, and narrow images to a stage of blurryness and thus 
transition, the spatial experience becomes tangible. These images mediate 
between being in and out of focus and share at least two spaces, two 
movements, two times. Hence, a density of meaning, of simultaneity, and 
of accessibility is established, which negotiate questions of perception, of 
understanding, of subject formation and spatialization. Martine Beugnet 
writes that ‘for all its photographic objectivity, cinematographic vision 
allows for the indef inite to surface’ – elements that ‘resist stability and 
def inition’ (Beugnet 2017, pp. 1–2), such as the inherent confusion of 
the phenomenal world and its constant transformations. Clash (2016) 
magnif ies this experience through techniques such as shallow focus, 
Figure 7.2: Clash (2016), view (00:15:21–00:17:26). 
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changes in speed, and other alterations of the focus of the image that 
pull it towards the painterly.
Outside – truck – night. The truck is still on the road, the detainees not 
freed. In the far distance, green laser lights illuminate the area. The green 
rays are visible from afar through the metal-grilled window, the truck drives 
closer, and the next shot shows, from an upper-view perspective out of the 
window, the same green rays and numerous uplifted hands. The scene looks 
more like a dancing or partying scene than a mass demonstration – no 
individual faces can be distinguished, though. The green rays enter the truck 
and mingle with the natural colours of the detainees’ faces and clothes. 
The truck is shaken and pushed over, obliterating the difference between 
the green outside and the more colourful inside. The next shot shows the 
image rotated by 90 degrees, suggesting the truck is lying on its side, the 
detainees on the inside are fully absorbed by the green light now. The door 
opens and people from the outside grasp for people on the inside, dragging 
some of them away. The following close-up reveals that the brawl does not 
allow a clear differentiation between an inside and outside space anymore. 
Everything is green; there is only one space immersed in the same light 
until the greenness submerges everything, dissolving the space completely, 
leaving only one green spot (Figure 7.3).
Clash’s ending thus perfectly demonstrates the transformative power that 
is made possible by the truck’s ability to accommodate numerous opinions 
and movements. Moreover, the close investigation of mise en scène and 
cinematography demonstrates that the cinematic space of ‘the Arab street’, 
with its intense expressions of popular mobilities, operates as a paradoxical 
space of oppression and resistance. It is a lived space that shows and shapes 
the subjective experience of social relations and conflicts. In its ability to 
accommodate and advance numerous movements, exemplif ied by the 
different opinions assembled in the truck, ‘the Arab street’ makes manifest 
the assertion that ‘space is not merely the setting of stories’ (Konstantarakos 
2001, p. 1).
This brings us back to the idea of the inverted road movie. In the road 
movie, the inside of the vehicle is equated either as a space of encounter 
and conversation, or as a space of physical activity. The truck, however, also 
represents a space of waiting and watching. Ultimately, it produces spaces 
that have a cinematic signif icance and are cinematically conditioned at the 
same time. ‘The interior space of a car makes more dramatic possibilities 
of character interaction’ (2006, p. 13), f ilm scholar David Laderman says, 
emphasizing the car and thus the road movie as a genre for cultural critique:
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The driving force propelling most road movies […] is an embrace of the 
journey as a means of cultural critique. Road movies generally aim beyond 
the borders of cultural familiarity, seeking in unfamiliar for revelation, or 
at least for the thrill of the unknown. Such travelling, coded as defamil-
iarization, likewise suggest a mobile refuge from social circumstances felt 
to be lacking or oppressive in some way. This broadly conceived notion 
of cultural critique functions in road movies on many levels […]. Thus 
the road movie celebrates subversion as a literal venturing outside of 
society. (2006, p. 1)
Figure 7.3 Clash (2016), submergence (01:30:07–01:38:00). 
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This might also be true for the inverted road movie; nevertheless, Clash 
(2016) does more than that: it broadens our understanding of f ilm as map. It 
does so in involving locational imaging and representational practices that 
situate the viewer within cinematic spaces that are mobile and dynamic. 
Film scholar Teresa Castro uses the phrase ‘mapping impulse’ to reference 
cinema’s ‘particular way of seeing and looking at the world, a visual regime’ 
(2009, p. 7). She argues that a mapping impulse envelopes cinematography 
through its use of various cartographic shapes. For Giuliana Bruno, on the 
other hand, cinema offers ‘both an instrument and a route’ (2002, p. 270). 
While cartography defines a location in absolute terms, cinema is, so I argue 
in this chapter, a mobile media space. Whereas a map requires objects in 
space to understand their relation to other objects, Clash (2016) develops a 
topology of image facts that behave like islands of meaning linked together 
by a narrative f low. Rather than dismissing ‘the Arab street’ as a notion 
that either transfers spatial knowledge or reinforces power relations, both 
perspectives are true when it comes to cinematic spaces. If we think of the 
inverted road movie not having any outside boundaries but always already 
being an interactive re-configuring of the world, then it can be constituted 
as an open-ended cultural practice capable of critique in itself. In this sense, 
Clash (2016) demonstrates the extent to which cinema today is marked 
by a complex system of media and mapping practices negotiated by each 
f ilm anew.
Conclusion
Film studies has explored the use of cartographic logic to expand upon 
theories and methodological practices. In contrast, cartographic science 
has drawn on f ilm studies to consider how to improve mapping practices 
related to emotion, affect, and memory. Whereas interest in cinematic 
cartography has focused on cross-disciplinary theoretical developments 
and applying spatial analysis to f ilm, the epistemologies behind the media 
practices are not emphasized. Critical cartography has shown that maps 
as representations are social, and rather than using maps as inscriptions, 
the focus on understanding ‘the Arab street’ and its role in everyday life 
allows for thinking of social upheavals as media practices. This shift is a 
movement away from ‘the Arab street’ as a static product coded with power 
relations, ideology, and bias, to one that looks at cinematic spaces as an 
ongoing cultural process. The cultural critique here is bound to a specif ic 
materiality of the image (and the camera that produces it), attaching ‘the 
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Arab street’ to discursive formations and f igures of (present and past) 
opinions.
Jean-Paul Satre’s Joseph Garcin famously said, referring to the eternal 
entrapment with fellow damned souls in the same prison-like room of No Exit 
(1944): ‘Hell is other people’. Just as there is remarkable continuity between 
structures, abilities, and opinions, so too are there equally remarkable 
differences. Member of the Muslim Brotherhood or not, police off icer or not, 
or inside or outside the truck makes no difference. Such interstices allow 
insight into the fundamental role of the encounter, the connection, and 
separation as epistemically relevant events. This chapter situated cinematic 
spaces at the intersection of media and mapping practices. It did so by using 
the two spatial narrative modalities of ‘the Arab street’ and the inverted 
road movie. Clash (2016) shows how connections and separations work 
both within, beside, and in between the physicality of the street, within 
the aesthetic ensemble of the f ilm, positioning the cinematic space of the 
truck within and amongst a topological place that resonates and confirms 
space as a media product.
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8. Body-Space-Relation in Parkour : Street 
Practices and Visual Representations
Ines Braune
Abstract
Parkour today is a global subcultural scene that combines street with 
media practices. Parkour consists of a local moment, fundamentally 
concerned with the materiality of the street, and simultaneously of a global 
digital discourse, which involves millions of parkour actors. While the 
spatial knowledge requires a very close knowledge and tactile contact of 
the surface’s nature of space, the media representations seem to reflect an 
opposite image, namely the detachedness of space. In this chapter, I will 
address the question of space-making and spatial practices in Morocco 
and the relation to parkour’s visual representations.
Keywords: Morocco, parkour, body, street
Today, parkour is a global cultural scene that combines the street with media 
practices. In that sense, parkour consists of a local moment, fundamentally 
concerned with the materiality of the street, and simultaneously of a global 
digital discourse involving millions of parkour actors, called traceurs, negotiat-
ing and re-evaluating their navigation through both physical and digital space.
The f irst and often only contact with parkour, from the point of view 
of non-practitioners, frequently comes through its visual representations. 
Spectacular images and videos depict the weightlessness of the body and its 
detachment from space. Scholars have also weighed in here, analysing the 
relationship between the body and public space – that is, the interaction 
and engagement between body and space – while also evaluating parkour 
as an online culture, assessing the relevance of (digital) media practices 
within parkour and other youth and sport cultures such as skateboarding 
(Borden 2001; Buckingham 2009) and surf ing (Booth 1996; 2001).
Strohmaier, A. and A. Krewani (eds.), Media and Mapping Practices in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Producing Space. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021
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This chapter focuses exclusively on the body-space relationship invoked 
by the practice of parkour in a local setting, as well as on the body-space 
relationship inherent in its visual representation. This focal point has been 
selected to link the two aforementioned discourses: the f irst about the 
engagement of the body with the public space, and the second about the 
relevance of parkour in digital media. The aim is also to shed light more 
generally on the fundamental tension between the practice itself, on the one 
hand, and its visualization, on the other. In the wake of the iconic/pictorial 
turn (Boehm 2001; Mitchell 2008; Alloa 2015) and the resulting culture of 
enhanced visuality, images are more easily created and distributed due 
to the digital transformation of the technology needed. Consequently, a 
renewed focus on the structure of the visual material and its relation to 
the depicted practices seems to be of particular importance.
Parkour is practised across the world, including in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region. I approach parkour from a Moroccan 
perspective, which does not mean that I am a Moroccan traceuse; I am a 
female German researcher taking the ideas and positions imparted to me by 
Moroccan traceurs during my field research (2012–2014), and using these as 
a lens through which the body-space dynamic of a particular global cultural 
practice can be observed. This chapter will address the following questions: 
What characterizes the body-space relationship and the spatial knowledge of 
the local discourse and the practice of parkour on the local ground? How is the 
body-space relationship visualized? How are these two approaches related, 
and what are the implications for (and beyond) the body-space relationship?
To answer these questions, this chapter is structured as follows: after a 
short introduction to parkour, the next section deals with its underlying 
theoretical assumptions with respect to the body and sensory ethnography. 
This is followed by an investigation into the body-space relationship during 
the practice of parkour, which will then be confronted with the body-space 
relationship inherent in visual and digital records of parkour (this section 
begins with a commentary on media and visual ethnography). Finally, this 
chapter offers an analysis of three parkour images from a Moroccan traceur, 
and some concluding thoughts.
Parkour as a Global and as a Moroccan Cultural Practice
The idea behind parkour is to f ind the most direct path between two points 
and to overcome any obstacle within that path, using only one’s own physical 
and mental capacities (Belle 2009; Lauschke 2010; Angel 2011; Thibault 2013). 
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Although nothing other than one’s own body is needed to practise parkour, 
it is mainly trained and organized in groups. Male parkour actors are called 
traceurs, while female actors are called traceuses, to indicate that these 
actors trace their way through their environment. Any barriers or hindrances 
on the route are perceived as a challenge, and will be integrated into the 
parkour movements, without in any way affecting or damaging them.
Alongside the street practice, part of the cultural practice of parkour 
is also the production of visual material, in the form of photos, videos, or 
other media. Indeed, street and media practices are interrelated constituent 
components of parkour, which itself is a circular process. The circulation 
between the performances on the street and those in the video clips is con-
stituted through citation, repetition, and modification. Internet applications 
provide the virtual architecture for the media performances – that is, free 
platforms on which to post the clips and the possibility of easily circulating 
and commenting on them – while benches, buildings, and bridges provide 
the material architecture for the street performance.
Since its inception in the 1980s and 1990s in the suburbs of Paris, parkour – or 
the art of displacement (l’art du déplacement) – reached the wider public via 
media representations: parkour became internationally popular through films 
and documentaries with and about its founding figures, David Belle and Sébast-
ien Foucan.1 For many traceurs, their initial encounter with parkour occurred 
through films and, later, video clips on YouTube. Furthermore, music videos, 
commercials, and computer games began to copy and include parkour moves 
and, in doing so, increased parkour’s international visibility and popularity.
In the early 2000s, parkour groups started to emerge in places as diverse 
as France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Mexico, Russia, Spain, 
and Japan. The story of parkour in Morocco can be traced back to the years 
2005–2006, when young teenagers saw their first parkour moves in the French 
films Yamakasi (2001) by Ariel Zeitoun and Banlieue 13 (2004) by Pierre Morel, 
interestingly both co-authored by Luc Besson.2 They were attracted by these 
1 David Belle is said to be the founding f igure of parkour. He was born in 1973 in Fécamp 
(France), where his father, who trained as a soldier in Vietnam, taught him escape moves. Belle 
translated these movements into the concrete setting of cities. Sébastien Foucan was one of the 
f irst traceurs associated with Belle, who later followed his own ideas and founded free running. 
Free running accentuates the acrobatic, rather than the most eff icient, mode of displacement. I 
am aware of these differences, which are also discussed in the community, but they are irrelevant 
for the purpose of this chapter. When I talk about parkour here, free running is included.
2 In the following part, I try to trace the history of parkour in Morocco based on interviews 
I conducted with different pioneers of the parkour community in the country, such as Souf ian 
and Badr from MpK in Marrakech, and Adil from Accroches Toi in Casablanca. Both groups are 
considered the f irst parkour practitioners in Morocco. In addition to this, I refer to an interview 
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moves and were inspired to translate them into their own environment, so 
they began to train alone or with a handful of friends in their neighbourhoods. 
While searching for additional information and material about parkour on 
the internet, the groups came into contact with each other. These personal 
encounters were crucial for the further development of parkour in Morocco. 
Added impetus was provided by visits from international traceurs, such as a 
Belgian Moroccan traceur who was also in contact with David Belle, and who 
shared his experience during training sessions with traceurs in Morocco. As 
soon as Moroccan traceurs established a certain level of proficiency, they 
started to take pictures of their best movements, and those who had access 
to the technical equipment tried to produce footage for videos.
Due to the availability of technical equipment and the ongoing spread 
of digitization since the 2000s, digital media practices became integral to 
the cultural practice of parkour, alongside the global emergence of local 
groups. Today, Moroccan traceurs, as well as global parkour communities, 
organize themselves and communicate via different social media channels 
(mainly Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram).
Today, hundreds of traceurs are active all over Morocco.3 A number of 
groups and individuals are active in metropolitan areas such as Casablanca, 
Marrakesh, and Tangier, but parkour is also practised by young people far 
from such urban centres – in Berkane and in the surroundings of Agadir, 
for example. Parkour is performed on the roofs of public schools, municipal 
buildings, or mosques in the city; on top of private houses in residential areas; 
in empty villas, on crowded beaches, and even at famous architectural sites. 
With respect to their corporeal skills, as well to their visual, technical, and 
digital engagement, traceurs are involved at different levels. They train as 
individual traceurs, but they have also established parkour groups, many of 
which have been active for several years, and are involved in global parkour 
institutions, such as Ibkano in Casablanca or Jlafet in Tangier. The different 
local actors are well connected via social media but also personally; they visit 
each other and undertake shared training sessions in different Moroccan cities.
Moroccan parkour practitioners have produced themselves. In it, Ahmad Bakkali, a brother of the 
founding member Badr of MpK, tells the story of parkour in Morocco: Ahmed Bakkali’s Interview 
– PARKOUR, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fb9Tk_v6KGs (last accessed 18 November 2020).
3 The following description about the present-day Moroccan parkour community is the 
result of f ield research and participant observation in Morocco since 2012. In addition to this, 
I conducted qualitative interviews with around 30 traceurs and 3 traceuses, mainly in 2014 
during f ield research, but also in the following years, up to today. In the course of the chapter, 
I refer to the interviews I conducted.
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The fact that Moroccan parkour actors originate from a diverse range of 
social backgrounds rather contradicts the common assumption that global 
cultural trends are mainly the preserve of middle-class adolescents. Nothing 
other than one’s own body is required to practise parkour, which opens up 
opportunities for participation, irrespective of the f inancial resources at 
one’s disposal. In interviews, traceurs often mention that, through parkour, 
they have encountered people from different social backgrounds, and that 
they have established close ties with them.
Like other body-centred sport cultures (surfing, skateboarding, climbing, 
etc.), parkour is rather male dominated.4 Nonetheless, it is also practised 
by some women, including in Morocco and other Arab countries. However, 
traceuses in Arab countries are confronted by a gamut of prejudices towards 
the idea of women moving expressively through public space.5
The Body and Sensory Ethnography
The body, in my approach, is a regulated but conscious and sensory entity. 
In recent decades, the body and its practices have become increasingly 
prominent in social theory through concepts such as Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ 
(1977), Butler’s ‘gender performativity’ (1988; 1990), Foucault’s ‘biopolitics’ 
(1976), and Howes’ ‘sensing culture’ (2003). Within the hyper-rationalist 
4 There is a scientif ic debate about the role of gender in sport cultures, which also questions 
hegemonic white masculinities in it. See e.g. Robinson 2008 with a focus on climbing, Thorpe 2008 
for snowboarding, Yochim 2009 for skateboarding, Kidder 2013 for parkour, and the important 
volume Women in Action Sport Cultures: Identity, Politics, and Experience (2016), edited by Holly 
Thorpe and Rebecca Olive, which includes many inspiring articles and interviews with pioneers 
in this f ield. For parkour in this edited volume, see Wheaton 2016. See also the volume entitled 
New Sporting Femininities: Embodied Politics in Postfeminist Times (2018), edited by Toffoleti et 
al.
5 There is sparse literature about women and gender in sport cultures in ‘non-Western’ 
settings. Wheaton writes in her article about gender and parkour: ‘These insights remind us 
to look outside of our predominantly white Western perspectives and empirical contexts to 
map the differences in gender and its intersectionality with ethnicity and religion, as well as 
other markers of identity to expose the complex and contradictory articulations of identity in 
these informal but increasingly globally widespread spaces and settings in which action sports 
takes place’ (2016, p. 130). However, here are some references for parkour: Braune (2019) on 
gender and parkour in the Arab World, and Thorpe and Ahmad (2015) about parkour in Gaza. 
There is also a quite vibrant female parkour community in Iran; you can f ind some journalistic 
snapshots about it here: ‘Fast-paced parkour offers outlet for women in Iran’, 2014: http://www.
nydailynews.com/life-style/health/iranian-women-embrace-parkour-article-1.1731975 (last 
accessed 18 November 2020), and Fazekas 2018.
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and hyper-intellectualized context of social theory, notions of the ‘body’, 
‘things’, and ‘practical knowledge’ have become increasingly relevant as well 
(Reckwitz 2002, p. 258). A focus on practices implies centring on agency, 
rather than an exclusive reliance on texts, discourses, and mental processes. 
Reckwitz draws on the work of Bourdieu, Foucault, Latour, and Butler to 
describe practices as a set of ‘routinized bodily performances’ and ‘mental 
activities’ (2002, p. 251). Focusing on practices means ‘the exploration of the 
embeddedness of the mental activities of understanding and knowing in a 
complex of doings’ (Reckwitz 2002, p. 258).
In this vein, my main interest lies in the reconstruction of how parkour ‘is 
produced by a nexus of […] practices as body/knowledge/things-complexes’ 
(Reckwitz 2002, p. 258). A post-structuralist approach is taken here, in 
that space is presented as something that is materialized through bodily 
practices. As de Certeau puts it:
[I]f it is true that a spatial order organizes an ensemble of possibilities (e.g. 
by a place in which one can move) and interdictions (e.g. by a wall that 
prevents one from going further), then the walker actualizes some of these 
possibilities. In that way, he makes them exist as well as emerge. But he 
also moves them about and he invents others, since the crossing, drifting 
away, or improvisation of walking privilege, trans-form or abandon spatial 
elements. (1988, p. 98)
At the moment of the parkour encounter, the identity of the architectural 
site is questioned. The traceur not only confirms a distinctive architectural 
structure but also contests its identity. Buildings and places are perceived 
with alternate perspectives. For example, a windowsill is explored as a poten-
tial foothold to overcome a certain distance. This allows the sill to continue 
to function as intended, and at the same time, its function is changed: ‘in 
doing so the traceur not only changes his own perception of the building 
but also changes the building itself as perceived object’ (Fuggle 2008, p. 215).
To put the spotlight on the body allows for an incorporation of the 
sensorial dimension, in the sense that there is no separation between the 
corporeal experience and the rational mind: ‘the experiencing, knowing 
and emplaced body is therefore central to the idea of a sensory ethnography’ 
(Pink 2015, p. 28). Concisely, a sensory ethnography includes the senses in 
the process through which knowledge is produced and takes into account 
knowledge which is not spoken. Three topics are central in the debate on 
the anthropology of the senses: the relationship between senses and culture, 
vision and its relation to other senses, and ‘reflexivity that goes beyond the 
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interrogation of how culture is “written” to examine the sites of embodied 
knowing’ (Pink 2015, p. 13).
Sensory ethnography takes its impulses from different disciplines such as 
anthropology, human geography, and sociology. Due to this chapter’s focus 
on space, I refer to works from geography and walking studies (Wunderlich 
2008; Edensor 2010; Middleton 2010; Yi’En 2013), especially with regard to 
practising parkour in a local setting. The reference to walking studies is 
made due to a basic commonality between walking and parkour – namely, 
that only the body, bereft of any additional instruments, moves through and 
shapes space. The geographer Yi-Fu Tuan has consistently argued that, to 
achieve a more complex understanding of objects, places, and their relation, 
the senses must be taken into account (Tuan 1977). In Sensuous Geographies 
(1994), Paul Rodaway proposes an approach that ‘offer[s] a more integrated 
view of the role of the senses in geographical understanding: the sense 
both as a relationship to a world and the senses as themselves a kind of 
structuring of space and defining of place’ (1994, p. 4). When moving, it is 
not only the feet but rather the whole body that is involved and in contact 
with the environment. Rodaway classif ies four different ways of ‘getting in 
touch’ with the environment: the ‘global touch’ ‘represents the body’s general 
contact with the environment’ and refers to the feeling and reaff irmation 
of one’s own body in a certain spatial context. The ‘reach touch’ denotes 
the contact of feet and f ingers, for example, with the environment. Here, 
the feeling of the texture comes into play. The ‘extended touch’ is mediated 
through an instrument or device, while the fourth ‘imagined touch’ is based 
on tactile memory and/or expectations (Rodaway 1994, p. 48).
In her article ‘Walking and Rhythmicity: Sensing Urban Space’, 
 Wunderlich explores three modes of walking and highlights implications 
for urban design. Irrespective of whether the form of walking is characterized 
as ‘purposive’, ‘discursive’, or ‘conceptual’, the basic rhythmicity of walking 
remains inherent to it: ‘the rhythm of walking is influenced by the interac-
tion with other external rhythmical events that we came across in urban 
environments, such as other walking practices, or other bodily movements 
or activities that contrast in pace or rhythm’ (Wunderlich 2008, p. 133).6 In 
the case of walking, it seems that ‘[a] notion of place is acquired through 
the participatory attribute of the haptic sense’ (Wunderlich 2008, p. 129), 
which relates to the conditions of the pavement (e.g. cobblestone, flagstones, 
gravel) (Gehl 1987), as well as to the responsiveness (Endensor 2010) and the 
6 About rhythmicity, see also Edensor 2010; about different kinds of walking, see also Middleton 
2010.
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affectiveness of materialities (Yi’En 2013). Edensor includes mechanisms 
that regulate the style of walking, from outside weather conditions to the 
form of clothing (2010, p. 73). He refers to Lefebvre’s notion of ‘dressage’ ‘as a 
means to train the body to perform and condition it to accede to particular 
rhythms so that people walk “properly”, do not slouch, put their shoulders 
back and f irmly plant their heels down first’ (Edensor 2010, p. 71). Middleton 
extends this argument to the embodiment of places (2010).
In addition to the rhythmicity and purpose of walking, the quality of 
surfaces, weather conditions, clothing, and the learned way of walking, 
there are also normative expectations which are deeply embedded in society 
with regard to gender-appropriate behaviour and the given architectural 
structures that regulate the sensory body and its movement.
Sensing Parkour while Practising It
A key component of the cultural practice of parkour is seeing the environment 
with parkour-eyes; the perception of one’s own surroundings starts to change 
signif icantly. The priority then becomes to look for good spots to perform 
new manoeuvres. In what follows, I refer to this as the ‘parkour gaze’. On 
both an intentional and unintentional level, this crucial and comprehensive 
change of perception structures the practitioner’s movements through the 
city. The traceur either consciously searches for a good spot, or is en route 
to somewhere else, such as school or work, and coincidentally discovers a 
suitable setting. The parkour gaze has an explicit interest in discovering 
potentially interesting athletic challenges, with the attention lying primarily 
on the surfaces of a given structure (place or object). What happens inside 
a building, the historical background of a certain structure or area, is not 
important to the successful performance of parkour-related movements.
My argument here is that this perception represents a radical perspective 
on public space, because it disregards the putative symbolic meaning, social 
status, or historical prestige of buildings, places, or objects (see also Atkin-
sons ‘urban deconstruction’ with regard to parkour, 2009). Furthermore, 
it is worth highlighting that the perception of public space is primarily 
driven by the potential athletic challenges offered by a certain architectural 
structure. Different architectural structures assume importance depending 
on one’s corporeal capability and the intended parkour manoeuvres. A 
wall’s height or inclination for climbing over or for leaping off; the distance 
between benches for jumping over or from one to another; the presence of a 
handrail to offer balance – such features now assume a special signif icance.
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Once the traceur has arrived at a (new) spot, the surfaces and dimensions 
of the location are carefully measured through a close sensory investigation. 
The information that is useful for practising is to be found on the surface 
itself, rendering a detailed and deep knowledge of it indispensable. The 
surface’s character is experienced through close tactile contact – through 
touching, pushing, and scratching. By tangibly touching it, the traceur 
acquires the necessary information with respect to stability, f irmness, and 
grip, for example. Furthermore, distances and conditions are evaluated 
through careful examination, while the smell provides further information 
about the place. Does it smell of fragrant flowers or of rotting rubbish? The 
odour offers evidence about context and situatedness, as well as about the 
weather. The same is true for the taste – during intensive training sessions, 
dust as well as sweat and water are tasted (differently).
While all of this is occurring, the traceur also hears noises which the body 
produces during the practice of parkour: the squeak of sneakers over different 
surfaces, the rush of wind while flipping in the air, the heavy breathing while 
performing a particularly demanding sequence of motions. Furthermore, it 
may be possible to hear the comments of observers, as well as a range of other 
background noises, as parkour sessions transpire against the soundscapes 
of public space, whether in the centre of a metropolitan city, at the beach, 
or in a lower-class residential area. For some traceurs, this sonic dimension 
is an important component of parkour and is by no means perceived as 
annoying, whereas others prefer to listen to music while training. This serves 
different purposes: ‘During the training we can listen to music that inspires 
us, to make our level better and to make us feel free. It also helps us not to 
feel bored from training’ (personal interview, 16 October 2013, Facebook).
Depending on the information collected through tasting, hearing, seeing, 
smelling, and palpation, the traceurs start to test aspects of their planned 
movements before proceeding to perform complex motion sequences. 
The appropriation of a new location, as well as regular play sessions, are 
characterized by a high level of repetition. The same motions are continu-
ously repeated ten times, a hundred times, a thousand times. A fundamental 
aspect of parkour is precisely this repetition, which has two interrelated 
meanings: f irst, to exercise intensively and repetitively in preparation for a 
move or f igure, and second, to ensure that the skill is successfully completed 
if the f igure can be repeated again and again.
Through this process of continuous repetition, the specific location becomes 
embodied, in a very literal sense of the word. This embodiment is intensively 
related to the location insofar as it is not readily reproducible at another place 
with different spatial and surface conditions. Furthermore, while practising 
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parkour, the traceur comes into bodily contact with urban materials such 
as dust, mud, and rubbish, inhales car exhaust gases, smells a baker’s shop, 
hears people chatting, and gets dirty. The places inscribe themselves even 
deeper into the body; sometimes the body is marked by small scratches, 
bloody wounds, or even serious injuries. In addition, of course, the body is 
profoundly shaped through repetitive training, not only to perform a specific 
place-related move but more generally with regard to its overall constitution.
Not only the body but also the place is physically shaped by direct contact. 
I argued above that a given building or location changes its character and 
function when it is perceived as an object for the parkour encounter. In 
terms of the more or less visible tracks left through wear and tear, this also 
holds true for the physical encounter. Moreover, traceurs also restructure 
particular settings to suit their purposes.
The relation between body and space is characterized by a close sensorial 
connectedness and an embodied perception of places and their spatial 
relations. The body is in direct contact with the space; it gets dirty, it inhales, 
it touches and tastes the dust and the earth. Moreover, like the place, the 
body is shaped by the encounter through repetitive exercises. At the same 
time, the places become embodied (both inwardly and outwardly) through 
repetitive training, as well as through small scratches and wounds.
A deep and detailed knowledge of the structures and qualities of surfaces 
is acquired through tactile and haptic contact, as well as through a visual, 
sonic, smelled, and tasted perception of it. As the parkourian body forges 
paths that were not originally made for walking and jumping, the sensorial 
encounter provides vital information for a creative and secure performance. I 
argue here that it is through the very practice of parkour that spatial elements 
acquire new and different meanings. The body-space relation imparts this 
meaning in the very moment of encounter. Parkour implies new ways in 
which space is negotiated and appropriated that were not originally intended 
by city planners and architects. Parkour-related practices thus implicitly 
contest traditional forms of behaviour, as well as the intended functions 
of particular public spaces.
Media and Visual Ethnography
The visual material and its digital circulation are part of parkour and open 
it up to a wider audience. Approaching parkour through its media practices 
and products allows for varying levels of involvement. In what follows, I 
will briefly touch on several perspectives, which conceptualize parkour as 
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a media practice, thereby linking it to other sport (media) cultures (such as 
skateboarding, snowboarding, windsurfing, and climbing). These practices 
all have an important visual component and are characterized by a special 
and fundamental relationship between cultural practices and evolving 
media technologies. In recent research, such practices and sports have 
been variously described as ‘life style sports’ (Gilchrist and Wheaton 2013), 
Stil-Kulturen (translated as ‘style cultures’, Stern 2010), or as ‘action sport 
cultures’ (Thorpe and Olive 2016), and also as ‘new’, ‘extreme’, ‘alternative’, 
or ‘freestyle’ sports. For the purpose of this chapter, I use the term ‘cultural 
practice’ to refer to the broader cultural context and practices in which 
these athletic activities are embedded.
Early subcultural studies addressed media coverage, and specif ically 
the extent to which media coverage could constitute a ‘co-opting’ of the 
subversive potential of style-orientated cultural practices (Hebdige 1979). 
Scholars writing in the 1990s tended to arrive at a very different conclusion, 
however; namely, that different cultural communities ‘use specialist or 
“niche” media for their own purposes – not merely to disseminate informa-
tion, but also to establish (and to regulate) collective identity’ (Buckingham 
1999; Thornton 1995).
As in the cases of surfing (Booth 1996; 2001), skateboarding (Borden 2001; 
Buckingham 2009), and other sports, media has played and continues to 
play a crucial role in the development of parkour, on many different levels 
(Gilchrist and Wheaton 2013; Kidder 2012; Ladewig 2008). The history of 
each of these cultural practices is very much linked to medial production 
because through f ilms and documentaries, these practices have become 
internationally visible and popular. In more recent years, parkour’s inter-
national visibility and popularity have been further enhanced by YouTube, 
music videos, commercials, and computer games, attracting young people all 
over the world to imitate parkour movements and adapt them to their own 
surroundings. Furthermore, different parkour communities are mainly (self-)
organized, on both a local and global level, through particular social media 
channels. Gilchrist and Wheaton highlight the importance of ‘continuities 
with pre-Internet forms of communication’ (2013, p. 170), and here I would 
further emphasize the role of ‘internet-supplementary’ forms of communica-
tion. Overall, however, Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram provide the 
digital architecture for parkour media practices and performance. The 
opportunity to participate – that is, the availability of online forums on 
which to post information, pictures, and videos free of charge, and the 
possibility of easily circulating and commenting on these clips both locally 
and globally – constitute structures of marginalization and exclusion.
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With respect to the visual material produced by parkour practitioners – 
and taking into account the power of representation – the story of parkour 
might be told as a narrative produced firstly through Western documentaries 
and representations about it, until, secondly, more self-presentation by the 
practitioners – as expressed through their own self-made videos – became 
prevalent. As the technology needed to take photographs and record footage 
becomes cheaper and more available in Morocco, Moroccan traceurs are 
able to produce and spread their own visual representations. Due to their 
creativity and professionalism, the Moroccan traceurs are able to produce 
digital representations of themselves.
The value of the visual material is constantly being negotiated within 
the different lifestyle communities in terms of what is perceived as a ‘good’ 
picture or a ‘nice’ video. This is shaped by, and dependent upon, the develop-
ment of f ilming technology and equipment. The media practices of parkour 
range from simple unedited photos to animated pictures, HD videos recorded 
with smartphones, digital reflex cameras, action cameras (such as GoPro), or 
camera drones. These different technologies, as well as the editing software 
used and perspectives chosen, are central to the pictures and videos that 
are ultimately produced. This also touches on sensitive questions around 
access to technology, and especially the highly professionalized knowledge 
needed to manipulate it, to produce what is perceived as a ‘good video’.
In the following, I will make explicit how I work with visual material as 
a means of knowledge production. The engagement with visual material 
hints at the tense relationship between visual and perceived reality, between 
sight and the other senses, and between the visual and textual, as the result 
of academic knowledge production.
I approach visual material in several different ways. As a matter of prin-
ciple, this chapter deals solely with photos, even though videos are equally 
important components of parkour’s media culture. This focus on photos 
has profound implications on the sensorial encounter of the body-space 
relationship, because pictures rely exclusively on the visual sense (whereas 
videos, for example, also have a sonic component). There is a close relation-
ship between image and video in the sense that the images are themselves 
usually extracted from video footage, with images effectively snipped from 
a movement to capture the motion more expressively.
Firstly, I use photos I have personally taken to underline the sensorial 
description of the spots. Even though these relate exclusively to the visual 
dimension, they are employed here to provide a more vivid illustration of 
the spatial relations of the chosen sites. Furthermore, my photos were taken 
without any specific technology; in other words, I used a simple camera without 
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any specific angle or f ilter. I am nonetheless aware that these photos are not 
realistic renderings of a given place, but merely constructed moments of reality.
Secondly, I work with photos taken and produced by a Moroccan traceur to 
analyse the body-space relationship and its fundamental constructedness in 
and through the visual material. The production of parkour images is critically 
reliant on a profound knowledge of the movement sequences in parkour, on 
the ability to anticipate and accompany the movements, and on the handling 
and manipulation of the advanced recording technology and editing software. 
Furthermore, knowledge of what is perceived within the parkour community 
as a good and thrilling image is vital. Traceurs often told me that collabora-
tion with otherwise talented and well-equipped cinematographers who did 
not have a parkour background failed because they lacked this important 
knowledge of parkour movements and their visual representation.
To elaborate on my argument, and to highlight the specif icity of the 
spatial knowledge in parkour images, I contrast the sensorial description 
of the chosen spots with the photos I have taken, which offer some idea of 
the general spatial setting of the edited images of one Moroccan traceur 
taken at the same spot.
Therefore, out of hundreds of different spots in Marrakech, I have chosen 
three exemplary images, due mainly to their diversity but also to their 
popularity. These images are from Abderrahim Arradi, a traceur from Mar-
rakech, who has been practising parkour since 2006 and has developed a 
remarkable physical proficiency. Abderrahim Arradi puts a great amount of 
energy into the visual representation of his talents, which has gained him 
widespread recognition, not just locally but also globally.
A Sensorial Description of the Spots
The following sensorial descriptions of the spots encompass the sensorial 
encounter of parkour while practising in different public spaces, thus offering 
a more intimate insight into three specif ic settings.
Al Anber is the name of an urban quarter where several traceurs live, 
including Abderrahim Arradi. Al Anber can be considered as the residential 
courtyard of the city’s lower class. This spot is very important to the traceurs, 
and it is used intensively as an everyday training ground (Figure 8.1). It is 
soundtracked by the daily hustle and bustle of the surrounding flats and 
the public spaces: mothers shouting for their children to come for dinner, 
music, televisions, the smell of cooked food. Inhabitants usually pass through 
the courtyard, and children play there (and, indeed, receive their f irst 
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Figure 8.1: Al Anber. Photo: ines braune.
Figure 8.2: Koutoubia Mosque in Marrakech. Photo: ines braune.
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parkour lessons). Nearly every single given structure in the courtyard is 
perceived as a potential training surface: the branches of trees are used 
to swing on, the iron bars at the forefront of the picture are used to train 
one’s balance, the different distances and heights between walls are used 
to jump on, off, or over. The traceurs also tend the spot and try to keep it 
clean, while periodically rearranging it for their own special purposes, such 
Figure 8.3: ‘the castle’. Photo: ines braune. 
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as by putting an old tyre in the sand to use as a springboard, while an old 
mattress functions as an exercise mat for secure landings.
The second spot is the famous Koutoubia Mosque in Marrakech (Figure 
8.2). It is one of the most well-known and important tourist attractions in 
the heart of the city. It lies opposite the Jamaa El Fna, is surrounded by a 
network of busy central roads, and is frequented by inhabitants of Marrakech 
as well as by local and international tourists. The parkour sessions here 
take place in a quite astounding setting, amidst the vivid soundscape of 
a city centre alive with the noise of traff ic and crowds, of passers-by and 
astonished spectators. The athletic challenges at this spot lie in the minaret, 
different-sized bases of columns, and various handrails.
The next spot is a building located on the outskirts of Marrakech known 
to the traceurs as ‘the castle’ (Figure 8.3). This is an unf inished empty 
villa on a hill with an amazing view over Marrakech that extends to the 
snow-capped Atlas Mountains. Its outer façade is complete but devoid of 
window glass, while the interior of the multilevel villa comprises a set of 
incomplete stairs and only a preliminary, foundational distribution of 
rooms. These structures have proven inspiring, setting the scene for several 
extraordinary parkour recordings. The castle is a semi-public place, in the 
sense that it is not on any public transport link. In addition, the whole area 
is sealed off by a wall at the foot of the hill. The place was discovered by 
one of the traceurs while working nearby as a painter. However, traceurs 
are not the only lords of this castle; they share it with other refuge-seekers 
(such as the homeless or drug addicts). Because it is far from the city, the 
air here is f illed with a certain freshness, but it also offers a glimpse into 
the abysses of human existence.
Visual Analysis of the Body-Space Relation in the Images
Al Anber
In the f irst picture, taken in the courtyard at Al Anber, we see a human 
body elevated in midair in the middle of the image (Figure 8.4). The bottom 
third is taken up by a panoramic view of Al Anber’s courtyard, while the 
upper two-thirds are f illed with blue sky and wispy clouds. It seems to be 
a backlit photograph: dark, with only few gradations. Details are hardly 
recognizable, and it is not clear whether the person depicted is male or 
female. The picture is characterized by a tension between the flat body and 
the increased spatiality of the architecture through the curved horizon. 
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While the body is mainly black, the colours of the background are edited 
and form a complementary contrast between blue and orange (against the 
coloured background, the dark f igure does not really f it into the image, or 
even appears detached from it). With the help of the ‘hero’ or ‘superman’ 
perspective (i.e. from below), the body appears frozen in the sky, with 
seemingly no relation to the architecture or the ground, like a f lying bird 
that contradicts human limitations and gravity.
Koutoubia
This picture shows the famous mosque Koutoubia in the city centre of Mar-
rakech (Figure 8.5). In the middle of the picture, the traceur bridges a divide 
in a wall. The leaping body is in focus, and even the face is recognizable. As 
in f igure 8.4, the body appears entirely framed by the sky, and the photo 
is also taken from the ‘hero’ perspective, from below. In the bottom half of 
Figure 8.4: ‘Superman’. Photo: Abderrahim Arradi.
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the picture, we see a panorama of the paved floor, parts of the wall, and the 
minaret of the former mosque. The upper half of the picture is f illed with 
cloudy sky. This picture has been reworked and the contrasts sharpened; 
consequently, the structure of the pavement, as well as the stone wall and the 
minaret, are extremely clear. The same is true of the cloudy sky. The spatiality 
is highlighted through the curved horizon. Against this backdrop, the body 
seems to be frozen and serves as a point of tranquillity. In contrast to the other 
pictures, the standpoint of the observer is obvious, as is the landing point of 
the traceur. The photographer and the observer stand on the pavement and 
most probably recognize the sequence of the movement, the starting and 
landing points. Furthermore, the body is more integrated into the picture and 
serves as a kind of connection across the divide in the architectural structure.
While in the other two pictures the tension is created through the un-
expected, the intensely motionable body and its exclusion, in this picture 
the body seems to recognize the impossibility of remaining suspended in 
the air, and connects to the manmade architecture.
The Castle
The picture is divided into two parts (Figure 8.6). On the left-hand side of 
the foreground, there are close, f inely structured parts of an unfinished, 
Figure 8.5: ‘Jump’. Photo: Abderrahim Arradi.
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f lat-roofed, multilevel villa. On the right-hand side, the observer has an 
extensive view and can see, f irstly, the incline on which the villa was built, 
followed by the (typically Marrakechian) red-coloured sea of houses, with 
the horizon composed of the spectacular snow-capped Atlas Mountains. In 
the upper part of the picture is a rotating human body, which, as in the other 
two pictures, is surrounded completely by sky. In contrast to the other two 
pictures, however, this has not been taken from the ‘hero-perspective’ – in 
other words, not from below. Instead, the camera is located at the same height 
as the screened body. Due to the architectural structure of the building, this 
was only possible with a drone camera, which was used to produce a video 
clip. The photo was extracted from the video footage and subsequently edited; 
the colours and their contrasts were sharpened, and the photo was mirrored.
Against the flat, monotonous sky, the ‘flying body’ is striking, also due to 
its (constructed) posture, the angled arms, offset legs, curved upper body, 
and falling hair. The tension in this picture is created through the spatial 
Figure 8.6: ‘Flying body’. Photo: Abderrahim Arradi.
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arrangement, the sharp contrast between extreme movement and stillness, 
and through the uncertain moment of contact with the ground.
With regard to the description of the image content in all three pictures, 
the body is surrounded by sky and has no contact at all with the architectural 
structures of the particular setting. The images convey the impression of a 
body detached from the places and from the natural law of gravitation; they 
seem to fly or hover above their surroundings. The frozen body in the sky 
conveys a certain separateness from the banality of the grounded everyday: 
lightness and freedom versus seriousness and problems. Nevertheless, the 
architectural structures of the places serve as crucial points of reference 
for the situatedness and proficiency of the body.
The construction of this surface of the image content is quite complex. 
The viewer looks at what is not actually shown, what remains invisible, 
and thus at the techniques of construction. All signs of physical exertion 
are invisible; sweat-distorted faces due to the complicated and challenging 
moves are hidden from view. There is no indication of the direct encounter 
with the surfaces, no dirt, and no dust. Furthermore, there is no contextual 
information about the places, or about how the video was recorded, or about 
how long the practitioner has trained to perform such impressive moves. 
The qualities of the buildings’ surfaces are similarly unrecognizable.
With respect to the construction of the image, the chosen perspective 
plays an important role. Two of the three pictures are taken with the ‘hero’ 
or ‘superman’ perspective from below, which makes the body appear larger. 
The third picture was taken at eye level by a drone camera, but because of the 
specific site of the recording (the most elevated point in the location), as well 
as of the splitting of the image, the body is also elevated above everything else.
Furthermore, complicated graphic f ilters are applied to the digital image 
to highlight, and neglect, particular information. In all three pictures, the 
colours as well as the contrasts are edited. In the f irst two pictures, the 
image horizons are curved, which creates a stronger sense of spatiality of 
the architectural structures.
Perspective, the splitting and arrangement of the image, and different 
graphic f ilters are all important tools for producing parkour images that 
simultaneously reflect weightlessness, tension, and risk.
Concluding Remarks on the Sensorial, the Visual, and the Textual
Street practices require an intense knowledge about and a dense sensorial 
contact with the surfaces of the architectural structures of the public space. 
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The body exerts itself, it transpires; it is exhausted, and it is satisf ied. The 
body has a close haptic relation to the places and feels it; the body carefully 
measures, maps, and evaluates the surfaces through its eyes; the body 
smells, tastes, listens, sees, and feels the spatial surroundings. By doing so, 
the body reaff irms and recreates spatial relations. The body is involved as 
subject and actor of the movements and is manipulated through intense 
training sessions to perform the movements. Simultaneously, the body 
is shaped by the places and in a literal sense, the places are embodied as 
well, and the places are shaped by the encounter. Furthermore, the regular 
street practices are characterized by a high level of repetition, control, and 
safety. The body as a tool to practise will not be risked easily or recklessly.
In contrast to this, the visualization of the body-space relation in park-
our ref lects a contrary approach. The images by their very nature refer 
exclusively to the visual sense. With regard to the body-space relation, 
there is no direct contact between the body and the surfaces depicted. The 
images are edited in a way to visualize a distance between the body and 
the different architectural structures, even though the different places are 
crucial references to give meaning to the body-space relation. Moments of 
exertion and strain are not visible and the body becomes a f lying object 
(instead of actively producing the moves). The detached body as object is 
technically manipulated by camera settings, angles, and the editing process. 
Repetition, control, and safety are replaced in the pictures by extraordinary 
singularity, risk, and danger.
Both approaches – the body-space relation while practising parkour on 
the streets and the body-space relation in the visual material – seem to be 
driven by antagonistic momentums: connectedness versus detachedness, the 
routine versus the extraordinary, subject versus object, and control versus 
risk. Both approaches follow different ideas and construct the relationship 
between body and space in a distinct way. This hints at the crucial claim 
about the limitedness of assertions about practices while looking exclusively 
at the visual material and vice versa.
Working with the visual material opens up a broader access to embodied 
knowledge but underlines a certain predominance of the visual sense, which 
excludes further frames of sensorial knowledge. Furthermore, the academic 
knowledge production is based on textuality, meaning the knowledge gained 
has to be translated into a written text.
I argued in the beginning of this chapter that the exploration of the body-
space relationship as practice and as representation are used to relate the 
two to each other. They constitute components of parkour but also of other 
media-intense lifestyle and sport practices, though the approaches to how 
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body and space are related are diverse and sometimes even contradictory. 
Parkour can be and is practised without any recording technology, but when 
visual material of one’s own practices is targeted, the recording becomes 
part of the training session. Furthermore, the images, which are edited and 
technically manipulated for extraordinary moments, are mainly taken during 
routinized training sessions and settings. The body-space relationship while 
practising parkour is mediated through the production of visual material in 
various ways. The places of the routinized training sessions are reimagined 
through the images as results of the visual material. Moreover, the digital 
recordings of the movements are evaluated directly after performing the 
movements on the screens of the cameras. Here again, the body-space relation 
is perceived through the visual material with an aesthetic but also athletic 
claim. The direct evaluation of the material is done through an analysis of 
the aesthetic composition; in other words, how to improve and accentuate 
certain body parts or how to improve the athletic performance. The digital 
recording technology enables the traceurs to slice their movements into the 
tiniest parts (invisible to the eye while performing) to improve, control, and 
shape their body knowledge. Referring to Rodaway’s classif ication of getting 
in touch with the environment, the ‘global touch’ of parkour is intensively 
shaped by the parkour gaze, a gaze on the places that signals aesthetic as well 
as athletic challenges but disregards any historical or reputational meaning. 
‘Reach touch’ describes the sensorial encounter of body and place with all 
senses. The ‘extended touch’ is mainly mediated through the recording 
technology, while the ‘imagined touch’ refers to memory as well as the power 
of imagination of the different moves performed or to be performed at a place.
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9. Mediated Narratives of Syrian 
Refugees : Mapping Victim–Threat 
Correlations in Turkish Newspapers
Ayça Tunç Cox
Abstract
Turkey has become the f irst and main transition hub for Syrian refugees. 
Furthermore, Turkey is spatially as well as culturally simultaneously 
referred to as European and Asian or Middle Eastern depending the point of 
view. Therefore, the representation of refugees in the Turkish press proves 
signif icant for the knowledge produced about refugees. Accordingly, this 
chapter strives to investigate the coverage of Syrian refugees in newspapers, 
which constitutes only one aspect of the overall reception of the issue in 
Turkey, and therefore does not claim to be exhaustive. Yet, because daily 
newspapers are still among the most important media sectors in Turkey, 
they constitute a special case of knowledge production worth investigating.
Keywords: Turkey, refugees, print media, narratives
One of the biggest current global issues is arguably the so-called refugee crisis 
that is likely to have an impact on every possible aspect of daily life – from 
employment to housing, education, and health – especially in Europe, for 
the coming decades. This should be evaluated in light of major debates about 
transnational mobility, migration, ethnic and racial discrimination, and the 
concomitant image and knowledge production. Arjun Appadurai argues that 
‘mediascapes provide large and complex repertoires of images, narratives and 
ethnoscapes to viewers throughout the world’ (2003, p. 35). In other words, 
mediascapes help to create and then to consolidate transnational ‘imagined 
communities’. In this context, mediated narratives about migration and about 
refugees play an important role in ethnic and cultural identification processes.
Strohmaier, A. and A. Krewani (eds.), Media and Mapping Practices in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Producing Space. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021
doi 10.5117/9789462989092_ch09
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Turkey has become the f irst and main transition hub for Syrian 
refugees, and furthermore, the country is spatially as well as cultur-
ally simultaneously referred to as European and Asian/Middle Eastern. 
Therefore, the representation of refugees in the daily Turkish press is 
signif icant for the knowledge produced about them. Accordingly, this 
study strives to investigate how different media groups in Turkey deal 
with the issue from different perspectives based on political stance, 
aff iliations, and agenda. Focusing on the coverage of Syrian refugees in 
newspapers comprises only one aspect of the overall reception of the 
issue in Turkey, and therefore, this study does not claim to be exhaustive. 
Yet, because the daily newspapers are still among the most important 
media sectors, especially owing to increased global accessibility via the 
internet, they constitute a special case of knowledge production worth 
investigating.1
The Turkish government’s off icial welcoming attitude notwithstanding, 
it appears newspapers with varied ideological aff iliations subscribe to 
differing interpretations of the issue. To this end, the coverage in Hürriyet, 
a mainstream conservative paper; Milliyet, a right-wing pro-government 
paper; and Cumhuriyet, the nationalist Kemalist representative of the Turk-
ish press, are analysed in the following. Rather than employing random 
sampling, certain periods that raised momentous interest among the 
public have been chosen: 1) the three days following the outburst of the 
Syrian crisis (17–19 June 2011); 2) the three days following the discovery of 
baby Ailan’s body washed ashore (3–5 September 2015); and 3) the three 
days following the European Union’s three billion-euro fund for Turkey 
(29 November–1 December 2015).
It is important to locate the critical discourse analysis of Turkish newspa-
per coverage of Syrian refugees in the appropriate context. It therefore seems 
crucial to f irst illustrate Turkey’s position with regard to the Syrian war, and 
second, to disclose the ownership structures and ideological aff iliations of 
the newspapers in Turkey that would presumably affect their framing of 
the issue, and thus, the ultimate portrayal of Syrian refugees.
1 As explained by Sőzeri and Güney, based on an off icial report by the Press Audience Research 
Committee (BİAK), there were 11.4 million newspaper readers in cities alone in Turkey in 2010. 
This indicates a decrease in readership compared to previous years; however, such a drop 
appears to be a common trait across the world, according to an OECD Directorate for Science, 
Technology and Industry Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy 
report. And yet, Sőzeri and Güney argue, the drop ratio in Turkey seems to be less in comparison 
with other countries, which might owe to the widespread promotional campaigns employed 
by Turkish newspapers (2011, p. 58).
MEdiAtEd NArrAtivES oF SyriAN rEFugEES 203
Is the Door Really Open?
The war in Syria, which has been going on for seven years, is now an is-
sue of international importance even though ‘it was not a problem until 
it hit Europe’, as argued by Kirişci (2016, p. 84). Millions of Syrians have 
escaped the country due to increasing violence. Human rights abuses such 
as rape, torture, and the use of incendiary and chemical weapons have been 
extensively reported.2 People have fled from the war-torn area to several 
neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, and some have 
even managed to take refuge further west despite extreme diff iculties on 
migratory routes, including being forced to travel illegally, often ending up 
in the hands of human traff ickers. It is estimated that so far around 150,000 
people have been killed during flight from Syria; over twelve million have 
been displace, either internally or externally (Kaya 2017, p. 365).
Among all the neighbouring countries, Turkey arguably harbours the 
highest number of refugees from Syria. Since the beginning, Turkey officially 
acknowledged an ‘open-door’ policy regarding Syrian refugees, albeit calling 
them ‘guests’ rather than refugees, with the hope that they would soon leave.3 
This allowed an unprecedented flux of people to be admitted into the country, 
f irst in the contained refugee camps in border cities, and then across the 
country. According to a recent report by the European Commission (2017), the 
current number of refugees in Turkey is over 3.4 million.4 This means Turkey 
is the country with the highest number of refugees in the world right now. 
By January 2017, the number of refugee babies born in Turkey was around 
230,000.5 It can easily be claimed that, although Turkey has received migrants 
throughout its history, the sheer scale of this recent human mobility, as 
well as its duration, struck the country unexpectedly; Turkey was not ready, 
neither legally nor socially. As rightly put by Erder, ‘it did not have the legal 
arrangements, institutions, and resources that would cater to the needs of such 
a large and diverse refugee group with differing expectations’ (2016, p. 126).
Initially, while complying with the 1951 Geneva Convention, to deal 
with this unforeseen number of refugees, Turkey appropriated a temporary 
2 For further information, see: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/
syria
3 ‘This is partly because the geographical limitation clause of the 1951 Geneva Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees maintained by Turkey restricts the refugee status only to those 
coming from Europe’ (Toğral Koca 2015, p. 209).
4 Among those, 85 per cent appear to live outside of specif ically designated refugee camps. 
Refer to ORSAM Report 2015 for details.
5 https://www.milliyet.com.tr/, 7 January 2017.
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protection regime.6 In addition, in February 2016, Syrian refugees were 
granted the right to work legally in Turkey. These implementations undeni-
ably provided certain assurances for Syrian refugees: ‘An open-door policy 
for all Syrians; no forced returns to Syria (non-refoulement); and unlimited 
duration of stay in Turkey’ (Kaya 2017, p. 370). Nonetheless, as Toğral Koca 
explains, ‘if asylum seekers are recognized as refugees, they are resettled 
in a third country with the support of the UNHCR. However, said latest 
Directive prevents refugees […] from being considered for resettlement into 
third countries as recognised refugees’ (2015, p. 211; emphasis in original). 
That is to say, they have no other option than to settle in Turkey as somewhat 
‘unwanted/overstayed’ guests or to resort to dangerous, illegal means to 
migrate to Europe. The latter has been made even harder, if not impossible, 
by the highly criticized deal signed between Turkey and the European Union 
in March 2016 to stop movement from Turkey to European countries.7
For those who opt to stay in Turkey, the prospect does not seem any 
brighter either, as the local people’s attacks against Syrians in 2014 showed. 
Such incidents underline the fact that the more ill-conceived, stereotypical 
images prevail in the media, the more prejudices are formed against the 
refugees among the Turkish public. Furthermore, research conducted in areas 
with a high population of refugees demonstrate the effects of these prejudices. 
Even though most of the Syrian interviewees express their gratitude towards 
the Turkish state and society for accepting them, among their complaints 
are exploitation in the labour market, bigotry and discrimination they are 
exposed to on a daily basis, limited access to health and education facilities, 
housing problems, and integration problems – further made diff icult not 
only because of linguistic and cultural differences but also by their perceived 
temporariness (Dinçer et al. 2013; Erdoğan 2014; ORSAM Report 2015; Toğral 
Koca 2015; Kaya 2016). On the other side of the coin is the impact of the 
increasing number of refugees on Turkey’s socio-economic structure. As 
addressed by the ORSAM Report in 2015, forecasted problems are an increase 
in child labour, an increase in polygamy and the resultant divorce cases, a 
potential risk of ethnic and religious polarization, a change in demographic 
6 With the additional introduction of the Temporary Protection Directive in 2014, the scope 
of temporary protection was expanded (Toğral Koca 2015, p. 211).
7 ‘The so-called one-to-one initiative, as part of the deal, stipulates that for every Syrian who 
has travelled without authorization to Greece and been returned to Turkey, EU member states will 
resettle one Syrian from Turkey’ (Rygiel et al. 2016, p. 316). See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/ for the details of the deal. Also refer to: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/eus-reckless-refugee-returns-to-turkey-illegal/ 
for the reasons for criticism of this deal.
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structure, rising levels of poverty and unemployment, an increase in cases 
of human traff icking, an expected increase in crime levels in the long term, 
unplanned urbanization, inflation in border regions, undocumented workers 
causing resentment among Turkish residents, and so on.
In light of these issues, Turkey’s off icial ‘open-door’ policy needs to be 
further questioned not only because this policy was suspended several times 
over the years but also because of the increased securitization (Huysmans 
2000) of the borders via militarized and technology-driven practices (Toğral 
Koca 2015, p. 212). This implies at the same time exclusionary rather than 
standardized practices on the borders:
The various groups arriving from Syria – Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmens, 
Armenians, and Yezidis – carry with them varied contentious political 
histories. Thus, refugees may be initially classified as Syrian, but may 
then subsequently be grouped as either friend or enemy along lines of 
ethnicity and/or religion. (Erder 2016, p. 119; emphasis added)
In other words, not every refugee from Syria receives the same treatment 
from the Turkish authorities while crossing the border, nor in the society, 
provided that they manage to enter the country in the f irst place.
Free Press or Whose Press?8
Common public perception of Syrian refugees is inevitably shaped by the 
knowledge produced about them in the media. The end product – that is, the 
news reports, narratives, and mediated images – eventually serves to create 
a popular imaginary that inscribes itself in Turkish collective memory. Every 
text is a product of a strongly connected net of social, cultural, and historical 
determinants, and thus, each text has a certain meaning depending on the 
particular context in which it is produced. In this respect, revealing the 
principles of the Turkish press will provide a basis for understanding the 
infrastructure of the news media, and consequently, the specif ic modes of 
knowledge production.
8 This section of the study provides a modif ied version of a previously published work: Ayça 
Tunç Cox. ‘Hyphenated Identities: The Reception of Turkish-German Film-makers in the Daily 
Turkish Press’, in Turkish German Cinema in the New Millennium: Sites, Sounds, and Screens, ed. 
by Barbara Mennel and Sabine Hake (New York: Berghahn, 2012), pp. 161–172.
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The Turkish press has never been truly independent, either economically 
or politically. This is mainly due to particular structures of ownership 
and legislative measurements that determine the context in which the 
Turkish press operates. In Turkey, as elsewhere in the world, newspapers 
evolved from individual enterprises to national and then international 
monopolies or oligopolies that are subject to the rules of capitalist industrial 
regulations.9 However, they heavily relied on the f inancial support of the 
state. The political and economic interventions of the government have been 
justif ied by claiming that they are to protect the public, whereas in fact the 
legislative measures have functioned as a censorship tool to silence the press 
when required (Ünlüer 2006; Erdoğan 2007). As a result, there has been an 
ongoing and intrinsic f inancial dependency upon the state and a resultant 
ideological conformity of the Turkish press with successive governments.
In the mid 1990s, an amendment was made to liberate the mass media 
industry from the state monopoly (Darendeli 2007, p. 7). However, despite 
their seeming f inancial independence, the media remained under the 
control of the state by the enactment of several articles such as 3984 and 
301, which made it possible to imprison journalists for articulating their 
opinions on controversial matters, as the latter presents a vague definition 
of what constitutes insulting Turkishness and the Turkish state (Turkish 
Penal Code-TCK 2004). The political conformism enhanced during this 
period has become one of the inherent characteristics of the mainstream 
Turkish press. That is, the newspapers have customarily acted in line with 
off icial state policies, approximating the dominant discourse, if not totally 
reproducing it.10
State control over the press has increased dramatically from 2013 onwards, 
following Gezi Park Protests in 2013. The failed coup d’état in July 2016 
9 The f irst newspapers in Turkey can be categorized as off icial and semi-off icial on the 
basis of their institutional structure. The f irst newspaper in the Ottoman Empire, Bulletin de 
Nouvelles, was printed in the eighteenth century by the French Embassy. This was followed by 
more private newspapers that were published in other foreign languages in Izmir and Istanbul. 
They were subsidized by the government, as they had pro-empire policies. The f irst newspaper 
in Ottoman, Takvim-i Vekayi, was printed in 1831 as an off icial journal under the full control of 
the government. For a detailed historiography of the Turkish press, see: Erdoğan 2007.
10 An example from the 2000s shows the continuing state inf luence on the Turkish media: 
the current governmental party in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), charged 
Doğan Media Holding with a 2.5 billion-dollar f ine for alleged improper business dealings 
on 8 September 2009 following Hürriyet and Milliyet coverage of a scandalous court case in 
Germany involving top AKP bureaucrats (Cagaptay). Following this f ine has been a period of 
serious suppression of the press either via acquisitions, f ines, or legislation, which has never 
been done so manifestly before.
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exacerbated the situation, as Turkey was governed under the state of 
emergency for a while. Subsequently:
Turkey jailed more journalists than any other country had in any year 
since the Committee to Protect Journalists began keeping records in the 
early 1990s […]. The Turkish news media were hollowed out. More than 
100 outlets were closed. Journalists were jailed or pushed into exile to 
avoid retaliation for their work. Hundreds of media workers were left 
unemployed. Pro-Kurdish media was almost entirely decimated. Any 
media outlet accused of any aff iliation with the movement of exiled 
preacher Fethullah Gülen – whom the Turkish government accuses of 
being the mastermind of the coup attempt – was closed. Small leftist 
publications were closed. (Öğret and Ognionova 2017)11
Today the media industry in Turkey is an oligopoly in which a few giant 
media groups compete at the centre, exercise excessive power, and demon-
strate a high level of political influence.12 The newspapers constitute one 
leg of a vertically integrated industry, which has also expanded towards 
other sectors such as energy, telecommunications, banking, insurance, 
and f inance, resulting in the formation of formidable conglomerates in the 
f ield (Figure 9.1).13 The concentrated ownership structure and the expansive 
f inancial interests of the patrons suggest they have interests other than 
creating a democratic media environment. Power and business relations 
as such have an impact on the attitudes of newspapers towards issues that 
would determine the success of their wider corporate businesses.14 Put 
11 For lists of closed media institutions by statutory decrees under the circumstances of state 




12 It should also be highlighted here that the structure of the Turkish press has been changing 
rapidly. For instance, Milliyet used to belong to Doğan Group, owned by the giant media mogul 
Aydɩn Doğan; now it is under the Demirőren Group, which is openly pro-government. Similarly, 
the newspaper with the highest circulation, Zaman, which was alleged to have ties with Fethullah 
Gülen, was closed by a statutory decree. Such transformations inevitably changed the dynamics and 
power relations in the Turkish press. For an insightful analysis of these changes, see: Adaklɩ 2006.
13 For detailed historical analyses of the Turkish press’s ownership structure, see: Tunç 2004; 
Adaklı 2006; Erdoğan 2007; Sőzeri and Güney 2011; Sőzeri 2015.
14 ‘This is particularly visible in the distribution of public procurements (biddings) in various 
industries; those who maintain close relationships with the government seem to secure the 
deals. This entire process was made possible by legal changes in pertinent legislations, allowing 
media moguls to have investments in other areas, f irst in 2001 and then 2011’ (Sőzeri 2015, p. 14).
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briefly, the economy politics of the Turkish press is crucial in its ideological 
reproduction and in the creation of knowledge (Sönmez 2003; Bek 2004; 
Adaklı 2006).
Media Industry Other Sectors
Doğan Holding Newspapers: hÜrrİyEt, Posta, 
Fanatik, hürriyet daily News, 
tME
Periodics: doğan burda dergi
Publishing (Book): doğan 
Egmont, doğan Kitap
News Agency: dhA
tv channels: Kanal d, cNN 
türk, tv2, dream tv, Kanal d 
romania, Eurod
Production: d Productions, 





tr, netd.com, hurriyetaile.com, 
mahmure.com, bigpara.com
online Advertising and Market-




other: doğan Factoring, doğan 
Foreign commerce
Social responsibility: Aydın 
doğan vakfı
Energy: doğan Enerji, boyabat 
Elektrik Üretim ve ticaret ltd. 
Şti, giresun Aslancık barajı, 
Mersin rES, Şah rES, d-tes 
Elektrik Enerjisi toptan Satış 




Finance: dd Konut Finansmanı
Tourism: Milta




Energy: Milangaz, oto 
Milangaz, Moil, demirören-
AxPo Enerji
Inudstry: demirören Ağır 
Metal Sanayi A.Ş., Parsat Piston, 
MS Motor Servis, d-Mermer, 
İstanbul zeytinburnu zeyport
Property: Kemer golf&country 
club, Kemer golf resort hotel, 
taksim gayrımenkul yatırım 
geliştirme ve İşletmecilik A.Ş.
construction: lidya yapı, 
demirören Eskidji İnşaat
Education: Ata Koleji
Figure 9.1: vertical integration of the surveyed media groups. Source: Sőzeri Türkiye’de Medya-İktidar 
İlişkileri, pp. 30–34
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Accordingly, Nick Ludington once identif ied three main ideological 
trajectories among Turkish newspapers: 1) private-sector liberals that sup-
port pro-Western policies; 2) nationalist Kemalist papers; and 3) political 
Islamist papers (cited in Kışlalı 2009).15 Yet, with the long-lasting Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) reign in Turkey, we have seen a new type of 
categorization, which appears to be more accurate and convenient in the 
current Turkish context (Figure 9.2) (Köktürk 2016).16 This classif ication in 
particular will guide our mapping in the following section.
Victims or Threats?
As addressed by Abid et al., among numerous studies across the globe that 
analysed the media coverage of minority groups in general and refugees in 
15 Being a Kemalist basically means supporting and following the ideas of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, and cherishing the founding principles and constituents of the Turkish Republic, 
which were conceived and introduced by the founder Atatürk. I believe this is the reason why 
Ludington uses the term ‘private sector’ to describe the liberal pro-Western papers, because 
Cumhuriyet in essence is a private enterprise, too. Also see Kahraman and Keyman 1998 for a 
further comprehensive discussion of Kemalism as an ideology and a discourse.
16 Most of these newspapers have now been closed based on statutory decrees after the failed 
coup d’état in July 2016. Still, the newspapers that constitute the research sample for this study 








(government sees them 
as rebels while some 










due to being 
seized)
MİllİyEt cuMhurİyEt hÜrrİyEt taraf zaman
habertürk Evrensel Posta Özgür düşünce bugün
Sabah birgün Milli gazete Meydan Millet
vatan yurt Aydınlık yarına bakış






Figure 9.2: Political affiliations of turkish newspapers. Source: http://www.aynahaber.org/yandas-akp-
yanlisi-ve-muhalif-gazete-ve-televizyonlar/517/
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particular, the majority of them ‘indicates that these minority groups are 
systematically discriminated in media and deemed as a security, economic 
and hygiene threat to the majority groups’ (2017, p. 122). To investigate how 
and to what extent the Turkish newspapers’ coverage of Syrian refugees 
corresponds to or differentiates from this general trend, three national news-
papers with online archives have been surveyed (Figure 9.3).17 The analysis 
has been conducted bearing in mind Van Dijk’s leading approach to critical 
discourse analysis, which ultimately attempts to connect the microstructure 
of language to the macrostructure of society (Kintsch and Van Dijk 1978; Van 
Dijk 2001). The focus has been news reports only, excluding any other articles 
and newspapers’ additives. Using the keywords ‘Syria’, ‘refugee’, and ‘Syrian 
refugees’, 348 news reports in total have been surveyed (Figures 9.4 and 9.5).
17 Hürriyet, founded on 1 May 1948 by Sedat Simavi with the motto ‘Türkiye Türklerindir’ 
(‘Turkey belongs to Turks’), is a daily newspaper and has the highest circulation f igures among 
the three. Milliyet, founded on 3 May 1950 by Ali Naci Karacan with the motto ‘Basında güven’ 
(‘Trust in Press’), is also a daily newspaper. Cumhuriyet, founded on 7 May 1924 by Yunus Nadi, 
together with his partners Nebizâde Hamdi and Zekeriya Sertel, is a daily newspaper which 
can be described as a low-circulation, high-impact paper.
HÜRRİYET MİLLİYET CUMHURİYET






Circulation (roughly) 340,000 142,000 51,000
Figure 9.3: ownership and circulation figures of the surveyed newspapers. Source: table created by 
the author based on gathered data.
Figure 9.4: total number of news reports 
analysed. Source: graphic created by the 
author based on the survey results.
Figure 9.5: Front page coverage in the newspa-
pers analysed. Source: graphic created by the 
author based on the survey results.
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The f irst three-day period is dominated by the international star Angelina 
Jolie’s visit to a refugee camp in Hatay. That is, the front-page coverage 
mostly consists of various accounts of her visit. Her visit appears to have 
been utilized to raise a sense of national pride as well as to draw attention 
to the issue (Tunç Cox 2012). In this context, news reports such as Hatay’da 
Angelina heyecanɩ (‘Excitement for Angelina in Hatay’) (Milliyet, 17 June 2011); 
Hatay’dan bir melek geçti (‘An angel has been to Hatay’) (Milliyet, 18 June 2011); 
Duydukları karşısında kahroldu (‘She was heartbroken by what she heard’) 
(Hürriyet, 18 June 2011); and İlk kez gülen çocuk gőrdüm (‘This is the f irst time 
I saw smiling kids’) (Hürriyet, 19 June 2011) frame her visit as the success of 
the Turkish state that has welcomed Syrian refugees and offered them a 
decent place to live and favourable conditions compared to other refugee 
camps across the world. Both Milliyet and Hürriyet report Jolie’s comments 
praising the Turkish government and the Turkish Red Cross, underlining 
Turkish authorities’ management of the issue, their organizational skills, and 
their generosity. This complies with the suggested categorizations of the two 
papers as ‘partisan’ and ‘indefinable’, respectively (Figure 9.2), especially 
when combined with other news reports published during this period. For 
instance, news reports titled Evden aldılar tecavüz ettiler asit döktüler (‘They 
took them away, raped them, and threw acid on them’) (Milliyet, 17 June 
2011); Dünya Erdoğan’ı konuşuyor (‘The world talks about Erdoğan’) (Milliyet, 
19 June 2011); and Erdoğan’ı alkışlıyoruz (‘We are applauding Erdoğan’) 
(Hürriyet, 19 June 2011) contribute to the prevailing ‘victimhood discourse’ 
while presenting Turkey and the Turkish prime minister as the saviour of 
these ‘wretched’ Syrian refugees. It is particularly emphasized that Turkey’s 
efforts have been highly appreciated by the international community as 
the reported foreign newspapers’ coverages indicate.
Since the Turkish government tried hard to convince the public that 
Turkey’s involvement in the matter was necessary, these papers make the 
most of an international star’s visit to highlight the humanitarian aspect of 
the issue. Graphic narrations of Syrian refugees’ horrifying experiences are 
used to justify Turkey’s interference and its ‘open-door’ policy, which has 
been increasingly contested in the public sphere. It is worth mentioning 
here that both papers accentuate the then prime minister’s name as the 
sole architect of this success story. This is probably one of the reasons why 
Turkey’s ‘Syrian refugee problem’ is widely associated with the Justice and 
Development Party (Adelet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) rather than the Turkish 
state’s foreign policy. It is also why opposition parties such as the Republican 
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the Nationalist Movement 
Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) ‘have instrumentalised Syrian refugees 
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to express their critics against the AKP, which they blame for deepening the 
Syrian crisis in the first place, thus leading to the massive migration of Syrians 
to Turkey at the expense of Turkish citizens’ (Kaya 2017, p. 373). The more the 
pro-government newspapers have framed this phenomenon as the AKP’s 
triumph; the more the oppositional media have used it as a point of critique.
In this respect, Cumhuriyet, as the ‘dissident’ representative of the Turkish 
press, covers Jolie’s visit from a rather different perspective. As seen in 
the title Angelina Jolie izdihamı (‘Stampede during Angelina Jolie’s visit’) 
(Cumhuriyet, 18 June 2011), somewhat negative words such as ‘stampede’ are 
employed to describe her visit. Also, Turkish authorities’ superficial efforts, 
such as doing engineering work on the roads Jolie would use or spending 
extra hours cleaning, are diligently emphasized. In fact, the paper uses 
Jolie’s visit two days in a row to attract attention to more critical issues. 
Accordingly, the news report Musul-Hayfa boru hattı (‘Musul-Hayfa petrol 
pipeline’) contains the CHP MP Mehmet Ali Edipoğlu’s commentary. He 
argues that an ethnic conflict is being deliberately created by the parties 
that are after the petrol in the area. Among Edipoğlu’s claims are secret 
meetings organized by the local authorities in Hatay, who are banned from 
speaking publicly, and the government’s attempts to cover up the fact that 
the actual number of refugees is much higher (around 350,000) than what 
is revealed in the media (mere thousands). Furthermore, the off icial public 
declarations such as the ‘refugees would be Turkmens from the region’ does 
not reflect the truth since ‘the majority of the refugees are the wives and the 
children of rebel f ighters in Syria’ (Cumhuriyet, 19 June 2011). This implies that 
Turkey sides with the rebels instead of being unbiased, as the government 
publicly claims to be. Through Edipoğlu’s commentary, the paper argues 
that it was a mistake to accept refugees; instead there should have been a 
buffer zone for these people to take refuge, and it should have been under 
the protection of the United Nations. Such negative remarks are presented 
in bold even if given in quotation marks, assigning these parts of the report 
extra significance. Cumhuriyet has always been associated with the CHP and 
also has a generally nationalist attitude; therefore, it is not surprising the 
paper refers to the CHP members as the voice of authority in the discussion.
Similarly, the news report titled Türkiye sınırından silah geldi (‘Weapons ar-
rived from the Turkish border’) disputes the arguments raised in the other two 
papers by stating that ‘the Prime Minister Erdoğan receives intense criticism 
regarding his Syrian policy’ (Cumhuriyet, 17 June 2011). Based on the comments 
of an authority figure, Allepo’s mayor Ali Ahmet Mansura, who is naturally 
pro-Assad, Turkey is alleged to have provided weapons for the war in Syria. 
These news reports demonstrate that while Milliyet and Hürriyet represent 
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Syrian refugees as ‘victims’ in need of Turkey’s help, thus supporting the 
government’s decision for an ‘open-door’ policy, Cumhuriyet renders them as 
a ‘problem’, if not yet a complete ‘threat’, in order to criticize the government.
The second three-day period is marked by the tragic death of a refugee 
child, Ailan Kurdi. Milliyet in its coverage of the issue, including headlines 
such as Utan dünya (‘Shame on you world’) (Milliyet, 3 September 2015), 
which states that Turkey is the ‘only’ country who welcomes these refugees, 
cites lengthy speeches of both President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu.18 Two particular news reports, Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: O fotoğrafı 
görünce yıkıldım (‘President Erdoğan: I was devastated when I saw the photo’) 
(Milliyet, 4 September 2015) and Davutoğlu: O cansız beden bir uyarı sinyali 
(‘Davutoğlu: That inanimate body is a warning’) (Milliyet, 5 September 2015), 
specif ically stress how European countries have been indifferent to the 
issue until this tragedy. Both the president and the prime minister present 
a very emotional and highly dramatized account of the incident, whereby 
they blame ‘the EU, the modern world and the international community 
for turning a blind eye to the ongoing crisis’. Turkey, on the other hand, is 
portrayed as the responsible, merciful, dutiful, hospitable, and selfless country. 
Such juxtapositions, reinvigorating age-old dichotomies such as ‘us’ versus 
‘them’, serve to revive and consolidate Turkish national pride in the eyes of 
the public. These political f igures’ attempts to engage the Turkish public in 
the matter by praising them for their hospitality seems especially important 
when it is considered that this was the time when the highly controversial 
Syrian and Northern Iraq note was being discussed in the parliament.19
Hürriyet, too, uses these two speeches for its coverage of the tragic 
incident, in addition to headlines such as Dünyayɩ sarstɩ (‘He shook the 
world’) (Hürriyet, 3 September 2015); Tokat gibi (‘Like a smack’) (Hürriyet, 
4 September 2015); Başbakan Davutoğlu’ndan Aylan açıklaması (‘Prime 
Minister Davutoğlu’s declaration on Ailan’) (Hürriyet, 3 September 2015); 
and Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan önemli açıklamalar (‘Important comments 
from President Erdoğan’) (Hürriyet, 3 September 2015).  All in all, both 
papers appear to have a similar attitude again, aligning with the off icial 
discourse that portrays Syrian refugees as victims to garner public support 
and legitimize the government’s actions.
18 It should be noted here that in August 2014, having been elected in a referendum, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan became the president of the country, and subsequently, Ahmet Davutoğlu 
became the leader of the AKP and the prime minister.
19 This is the note that allowed Turkey’s military intervention in the region, and it was accepted 
despite heated debates between the government and its opposition, both in the media and in 
the parliament.
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Subscribing to an opposing interpretation of the issue, Cumhuriyet develops 
a critical stance, albeit accepting the humanitarian aspect of the tragedy. 
Consequently, the news report Elimden kayıp gitti (‘He just slipped away from 
my hands’) (Cumhuriyet, 4 September 2015), narrating Ailan’s father’s story, 
alludes to President Erdoğan’s comments such as ‘what has drowned in the 
Mediterranean is our humanity’. However, the paper also reveals informa-
tion that is not mentioned by the other two papers at all: a relative of the 
family who lives in Canada argues that Ailan’s family’s official application 
for refugee visas to Canada was refused due to complications and mistakes in 
the procedures in Turkey, where the family was treated badly. In a systematic 
attempt to undermine the government’s official discourse of glory, Cumhuriyet 
highlights contradictory statements. Accordingly, the news report Küçük 
Aylan artık vatanında (‘Little Ailan is in his homeland now’) (Cumhuriyet, 5 
September 2015) includes comments of some relevant parties on the matter. 
For instance, Human Rights Association Şanlıurfa leader Atilla Yazar claims 
that ‘the AKP is showing off, they are not sincere […]. They do politics over dead 
bodies’. Similarly, the CHP MP Sezgin Tanrıkulu argues that ‘the government 
is responsible for the interests and lives of refugees’. The People’s Democratic 
Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) MP İbrahim Ayhan also reinforces 
the criticism by stating that ‘the reason for all these deaths is pro-war mental-
ity. AKP’s support for DAESH is manifest now’. It is clearly detectable here 
that political difference plays an important role in newspapers’ coverage of 
the issue. So much so that Cumhuriyet does approve a HDP MP’s statement, 
which it would customarily be against since the HDP is primarily a Kurdish 
party, not compliant with the paper’s nationalist ideals and sensitivities.
When it comes to the last three-day period examined, Turkish domestic 
politics shadow the coverage of the European Union’s three billion-euro 
fund for Turkey.20 In this last period, alongside the Turkey–EU negotiations, 
the straining Turkish–Russian relations are covered with regard to Turkey’s 
Syrian policy by all the papers that constitute the research sample for this 
study. Not surprisingly, they advocate varied aspects of the issue.
In compliance with Ludington’s aforementioned categorization as papers 
with pro-Western policies, both Milliyet and Hürriyet celebrate the outcome of 
the Turkey–EU negotiations. News reports such as AB ile 2016 umudu (‘Hope for 
2016 with the EU’) (Hürriyet, 29 November 2015), Türkiye Almanya’nın partneridir 
(‘Turkey is Germany’s partner’) (Hürriyet, 1 December 2015), and AB-Türkiye 
20 Since Tahir Elçi, the head of Diyarbakır Branch for the Body of Lawyers, was killed on 
28 November 2015, Cumhuriyet does not cover the issue on the front page at all. Likewise, the 
other two papers devote much of their attention to the assassination of Elçi.
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zirvesi başladı (‘EU-Turkey summit has started’) (Milliyet, 29 November 2015) 
present the negotiations and the resultant agreement as the turning point in 
Turkey–EU relations. In particular, the potential visa exemption for Turkish 
citizens in the Schengen area is highlighted as the government’s achievement.
This should certainly be considered in the context of Turkey’s long-
standing attempts to become a member of the European Union. The AKP, 
which has been in power since 2002, paid extra attention to deepening the 
relationship with the European Union. ‘During the AKP’s f irst legislative 
term (2002–2007), its EU policy focused on using the pursuit of membership 
to support its legitimacy, maintain its public support, and expand Turkey’s 
economy and its role as a regional and international actor’ (Goff-Taylor 2017, 
pp. 1–3).21 In this context, it can be argued that the issue of Syrian refugees is 
used as leverage in the Turkey–EU negotiations by both sides. For Turkey, it 
meant the revival of the relationship. ‘Turkish identity is perpetually imagined 
and constructed in relation to Europe, leading to an ambivalent sense of self 
because Turkey has long been denied any proximity by its everlasting object 
of desire’ (Tunç Cox 2012, p. 167). Hence, the focus on this possible outcome 
increases the sense of gain and victory in the Turkish reader’s mind. The 
supportive coverage of Milliyet and Hürriyet, therefore, corresponds to their 
classif ication as ‘partisan’ and ‘indefinable’, respectively (Figure 9.2).
Cumhuriyet, on the other hand, covers the same deal as a sign of corrup-
tion. The news report AB’den Türkiye’ye Sığınmacı rüşveti (‘The EU bribes 
Turkey on refugees’ (Cumhuriyet, 30 November 2015) interprets the three 
billion-euro fund from the European Union to Turkey as an enticement in 
return for Turkey becoming a refugee camp. The paper touches upon the 
anxiety in the Turkish public concerning the ever-increasing number of 
Syrian refugees by arguing that
the deal means the number of refugees which is currently 2.2 million will 
increase even more, and the promise that Turkish citizens would not need 
visa to enter the EU countries is not a definite but just a weak possibility.
In other words, the paper’s attitude revolving around a discourse that ad-
dresses Syrian refugees as the scapegoats persists.
21 This pursuit was so determinant for the party’s continued success that it even established 
the Ministry for EU Affairs. However, this positive attitude, which was addressed as ‘Islamic 
Europhilia’ by Ioannis Grigoriadis, was gradually replaced by a strong Euroscepticism (Tezcan 
and Aras 2015). Beginning with the Cyprus conflict in 2005, followed by the Syrian refugee 
crisis in 2011, and then the repercussions of the failed coup d’état in 2016, Turkey–EU relations 
reached an all-time low.
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In terms of the diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Russia following 
the downing of a Russian plane by the Turkish army at the border, Milliyet 
and Hürriyet again side with the government while Cumhuriyet increases its 
criticism. News reports such as Birçok Rus Türkiye’yle yaşanan krizden Putin’i 
sorumlu tutuyor (‘Many Russians hold Putin responsible for the crisis with 
Turkey’) (Hürriyet, 29 November 2015), Rus medyasından Putin’e eleştiri (‘Russian 
media’s criticism of Putin’) (Milliyet, 1 December 2015), and DAEŞ’in en önemli 
petrol müşterisi (‘The most important oil customer for DAESH’) (Milliyet, 1 
December 2015) antagonize President Vladimir Putin and Russia for supporting 
Assad and present the Turkish government as the strongest side in the conflict. 
On the other hand, Cumhuriyet, in the news report Kremlin’den Ankara’ya 
sert çıkış (‘The Kremlin tells off Ankara’) (Cumhuriyet, 29 November 2015), 
implies that the government’s restless attitude is asking for a war with Russia, 
putting Turkey in danger. In a similar fashion, the news report Işid’in Petrol 
trafiği (‘ISIS’s oil traffic’) (Cumhuriyet, 29 November 2015) points out Turkey’s 
involvement in the distribution of ISIS’s oil as one of the biggest revenue sources 
for the organization. The paper claims that ISIS oil is sold to Israel through 
Turkey and indicates the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government’s connection in 
the process. Taking into account the history of Turkey–Israel relations as well 
as the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, it is clear that the paper depicts a negative 
picture to cater to the nationalist sentiment of the Turkish public.
In brief, Turkish newspapers appear to selectively highlight different 
aspects of the refugee phenomenon, reflecting their political aff iliations 
and ideological standpoints. Guided by corporate interests, Milliyet and 
Hürriyet act as mouthpieces for the government, turning every newsworthy 
incident into a showcase that justif ies the off icial Syrian refugee policy. In 
contrast, Cumhuriyet, which is categorized as ‘centre left’ in the Turkish 
context by some scholars (Kőse and Yɩlmaz 2012), does not refrain from 
creating a discourse that feeds the sense of fear in the public in order to 
criticize the AKP government. In other words, having been framed in the 
context of Turkish domestic concerns, Syrian refugees are either depicted 
as the victims of the global system as well as the cruel Assad regime, or as 
threats to the well-being and stability of Turkey and the Turkish nation.
Conclusion
In the age of new media, democratized and interactive modes of knowledge 
production are possible when anyone can potentially make use of advanced 
technologies. This increasingly includes news-making practices by ordinary/
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non-professional individuals across the world. Nonetheless, conventional 
media, such as newspapers, still appear to play an important role in terms 
of knowledge production, distribution, and consumption. In other words, 
corporate media constitute the norm despite the celebrated interference 
of citizen-generated content.
Accordingly, this chapter has explored alternative approaches pre-
dominant in the Turkish press that have evidently shaped the pertinent 
newspaper coverage of Syrian refugees. In doing so, it has drawn attention to 
the intrinsic connectedness between institutions, ownership structures, and 
media practices, which ultimately determine the production of knowledge 
in the public sphere. Locating the analysis of the news coverage in the wider 
contexts of statutory refugee policies and the news media structure has made 
it possible to accentuate not only what knowledge is produced, but also how 
it is produced and why it is produced in that specif ic way. Demonstrated 
entanglement of press and politics has revealed the dynamics of off icial 
knowledge production.
This captured, aggregated knowledge produced about Syrian refugees 
both shapes and is shaped by the public discourse in a circular fashion, as 
exemplif ied by the analysis above. The fact that the Turkish news media 
do not differ much from the global media in the handling of refugees as 
the ‘marginalised others’ indicates a need to seek a plurality of knowledge 
structures. Therefore, to achieve true diversity, the hegemony in knowledge 
production needs to be challenged, and alternative modes of knowledge 
production should be introduced.
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In this chapter, I explore the media coverage of the Arab Spring and 
the reactions of Western media communities. Focusing on interactive 
documentaries and websites, this chapter clearly demonstrates to what 
extent media bring about individualized coverage to major events. Digital 
media especially have merged with cartographic competencies to provide 
topical information. Compared to the informational range of classic print 
media and television, these digital platforms and digitally distributed art 
forms create new and interactive forms of media participation.
Keywords: Locative media, Arab television, i-docs, interactive websites
Up to now, the majority of research on mobile spaces and locative media has 
proceeded with regard to European and American urban spaces – always 
taking for granted that a young, well-educated middle class is using these 
technologies for entertainment (Farman 2013; Hemmersam and Aspen 2015; 
De Souza e Silva 2015). However, there is a new awareness of media agency in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Digital media have become 
important factors within the changes and upheavals in this region as well as 
agents of social developments (Mellor and et al. 2011; Mellor and Rinnawi 2016; 
Sakr 2007; Kraidy 2016; Richter 2018). To keep track of the changing media 
landscapes, this chapter sets out to explore the practices and social dimensions 
of mobile media in the MENA region in contexts of political and humanitarian 
crises. Before focusing on the impact of social and mobile media systems, 
this chapter provides a short overview on television, since the quality and 
proliferation of television systems define the use of mobile and social media.
Strohmaier, A. and A. Krewani (eds.), Media and Mapping Practices in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Producing Space. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021
doi 10.5117/9789462989092_ch10
226 ANgElA KrEwANi 
Television in the MENA Region
Similarly to the Global North, the Global South has also been deeply affected 
by media changes from controlled broadcast systems to individualized, 
non-censored communication. Although broadcast and satellite television 
are a well-known factor in the MENA region, their organizational forms 
differ from European or North American television systems. Contrary to 
their democratic or commercial institutionalizations, the MENA region’s 
television systems follow a different timeline. According to Mellor et al., 
until the 1980s television was a ‘local, government-monopolized terrestrial 
operation with limited reach’ (2011, p. 85), thus completely controlled by the 
state. The f irst commercial Arab television station was aired from broadcast 
facilities in London in 1991, a circumstance that, in some regard, matches 
the frequent cartographic situation of marking a region from foreign places. 
Since, Arab television has been on the rise:
To the present date, television broadcasting in the Arab world has experi-
enced a real revolution: not only in terms of global reach, channel diversity, 
and program quality, but also in terms of the increased involvement of 
the private sector in broadcast operations. Arab States Broadcasting 
Union (ASBU) statistics show that over 500 free-air-television channels 
are available to Arab viewers across the region, in addition to scores of 
channels furnished by cable and digital satellite TV systems. (Mellor 
and et al. 2011, p. 85)
The Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) also conveys that over 65 
per cent of television channels in mid 2009 were ‘privately controlled and 
operated’ (Mellor and et al. 2011, p. 85). Mellor et al. come to the conclusion 
that, despite the rapid surge of television programmes and stations, television 
has not supported democratization or cultural advances in the region: ‘The 
emergence of a private broadcasting sector was seen as a purely commercial 
development, simply because it was not matched by an emergence of viable 
pluralistic and independent political structures with adversarial functions’ 
(2011, p. 85).
Accordingly, it can be concluded that television does not offer a demo-
cratic, discursive media space. Liberal political communication is delegated 
to individualized social networks. Facing the individuality and variety 
of social media, there is not one common media space, but the construc-
tion of space as an individually embodied act – usually with the help of a 
smartphone:
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Because space, as Henri Lefebvre has famously noted, is social (and cannot 
be considered outside of the social), we must ask whose space is considered 
when looking at how locative media projects impact space (and how the 
space impacts these locative interfaces). (Farman 2015, p. 85)
Moreover, the turn towards networked digital cultures brings about a 
transformation of political powers and enables individuals to participate 
in political movements (Lim 2018), and, returning to this chapter’s focus, in 
media spaces. Digital media bring about a reformulation of spatial dimen-
sions by bloggers, artists, f ilm-makers, and interested individuals. Contrary 
to the classical broadcast media such as television, mobile media activate 
diverse, sometimes small, groups before their knowledge inf iltrates into a 
general media public. Lim terms this ‘brokerage’ (2018, p. 19). The term also 
refers to the change in the idea of media publics and audiences, which have 
to be re-conceptualized in accordance with the communication forms and 
audiences. This reformulation of audiences also affects the spatial dimen-
sions of media, the media constitutions of space, and the reflections within 
media. Parallel to the re-conceptualization of regimes of knowledge and 
their respective media practices, the construction of media spaces plays an 
important role and has to be integrated into research agendas: the concept 
has to be triangulated between regimes of knowledge, media methods, and 
spatial practices, whereby the media and spatial practices usually merge. 
In the following, media examples will be understood along these lines. 
Additionally, there will be a close look at self ie cultures and artistic projects 
with media spaces, interactive documentaries, and investigative journalism 
websites. All these media forms generate a variety of media practices that 
accompany specific configurations of media spaces and political knowledge.
Smartphones and Geotagged Selfies
In the context of what has been called ‘locative media’, one of the most 
typical media habits is the use of smartphones by refugees. Although the 
smartphone is considered a luxury item, it has come to be the most valuable 
communication and orientation device, since it is used for communication, 
self-representation, and spatial orientation (Literat 2017, p. 4). Although it is an 
indispensable tool for communication, anti-refugee propaganda commented 
on refugees’ possession of smartphones, which presumably turns them into 
‘economic migrants’ (Literat 2017, p. 2). More than four million Syrians have 
fled their country, in what the United Nations has labelled the ‘the worst 
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refugee crisis in 25 years’ (quoted in Literat 2017, p. 1). The debate about 
financial support and immigration options for refugees has been transported 
into European media. The ‘refugee self ie’ is especially a point of debate and 
a marker for the supposed cheating of refugees. As Literat remarks,
anti-refugee commentators on social media have been especially vitriolic 
on one particular way refugees use smartphones: taking self ies. These 
images of refugees taking self ies – and signif icantly, not the self ies 
themselves – have been published in various media outlets, from Time 
Magazine to The Daily Mail and The Daily Mirror. Following their publica-
tion online, the images are then picked up and circulated via social media 
(especially Twitter, Facebook and Reddit), where they are fodder for further 
discussions and, most often, outrage. (2017, p. 2)
Besides the possession of the luxury item smartphone, the practice of self ie-
taking seems to contradict the general concept of being a refugee. In a 
politically vitriolic and adverse treatment of refugees, the self ie represents 
a forbidden media practice, which is attributed to advertising and leisure 
time. The desperate refuge from a war-torn country ‘fundamentally conflicts 
with the image of the refugee in our cultural imaginary, in which refugees 
are presumed to be sad, disconnected, and uprooted’ (Literat 2017, p. 4).
However, taking a self ie is not just a technologically advanced form of 
self-portrait. The self ie’s technology and social practice implies the sharing 
of the image on social websites such as Flickr, Instagram, or Facebook. Exiled 
from the original, located home community, the self ie thus offers participa-
tion in a virtual, social space. Moreover, self ies are usually geotagged, which 
connects them to a specif ic place. Eszter Zimanyi experiments with the 
aspects of the geotagged self ie by looking up the specif ic places of refugees 
on Instagram. Thus she points at the geotagged aspects of the self ie, which 
is added to the digital social communities (Zimanyi 2017, p. 7), insofar as 
the ‘geotagged self ie offers an opportunity for the refugee to re-inscribe 
himself/herself into place after becoming stateless’ (Zimanyi 2017, p. 10).
By taking selfies, refugees inscribe themselves into a new geographical space 
as part of the embodiment structures Jason Farman describes as connected 
to the phenomenological debate on film and digital media, as it is conceived 
by – among others – Vivian Sobchack (1988) and Mark Hansen (2004). The 
latter notably discusses the affective impact of digital art on the body by 
exploring what he calls the ‘affective dimension’ (Hansen 2004, p. 101) or the 
‘pre-sensory moments of vision’ (Hansen 2004, p. 27). Affection especially 
takes on a dominant role in the connection between experience and medium, 
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as Hansen argues with reference to Henri Bergson: ‘There is no perception 
without affection. Affection is, then, that part or aspect of the inside of our 
body which we mix with the image of external bodies […]’ (Bergson quoted in 
Hansen 2004, p. 100). Whereas Hansen speaks of digital art, Farman accounts 
for the smartphone and its affective structures, which he considers as embodied 
media that help to connect to material spaces and thus shape individual, 
spatial embodiments, since the spaces are a hybrid of ‘material’ and ‘medial’ 
spaces, which can be experienced through virtual media (2012, pp. 16–34).
With this theoretical background in mind, I understand the refugee self ie 
as an individual inscription into space and also as an individual negotiation 
of the topic’s visual politics. One of the f irst acts is to inform relatives and 
friends of the safe advent on an island and about the local whereabouts. As 
Katazyrna Marciniak observes, the visual discourse – ‘viscourse’1 – of the 
refugee is dominated by opposing patterns, which includes the refugee having 
safely arrived at the shore, like Tom Stoddard’s famous photo of a father 
with his child celebrating their safe arrival on the Greek island of Lesbos.2
However, there is also the absolute counterpoint of this narrative: the 
body of dead child, Alan Kurdi, washed up on the Turkish shore.3 In all these 
images, the shore also denotes a mythological shelter against the waves and 
the empty spaces of the sea. Thus the images of the living or dead bodies on 
the shores bring about intertextual references to narratives of shipwreck 
and rescue. This contextualization of shipwreck and European mythology 
explains why refugee self ies have been subject to artistic considerations. 
As Frosh resumes, ‘the self ie is the production of the mediated phatic body 
as a visible vehicle for sociable communication with distant others who are 
expected to respond’ (2015, p. 1623). The Chinese artist Ai Weiwei reacts to 
these contrasting images with a photograph of himself lying on the shore, 
which expresses the tragic end of a f light in a paradoxical turn: the body 
has arrived on the shore, not safely and triumphantly, but as a lifeless dead 
body.4 In a further turn, this image could be read as commentary on refugees’ 
situation in host countries. Sometimes the islands’ shores f igure as natural 
1 Karin Knorr-Cetina has coined the German term Viskurs, referring to a combination of 
textual and visual discourses. I relate to this concept and translate it as ‘viscourse’.
2 https://www.theannenberg.org/person/tom-stoddart/.
3 Helena Smith, ‘Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees’, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-
plight-of-refugees.
4 Monica Tan, ‘Ai Weiwei poses as drowned Syrian infant refugee in “haunting” photo’, https://www.
theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/feb/01/ai-weiwei-poses-as-drowned-syrian-infant-refugee-in-
haunting-photo.
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borders for the refugees, who are sometimes confronted with the stereotypical 
antipathy of the alt-right’s biologically orientated rejection of their identity.
A further artistic reaction to the refugee’s situation is offered by the Sri 
Lankan rapper M.I.A., who, having arrived in London as a refugee herself, 
produced and directed a video titled Borders, in which she restages iconic 
images of the refugee situation as tableaux vivants with dark-skinned actors. In 
this video, she visually re-enacts the iconic media images of refugee situations, 
such as the wired fence (which has to be overcome), the boat, and the advent 
on the shore. Placing herself centrally within the image, she sings ‘Borders: 
What’s up with that?/ Politics: What’s up with that?/ Your privilege: What’s Up 
with that?/ Broke people: what’s up with that?/ Boat people: what’s up with 
that?’. Through choosing exclusively men, she avoids the feeling of empathy 
in humanitarian crises, and can easily meet and undercut anti-migrant senti-
ments. Concerning aspects of media embodiment, the video’s mise en scène 
offers the most radical relationship between body and image. By constructing 
iconic images by staging human bodies, the term ‘embodiment’ is taken more 
than literally, since the space is the space of the individual body, culminated in 
a perverse ‘ornament of the masses’ (Kracauer 1995, pp. 75–88). These images 
evoke the Busby Berkeley musical films in the use of bodily ornamentation, but 
they turn them into a perverse demonstration of the refugee’s body, which is 
aligned with the land. Contrary to the manifold images of individual refugees, 
this underlines the fact that refugees come ashore in great numbers and that 
they are politically conceived of as an anonymous mass.
Interactive Documentaries
If we perceive the selfie and its geotagged possibilities as a new form of media 
space, the interactive documentary (i-doc) can be understood as a sampled 
collection of these images. A relatively new and collective form, the i-doc 
steps back from the construct of the documenting subject in the form of the 
film-maker in favour of documentary production as a collective event. In this 
context, the idea of documentary work as active mapping is pointed to, as 
Brian Winston’s foreword to Judy Ashton’s publication on i-docs clearly voices:
Any project that starts with the intention to engage with the ‘real’ and 
does so by using digital technology. Unlike the traditional linear ‘closed’, 
Barthesian ‘readerly’ documentaries, with i-docs, at the intersection 
between the linear and the digital, the audience become active agents 
within a ‘writerly’, more open, documentary text. (2017, p. xv)
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This development from the authorizing documentary subject towards 
the documenting collective, using a variety of digital media, parallels the 
development within cartography from institutionalized cartography towards 
collective geo-webbing, proceeding based on mobile digital technologies. 
Both cartographic and documentary activities have established a collective 
turn within these media practices. One of the questions arising from these 
changes points to the authority of speech, or who is allowed to speak for 
whom. Canadian f ilm-maker Kat Cizek makes the demand for collective 
agency explicit when she says:
Co-creation for me is a method or an intention to make media with people 
that aren’t media-makers. As I go into different disciplines and worlds I 
see that there are very specif ic def initions of co-creation as being type 
of, for example, social entrepeneural approach. So the term is causing 
as many problems as it’s solving. But for me co-creation is a very broad 
term that implies a thoughtful process, which involves a collaboration 
with the intent to make quality media with partners instead of just about 
them […]. Technology allows us to be collaborative in new ways. (2017, 
p. 39; emphasis in original)
Thus, contrary to geo-webbing, which can be applied from outside the 
respective region, i-docs seem to rely on the actual events being displayed, 
since they are usually shot with a smartphone or a video camera by active 
participants from inside, guaranteeing their participation. These recordings 
can be post-produced or collected on a website and made accessible over 
the internet. These conditions apply to the website of the Egyptian media 
collective Mosireen presenting an online archive of the Egyptian revolution 
and the events around Tahrir Square. The collection ‘858.ma – an archive of 
resistance’ provides raw footage of the revolutionary events. The number 858 
refers to the number of individual videos presented by the collective, which 
informs the site’s visitors: ‘858 is, of course, just one archive of the revolution. 
It is not, and can never be, the archive’ (emphasis in original). Before giving 
access to the videos, the website informs visitors about the group’s history, 
intent, and media practice. The 858 video clips are organized by place, topic, 
date, month, and keywords. Thus, the mapping aspect becomes one of the 
determinations for events, since users can change a certain place and are 
presented with the respective videos. Through this presentational form, 
the drop-down menus map the different places of the uprising, providing 
a spatial dimension to the revolutionary action. Although these videos 
cannot be checked for the truthful documentation of events, it is nonetheless 
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true that they offer proof of hidden crimes and human rights violations in 
closed societies with media censorship (see also Dang and Strohmaier 2018). 
Through the open access, they offer material for further documentary and 
aesthetic f ilm production, as the Syrian f ilm-maker Ossama Mohammed 
has done in his documentary Silvered Water, Syria Self Portrait (2014), which 
uses the material of 1001 Syrian citizens.
Another project documenting flight from Syria is the Abounaddara Group 
collection, which was displayed as part of an exhibition on Arab Art in the 
New York City New Museum in September 2017. As the review mentions, 
the Abounaddara Group offers more than 250 videos online; most of the 
f ilm-makers are anonymous. The group’s intent is to offer alternative media 
coverage to the mainstream media, as one of their members recounts:
If we accept the mainstream representation of the conflict in Syria we just 
have two actors. A gentleman who is a dictator but he is very polite, he 
smiles, a very attractive guy, but he is a criminal – and the ugly jihadists. 
But we don’t see the society. We don’t see ordinary people. So we try to 
show those people who are not victims, not heroes, they just try to struggle 
for freedom and to live with dignity. (cited in Krüger 2018)
According to this principle, the group offers a documentarian display of 
everyday life in Syria, avoiding direct depictions of war. Contrary to the 
Egyptian Mosireen collective, Abounaddara does not present names or 
places; it instead presents an anonymous, nameless Syria as a virtual space. 
On Facebook, the group rejects the clichéd media images of a war-torn Syria 
on account of their reproduction of
old Orientalist clichés constraining Syrians ever since their f irst appear-
ance on screen in a f ilm by the Lumière brothers. […] Syrians are subject 
to a regime of representation that treats them in a way that violates 
the principle of dignity inscribed in stone on the pediments of global 
institutions. […] It also threatens Syrian society, whose fate rests on the 
production of images that so little reflect reality. (Abounaddara Films)
The f ilm collective’s rejection of mainstream media images clearly corre-
sponds to the structure of the site. Contrary to the Egyptian Mosireen Group 
and their effort to establish a political discourse and symbolic value to the 
Egyptian revolution, Abounaddara expressly refuses to become a part of the 
journalistic-documentarian intent to inform about topical situations. The 
Facebook site instead connects the group’s work to a European f ilm culture 
docuMENtiNg SociAl chANgE ANd PoliticAl uNrESt 233
and specif ically to the visual and aural history of the French Resistance, 
with a link to an interview with Alain Resnais on Nuit et Brouillard (Night 
and Fog) from 1955 and a link to Léo Ferré chansons, which are underlined 
by images from the resistance. There are references to the French 1968 revolt 
and a recent post, in French and German: ‘La mort n’éblouit pas les yeux des 
Partisans/Der Tod blendet die Augen der Partisanen nicht’ (Abounaddara 
Films). The collective’s Facebook presentation makes clear that they want 
to bypass the actual Syrian situation in order to address wider issues of 
resistance. However, this intent shapes their grasp on the spatial aspects 
of their website. As just mentioned above, contrary to the approaches of 
activists, who eagerly locate their videos within real situations and places, 
Abounaddara employs opposing strategies. Guided by the intellectual 
and theoretical critique on the ‘Orientalism’ of media images, they clearly 
dis-locate their videos and re-locate them within the European romantic 
discourse of historical revolutions and resistances. This is cleverly done not 
so much on the group’s website, but through networking on social media, 
which shifts the focus away from the Syrian situation to a general discourse 
on revolution and resistance.
The organization of collective material is also undertaken by the German 
documentary project My Escape (2016),5 which edits a collection of individual 
smartphone videos into a narratively coherent documentary on the topic of 
escape. Diverging from the collective websites, the documentary points to 
the refugee situation, independent of the topical situation; the f ilm conflates 
refugees’ stories from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iran into a coherent documen-
tary narrative of their dire situation. Although the f ilm is constructed from 
a compilation of individual videos, it is edited into a narrative on flight and 
escape. Correspondingly, the film starts with a sequence displaying a bomber 
dropping its deadly weapons on a residential area, while off-screen a voice 
shouts ‘Allahu akhbar’, accompanying the sound of explosions. The sequence 
ends with a zoom in on the bomb exploding into apartment buildings and 
people running away from the scene. In terms of the construction of f ilmic 
space, this documentary seems at f irst to display a conventional setting 
and subverts it at the same time. Although the narrative starts with a clear 
image of the residential situation and Arabic sounds, it does not specify the 
place, and it is undercut by the following stories of f light and escape from 
different countries. By dispersing the narrative subjects and their origins, 
the f ilm dislocates stories and characters by constantly shifting the point of 
5 https://www1.wdr.de/mediathek/video/sendungen/wdr-dok/video-my-escape--meine-
f lucht-100.html.
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view. Characters tell individual stories of f light from a variety of countries, 
and they often present their smartphones with videos and photos. Through 
the constant shifting in character, place, and story, the f ilm accentuates the 
situation of flight and escape with the iconic places and situations: driving 
in a car, walking through a desert area, waiting in a refugee camp. Thus, 
My Escape (2016) transfers the individual, locative smartphone videos into 
a traditional documentary without narration or a f ilmic subject. In this 
way, the f ilm functions on a double level as multidimensional collection of 
individual clips and traditional documentary at the same time. Additionally, 
the f ilm sports a Facebook site, which allows for communication with the 
f ilm-makers, and it offers further information on connected activities.
Investigative Jounalism Websites
Contrary to the locative features of 858.ma, the investigative site bell¿ngcat 
uses open-source and social media investigation to explore a variety of 
subjects, and it ‘brings together contributors who specialize in open-source 
and social media investigation’, and creates ‘case studies so others may 
learn to do the same’.6 bell¿ngcat was founded by the journalist Eliot Hig-
gins, who also ran the Brown Moses Blog up to 2016. Besides Eliot Higgins, 
the site lists several international contributors with short biographical 
notes and a picture, which makes it a collective project, but contrary to the 
locative aspects, international reporters who seek to reflect and examine 
international media coverage inform the site. The home page links to dif-
ferent international regions; after Africa and America, the MENA region 
comes third. The reports from the MENA region include a close inspection 
of the events in Syria. Under the headline ‘Schrödingers’s Strike: Who Hit 
These Buildings in Raqqa, Syria’, Jeanne Sanya and Christiaan Triebert offer 
a detailed investigation into the news coverage of the bombing of a civilian 
block of buildings in Raqqa. The story starts with a summary of media 
events, which poses relevant questions and underlines the uncertainty of 
international journalism and the usage of unspecif ic imagery:
The Russian Ministry of Defense accused American-led Coalition of bomb-
ing a block of civilian buildings in Raqqa, Syria. However, a year earlier, the 
Russians said it was them who targeted leader of the Islamic State in those 
exact same buildings. What is going on here? (2018; emphasis in original)
6 https://www.bellingcat.com/about/
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To analyse the factual events behind the bombings, Sanya and Triebert refer 
to satellite images of the buildings before and after the bombings, which had 
been tweeted by the official Twitter account of the Russian Ministry of Defence 
(MoD). According to the authors, a similar post appeared on the Russian MoD’s 
official Facebook page as well. In the course of their analysis, Sanya and Triebert 
compare satellite images from 2017 and 2018 and come to the conclusion that 
the images ‘show exact the same location in Raqqa, Syria’.7 Because of these 
images, the authors trace the exact location of the buildings near the Al-Ala 
mosque, which is documented by an image of the respective mosque as ‘shown 
on Wikimapia with Bing satellite imagery’ (Sanya and Triebert 2018). A photo 
published in 2015 shows the mosque’s interior. Having established the specific 
place with the attached symbolic meaning of a mosque, the article offers two 
images of the destroyed mosque published by local activists on social media, 
showing the perspective from the ground of the location shown in the aerial 
photos of the Russian Ministry of Defence. According to the website, the local 
activists of Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently are convinced that the mosque 
was destroyed by the US-led coalition in 2017. The photos had been published 
on Facebook and Twitter, and they have been geolocated to the ‘same site as 
shown in the Russian MoD satellite imagery’ (Sanya and Triebert 2018). At 
the same time, there is a video to be found on Facebook, which shows the 
damaged but not completely destroyed mosque.
Further research on the photos documents that the local activists used 
screenshots from a video from the A’maq New Agency, ‘which functions as 
IS’s auxiliary media wing’, and minor damage to the mosque can be observed 
between 1 August and 13 August. As a next step, Christiaan Triebert uses satellite 
images from TerraServer/DigitalGlobe to show that the mosque must have been 
destroyed between 13 and 25 August 2017. They present a territorial control map 
of Raqqa, Syria from 25 August, from Liveuamap (Live Universal Awareness 
Map), which displays the respective area circled in red; the subtitle informs us 
that ‘the area is being encircled by the Syrian Democratic Forces, supported by 
the U.S.-led Coalition’ (Sanya and Triebert 2018). The investigation concludes 
that it cannot be decided who was responsible for the bombing of this area of 
Raqqa. Of importance here is the insight into interconnected informational 
media, which are condensed within the article on the bell¿ngcat website.
The article starts with information on the author Christiaan Triebert, a 
freelance journalist specializing on the Syrian war. Following on general 
information about the bombing, Triebert relates to the official Twitter and 
7 https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/07/13/schrodingers-strike-hit-buildings-
raqqa-syria/.
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Facebook profiles of the Russian MoD, which accuse the coalition forces of 
the bombing. This information is supported by a screenshot of the respective 
tweet; a link connects to the Facebook site. These are followed by Russian 
satellite images before and after the respective bombing. These images are 
countered by Bing satellite imagery on Wikimapia in which the area is still 
intact. Next, the article offers images from the inside of the mosque, displaying 
men at prayer – the most peaceful images amongst the imprints of war. The 
next images are activists’ photos of the destroyed area, with the mosque 
displaying some damage, but still intact. These images are supported by an 
activist video also documenting the mosque’s dome. These images are followed 
by satellite images tweeted by Triebert, and finally images from Liveuamap 
about this area. To sum up, the impressive variety and complexity of digital 
images, video proofs, and cartographic information distributed over the 
social networks provide a collective cartographic knowledge. Comparing this 
article with the regular German news show Tagesschau and the respective 
correspondents’ networks, the def iciency in the German news coverage 
becomes striking, especially in comparing the thin network of MENA cor-
respondents with the collective activity of freelance journalists. Compared 
to the multifarious activities of videographers, bloggers, and journalists in 
the MENA region, the German television channel ARD (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland) 
foreign correspondent’s network looks relatively meagre. The network of media 
correspondents is displayed on OpenStreetMap, which proves the evident lack 
of media correspondents in the MENA region: one correspondent in Morocco 
and another in Cairo. Compared to the political influence and the evident 
instability of this area, the number of correspondents is more than insufficient.
A further point for discussion is the presence of collective mapping sites. 
Wikimapia is a website that combines satellite cartographies with a limited 
wiki system, relying on the maps of Google Maps but with the chance to 
switch to maps from Bing, OpenStreetMap, or Yahoo. Wikimapia is run 
by Alexander Korjakin and Jewgeni Sawelew and is registered in Moscow. 
There is no impressum on the website and no further information on the 
project’s general intent; the user can add remarks and symbols within each 
place on the map. There is more information provided with Liveuamap, 
which, according to the website’s organizers,
is a leading independent global news and information site, dedicated to 
factual reporting of a variety of important topics including conflicts, human 
rights issues, protests, terrorism, weapons deployment, health matters, 
natural disasters. […] Our innovative map-centric approach to organization 
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of information will allow our viewers to quickly f ind the stories most 
relevant to them, and in geographies of their interest. […] Liveuamap was 
founded in 2014 by a team of devoted software developers and journalists 
who wished to inform the world about the Ukrainian conflict.8
The site also offers a list of additional links to Facebook, Twitter, and 
other social networks, and it informs about the founders and the legal 
situation. Compared to the rather clandestine site Wikimapia, Liveuamap 
appears to be a well-organized and well-funded enterprise: the pro ver-
sion offers Google Satellite maps. Similar to Wikimapia, the free version 
offers open maps, and users can integrate message and information via 
a set of icons, including to another information sources, usually social 
networks, that expands on the message. The site advertises as follows: 
‘Liveuamaps is opendata-driven [sic] media platform that change [sic] 
the way you receive latest news. Explore a map, messages, pictures and 
videos from the conflict zone’. This cartographic news website somehow 
offers a continuation and expansion of the Egyptian 858.ma with its 
collection of videos from the Egyptian revolution. Liveuamaps connects 
individual messages to mapping systems – alongside the map, the news 
can be viewed and followed up through individual videos and further 
information on social media.
In conclusion, these diverse means of connecting locative media to 
cartographic places bring about a variety of geographical and media con-
f igurations. These forms of collective journalism and information systems 
focus on nations and events, which lack proper and democratically organized 
media systems and are shaken by situations of violence and war that are not 
covered by internationally established journalists and media correspondents. 
Thus, these areas are withdrawn from off icial mapping activities – our 
knowledge of these war-torn regions is brought about by the manifold 
efforts of media activists.
References
Abounaddara Films, ‘The Revolting Animals’, Online Resource: https://www.
facebook.com/notes/abounaddara-films/the-revolting-animals-de-revolterande-
djuren-la-révolte-des-animaux/1745373475523352/ (accessed 17 November 2020).
An Archive of Resistance, Online Resource: https://858.ma (accessed 17 November 2020).
8 https://liveuamap.com/about/
238 ANgElA KrEwANi 
bell¿ngcat, Online Resource: https://www.bellingcat.com (accessed 17 November 2020).
Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet 
Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015).
Lili Chouliaraki, ‘Symbolic Bordering: The Self-Representation of Migrants and 
Refugees’, Digital News. Popular Communication, 15(2) (2017), pp. 78–94.
Katharina Cizek, ‘Documentary as Co-Creative Practice. From Challenge for Change 
to Highrise: Cat Cizek in Converstation with Mandy Rose’, in I-Docs. The Evolving 
Practices of Interactive Documentary, ed. by Judith Aston, Sandra Gaudenzi, and 
Mandy Rose (New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2017), pp. 38–65.
Jason Farman, ‘Map Interfaces and the Production of Locative Media Space’, in 
Locative Media, ed. by Rowan Wlken and Gerad Gogin (New York and Oxon: 
Routledge, 2015), pp. 83–93.
---, Mobile Interface Theory: Embodied Space and Locative Media (New York: Routledge, 
2012).
---, The Mobile Story: Narrative Practices with Locative Technologies (Hoboken: Taylor 
and Francis, 2013).
Paul Frosh, ‘The Gestural Image: The Self ie; Photography Theory, and Kinesthetic 
Sociability’, International Journal of ommunication, 9 (2015), pp. 1607–1628.
Elisa Giaccardi, ‘Reframing Heritage in a Participatory Culture’, in Heritage and 
Social Media: Understanding Heritage in a Participatory Culture, ed. by Elisa 
Giaccardi (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 5–10.
Mark B.N. Hansen, New Philosophy for a New Media (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).
Peter Hemmersamand, et al., ‘Exploring Locative Media for Cultural Mapping’, in 
Mobility and Locative Media. Mobile Communication in Hybrid Spaces, ed. by 
Adriane e Silva de Souza (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 167–187.
Jessica Holland, ‘Syrian Video Collective Brings Glimpse of Life During Wartime’, The 
Guardian, Online Resource: https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/
jul/18/syrian-video-collective-abounaddara (accessed 17 November 2020).
Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada; an Introduction to Canadian Economic 
History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956).
Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture. Where Old and New Media Collide (New York 
and London: New York University, 2006).
Karin Knorr-Cetina, ‘Viskurse der Physik: Konsensbildung und Visuelle Darstel-
lungen’, in Mit dem Auge denken. Strategien der Sichtbarmachung in wissen-
schaftlichen und virtuellen Welten, ed. by Heintz, J. Huber (Zürich: Voldemeer, 
2001), pp. 304–320.
Siegfried Kracauer, The Mass Ornament. Weimar Essays, ed. by Thomas Y. Levin 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 75–88.
Marwan N. Kraidy, The Naked Blogger of Cairo (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2016).
docuMENtiNg SociAl chANgE ANd PoliticAl uNrESt 239
Paul Anton Krüger, ‘Roh wie die Revolution’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, HF2 (2018), p. 11.
Bruno Latour, ‘Drawing Things Together’, in Representation in Scientific Practice, ed. 
by Steve Woolgar and Michael Lynch (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 16–68.
Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space [1974] (Malden: Blackwell, 2000).
Merlyna Lim, ‘Sticks and Stones, Clicks and Phones: Contextualizing the Role of 
Digital Media in the Politics of Transformation’, in Digital Media and the Politics 
of Transformation in the Arab World, ed. by Carola Richter, Anna Antonakis, 
and Cilja Harders (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2018), pp. 9–35.
Ioana Literat, ‘Refugee Self ies and the (Self-)Representation of Disenfranchised 
Social Groups’, Media Fields Journal, 12 (2017), pp. 1–9.
Live Universal Awareness Map, Online Resource: https://liveuamap.com/about 
(accessed 17 November 2020).
Lev Manovich, ‘Die Poetik des erweiterten Raums. Von Prada lernen’, in Black 
Box White Cube, ed. by Lev Manovich, trans. by Ronald Voullié (Berlin: Merve, 
2005), pp. 105–144.
Noha Mellor, Khalil Rinnawi, Nabil Dajani, and Mohammad I. Ayish, Arab Media: 
Globalization and Emerging Media Industries (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).
Noha Mellor and Khalil Rinnawi, Political Islam and Global Media (Oxon and New 
York: Routledge, 2016).
M.I.A., Borders, Online Resource: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-Nw7H-
baeWY (accessed 17 November 2020).
My Escape (Germany 2016), Online Resource: https://www.ardmediathek.de/
ard/player/Y3JpZDovL3dkci5kZS9CZWl0cmFnLTA1ZjJjMGE2LWZjMDktND-
M1Yy05NTViLWZkZGU0YjgyMDZhYg/ (accessed 17 November 2020).
Carola Richter, Antonakis. Introduction: Digital Media and the Politics of Transforma-
tion – a Dialectical and Multi-Scalar Reading (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2018).
Jeanne Sanya and Christiaan Triebert,  ‘Schrödingers’s Strike: Who Hit These 
Buildings in Raqqa, Syria’, Bellincat, 13 July 2018, Online Resource: https://www.
bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/07/13/schrodingers-strike-hit-buildings-raqqa-
syria/ (accessed 20 January 2021).
Naomi Sakr, Arab Television Today (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007).
Irmela Schneider,‘Zur Archäologie der Mediennutzung. Zum Zusammenhang 
von Wissen, Macht und Medien’, in Kulturindustrie Reviewed. Ansätze Zur 
Kritischen Reflexion der Mediengesellschaft, ed. by Barbara Becker and Josef 
Wehner (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2006), pp. 83–100.
Bernhard Siegert, Relais. Geschicke der Literatur als Epoche der Post 1751–1913 (Berlin: 
Brinkmann & Bose, 1993).
Vivian Sobchack, ‘The Scene of the Screen. Beitrag zu einer Phänomenologie der 
“Gegenwärtigkeit“ im Film und in den elektronischen Medien’, in Materialität 
240 ANgElA KrEwANi 
der Kommunikation, ed. by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and K. Ludwig Pfeiffer 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Insel, 1988), pp. 416–427.
Adriana de Souza e Silva, Mobility and Locative Media (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2015).
---, ‘From Cyber to Hybrid. Mobile Technologies as Interfaces of Hybrid Spaces’, 
Space and Culture, 3 (2006), pp. 261–278.
Wikimapia, Online Resource: http://wikimapia.org/#lang=de&lat=51.215400&lon
=6.663100&z=12&m=w (accessed 17 November 2020).
Christian Wille and Rachel Rickinger, ‘Exploring Constructions of Space and 
Identity in Border Regions’, in Spaces and Identities in Border Regions, ed. by 
Christian Wille, Rachel Reckinger, Sonja Kmec, and Markus Hesse (Bielefeld: 
transcript, 2016), pp. 9–14.
Hartmut Winkler, ‘Landschaft und Architektur als Modell für den Datenraum’, in 
Hyperkult II. Geschichte, Theorie und Kontext digitaler Medien, ed. by Wolfgang 
Coy (Frankfurt and Basel: Stroemfeld, 1997), pp. 227–239.
Brian Winston, ‘Foreword’, in I-Docs. The Evolving Practices of Interactive Docu-
mentary, ed. by Judith Aston, Sandra Gaudenzi, and Mandy Rose (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2017), pp. xv–xvi.
Eszter Zimanyi, ‘Digital Transcience: Emplacement and Authorship in Refugee 
Self ies’, Media Fields Journal, 12 (2017), pp. 1–16.
About the Author
Angela Krewani is a full professor of media studies at Philipps-Universität 
Marburg, with a special focus on the impact of digital media on social 
practices and art. She is interested in the epistemic, aesthetic, and cultural 
configurations of digital media. She has widely published on these topics; 
her publication Medienkunst. Theorie, Praxis, Ästhetik (2016) examines the 
practices and the developments within media art. She recently co-edited 
a book on Canadian Ecologies (2020) (with Alessandra Boller and Martin 
Kuester) and another one on contemporary authorship Constructions of 
Media Authorship (2021) (with Christiane Heibach and Irene Schuetze). 
Currently she is preparing a publication on Corona and Media (with Peter 
Zimmermann).
11. Reframing the Arab Spring : On Data 




This chapter presents a basic genealogy of the existing literature on the 
2010–2012 era of the Arab Spring within Middle East studies and media 
studies more broadly. The aim is to map the plurality of patterns, stories, 
ideas, and analyses networked across media forms. This chapter is designed 
to refute the possibility of a monolithic narrative about contemporary 
Egypt. It also situates the study within the growing scholarship on social 
media and political change and introduces key concepts in design research 
methodology.
Keywords: Egypt, glitch, internet studies, revolution
Introduction
When activists took to Twitter and Facebook in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region to push for political change, digital media captured the 
imagination of scholars, interest groups, and multiple publics. Pundits coined 
the uprisings of 2011 ‘Facebook and Twitter revolutions’. Arab activists’ use 
of social media became a model for other social movements. These included 
Occupy Wall Street, From Ferguson to Palestine, the Umbrella Revolution in 
Hong Kong, and 12M and 15M in Spain. These movements quickly adopted 
similar tactics, enabling people around the world to participate virtually as 
witnesses to contemporary events. In an act of transnational solidarity, in 
February 2011 an Egyptian activist ordered pizza for labour union protesters 
in Madison, Wisconsin. The international phone call from Egypt was just 
Strohmaier, A. and A. Krewani (eds.), Media and Mapping Practices in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Producing Space. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021
doi 10.5117/9789462989092_ch11
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one of many messages of solidarity streaming into Wisconsin from all over 
the world on mobile devices and social media.
The dramatic increase of virtual and on-the-ground revolutionary 
activism also inspired corporate interests and government entities such as 
the National Security Agency (NSA) to hijack or monitor social media for 
a variety of purposes. These included surveillance as well as monitoring 
consumer behaviour. In sum, movements, activists, and governments 
alike have radically transformed social media platforms. In many ways, 
the MENA region has been ground zero for some of the most dramatic 
and inf luential changes in the ever-widening spectrum of digital pos-
sibilities. This chapter explores our understanding of and approach to 
digital media in relation to human rights, political speech, and social 
change. It forms part of a larger study on glitch and resistance that traces 
the impact of social media on popular social movements in the early 21st 
century, focusing specif ically on Egypt. By centring on Egypt, rather than 
on the United States or Europe, and by drawing on both design research 
and humanistic inquiry, this chapter aims to show how digital media and 
politics are co-creative.
The concept of ‘glitch’ comes from the mechanical term for a sudden 
interruption, noise, error, or malfunction. It broadens to what I call ‘technical 
semiotics’ as it expands the logic or language of algorithms within networked 
societies by introducing messiness and mistakes. Although the glitch has 
been closely associated with technology, it nevertheless has the potential 
to illuminate other areas of experience and understanding. As a form of 
noise, for instance, it brings a political dimension to its practice. Noise 
becomes political when it translates into voice – and succeeds in entering 
and interrupting the ordered political world of policy. Noise is produced 
by anyone who acts from outside the order and, hence, can be returned 
to no one in particular. Building on postcolonial theoretical approaches, 
I argue that glitches provide an important critical lens for understanding 
the operational logic of systems of power: through its cracks and failures, 
the dynamics of systems become visible.
Hence, the following question araise: Why do programmers situated in 
a particular context, at a particular moment, come up with new modalities 
for thinking about resistance? A glitch is not a thing but a command, a 
script, an algorithm, a procedural set of actions. Glitch is a queer modality 
that processes, redirects, and opens new pathways. The genealogy of my 
use of the term ‘glitch resistance’ is associated with sound studies, queer 
studies, and radical feminist studies. If 21st century capitalism is driven 
by the logic of maximum performance (Lyotard 1973), then the glitch or 
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failure of performance undermines the fetishizing of eff iciency, accuracy, 
and predictability of producers, consumers, and drivers of capital. Glitch 
may sound undesirable in the parlance of late capitalism; however, it also 
serves as a point of entry for activists, hackers, or artists to resist.
A review of scholarship on media and the Middle East reveals a lack 
of engagement with digital media content, whether as primary sources 
or in critically questioning the tools and analytics provided. While many 
humanities scholars offer rich insights in history and culture, their analyses 
are often constrained by limited tools for understanding the ontology and 
syntax of digital production and social media networks. Arguments by 
writers such as Malcolm Gladwell, who writes that ‘high risk social activism 
requires deep roots and strong ties’ (2011), can likely be verif ied. Thus, 
literature that is more technologically literate helps revisiting those studies 
portraying the Arab Spring as a ‘Facebook revolution’ and broadens our 
understanding of networks, social media tools of counter-revolutionary 
bots, and fake news. Therefore, glitch theory provides an alternative to the 
celebration of social media in the 2010–2012 era and the demonization of 
the same technological platform.
When Mark Zuckerberg testif ied before US senators1 in the f irst of two 
hearings about Facebook’s role in the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 
April 2018 (i.e. the influence of Russian hacking on the 2016 US election), 
the gap between Silicon Valley technology giants and policymakers in 
Washington, DC became once more obvious. As the social media memes 
suggest, the gap itself was untranslatable. The Senate hearings displayed 
fundamental confusion in the public understanding of the meaning and 
implications of these technologies. Scientif ic and humanistic knowledge 
have long been recognized as dominating social, cultural, and educational 
systems. However, social media websites and apps can be seen as a legacy 
of the modernist Bauhaus movement. The expression ‘form follows func-
tion’ def ined the European modernist design aesthetics, also known as 
the Bauhaus movement, originating specif ically from Germany and then 
the United Kingdom. However, as Mohamed Elshahed has argued, there 
is signif icant difference between the European and the Arab modernist 
experience. While in Europe economic hardship, socialism, world wars, 
and the housing of soldiers drove the modern movement’s development, 
in Egypt the wealthy capitalist elite embraced modernist design in their 
1 C-SPAN, ‘Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Hearing on Data Privacy and Protection’, 2018, Online 
Resource: https://www.c-span.org/video/?443543-1/facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-testif ies-data-
protection&live
244 lAilA ShErEEN SAKr 
mid 20th-century grand apartments and aristocratic villas. To understand 
how a complex system such as Facebook might influence political change 
requires, however, literacy in design research (Cross 1982).
First, I will present a basic genealogy of the existing literature on the 
2010–2012 era of the Arab Spring within Middle Eastern media studies. The 
aim of this is to map the plurality of patterns, stories, ideas, and analyses net-
worked across media forms. It aims to refute the possibility of a monolithic 
narrative about contemporary Egypt. It also situates the study within the 
growing scholarship on social media and political change and introduces 
key concepts in design research methodology, which works specif ically at 
intersections – between cultural and technical analytics, theory and practice, 
virtual and embodied practices, and Eastern and Western languages. These 
ideas are based in a multidimensional approach and thrive in situations in 
which differences between modalities of knowledge production, culture, and 
languages require one to translate and straddle these differences to create a 
cohesive form. Second, I will provide some context for the growing interest 
in the analytic properties of social media content. The stock of primary data 
is important, but is not determinant in creating nuanced cultural analyses. 
I will consider the work of data visualizations, especially in relationship to 
the stock of primary data (actual tweets, status updates, etc.). Third, I will 
argue for the importance of paying attention to the specif ic language of the 
stock of primary social media data. I focus specif ically on the use of Arabic 
language online. This is critical for a number of reasons, one of which is the 
moment that has been dubbed the Arab Spring. However, most analyses 
of this so-called social media revolution have not taken into consideration 
the analysis of the meaning of actual Arabic language use. After harvesting 
and analysing Twitter posts for more than eight years (2010–2018), I became 
aware that the use of Arabic online was steadily rising. Hence, the critical 
analysis of digital information on the MENA region has to identify and 
address existing gaps in how the use of Arabic is perceived.
The medium of digital substance is computer code; the manner of its com-
position is through words and images that can be interactive and animated; 
and its form is the posted digital composition itself. Thus, to understand 
these factors and their influence on ideas such as political mobilization, 
scholars must take into account a host of variables. However, studying and 
interacting in a networked culture requires fluency in interfaces and digital 
software. Such literacy understands computational media at the level of its 
‘rhetoric, aesthetics, and poetics encoded in any work’ (Mateas 2007). This 
language provides the conceptual framework for the research presented 
in the following.
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Arabic Language Analysis and the Glitch
Before 2010, much of the scholarly research published on new media in the 
Middle East dealt with television politics and big broadcasters such as Al 
Jazeera (El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2003; Seib 2008; Kraidy 2009; Kraidy and 
Khalil 2010). Social media, blogs, and other online publications became part 
of the socio-digital convergence of technology, cultural transformations, 
and national narratives enabling the mobilization of the popular uprisings 
in the MENA region after 2010. These events raised questions about the role 
of communication technology in the development of social movements: 
Do the political uprisings in Egypt, Spain, and on Wall Street conf irm 
the horizontal networks paradigm? What kind of hierarchical relations 
are undermined and which are conf irmed in the stream of social media 
patterns that emerged?
The ongoing Egyptian uprising offers a unique case to research how 
political agency is mediated and how these voices are connected, creat-
ing – thanks to the characteristics of digital media – more transnational 
political identities and political subjectivities. An important shift is that 
contemporary mediation blurred the online–off line and digital–paper 
separation. Merged, they may represent a convergence culture (Jenkins 
2008), produsage (Bruns 2007), or media synchronization. The political 
changes and outcomes in turn raise new questions about the efficacy of prior 
empirical methods and tools. Further obscuring the diff iculty of analysing 
complex developments are the differences between the distinct theoretical 
and methodological foci among academic disciplines.
Recent studies about the influences of technology on social movements 
such as the Arab uprisings have rarely incorporated rigorous Arabic 
language analyses on a large scale in social media (billions of tweets 
and millions of website articles over several years). This is partly due to 
the lack of natural language processing tools to conduct computational 
linguistic research in languages other than English but also because of 
the lack of access to appropriate large-scale data collections. The growth 
of big data, particularly collections of social media trends, has enabled 
more in-depth examination of the role of digital networks, allowing 
scientif ic and policy communities to direct their attention to aggregated 
imprints of online and social media activity, without engaging in criti-
cal methodological analyses that take into account the historical and 
cultural basis to inform meaningful critique. This fetishization of data 
over meaning has produced much research that examines the scale, 
speed, and directional inf luences in digital networks and social media. 
246 lAilA ShErEEN SAKr 
However, complementary approaches engaging in historical, cultural, and 
textual analysis can reveal richer insights to explain the wider context 
of such phenomena.
For example, in 2009, Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet 
and Society conducted one of the f irst research initiatives on political 
dissent and digital content. The resulting publication, Mapping the Arabic 
Blogosphere: Politics, Culture, and Dissent, focused on node-to-node interac-
tion and general demographics of bloggers. While the report marked a 
new direction in this f ield of research, it lacked explanation about the 
data modelling and sampling methods that were used. Moreover, the 
model focused on def ining groups of people, rather than combining the 
resulting empirical data with historical and cultural understandings of 
the region or the transmission of ideas across multilingual discussions in 
the blogosphere.
In the case of the Egyptian revolution, the challenge scholars face when 
examining contemporary digital media and political change is how to 
analyse information quantitatively about groups of people in a region where, 
historically, data science has been used to support forms of colonialism. As 
Timothy Mitchell explains in Colonising Egypt, the practice of science and 
systems of ordering national standards are modern projects that enable 
governments to maintain discipline and surveillance. A cog in the colonial 
project, the science of documenting every political act reflected a ‘tendency 
of disciplinary mechanisms, as Michel Foucault has called these modern 
strategies of control, not to expect and dissipate as before, but to inf iltrate, 
and colonise’ (Mitchell 1991, p. 38). Indeed, before and even after the upris-
ings of 2011, there was a clear divide between the qualitative, humanistic 
research Middle East media scholars produced and the quantitative approach 
of traditional communications scholars. For example, in the articles of 
Volume 5 of Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication (2012), the 
authors do not employ methods to examine large data sets of digital media 
content specif ically, yet they address important sociopolitical concerns 
about Middle East media.
On the other hand, in his 2013 book The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished 
Revolutions of the Middle East, Marc Lynch works towards defining a political 
history of the Arab public sphere. Though also engaged in the subject of ‘the 
Arab public sphere’, like Anderson and Eickelman in 2003, Lynch writes 
post-2011 and specif ically takes a stance on the role of social media in the 
uprisings early on in his book.
The role of social media and the internet in the Arab uprisings has often 
been exaggerated, with too much focus on Facebook or Twitter rather than 
rEFrAMiNg thE ArAb SPriNg 247
the underlying political struggles. However, Timothy Mitchell’s concern 
about the disciplinary and colonizing purposes of data science (1988) must 
be carefully employed in these empirical critiques on the popular upris-
ings in the MENA region. Many of the research projects, conferences, and 
publications that have conducted in-depth data analytics from social media 
and other internet content about the popular uprisings in the MENA region 
are sponsored by think tanks such as RAND and political organizations 
such as the National Endowment for Democracy or the Dubai School of 
Governance.
Two years after Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere: Politics, Culture and 
Dissent Online (Etling et al. 2009), and following the uprisings in Tunisia 
and Egypt, the same core group of scholars organized a round-table confer-
ence entitled ‘Blogs and Bullets II’. Following the conference, the Journal of 
Communications published a special edition on ‘Social Media and Political 
Change: Capacity, Constraint, and Consequence’. A year later, Rob Lever 
interviewed the same group of scholars who participated in the ‘Blogs and 
Bullets II’ conference for his article ‘Debate Flares on “Twitter Revolutions” 
Arab Spring’ (2013). The common thread in all these discussions has been 
the focus on debating the role of social media in the revolutionary praxis 
of the MENA region, perpetuating the debate on the causational impact 
social media supposedly has on social movements.
One comprehensive research effort to study the impact of social media 
on the MENA region is a three-part series co-authored by Racha Mourtada 
and Fadi Salem. Their intention was to make sense of Twitter by recoding it 
into geolocation/geo-coordinates; this, however, is a way to estimate, not an 
actual statistical method (Salem and Mourtada 2011).2 It is important to note 
the effort put into translating the numerical estimate that could represent 
the data in terms of nation states and populations, rather than simply 
exploring what is in the data imprints. Geolocation is not a common data 
imprint. This top-down approach to data mining allowed the researchers 
to f ind answers about Facebook usage based on gender, age, and national 
origin. However, the categories chosen left no space for including hybrid or 
shifting identities. In the second report of the series, the authors built upon 
their previous research on Facebook and introduced Twitter analytics. By 
2 They explain their statistical methods as, ‘with a sample of about 10,000,000 tweets 
among 190,000 Twitter users, estimating the size of a Twitter population was a simple two-step 
process: capture a number of samples (or “sweeps”) of users from each country, and use a 
mark-recapture based technique to compute a population estimate’ (Salem and Mourtada 
2011, p. 63).
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the time Mourtada and Salem authored the third part of the Arab Social 
Media Report, ‘The Role of Social Media in Arab Women’s Empowerment’, 
they had started to discuss ‘netizens’ (online communities) in more detail. 
Each of their charts provides a demographic breakdown by country (Salem 
and Mourtada 2011). However, their approach remained unable to account 
for transnational netizens, or any individuals, for that matter, who did not 
f it neatly into predetermined categories.
While technology enthusiasts are being heard, so are voices that are 
more conservative. In an article that appeared in The Atlantic, Megan 
Garber warned, ‘a year after the Egyptian revolution, 10 per cent of its 
social media is already gone’ (2011). Earlier, Bassem Youssef argued ‘one of 
the diff iculties with efforts to understand the role of social media in the 
successful North Africa uprising (Tunisia and Egypt) is a paucity of theory’ 
(2011). He builds his argument on highlighting three problems in internet 
studies: (1) internet studies theorize new media using theories that have been 
shown to be unsophisticated even when applied to old media, seeing media 
primarily as a vehicle for the more or less passive receipt of information; 
(2) internet studies fail to theorize the specif ic elements that make new 
media ‘new’, and (3) internet studies ignore the active ingenuity, creativity, 
and agency of users, who not only receive but also write new narratives, 
and generate such innovations as the Bassem Youssef Show and Pigipedia. 
Furthermore, only about 20 per cent of people in Egypt are online, and they 
fall into specif ic age groups, income divides, and education demographics; 
yet the resistance movement itself clearly extends into many other walks 
of society (Youssef 2011, p. 4). An example of the kind of writing on new 
media that Youssef is criticizing might be the 2012 report by the Center 
for International Media Assistance (CIMA) and the National Endowment 
for Democracy (NED), ‘Digital Media in the Arab World: One Year After 
the Revolutions’. According to its author, Jeffrey Ghannam, the research 
was conducted through a series of ‘35 interviews in person, by telephone, 
email, and Skype: primary and secondary documents; commentaries; 
websites; blogs, and other sources’ (2012, p. 3). This research provided an 
overly optimistic conclusion:
Social media’s potential represents the brightest hope for the greater 
freedom of expression in the Arab region, enabling tens of millions of 
people, and ultimately many more, to actively pursue civic engagement, 
free and fair elections, political accountability, the eradication of cor-
ruption, as well as free, independent, and pluralistic media in a rapidly 
changing media environment. (Ghannam 2012, p. 3)
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Most striking in this investigation into digital media is the absence of 
any analysis of primary digital information. One might appropriately 
ask whether publishing on digital humanities without speaking digital 
languages or engaging primary digital media is akin to publishing on 
France without knowing French or engaging with any French primary 
material. Furthermore, the choice to interview ‘35 key individuals’ does 
not speak to the scale of the research question the report poses. It also 
negatively reinforces the top-down authority structures that these very 
upheavals have been resisting. Outside of the MENA region, Twitter data 
have been used for forecasting or measurement in a variety of domains, 
such as stock markets, politics, and social movements. In 2011, Murphy 
Choy’s Twitter sentiment failed to predict Singapore’s 2011 presidential 
election (Choy et al. 2011). Several research projects on Twitter sentiment 
analysis in particular have emerged during the last few years, including one 
80-page report by the RAND Corporation that uses tweets by Iranians to 
measure public opinion in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election 
(Elson and et al. 2011).
This research was one of the f irst projects to use natural language 
processing and text analysis to determine sentiment in tweets. Without 
much of a review of the historical scholarship on public opinion in Iran, 
this research focuses on a linguistic approach to understanding how 
people communicate and the functions of the words they use. In practical 
terms, this approach suggests that it is possible to gain insights into the 
emotional states and social dispositions of users, regardless of the content 
of the writing. It is important to note that all of this analysis to measure a 
Persian/Farsi-speaking public was conducted on English-language tweets, 
blind to tweets in any other language. Despite RAND’s efforts, their 
computer-driven analytics recently transitioned from manual analysis 
to applied simple computing techniques using a free Twitter archive 
service that is no longer in service (TwapperKeeper.com). RAND’s analysis 
relies on other sources to provide the technical analysis. However, these 
secondary sources and their methodologies are not examined in their 
larger research.
Few monographs provide critical analysis at the intersection of media 
studies and the popular uprisings in the MENA region. Zeynep Tufekci, a 
sociologist and associate professor in the School of Information and Library 
Science at the University of North Carolina, writes to the public while 
maintaining scholarly rigour in her f irst single-authored monograph, Twitter 
and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest (2017). Within 
Middle Eastern studies, there are a number of important works, such Paul 
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Amar’s The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexual Politics, and 
the End of Neoliberalism (2013), in which he charts the rise of what he calls 
the ‘human-security state’, and immerses his readers in urban laboratories 
of human security in both Cairo and Rio de Janeiro. Vijay Prashad also 
provides a global comparative analysis in The Death of the Nation and the 
Future of the Arab Revolution (2016); his underlying premise, which is central 
to my approach as well, is that revolutions are ongoing.3
All the above efforts, while paving the way for new grounds in research, 
have highlighted a growing and very tangible need for more research to 
interpret aggregated mediated interactions, as well as a different set of 
tools and languages that take seriously the digital as an archive of primary 
material. By the end of the f irst decade of the 21st century, we clearly have 
moved from the world of ‘new’ media to a world of ‘more’ media. When 
we reached 2011 and the Egyptian uprisings – which many hailed as the 
revolution brought about by Facebook – the ubiquity of computers, digital 
media software, and computer networks had led to an exponential rise in 
the number of cultural producers worldwide. No longer simply a matter of 
the rise of new media production in new global contexts, these social media 
platforms served as the database architectures for the accumulation of data 
on a scale heretofore unknown. This over-proliferation of data challenges 
research methodologies – the impossibility of knowing or representing such 
a mass of information requires new ways of investigation and interpreta-
tion. In just a few years, a plethora of articles and books on the popular 
uprisings in the MENA region were published, and trillions of Twitter and 
Facebook postings were micro-blogged in multiple languages. Though social 
media is often considered co-authored by the public, much research on 
the Arab public has focused on political histories, public opinion through 
traditional polling, or ethnographic investigations. In this regard, they have 
tended to undercut the mechanisms for verif ication and authority within 
the domain of the digital. Digital knowledge production is not like pop 
culture or traditional public texts, such as newspapers or legal documents. 
Rather, it offers a redefinition of ‘the public’ as societies systematically and 
increasingly engaged in the internet, open-source transactions, and mobile 
devices, for example, worthy of rigorous study.
3 Several excellent studies on contemporary resistance include Joel Beinin and Frédéric 
Vairel’s Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa 
(2011), in which the contributors forsake the cultural and political exceptionalism of the Middle 
East, and Revolution Without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring (2017), in which 
Asef Bayat laments the lack of revolutionary ideology.
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Network, not Geography
On 20 March 2004, Alaa Abd El Fattah and Manal Bahey El-Din Hassan, 
in Cairo, Egypt, f irst went live with their blog, Manal and Alaa’s bit bucket: 
free speech from the bletches.4 They explored and experimented with web 
publishing platforms that would help other groups and small initiatives 
have web presence. Alaa and Manal’s ‘bit bucket’ was one of the earliest 
blogs to come out of Egypt and the region. Its content was simply born of 
the public event of the day: 20 March 2004 was also the f irst anniversary 
of the massive global protests against the war in Iraq.
At the time, I was a fellow open-source designer building Arabic and 
English websites for academic and activist communities in Washington, 
DC. I met Alaa and Manal in 2007 through the Arabic network of designers 
and programmers on Drupal while building the beta version of the R-Shief 
software system.5 This informal network of Arab techies grew over the years 
as we forged new relationships and initiatives, including my own Twitter 
archiving project in 2008. By 2011, the US Secretary of State invited me to 
Washington, DC to explain how my software enabled me to predict within 
six hours of accuracy when Muammar Qaddafi would fall from power. This 
research on global, emergent media analytics became my doctoral scholar-
ship and a guiding focus of my career as a scholar: understanding digital 
communication as an indispensable component of living in the 21st century, 
and the importance of accessing information across borders and languages.
Two trends – one organized by activists and one by academics – seemed 
to run parallel to each other rather than converging. The set of research 
practices that emerge at the intersection of both cultural and technical 
analytics in the f ields of media studies is born out of the contemporary 
socio-historical moment as we face new scales of information that demand 
machinated computation and political influences on our cultural practices 
that are systematic, transnational, and mobile. Similar to the non-linear 
narrative form of a NoSQL database, data-driven narratives are also mapped 
relationally and within larger systems and orders (Figure 11.1).
This problem in scholarship continues today. In an edited volume that 
came out in late 2014, Media Evolution on the Eve of the Arab Spring (Hudson 
et al.), the original 2009 Berkman Center article was republished with no 
critical reflection on its lack of textual analysis. This brings into urgent 
question the standards in this f ield. How can academics repeatedly engage 
4 https://manalaa.net/.
5 r-shief.org.
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with the Berkman Center’s article on the ‘Arab Blogosphere’ (which even 
includes the word ‘culture’ in its subtitle) as a scholarly work, when the 
writers of the article did not discuss the contents of a single primary source?
Perhaps one reason they did not analyse or read the blogs is that most of 
the blogs are in Arabic. More specifically, it was crucial to overcome problems 
of web accessibility inherent in Arabic fonts. There was a time, right before the 
Arab blogosphere developed, when programmers could not encode the Arabic 
glyph for web interfaces. In addition, we could not get those interfaces to read 
from right to left. These two basic limitations presented quite a challenge 
from both technological and visual design perspectives and took some time 
to resolve. One problem was that the Arabic glyph appeared much smaller 
than the Roman glyph. In developing a bilingual site, it was very diff icult 
to design the Arabic legibly without the English looking dramatically large. 
That relationship between the Arabic and English text is reminiscent of the 
Figure 11.1: Network graph of Arab blogosphere, published in Mapping the Arab Blogosphere article 
by Etling et al. the harvard berkman center (2009).
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English language’s power in the internet’s early years. Later, open-source 
projects such as Wikipedia and Drupal worked to change that. This is an 
interesting friction point between technology and scholarship.
Accessing primary materials in their native language is essential to rigor-
ous scholarship; it allows researchers to raise the standards of what we think 
about social media, and elevates the scholarship and expectations from 
people who study social media to a set of standards. Arab digital activists 
addressed this issue in an interesting email thread on the Arab Techies email 
listserv. Sami Ben Gharbia, Slim Amamou, and Alaa Abd El Fattah expressed 
grievances to the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab when they approached 
activists on the listserv for data about open and collaborative research:
It seems like there is a new f ield in academia that uses the ‘newness’ of 
the Internet as an excuse to get rid of the guidelines, ethics and traditions 
developed in the humanities, so results are published without using 
the tools, algorithms or data, bringing into question how peer review 
is possible. The problem would be mitigated if local academia were 
consulted. Why seek stewards among practitioners and not engage with 
local universities and researchers? Sure our brown universities are as 
messed up as our brown lives here in the brown south but I assure you the 
diff iculties in working with them are nothing compared to the diff iculty of 
doing accurate research without their understanding of the context. (2012)
Ben Gharbia, Amamou, and Abd El Fattah suggest here that academia needs 
to shift from building tools that further reinforce hegemonic divides between 
cultures and peoples, to building tools that extend the work and agency of 
local digital activists themselves. The set of research practices that emerge 
at the intersection of both cultural and technical analytics in the f ields of 
new media studies6 is born out of the contemporary socio-historical moment 
as we face new scales of information that demand machinated computa-
tion and political influences on our cultural practices that are systematic, 
transnational, and mobile. Similar to the non-linear narrative form of a 
NoSQL database, data-driven narratives are also mapped relationally and 
within larger systems and orders.
6 Outside of the sciences, studying technology must also instil fear among many academics. As 
Franklin and Rodriguez introduce their argument, ‘Hypertext. Hypermedia. High Performance 
Computing. It’s enough to make a humanities scholar hyperventilate. A debate has raged in the 
last decade (at least) about whether or not the Digital Age will see the death of The Book, The 
Library and perhaps, The Humanities more broadly’ (2008).
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Alaa, Manal, and I were among the group of Arab Techies who gathered 
on the American University of Cairo’s Tahrir campus in July 2011. At the time, 
we thought we would be able to go to Syria and support activists. We had 
no way of imagining the devastation that would engulf the region after the 
disruptive, destabilizing glitch that shook the MENA region. We also never 
imagined that Alaa would end up serving a f ive-year sentence in Tora prison 
for protesting or that we would mourn the deaths of Aaron Swartz, Bassel 
Safadi, Ali Shaath, and many more. We were preoccupied celebrating our 
faults, failures, malfunctions, disturbances, anomalies, bugs, errors, and noises.
Conclusion
By 2004, two important movements in Egypt had emerged: the open-source 
software and localization movement, and the Kefaya political party and 
movement. Kefaya made its f irst public appearance in December 2004, when 
more than 50 people gathered outside the attorney general’s off ice, making 
demands far beyond the established boundaries of free expression at the 
time. Their banners read ‘Down with Hosni Mubarak’, and ‘The Egyptian 
Movement for Change’. Also founded in 2004, Open Craft is one of Egypt’s 
prominent web-building companies that, according to their website, supports 
‘the values of the open-source movement to provide Drupal Web application 
development: implementation, integration, and internationalization’.7 Open 
Craft served as a network hub of progressive, feminist programmers and 
designers: founder of SuperMama, Zeinab Samir, and activists Manal Bahey 
El-Din Hassan, Maggie Osama, and Mira Loutf i also worked at Open Craft. 
This network built on the online forums built by developers at Drupal. 
As recently as 2006, developers were still building applications to enable 
Arabic characters on a keyboard. Several open-source projects to develop 
software for Arabic on Drupal, Yamli, Kalimaat, GNOME, and other platforms 
enabled Arabic-language content to grow dramatically in the years to follow. 
There are activist platforms such as Katib and Take Back the Tech based in 
Lebanon. In addition, a great deal of work has gone into Arabic language 
analyses, from e-Space’s Arabic Morphological Analyser, to Taha Zerrouki’s 
Arabic conjugator project, Qutrub.8
I conceived R-Shief to f ill the gap. I built the prototype in Drupal because 
of its free Arabic localization modules. The use of creative commons licensing 
7 http://open-craft.com.
8 Arabeyes, Online Resource: qutrub.arabeyes.org.
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and praxis of free/libre/open-source software such as MediaWiki, Ning, and 
WordPress emphasizes R-Shief’s commitment to a collaborative, participa-
tory model of archiving. However, Drupal had proven Arabic-language 
programming abilities. There are all sorts of issues concerning right-to-left 
non-roman script languages. Drupal’s Arabic-language developers have 
been building modules to f ix the various problems. For example, Drupal 
developer @Amr recently released the FireFox Yamli9 extension and spent 
some time packaging a Drupal module to integrate the Arabic comma as 
a separator for Drupal tags.
Drupal development in Arabic10 (right-to-left programming and UTF-8 
encoding for Arabic script) grew tremendously in the years that followed, 
with over 50 software developers contributing to Drupal’s open-source 
platform. One of the Arabic team administrators for Drupal is blogger 
and activist Alaa Abd El Fattah. He posted the following biography on his 
prof ile in 2004:
From his work with children using Facebook to ridicule their teachers 
in the Arab digital expression camps, to his work with pro-democracy 
activists using blogs to mobilize thousands of Egyptians against the 
government in the Kefaya movement, Alaa just loves helping people use 
ICTs to stick it to the man. By day he works as a Free/Open Source Software 
developer, by night he dons his mask and cape and patrols the streets of 
Cairo, jumping from campaign to campaign, building websites, providing 
support and training, looking out for activists in need. He likes to pretend 
that his work on the Egyptian Blogs Aggregator helped bring in a new era 
of citizen journalism and usher in a new generation of digital activists, 
while the rest of the world acts as if his blog is relevant.11
One thing Alaa was mistaken about was that his work did not ‘pretend’ to 
‘bring in a new era of citizen journalism’. In fact, this work did usher in a 
new generation of digital activists. Between 2004 and 2011, the rise of the 
Arab blogosphere demanded rigorous attention. Alaa’s blog posts swung 
like a pendulum between RSS aggregators and the Egyptian constitution. 
He was f irst jailed in 2006, along with other bloggers, while calling for 
an independent judiciary in Egypt. At the same time, citizen journalist 
9 https://www.yamli.com/.
10 Drupal Translations, Arabic Overview, Online Resource: https://localize.drupal.org/translate/
languages/ar.
11 Drupal Translations, Alaa’s profile, Online Resource: https://www.drupal.org/user/8991.
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Noha Atef began a crucial website and blog called Torture in Egypt,12 Mark 
Zuckerberg launched Facebook in 2004, and Twitter launched in 2006. At 
the same time, the largest forum on the World Wide Web was a community 
for Egyptian women called Fatakat. From 2008 to 2010, bloggers continued 
to report on more violence by the state and growing social unrest.
I have argued that the scientif ic project of Arabic software localization 
(adapting computer software to different languages and regional differences) 
requires humanistic critical thinking (Sakr 2013). At an even deeper level, the 
shift in programming from C++ (a highly mathematical computer language) 
to Java (a computer language that contains lots of English-based vocabulary) 
has meant a shift into what is culturally and hegemonically English-based. 
The budding academic field of internet studies (i.e. the Association of Internet 
Researchers) is so young, however, that its ethical standards and traditions 
are still in formation. Scholarship on internet studies is often published 
without providing public access to the data or tools used in the analysis. 
Critiques of race, power, and colonialism are rarely brought into studies on 
how activists from the MENA region have used Silicon Valley tools to design 
their own virtualities specif ic to local culture and history.
References
Paul Amar, The Security Archipelago. Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and 
the End of Neoliberalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).
Jon W. Anderson and Dale F. Eickelman, New Media and the Muslim World: The 
EmergentPublic Sphere (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).
Miriyam Aouragh and Anne Alexander, ‘The Egyptian Experience: Sense and 
Nonsense of the Internet Revolution’, International Journal of Communication, 
5 (2010), pp. 1344–1358.
Asef Bayat, Revolution Without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017).
Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel, eds., Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contesta-
tion in the Middle East and North Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
Axel Bruns, ‘Produsage: Towards a Broader Framework for User-Led Content 
Creation’, Proceedings Creativity & Cognition, 6 (2007).
---, ‘From Reader to Writer: Citizen Journalism as News Produsage’, in Internet 
Research Handbook, ed. by Jeremy Hunsinger, Lisbeth Klastrup, and Matthew 
Allen (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), pp. 119–134.
12 Tourture in Egypt, Online Resource: http://tortureinegypt.net/.
rEFrAMiNg thE ArAb SPriNg 257
Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Networked Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1996).
Murphy Choy, Michelle L.F. Cheong, Ma Nang Laik, and Koo Ping Shung, A Sentiment 
Analysis of Singapore Presidential Election 2011 using Twitter Data with Census 
Correction, 2011 (eprint arXiv:1108.5520).
George Dunbar, Computers and Translation, 3(4) (1989), pp. 263–266.
Mona El-Ghobashy, ‘The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution’, Middle East Report, 2011, 
p. 258, Online Resource: http://www.merip.org/mer/mer258/praxis-egyptian-
revolution (accessed 18 November 2020).
Mohammed El-Nawawy and Adel Iskander, Al-Jazeera: The Story of the Network 
that is Rattling Governments and Redefining Modern Journalism (New York: 
Basic Books, 2003).
Mohammed Elshahed, ‘The “White City” and Egypt’s modernist History’, Cairobserver, 
2012, Online Resource: http://cairobserver.com/post/21938918144/the-white-city-
and-egypts-modernist-heritage#.W7_-uhNKhTY (accessed 18 November 2020).
Sarah Beth Elson, Douglas Yeung, Parisa Roshan, S.R.Bohandy, and Alireza Nader, 
Using Social Media to Gauge Iranian Public Opinion and Mood After the 2009 
Election (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2011).
Bruce Etling, John Kelly, Robert Faris, and John Palfrey, ‘Mapping the Arabic 
Blogosphere: Politics and Dissent Online’, New Media & Society, 12(8) (2010), 
pp. 1225–1243.
Kevin D. Franklin and Karen Rodriguez, ‘The Next Big Thing in Humanities, Arts 
and Social Science Computing: Cultural Analytics’, HPC Wire (2008).
Alexander R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 2004).
Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker, The Exploit: A Theory of Networks 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).
Megan Garber, ‘A Year After the Egyptian Revolution, 10% of Its Social Media is 
Already Gone’, The Atlantic, Online Resource: http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2012/02/a-year-after-the-egyptian-revolution-10-of-its-social-
media-documentation-is-already-gone/253163/ (accessed 18 November 2020).
Jeffrey Ghannam, ‘Digital Media in the Arab World: One Year After the Revolutions’, 
A Report to the Center for International Media Assistance, Online Resource: http://
cima.ned.org/publications/digital-media-arab-world-one-year-after-revolutions 
(accessed 18 November 2020).
Tarleton Gillespie, Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the 
Hidden Decisions that Shape Social Media (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018).
Malcom Gladwell, ‘Does Egypt Need Twitter?’, The New Yorker, Online Resource: 
http://newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/02/does-egypt-need-twitter 
(accessed 18 November 2020).
258 lAilA ShErEEN SAKr 
Jack Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).
Linda Herrera, Wired Citizenship (New York: Routledge Press, 2014).
Charles Hirschkind, ‘Uprising in Egypt: The Road to Tahrir’, The Immanent Frame: 
Blog of Social Science Research Council, Online Resource: http://blogs.ssrc.org/
tif/2011/02/09/the-road-to-tahrir/ (accessed 18 November 2020).
Philip N. Howard, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information 
Technology and Political Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
Leila Hudson, Adel Iskandar, and Mimi Kirk, Media Evolution on the Eve of the Arab 
Spring (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014).
Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New York: 
New York University Press, 2008).
John Kelly and Bruce Etling, ‘Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture in 
the Persian Blogosphere’, Internet & Democracy Case Study Series, 2008, Online 
Resource: https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2008/Mapping_Irans_On-
line_Public (accessed 18 November 2020).
Marwan Kraidy, Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public Life 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Marwan Kraidy and Joe Khalil, Arab Television Industries (London: British Film 
Institute, 2010).
Rob Lever, ‘Debate Flares on “Twitter Revolutions” Arab Spring’, Dawn, 11 March 
2013, Online Resource: https://www.dawn.com/news/791757/debate-flares-on-
twitter-revolutions-arab-spring (accessed 21 January 2021). 
Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the Middle East (New 
York: PublicAffairs, 2013).
Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).
Michael Mateas, ‘Procedural Literacy: Educating the New Media Practitioner’, 
ETC Press, 4 May 2007.
Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, 5(1) (2012).
Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
Safiya Umoja Noble, Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism 
(New York: New York University Press, 2018).
Vijay Prashad, The Death of the Nation and the Future of the Arab Revolution 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016).
Nicola Pratt, ‘The Gender Logics of Resistance to the “War on Terror”: Constructing 
Sex-Gender Difference Through the Erasure of Patriarchy in the Middle East’, 
Third World Quarterly, 33(10).
Legacy Russell, ‘Digital Dualism And The Glitch Feminism Manifesto’, Cyborgology, 
10 December 2012.
rEFrAMiNg thE ArAb SPriNg 259
Fadi Salem and Racha Mourtada, ‘Facebook Usage: Factors and Analysis’, Online 
Resource: http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/Facebook/LineChart.aspx 
(accessed 18 November 2020).
---, ‘Civil Movements: The Impact of Facebook and Twitter’, Online Resource: www.
dsg.ae/portals/0/ASMR2.pdf (accessed 18 November 2020).
---, ‘The Role of Social Media in Arab Women’s Empowerment’, The Arab Social 
Media Report, Dubai, UAE: Dubai School of Government, Online Resource: www.
arabsocialmediareport.com/UserManagement/PDF/ASMAR%20Report%203.
pdf (accessed 18 November 2020).
Laila Sakr, ‘The Materiality of Virtuality: Internet Reporting On Arab Revolutions’, 
in Mediating the Arab Uprisings, ed. by Adel Iskander and Bassam Haddad 
(Washington, DC: Tadween Publishing, 2013).
Philip Seib, The Al Jazeera Effect: How the New Global Media Are Reshaping World 
Politics (New York: Potomac Books, 2008).
Clay Shirky, ‘The Political Power of Social Media’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 
2011.
Zeynep Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).
Barry Wellman, ‘Physical Place and Cyber Place: The Rise of Networked Indi-
vidualism’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 25(2) (2001), 
pp. 227–252.
Bassem Youssef, ‘Internet and Political Mobilization in Egypt and Tunisia’, Connected 
in Cairo, Online Resource: http://connectedincairo.com/2011/08/08/internet-
and-political-mobilization-in-egypt-and-tunisia (accessed 18 November 2020).
About the Author
Laila Shereen Sakr is Assistant Professor of Media Theory & Practice at the 
University of California, Santa Barbara. At UCSB, she co-founded Wireframe, 
a new digital media studio that supports critical game design and digital arts 
practice. Sakr has shown in solo and group exhibitions and performances 
at galleries and museums including the San Francisco MoMA, National 
Gallery of Art in Jordan, Camera Austria, Cultura Digital in Brazil, Kirchner 
Cultural Centre in Argentina, Tahrir Cultural Center in Cairo, Fridge Art 
Gallery in Washington, DC, and 100 Copies in Egypt, among other venues. 
Over the last two decades, she has been a leading voice in the open-source 
movement, in particular for Arabic localization. She is Co-Editor for the 
open-access journal: Media Theory, and for After Video published by Open 
Humanities Press. She collaborates with MIT’s Global Media Technologies 
260 lAilA ShErEEN SAKr 
& Cultures Lab as a Researcher. At UCSB, she is Faculty Aff iliate in the 
Feminist Studies Department, Media Arts and Technology Program, and 
the Center for Responsible Machine Learning. She serves on the advisory, 
executive, and steering committees for UCSB Digital Arts & Humanities 
Commons, Center for Middle East Studies, and Center for Information 
Technology & Society.
12. Where is Iran? Politics between State 
and Nation , Inside and Outside the 
Polity
Annabelle Sreberny and Gholam Khiabany
Abstract
Three powerful spatial dynamics are at work in the analysis of a country’s 
political orbit. One is the classic remit of the international relations be-
tween states. The second is the mainstream remit of political analysis, 
the national dialogue – sometimes open, often constrained – between 
the state and its inhabitants. In addition, the third is the cross-border 
space between the state and its citizens who – as diaspora, exiles, and 
migrants – live in other countries. Too often, each is analysed in isolation, 
part of the intellectually unedifying division of academic work. In this 
chapter, we explore where contemporary Iranian politics exists and how 
it is played out through each of these political geographies.
Keywords: Iran, politics, nation, knowledge
The 2018 World Cup ended with France the winner, partly because its 
imperial past provided the country with many excellent football players 
of African origin. The Iranian team started at a disadvantage and did not 
make it beyond the f irst round. Nike, the Iranian team’s previous shoe 
provider, announced that because Donald Trump reimposed sanctions 
against Iran, they could not support the team any longer. The players were 
forced to improvise and to buy their own cleats. Despite this, Team Melli1 
1 Melli means ‘national’ in Persian, and Iranians’ reference the national team as such, clearly 
referring to the nation and not the state. Yet the world football governing body (FIFA) referred 
to the team by the name of the state, Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI).
Strohmaier, A. and A. Krewani (eds.), Media and Mapping Practices in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Producing Space. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021
doi 10.5117/9789462989092_ch12
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became a viral phenomenon and was widely praised for its stylish and 
dapper appearance.2 At some of the matches in Russia, Iranian women, who 
are banned from attending football matches at home, unfurled banners 
demanding access to football stadiums inside Iran; a few stadia within the 
country were indeed opened to women so that they could watch the Russian 
games relayed on-screen. An international sporting event always echoes 
political issues, and for Iran this World Cup echoed both international and 
domestic ones. Internationally, the spectre and realities of sanctions3 were 
on display, and nationally, the excitement of the games was a perfect excuse 
for a massive public presence in the streets.
Politics is predominantly ‘at a distance’. Most politicians are known to 
contemporary publics via media of one form or another. Now, few are on the 
stump anymore, talk directly to potential voters, or only briefly at rallies during 
elections. The television screen mediates the distance between representatives 
and supporters, bringing politics into the living room – as do radio, newspapers, 
and internet interactions, including through social media (Coleman 2007). 
If there is always a spatial dimension to any politics, in the contemporary 
world the distances have become longer while the speeds are faster. That is to 
say, long distance has collapsed into seconds, the time-space compression of 
globalization-speak (Giddens 2013). Thus, distance becomes a question of scale. 
This is all well known but worth repeating, to acknowledge that the claims about 
the deterritorialization of politics are not that new (Held et al. 2000, pp. 14–28).
A tendency within globalizing approaches and the perceived thickening 
of transnational relations is sometimes to ignore the ongoing signif icance 
of state-nation relations – although those remain. Indeed, state-nation 
relations have also become deterritorialized in fascinating ways as more 
and more countries have diasporic populations living outside the boundary 
of the state, which tries to maintain them within the political fold.
Three Geographies of Politics
Thus, we suggest that there are at least three powerful spatial dynamics 
currently at work in the analysis of a country’s political orbit. One is the 
2 Dailymail: ‘“Suddenly very invested in the World Cup!” Viral photo of Iran’s VERY dapper national 
football squad leaves new fans swooning’, Online Resource: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/
article-5820471/Suave-image-Iranian-world-cup-football-squad-social-media-swooning.html.
3 Independent, ‘World Cup 2018: Nike withdraws supply of football boots to Iran national team due 
to new US sanctions’, Online Resource: https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/world-cup/
world-cup-2018-iran-nike-football-boots-supply-donald-trump-us-sanctions-a8396921.html.
whErE iS irAN? PoliticS bEt wEEN StAtE ANd NAtioN 263
classic remit of the international relations between states, although even 
here, new approaches to public diplomacy suggest that states are reaching out 
across geographical borders to each other’s publics in unprecedented ways 
(Held et al. 2000, pp. 14–28) including interfering in each other’s elections, 
most obviously Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election.4 The second 
is the classic remit of political analysis, the national dialogue – sometimes 
open, often constrained – between the state and its inhabitants within the 
country. The third is the space between the state and its citizens who live 
abroad – as diaspora, exiles, refugees, or migrants. Too often, each is analysed 
in isolation, part of the intellectually unedifying division of academic work. 
In addition, to complicate these geographies further, diasporas can com-
municate back in various ways while other states and other publics can 
become entangled in the conversation.
These three spaces overlap in terms of communicative dynamics, even if 
they describe slightly different sets of actors and agendas. These dynamics 
are simultaneous, perhaps affecting each other, waxing and waning as the 
issues change. The nation as an interpellator of people and their political 
imagination and participation remains strong, so distance does not fully 
overcome location, and space does not alter the ongoing signif icance of 
place. We cannot fully embrace the arguments about ‘the death of distance’ 
(Cairncross 2001), since proximity to the orbit of the state clearly still matters 
at times. Better put, we might say that the repressive reach of the state is 
more noticeable and harder to evade within a country – Iran is our focus 
here – than outside, but it is also present there (regime pressure on the 
families and property of BBC Persian employees is one example). We need 
to think of space and place in tension, even in contradiction, all the time, 
and we need to ask where politics is to be found: within the system or on 
the streets, and which streets those might be? This chapter explores these 
issues by examining the spatiality of contemporary Iranian politics within 
and outside the country.
International relations is an obvious form of politics at a distance, involv-
ing the system of internationally recognized actors at the level of a state. 
Two or more political systems interact in a variety of forms, from complex 
communications to outright war. Iran was entangled in great power politics 
throughout the nineteenth and 20th centuries. It is currently embroiled in 
a number of international conflicts, with a range of countries aligned in 
opposition to it. Looking merely at Iranian international relations with ‘its’ 
region, we see some Iranian military personnel on the ground in Syria. It 
4 See: https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/russian-election-hacking.
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is involved in the political conflict in Yemen. It enjoys some influence still 
inside Iraq. It has been a vocal supporter of a Palestinian state and loud critic 
of Israel; Prime Minister Netanyahu has ratcheted up his inflammatory 
language about Iranian nuclear developments at the United Nations.5
Beyond its geographic neighbourhood, Iran has been locked in an antago-
nistic relationship with the United States – often only narrowly avoiding 
outright military conflict – since the islamic revolution and hostage crisis of 
1979. The successful negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) with the P5+1 in July 2015 was seen as a signif icant breakthrough in 
Iran’s diplomacy with the West. However, President Donald Trump withdrew 
the United States from the JCPOA in May 2018 and reimposed sanctions, a 
move condemned by the International Court of Justice in The Hague. He also 
used inflammatory rhetoric about Iran at the United Nations. Around 40 US 
military bases surround Iran.6 A number of Iran’s nuclear scientists have been 
murdered inside the country, state-sponsored killings that have received 
little publicity or analysis from Western media (Hasan 2012). Therefore, 
at the level of state activities, it is comparatively easy to understand the 
political extension of Iran into its wider neighbourhood and beyond – and 
the occasional hand of external states around and inside the country.
Somewhat more complicated is the dynamic nature of political com-
munication between the state and the nation. Appadurai has quipped that 
‘the nation and the state are each other’s project’ (1990, pp. 295–310) as states 
try to develop a strong sense of nationhood, including a shared culture and 
history, while some nations wish to become states. States everywhere indeed 
claim to represent not only the people but also the unity of their people 
and wield the monopoly of violence to ensure their governmentality. It is 
precisely through the enforcement of such claims that the state attempts 
to impose a singular politics and often fails to represent the unity of the 
people it purports to represent. In the MENA region – and because of military 
interventions of imperial powers that of course were and are de-territorial 
– there are huge areas in which the very idea of the state or state power 
has ceased to exist: in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Somalia, and Sudan. 
This idea is often referred to in the concise and somewhat crude notion of 
‘failed states’. The other related paradox, as Rogers Brubaker reminds us, is 
that the issue of membership of a national polity is not always generated ‘by 
the movement of people over borders, but by the movement of borders over 
5 Netanyahu’s UN speech can be found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4xCBbPnE3oE.
6 For discussion and a map, see: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2012/
0 4/2012417131242767298.html.
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people’ (2010, p. 69). The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 
various successor states or the breakup of the former Yugoslavia are some 
examples. Another fact that is often ignored is that in the formation of nation 
states and membership of their politics, many people did not join the state 
but rather the state encompassed them. This is true of all empires but in 
particular in the case of expansion of the United States into the Caribbean 
and Pacif ic (Brubaker 2010, p. 71). In the MENA region, two countries are 
still known not through the representation of the unity of their people or 
the name of the nation but by the title of the ruling family: the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The state is no longer 
(if it ever was) the container of the nation but often its substitute.7
However, we might also say that in Iran, the state and the nation are each 
other’s nemesis, locked in f ierce political confrontation. What we mean in 
our shorthand use of the ‘nation’ here is essentially a country’s citizens, 
its publics. Here we approach Hannah Arendt’s notion of the political as a 
contrast between a polis – or a res publica – in which citizens act together 
to manage their own affairs, and the state as holding the monopoly on 
violence and engaged in rulership over its citizens (1965, p. 280).
The Politics of the State
Clearly, the Iranian state, like all other states, is most governmental within 
its borders. Iranians inside are required to pay taxes, abide by all laws – 
including those relating to censorship, hijab, and sexual behaviour – travel 
on an Iranian passport, and so forth. Those individuals who question the 
actions of the state may feel the full force of the law through executions, 
imprisonments, censorship, travel bans, and more (Sreberny and Torfeh 
2013). Activists in unions, in women’s and minority groups (Bahai’i, Jews, 
etc.) have been joined by journalists, editors, bloggers, poets, cartoonists, 
musicians, and others in having experienced the repression of the Iranian 
state (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010; Sreberny and Torfeh 2013).
However, the space of Iran, and thus of Iranian politics, has become 
elongated because of the outmigration of a substantial diaspora since 
the 1979 islamic revolution. Approximately four million people, including 
some of the most highly educated, have become dispersed across many 
7 The new law of nationality promulgated in Israel in July 2018 is yet another example of the 
lack of contiguity between people and political demarcations; the Palestinians resident inside 
Israel becoming increasingly disenfranchised.
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different new host countries, including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, France, and Germany, but also Costa Rica, Malaysia, 
Japan, and Norway, depending on the vicissitudes of international relations, 
immigration regimes, and economic flux (Sreberny 2000). These diasporic 
communities are neither treated as postnational nor transnational but, as 
Moallem has suggested, as the ‘excess of the nation-state’ (2000, pp. 200–210), 
often encountering forms of racism in the host country and exclusion by 
‘their own state’. Over the past few years, the diaspora has acquired the right 
to vote in Iranian elections – yet the counting of votes often seems too fast 
to include that opinion (Boroujerdi and Rahimkhani 2018, pp. 101–103) – and 
the diaspora broadcasts and messages back to fellow countrymen and the 
Iranian state.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has used various approaches to persuade, 
cajole, and enforce its positions vis-à-vis its citizens, and these have a reach 
far beyond the confines of the territory of Iran. The long arm of the state can 
reach across borders to punish Iranians who live outside Iran. According 
to the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, the Iranian state has 
been involved in at least 162 extrajudicial killings of political opponents in 
nineteen different countries around the world, including in France, Sweden, 
Austria, Germany, the United States, Japan, Turkey, and Switzerland.8 High-
prof ile killings include the assassination of Abdol-Rahman Ghassemlou, 
Secretary General of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, in Vienna in 
1989 and his successor, Sadegh Sharafkandi, in the Mykonos restaurant 
in Berlin in 1992. A recent victim of such an assassination by the Iranian 
state was Saeed Karimian (who held British citizenship), chairperson of the 
Dubai-based GEM TV Network. He and his Kuwaiti business partner were 
shot dead on 29 April 2017 in Istanbul. GEM TV runs seventeen Persian-
language channels (with dubbed Turkish soap operas among its main and 
very popular programmes). In 2016, a revolutionary court in Iran passed 
a sentence of six years of imprisonment against Karimian for spreading 
propaganda.9
State violence against non-resident Iranians has also taken many forms 
inside the country. Recently, Iranian state activity has included the arrest of 
dual nationals entering the country to visit family or attend educational or 
8 Iran Human Rights, Online Resource: http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/
reports/3152-no-safe-haven-iran-s-global-assassination-campaign.html.
9 ‘Iranian TV executive shot dead in Istanbul, Turkish media report’, Online Resource: https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/30/iranian-gem-tv-saeed-karimian-shot-dead-in-istanbul-
turkish-media-reports.
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cultural events, often for these individuals to be used as a pawn in negotia-
tions with their new host country. According to Reuters,10 since 2015, more 
than 30 people with dual nationality have been arrested in Iran, including 
students, lawyers, academics, and charity workers; the majority detained 
in recent years have European citizenship. In February 2018, Kavous Seyed 
Emami, the Iranian Canadian founder of the Persian Wildlife Heritage Foun-
dation, died in solitary confinement in Evin Prison, having been charged 
with espionage. In 2003, another Iranian Canadian, photojournalist Zahra 
Kazemi, was killed in the same prison, arrested for taking photographs 
of protesting families of political prisoners. The ongoing imprisonment 
without trial of the Iranian British woman, Nazanin Zaghari-Radcliffe, 
whose daughter has now been returned to her father in London, has raised 
consternation in Britain and continues in autumn 2020 despite a strong 
public campaign and intervention from British political f igures.11
In addition, the Iranian state, like most other states, is very active in 
mobilizing politico-cultural support beyond its own borders. International 
media influence is important. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting 
(IRIB) broadcasts to foreign audiences through four international news 
television channels, six satellite television channels, and 30 radio chan-
nels broadcasting in 32 languages, including English, Arabic, Hebrew, 
Armenian, Turkish, Russian, Bengali, and Japanese. Its Jame-Jam network 
(comprising three channels for Europe, America, and Asia) also broadcasts 
specif ically to the Iranian diaspora. In January 2017, the Islamic Republic 
of Iran parliament approved a government proposal to double the budget 
of IRIB. According to published reports, ‘the IRIB will receive 0.7% of the 
government’s general budget over the next f ive years’ and is allowed to spend 
around $750 million annually.12 This is despite the wide acknowledgement 
that IRIB has lost a signif icantly large slice of its domestic audience. Press 
TV, an English-language channel with off ices in London, actively asserts 
its critical journalism vis-à-vis British politics. Communicative borders 
are f luid, and individuals can access multiple sources of information and 
cultural content.
10 ‘Exclusive – Iran’s Revolutionary Guards arrest more dual nationals’, Online Resource: 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-arrests-exclusive/exclusive-irans-revolutionary-guards-
arrest-more-dual-nationals-idUKKBN1D90TE.
11 ‘Britain tells Iran it will not let matter of detained aid worker rest’, Online Resource: https://
uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-iran/britain-tells-iran-it-will-not-let-matter-of-detained-aid-
worker-rest-idUKKCN1M71ZA.
12 ‘IRIB Budget Doubles’, Online Resource: https://f inancialtribune.com/articles/economy-
domestic-economy/57517/irib-budget-doubles.
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However, while the Iranian state is active in international broadcast-
ing, it does not like being the target of such broadcasting from others. The 
sensitivity of the Iranian state against what it calls ‘soft war’ (Sreberny 2013) 
is evident in its long-running hostility towards the BBC, especially BBC 
Persian, which was established in 2008 and is aimed at Iranians inside Iran 
(Sreberny and Torfeh 2014). The state had tried to block signal reception 
by sending up parasites, but audiences became adept at retuning their 
Hotbird receivers; unable to attack the station, the state has moved against 
its Iranian employees. The Islamic Republic of Iran has sequestered the 
property of BBC Persian staff and even held their families to ransom. In 
October 2017, the Iranian state opened a criminal investigation into what 
they considered to be ‘conspiracy against national security’ by 152 current 
and former BBC Persian journalists. Since the Iranian uprising in 2009, 
dozens of BBC journalists’ families and friends as well as those contributing 
to BBC Persian programmes have been harassed, investigated, and put under 
pressure by the Iranian security forces. The National Union of Journalists 
(UK), International Federation of Journalists, and a number of human rights 
organizations have condemned the Iranian state’s treatment of BBC journal-
ists and their families. In March 2018, the BBC World Service appealed to the 
United Nations for support to protect its staff but the problem continues.13
Digital Technologies and the Possibilities for and Limits to Politics
Digital technologies may have the effect of further increasing the geographic 
reach of Iranian politics and culture. The internet can link a national public 
across geographic borders. Home and away are all the same on Instagram 
or Telegram, which offer instantaneous communication and can facilitate 
diverse and multiple publics, otherwise referred to as public sphericules 
or even content bubbles.
Women have used new media to considerable effect (Sreberny 2017). Yet 
the dynamics of such interaction reveals the complexities and different 
senses of place. This is particularly acute in the case of a highly publicized 
and successful Facebook campaign called ‘My Stealthy Freedom’. Iranian 
journalist and activist Massih Alinejad launched the campaign in May 2014. 
This page was dedicated to posting images of women inside Iran who had 
dared to remove their hijabs. After a few days, the page had received over 
13 ‘BBC urges UN to help protect rights of Iran staff ’, Online Resource: https://www.alaraby.
co.uk/english/news/2018/3/12/bbc-urges-un-to-protect-its-iranian-staff.
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100,000 likes, and less than a year after the launch of the campaign, the 
page had over 760,000 followers – a much bigger following than the winner 
of the 2009 presidential election, Mir-Hossein Musavi’s, Facebook page 
at the peak of the 2009 Iranian uprising. The international success of the 
Stealthy Freedom campaign shows that new technologies do indeed break 
geographical boundaries and precipitate international sympathy and 
solidarity. However, these technologies are also born in specif ic historical 
societies and social relations.
The compression of time and space tends to make space seem irrelevant; 
however, new technologies by themselves cannot bypass assumptions, 
prejudices, and stereotypes. The overwhelming feeling outside Iran has been 
one of support, solidarity, and encouragement. Yet, the positive international 
coverage and support should not obscure a number of contradictions and 
dilemmas, especially when ‘saving’ Muslim women (Abu-Lughod 2013) was 
on the political agenda and used as an excuse for military interventions 
in the region. There is always a danger, as Zishad Lak reminds us, that a 
local struggle might be assimilated into something completely different 
(2014). For Lak, the Stealthy Freedom campaign is one of those instances 
in which ‘local resistance risks being thrust into obscurity to be protected 
from colonial interpretations. What we should be wary of is the audience 
or the interlocutor that is implicit in the message around which the actor 
organises her actions’ (2014). In every story published in mainstream British 
or American media are supporting statements encouraging Iranian women 
with phrases such as ‘Go Girls!’, or simply describing participants in this 
campaign as ‘[b]eautiful, smart, conf ident, and happy’ and welcoming 
them ‘to the 21st century’ (Khiabany 2015). The mismatch between local 
context and concerns (internal) and the framing and reception of these 
concerns outside the geographical boundaries of the local (external) are 
rarely considered.
The digital environment in Iran has been subject to friction between 
government factions of the state, competition between the institutional 
interests of various state agencies, and tension between the state and the 
public. Even though the Islamic Republic of Iran has off icially encouraged 
the use of the internet, issues of access and control over content remain 
controversial (Rahimi 2003, pp. 101–115). Fearful of the formation of any alter-
native source of social power, the state has taken a leading role in providing 
internet access and services. A majority of shares of the Telecommunication 
Company of Iran were sold to the Revolutionary Guards for $5 billion in 
2009, clearly demonstrating the signif icance of the internet to the state. 
This military takeover, which was done under the banner of privatization, 
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points to the security dimension of the internet in Iran. In addition, the 
Iranian state has devised a range of controls, which are implemented with 
greater or lesser degrees of eff iciency. These controls include ISP licensing, 
internet f iltering, censorship of sites, control of the speed of the internet, 
attempts to inundate the net with favourable content, the criminalization 
of digital activities, and the arrest of activists (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010). 
In short, the Iranian state, rather unsurprisingly, relies on coercion and 
violence (physical as well as symbolic) as its ultimate sanction.
The lack of independent media, the closure of many reformist newspapers, 
and the erosion of state legitimacy, coupled with the growing popular 
dissatisfaction in Iran, helped to increase activism in the blogosphere and 
develop a vigorous cyber culture – a ‘blogistan’, so to speak (Sreberny and 
Khiabany 2010). However, the collapse of the Iranian uprising in 2009 and 
the massive state crackdown on all forms of political activism (digital and 
otherwise) put an end to that phenomenon. A recent study suggested a ‘high 
rate of blog abandonment with only around 20 percent of the prominent 
blogs from 2008–2009’ still active in September 2013 and a general decrease 
in the frequency of posting: ‘70 percent of bloggers surveyed publish one 
post per month or less – in contrast to earlier years’ (Giacobino et al. 2014, 
p. 3). However, this decline can also be attributed to the growth of social 
media and the migration of bloggers to new platforms.
New Social Networking Sites (SNSs) ‘facilitate publication and instant 
promotion of any content, including short, often less analytical and re-used 
content and provide a consistent, seamless and cross platform experience 
for readers’ (Giacobino et al. 2014, p. 4). While these may be the technical 
advantages of SNSs, they also operate in the same historical society and thus 
have all the hallmarks of the existing realities and constraints on expres-
sion in Iran. Signif icantly, the popularity of and controversy over SNSs are 
consistent with previous phases of new media adoption and abandonment 
in Iran. In 2014, Al Jazeera reported that of those who have access to the 
internet, 58 per cent use Facebook regularly and 37 per cent use Google+. 
Facebook and Twitter are still officially banned in Iran, although that has not 
deterred key Iranian off icials, including the supreme leader, or institutions, 
from using such platforms.
The most interesting success stories, however, relate to the use of Viber, 
WhatsApp, and, more recently, Telegram. In contrast to the country’s 4.5 
million Facebook users, around 10 million people (12 per cent of the Iranian 
population) used Viber. In fact, in 2015, Iranians were the leading group of 
Viber users internationally, a trend similar to their earlier adoption of blogs. 
According to Alexa.com, Viber was ranked 6644th globally but 776th in 
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Iran; nearly 18 per cent of Viber users in 2015 were in Iran, ahead of Russia 
(8.8 per cent), the United States (8.4 per cent), India (7 per cent), and Brazil 
(4.9 per cent). Viber itself emerged as a top news item after the Iranian 
police arrested eleven people in September 2014 for circulating jokes about 
Ayatollah Khomeini on Viber.14 Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, f irst deputy 
of the judiciary branch, in a letter to Mahmood Vaezi, the communications 
minister, threatened that if Vaezi did not take action, the judiciary would 
‘take the appropriate measures’ (Khosrokhavar 2012, p. 152). Mohseni-Ejei 
described applications such as Viber, WhatsApp, and Tango as networks 
‘with immoral and criminal content’ (Khosrokhavar 2012, p. 152), and gave 
the government a month to block them. The communication minister 
replied that blocking such networks would not solve any problems.15 Iranian 
officials and institutions were also among Viber users and the fact that it was 
developed by Israel had not stopped Press TV, for example, or Rafsanjani’s 
website from using the app. Even the security off icials are divided over 
how to tackle these networks. Ahmadi-Moghadam, the chief of the Iranian 
police, had admitted that the use of such apps is inevitable, but added that 
the state needs to f ind ways to monitor and control inappropriate use of 
these services.16 He did urge the Supreme Council on Cyberspace to come 
up with appropriate guidelines regulating the use of networks such as 
Facebook and Viber. Prior to the Viber controversy and confusion, there was 
more unhappy news for users of new technologies in Iran when an Iranian 
court charged seven young men and women in May 2014 for posting their 
version of a Pharrell Williams music video on YouTube.17
The Viber controversy, however, had more than a political dimension; 
it was not simply over jokes about political leaders or irreverence towards 
the clergy, even though according to a report by BBC Persian, 29 per cent of 
all SMS in Iran are jokes.18 Tools such as Viber and WhatsApp were and are 
also denting the profits of the Telecommunication Company of Iran. Viber 
and WhatsApp provide Iranians with what voice-over internet protocol 
14 ‘The Most Popular Messaging App in Every Country’, Online Resource: https://www.similarweb.
com/blog/worldwide-messaging-apps.
15 ‘Iran Communication Minister: The problem will not be Solved by Closure of SNSs’, Online 
Resource: http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2014/10/141001_f ilter_communication_vaezi.




18 ‘Nearly One Third of all SMSs are Jokes’, Online Resource: http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/
iran/2015/03/150301_me_sms_iran.
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had done in the early 2000s: low-cost telephone communication. TCI had 
reported $20 million profit in 1998, but in 2002, despite a threefold increase 
in the number of people with access to telephone lines in that period, TCI 
reported a loss of $23 million. Expectedly, private internet and telephone 
providers were blamed for this loss in profit and the reversal of TCI fortune 
and, in reaction, the government began to close many cybercafés. The 
Revolutionary Guards, owner of TCI, were reacting yet again with the same 
moral crusade and waging their own war against what certain factions of 
the Iranian state have labelled ‘soft war’, yet this struggle may actually be 
more about money than influence.
The controversy over SNSs in Iran continued as Telegram started to replace 
Viber and WhatsApp as Iranians’ favourite method of communication. In 
October 2015, Mahmood Vaezi, still the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Com-
munications Minister, suggested that approximately 14 million Iranians 
use Telegram, although the social networking company claimed that the 
number of users was around 20 million.19 In October 2015, Pavel Durov, the 
co-founder of Telegram, revealed that Iran’s Ministry of Information and 
Communications Technology requested ‘spying and censorship tools’ from 
the service (Solomon 2015). When Telegram refused to give in to the minister’s 
request, the ministry moved to block the service – a claim that was vehemently 
denied by Iranian off icials. Because of their ease of use and accessibility 
via mobile devices, SNSs have started to replace blogs and emails. Their 
popularity is such that many state off icials, including the supreme leader, 
news organizations, political parties, musicians, and various social groups 
have opened their own channels on Telegram to share and disseminate 
their works, ideas, and analysis. As an emerging company, Telegram cannot 
ignore such a big market in Iran, and many organizations have expressed 
concerns over its possible cooperation with the Iranian state. For example, 
on 18 November 2015, Article 19, a British human rights organization, urged 
Telegram to ‘clarify the nature of its negotiations with Iranian off icials, 
including the nature of any data, technology, and censorship being requested, 
as well as the date on which discussions began, and which elements of the 
Iranian regime have been involved’.20 Such expressions of concerns about 
privacy and Iranian government interference with popular communication 
19 ‘Communication Minister: 13 to 14 Million use Telegram in Iran’, Online Resource: http://
www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2015/10/151025_l26_iran_ict_minister_telegram.
20 ‘Iran: Privacy and Censorship Fears around Telegram Messaging App’, Online Resource: 
https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38196/en/iran:-privacy-and-censorship-
fears-around-telegram-messaging-app.
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tools and applications are not without precedent. In 2009, Nokia Siemens 
Networks was forced to confirm that it had provided the Telecommunication 
Company of Iran with equipment that allowed it to spy on its customers. This 
led to a campaign against the Finnish information technology company, and 
‘Nokia: Disconnecting People’ became one of the slogans of Iranian activists in 
2009.21 Despite all of these issues, access to such tools have increased rapidly. 
In 2018, despite massive investment by the Iranian state to block and filter 
Telegram, 40 million Iranians (20 per cent of Telegram users across the world) 
were using it, which is around 90 per cent of Iranian adults. In the same year, 
Iran was among the top ten users of Instagram, with 24 million registered 
users. Such platforms blur the line between inside and outside and help to 
create a transnationally stretched Iranian politico-cultural space.
Mobile phones equipped with SNS capability are also politically relevant 
for other reasons; they
not only permit the exchange of information between the individuals 
but also enable each person to act as an amateur photojournalist during 
demonstrations and their repression, sending photos and short videos 
to channels. In Tunisia, Al Jazeera did not have an authorized off icial 
journalist, and it broadcast the images and short sequences it received 
from the young amateur journalists. (Khosrokhavar 2012, p. 152)
During the 2009 Iranian uprising, Yahoo Messenger and Bluetooth technolo-
gies allowed individuals to maintain connectivity and exchange informa-
tion, often with international broadcasters such as BBC Persian, which 
rebroadcasts this material in Iran; such technologies made it possible to 
either bypass the government censorship wall or remain connected when 
the internet was down or too slow. SNSs thus connect Iranians inside and 
outside Iran, but they are also heavily used by the state itself. Uses and 
abuses of media (social or otherwise) happen within a particular political 
context. Thus, while the government might wish to control, or in the last 
instance, close down these platforms, its own involvement with them makes 
such control a mixed blessing.
Uncritical accounts of the role of information technologies tend to forget 
what Williams has called ‘uncontrolled effect’ (1974, p. 18). Williams insisted 
on f inding ways to democratize culture and cultural production and long 
before digital media optimism, he argued for access to cultural resources 
21 ‘Iranian consumers boycott Nokia for “collaboration”’, Online Resource: https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2009/jul/14/nokia-boycott-iran-election-protests.
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which would allow everyone to both produce and consume culture. Williams 
also pointed at alternative uses (and regulation) of technologies. In the case 
of television in particular, he suggested that while it is possible to discuss 
the social history of broadcasting on its own, ‘it is unrealistic to extract from 
it another and perhaps more decisive process, through which, in particular 
economic situations, a set of scattered technical devices became an applied 
technology and then a social technology’ (Williams 1974, p. 18). In other 
words, the level of one’s independence as a producer is shaped by the broader 
material realities that structure, regulate, and circulate symbolic production. 
However, in the same book, we read this memorable sentence: ‘For there 
was no way to teach a man to read the Bible which did not also enable him 
to read the radical press. A controlled intention became an uncontrolled 
effect’ (Williams 1974, pp. 133–134). In the case of social media, it is not just 
the contradiction between the original design (controlled intention), the use 
of technology (uncontrollable effect), and the obvious and stark interplay 
between public and private that confront us. Furthermore, the guerilla 
political struggle and the constant shift from one software to the next, one 
application to another, one platform to a different one, reveals more about 
the nature of resistance and political engagement than technologies per se 
or the iron f ist of state. This is, of course, not unique to Iran.
External Incursions into Iran
The crossing of territorial borders by the state to reach and influence audi-
ences, or harass, recruit, or even kill dissident voices is not unique to the 
Iranian state. The obverse, the incursions into Iran by external forces, is 
evident and sometimes even deadlier.
During the Iranian uprising in 2009, the US government asked Twitter 
to postpone its scheduled maintenance service because of Twitter’s alleged 
signif icance to the Iranian uprising. The US government had made every ef-
fort to appear as if it was not intervening in Iran’s domestic affairs. However, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton defended the decision by saying that ‘the 
United States believes passionately and strongly in the basic principle […]. 
We promote the right of free expression’.22
Such attempts to promote the myths of the ‘technologies of freedom’ 
were made at the same time that the US government was suppressing 
22 ‘Remarks With Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’, Online Resource: https://2009-2017.
state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/06/125044.htm.
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these very technologies (or alternative uses of them, particularly in the 
case of WikiLeaks) and, moreover, that US policy was contributing to 
censorship of the internet in Iran. It was not until President Obama 
delivered his famous message for the Iranian New Year on 20 March 2012, 
when he asked Iranian leaders to bring down the ‘electronic curtain’ of 
censorship, that he promised to lift the sanctions that had disconnected 
Iranians from the internet. The tragedy is not just that the US govern-
ment had contributed to that ‘electronic curtain’, but rather that it was 
hypocritically trying to ‘help’ Iranians to break free of the government 
at a time when US economic sanctions were making the Iranian people 
more dependent than ever on the Iranian regime (parallel to the situation 
in Iraq). US sanctions threaten the livelihoods and health of the Iranian 
people, but at least, thanks to the US government’s generosity, they could 
access Google+. President Obama promised that, despite objections from 
the Iranian government, the US would launch a Virtual Embassy that 
would bring ‘Iranians information they cannot access from their own 
government-controlled media, ranging from world news to facts on US 
policy and culture’. As Ben Rhodes, the deputy national security adviser 
for strategic communications and speech-writing, commented, the next 
step was to make easily available ‘software and services that Iranians 
have told us are essential in order to effectively use the Internet’ (2015; 
emphasis in original).
From the coup of 1953, and perhaps even before, there have been numerous 
attempts to provide Iranians with what they ‘need’ (Gasiorowski 2012, 
pp. 669–678). The policy of helping the Iranian people gained considerable 
traction after the popular politics against the ‘stolen election’ of 2009 in 
what became known as the Green Movement. For example, in January 2010 
the Wall Street Journal reported that the US government was searching 
for ways to support the Iranian opposition. In an article entitled ‘U.S. 
Shifts Iran Focus to Support Opposition’, Jay Solomon suggested that the 
government was considering new sanctions that would target individuals 
and institutions in Iran directly involved in suppressing dissent in the 
country. It was also reported that although Obama was not considering 
regime change, ‘Washington remains committed to a dual-track approach 
of pursuing dialogue aimed at ending Iran’s nuclear program while applying 
increasing f inancial pressure if the talks fail’ (Solomon 2015). Eighteen 
months later, the hint for the ‘Iranians’ to tell ‘us’ what was essential for 
them came in two interviews that Hillary Clinton gave to BBC Persian and 
Voice of America (VoA) in October 2011. In both interviews, she explicitly 
suggested that the US government would have supported the uprising in 
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Iran if people had asked for it.23 Around the same time, Kenneth Pollack 
of the Brookings Institution and Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council 
on Foreign Relations, argued in a joint article entitled ‘Doubling Down on 
Iran’ published in the Washington Quarterly that the dual-track policy of 
successive US administrations had failed and that the time had come to 
pressure Iran where it hurts most. In rethinking US strategy, they persisted 
in keeping the option of a ‘very limited military operation’ on the table, 
but insisted that policy-makers have to start breaking ‘old taboos – such 
as providing direct assistance to Iranian opposition groups’ (Pollack and 
Takeyh 2011, pp. 7–21). The strategy of ‘doubling down’ on Iran proposed by 
the authors had clear ‘cultural/technological’ elements. Connecting with the 
Green Movement (which by then had collapsed) was regarded a top priority, 
but the authors also pointed out that Iran is a place of labour, student, and 
ethnic minority protests, and while it is important for the CIA to be careful 
not to ‘fall into traps inevitably laid by Tehran’s own security forces at this 
point, it would be extremely productive to establish contact with Iranian 
opposition groups in hope of f inding out what the United States could do 
to help them’ (Pollack and Takeyh 2011, p. 16).
Such external ‘help’ is tied up with funding organizations and activi-
ties. Many of the initiatives involve media projects. In addition to the US 
government’s $36 million combined budget for two off icial US media 
channels, Radio Farda and VoA, various US institutions fund other media or 
cultural outlets, including TV channels and websites. It is hard to determine 
precisely how much is invested and where, but patterns of mismanage-
ment, abuse, and corruption have been reported.24 The point here is that 
communication technologies are not simply a force for opposition from 
below; they also facilitate attempts to direct opposition from above and 
from outside. What Pollack and Takeyh suggest could help the Iranian 
opposition and hurt the regime ‘lies in the overlapping areas of Internet 
freedom and information and cyber warfare’ (2011, p. 17). Helping to reopen 
internet services in Iran or trying to keep them open was one aspect of this 
policy; the other was to try to wrest control over information technology 
from the Iranian state.
23 For a trenchant critique of the US attempt and the complicity of some Iranian actors, see: 
Hamid Dabashi, ‘Fifth Column of the Postmodern Kind’, Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/opinion/2011/11/20111120132050412430.html.
24 For problems associated with VoA, see VOA PNN Watchdog, http://www. voapnnwatchdog.
com/; and for reports of f inancial irregularity associated with the National Iranian American 
Council, see National Endowment for Democracy, http://www. iranian-americans.com/docs/
NedReport.pdf.
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However, this involved not only platform politics but also cyber warfare. 
Iran has been the object of some of the f irst moves by Western powers in 
this new form of warfare, presaged in the early 1990s and made real in the 
aughts with the deployment of Stuxnet in 2009 (Giacobino et al. 2014, p. 3). 
In 2012 it was ranked highest of the ten most destructive computer viruses, 
described as ‘a cartoon villain come to life: it was the f irst computer virus 
designed specifically to cause damage in the real, as opposed to virtual, world’ 
(Weinberger 2012, quoted in Sreberny 2013).25 It is believed to have badly 
impeded Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme. The story of the US–Israel 
collaboration in developing Stuxnet is not denied by either state, but what is 
usually ignored is that the product of that collaboration was not one but three 
viruses: Stuxnet came first, followed by Flame and DUQU. Another ignored 
dimension is that while such attacks occur in the virtual realm, their damage 
is real and physical. Such cyberattacks were part of the ‘doubling down on 
Iran’ policy that has so far involved the killing of f ive nuclear scientists in 
Iran since 2007. Technological interventions have moved from creating and 
supporting a f ifth column in Iran to waging war in the f ifth domain – the 
other military operational domains are land, air, sea, and space.26
Barack Obama expanded the War on Terror and nurtured the security 
state even more than his predecessor. The Economist reported that he 
‘declared America’s digital infrastructure to be a “strategic national asset”’ 
(Giacobino et al. 2014, p. 3) and appointed Howard Schmidt, the former head 
of security at Microsoft, as his ‘cyber-security tsar’ (Giacobino et al. 2014, 
p. 3). The Economist also reported that
[i]n May [2010] the Pentagon set up its new Cyber Command (Cybercom) 
headed by General Keith Alexander, director of the National Security 
Agency (NSA). His mandate is to conduct ‘full-spectrum’ operations – to 
defend American military networks and attack other countries’ systems. 
Precisely how, and by what rules, is secret. (Giacobino et al. 2014, p. 3)
In addition, in July 2011 Reuters cited Deputy Defense Secretary William 
Lynn as saying that the Pentagon wants to avoid militarizing cyberspace, but 
will treat it as an ‘operational domain’ (Alexander 2011). However, as already 
indicated, US policy towards Iran has taken a turn for the worse under Trump.
25 Sharon Weinberger, ‘The top ten most-destructive computer viruses’, Online Resource: https://
www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/top-ten-most-destructive-computer-viruses-159542266/.
26 ‘War in the Fifth Domain: Are the Mouse and Keyboard the New Weapons of Conflict’, Online 
Resource: http://www.economist.com/node/16478792.
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2018 and the Current Political Upheaval
Nothing has shaken the regime more recently than the internal unrest that 
spread across numerous cities in the winter of 2017–2018, as popular concerns 
about the state of the economy, the environment, and indeed international 
affairs spilled onto the streets. This is ongoing. It also suggests that place 
still matters most.
During the late spring and summer 2018, there were sporadic protests 
around the country regarding water shortages, unpaid salaries, and severe 
currency depreciation. These show a new and different urban spatiality, 
away from major cities to smaller towns where there has historically been 
less investment and less economic activity. The current issues are less 
ideological and more economic and environmental. Iran was experienc-
ing its worst drought in recent history. There were severe water shortages 
and limits to accessibility; the famous Zayanderood River in Isfahan was 
completely dry, mocking its famous bridges, while Lake Urumieh almost 
disappeared. Electricity was frequently cut, cutting the internet, halting 
lifts, and disrupting air conditioning in a very hot summer (Kamali Deghan 
2018). These elements are the lived experience of Iranians inside the country, 
making them angry with an incompetent government that prefers foreign 
adventures to domestic investment. However, these also open up a gap 
with the diaspora, who do not experience such crises – or at least not in 
the same form.
In addition, there were some violent acts within the territory of Iran 
that raised the spectre of foreign-supported groups such as ISIS; however, 
and perhaps even more worrying for the Iranian state, an internal group, 
Ahwaz National Resistance, claimed responsibility.27
Conclusion
So where is Iran? What conclusions can we draw about the relevance of 
distance in contemporary national politics? We see Iran caught up in a 
vortex of international relations, including Putin’s instructions for Iran to 
leave Syria as well as Trump’s repudiation of JCPOA and his September 2018 
Twitter spat with Rouhani. The 2020 US election that voted Trump out 
may change these bilateral relations for the better. Nevertheless, for many 
27 ‘The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer’, Online Resource: http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.
com/2018/09/attack-in-iran-raises-spectre-of.html.
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Iranians these conflictual international relations are a diversion from the 
more pressing issues of domestic politics.
We see the emergence of stretched national publics, with Iranians inside 
and outside Iran sharing images, jokes, and political analyses. With the speed 
and immediacy of communications, dispersed populations can inhabit the 
‘same’ time frame. Yet, we also see that lived experiences inside and outside 
the country are very different, and a politics that emerges from everyday 
grievances may diverge from the more abstracted, more ideological positions 
of those further away. Similarly, while the state might have long arms, it 
also has powerfully short arms, and those within its immediate purview 
feel a much more severe repression than those outside.
Neither the state nor the nation is a singular entity; both have profound 
divisions. Everyday diff iculties inside Iran and vastly different diasporic 
lived experiences produce a psycho-cultural gap between Iranians outside 
and Iranians inside the territorial boundary of the country; even if for a 
moment, they (and the state) were all rooting for Team Melli.
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13. Mapping Genocide? Giving Visual 
Memory to Oral Culture
Sebastian Maisel
Abstract
Yezidi religion and history had been largely transmitted orally until the 
late 20th century due to the closeness, isolation, and marginalization 
of the community in their various home countries. It was the advent of 
digitization that sparked a radical switch and concurrent emergence of 
a new class of protagonists who used social media as a tool to theorize 
and generalize sacred knowledge. The new actors often do not belong to 
the traditional class of clergy in charge of preserving and transmitting 
this information. In this chapter, I argue that their use of social media 
to spread deliberate knowledge has contributed to the development of 
new forms of identity and loyalty among Yezidi groups in Syria and Iraq.
Keywords: Yezidi, genocide, new media, memory
In August 2014, the Yezidi community in Iraq endured yet another genocidal 
attack when the radical Islamist and terror organization ISIS targeted the 
community in the Sinjar Mountain region. The attack included mass killings, 
kidnapping and enslavement of women and children, forced exile, and the 
destruction and looting of property and sacred buildings. Because of the mag-
nitude of the event, the Yezidi community reacted differently to this attack 
than in the past. Yezidi activists, many of them women and survivors, broke 
with age-old customs, taboos, and traditions by publicly giving testimony to 
the atrocities and crimes committed against them. They did so by using their 
education and technological skills to promote their narratives. This story, 
which can be labelled ‘Victims seeking Justice’, reflects the transformation 
of Yezidi collective identity and the transmission of religious knowledge.
Yezidi religion and history have been largely transmitted orally until the 
late 20th century due to the closeness, isolation, and marginalization of the 
North Africa: Producing Space. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021
doi 10.5117/9789462989092_ch13
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community in their various home countries. A new class of protagonists 
emerged since the digital era reached the Yezidi community. They use social 
media as a tool to theorize and generalize sacred knowledge and social 
conventions. The new actors often do not belong to the traditional class of 
clergy or patriarchal community leaders, who used to be in charge of preserv-
ing and transmitting this information. Effectively, we note an increased 
exposure to sacred knowledge as well as a reinterpretation of social dogmas by 
unorthodox scholars, activists, intellectuals, and politicians. In this chapter, 
I argue that their use of social media to spread deliberate knowledge has 
contributed to the development of new forms of identity and loyalty among 
Yezidi groups in Syria and Iraq. The Sinjar genocide accelerated this process.
Methodology
The main objective of this chapter is to understand how the visualization 
of survivors’ memories spark social change. I will do this by discussing the 
relationship between social change, collective identity, and the production 
and circulation of both sacred and profane knowledge. This process traces the 
mapping of indigenous geographies, which is viewed as a means to establish 
new levels of authority and legitimacy within the Yezidi community.
Sources evaluated for this study include interviews with Yezidis from 
different social and religious groups, educational levels, and regional back-
grounds. In addition to the oral narratives, official Iraqi, Syrian, German, and 
Yezidi documents from governmental and private archives were analysed to 
supplement the empirical data. In addition, several other mapping projects 
with Yezidi collaborators, to which the author contributed, will be introduced 
in this chapter.
Aside from ethnographic methods of inquiry such as participant ob-
servation or key informant interviews, this chapter also relies on social 
media practices and technologies as part of the f ieldwork. In addition to 
the mapping project, popular social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook, 
and YouTube were accessed to communicate with distant informants, 
retrieve otherwise inaccessible data, and observe Yezidi practices of self-
representation. Especially when informants and localities are located in 
areas of war and conflict, thus making it impossible to conduct traditional 
f ieldwork, researchers refer to online sources. With the spread of technolo-
gies such as mobile phones and computers, the target community is more 
capable of sharing unfiltered and live information. For the distant analyst 
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and observer, the raw material, documents, f ilms, images, and other items 
become primary sources of high importance.
In case of the Yezidis, the number of primary sources prior to digitization 
was extremely small. However, over the past decade, Yezidis from all areas 
have gained access to various technologies and have used them vigorously 
to share f iles, photos, messages, and other information with each other 
and the rest of the world. Following the guidelines and recommendations 
of Hine (2008) as well as Poster and Pink (2012), the data was used to shape 
the opinion of the author and the argument of this chapter.
Introduction
To depict emerging social hierarchies, this chapter will highlight the shift 
in transmitting sacred and profane knowledge among the Yezidis using new 
tools and technologies at home and abroad in times of crisis.
The Yezidis, like other indigenous ancient religious and ethnic com-
munities in northern Mesopotamia, have been described in hierarchical, 
segmented terms. Their religious structure is def ined by the separation 
between clerics and laypeople. Most Yezidis support the idea of identify-
ing with Kurdish origin and ethnicity, while some prefer a distinct Yezidi 
ancestry as a unique ethno-religious group. Spatially, the community is 
divided among several host countries including Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Armenia, 
Georgia, and the diaspora in Europe and North America.
Throughout history, they have been exposed to numerous periods of 
upheaval and instability. But since the time of nation-building in the Middle 
East after World War I, Yezidis have experienced periods of intense, large-
scale population upheavals, often involuntarily due to forced displacement, 
ethnic and religious violence, and government interventions, some of which 
can be described as genocide. This study aims to investigate how recent 
events such as war, genocide, political change, and the promotion of specif ic 
identities have 1) affected the traditional Yezidi communities directly; 2) 
impacted gender roles; and 3) created new hierarchies based on the applica-
tion of new digital media.
Traditional Yezidi Society
Religious authority within Yezidi society is concentrated in the hands of a 
few hereditary families who also represent the two main clerical castes of 
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Sheikh and Pir. This system of authority was reformed in the twelfth century 
by Sheikh Adi bin Musafir, a historic f igure with strong connections to Sufi 
Islam. Prior to his arrival in the Hakkari Mountains, where the community 
lived, they already practised a proto form of Yezidism that incorporated 
elements of sun worship and likely Zoroastrianism. A group of religious 
leaders, the Pirs, stood above the general population of laypeople. Sheikh 
Adi added another group of clerics, the Sheikhs, and prescribed distinct 
marriage and interaction rules known as sed u hed. These rules define Yezidi 
society along three distinct groups, sometimes called castes, which were not 
permitted to intermarry and which were to guide and instruct each other. 
The descendants of Sheikh Adi have maintained political leadership over 
the community to the present day.
Little is known about the various Yezidi communities during the Ottoman 
Empire other that they lived secretive, reclusive lives at the periphery of 
society. Ottoman court records, French missionary reports, and British 
travellers’ accounts, however, depict a community life similar to that of 
Sheikh Adi’s time. They chose to live on the fringes away from the urban 
centre because of the continual discrimination by their Muslim neighbours, 
which resulted in mass killings, deportations, forced conversions, enslave-
ment, and general destruction of their livelihood. The reports, however, 
also talk about the preservation of ancient customs (sed u hed) and unique 
religious convictions. Similar to their Muslim Kurdish neighbours, the Yezidis 
maintained a patriarchal, tribal family structure, which was economically 
based on farming and animal husbandry. In contrast to their Muslim neigh-
bours, Yezidi communities made efforts not to integrate or assimilate with 
mainstream Ottoman, Kurdish, or Arab lifestyles. Instead, they favoured 
disassociation and avoiding cultural and/or religious exchange to a degree 
that the Yezidis in Sheikhan and Sinjar were known for their illiteracy. The 
leadership decided it was more beneficial for the community not to allow 
Islamic education to be spread among them. They argued that it was better to 
have no education than to be affected by Muslim da’wa (‘proselytizing’) and 
the kuttab (Koran schools). Thus, knowledge was concentrated in the hands 
of a few learned men while the rest of the community remained unexposed 
to religious (including Yezidism) and secular education until World War I.
With the establishment of nation states, which focused on nation-building 
through public education, the Yezidi communities in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria 
were no longer able to withhold their children from mandatory attendance 
at schools, where they were often forced to participate in Islamic educa-
tion. Since the Yezidis were not recognized as an autonomous millet (an 
autonomous religious or ethnic community in the Ottoman Empire), they 
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were not granted special treatment and ownership of their religious affairs 
and education. This also enabled governments to extend conscription laws to 
the Yezidis, which the community strongly opposed. Their motto of survival 
was still disengagement at all costs, and the community leadership in Iraq 
tried everything to avoid nationalistic, sectarian, or political conflicts.
The situation in Syria was less tense because the Yezidi community there 
was much smaller and already deeply embedded in the Kurdish sector 
(Maisel 2017). There was even a certain degree of tolerance towards the 
Yezidis, especially in the Efrin region, where Yezidi settlements can be 
traced back to the sixteenth century. Thus, the policies of anti-educational 
disengagement did not apply here. On the contrary, Yezidi community leaders 
such as Darwish Shamo actively pursued religious and secular education in 
their villages. In 1925, Shamo opened the f irst Yezidi School in the village of 
Qibare, and a Yezidi teacher from Iraq was hired to teach, among other topics, 
Yezidi religion. The minority-friendly attitudes of the French mandate powers 
allowed this to happen. When Syrian nationalists took over Syria after the 
country had become independent, Yezidism was no longer a permitted topic 
to teach. This and the physical disconnect from the main Yezidi territories 
in Iraq led to the formation of a diverse Yezidi identity in Syria – one that 
saw a decreased influence of clerics over community and identity-building 
measures. This void was often f illed by educated laypeople, a process that 
has continued to the present day. Moreover, with the current political and 
demographic changes in Rojava (the Kurdish territories in Syria), such as 
the rise of the PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat) and the establishment of 
self-autonomy, there might be greater changes for the Yezidi community 
in Syria and their role in shaping the future society.
New Gender Roles
In all Yezidi territories, including among the diaspora communities, gender 
roles have transformed. The traditional model of the patriarchal family is 
still widely accepted, but the recent experiences in Syria and Iraq, both 
traumatic and positive, pushed for a bigger role for Yezidi women in com-
munity life. The religious sphere, however, is less affected, and women are 
still largely excluded from it. Traditionally, they have played a minor role in 
the transmission of sacred knowledge. While Yezidi women have to select 
two female spiritual mentors (Sheikh and Pir) and a sister in the hereafter, 
these functions are largely passive. The only important role Yezidi women 
play in the religious landscape is a supportive one during weddings and 
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funerals, where they often contribute with laments, traditional hymns, 
and other songs.
As such, very few historic female role models could have inspired Yezidi 
women to seek a more active role in social and religious life. Certainly, until 
the end of the 20th century, they were stuck in the traditional, patriarchal 
society where they had specif ic obligations and functions to fulf il. Seeking 
education, either secular or religious, was not one of those tasks. Some Yezidi 
women gained wider popularity throughout history mainly because of their 
political or social activism. They include the Grand Dame of Yezidism, Mayan 
Khatun, and some other female members of the Mir family. However, since 
the outbreak of the Kurdish national struggle and the limited involvement 
of Yezidi organizations, more Yezidi women from various backgrounds 
have used this platform to present a new image of Yezidi womanhood. In 
particular, the role Kurdish Yezidi women play in the PKK (Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistanê) as politicians, f ighters, activists, or supporters is noteworthy. 
The area of operation covered the Yezidi territories in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, 
and the fallen members were always honoured and held in high esteem. A 
small number of Yezidi women from Turkey and Syria were among them. 
The number of Yezidi female f ighters increased during the early years of 
the Syrian civil war, when many joined the Women’s Protection or Defense 
Units YPJ (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin) in the battle against ISIS and other radical 
Islamic groups. Others joined the Asayish police force or the autonomous 
self-administration in high-ranking positions. The PYD has a women quota 
and a female co-chair, and similarly, Syrian Yezidi women became involved 
in the local politics of Rojava. Especially in the Efrin Canton, Yezidi women’s 
organizations are particularly active and successful in promoting women’s 
rights, the Yezidi religion, and the Kurdish national struggle. They use social 
media to connect and organize events and spread awareness among the 
general Kurdish population as well as the Yezidi diaspora.
The general access to the internet and availability of computers and more 
so of mobile phones have contributed much to enabling Yezidi women in 
Syria and Iraq to communicate their side of the story to a widespread and 
international audience. While they may be semi-analphabet, they know how 
to use technology to better connect and communicate with each other. The 
live newsfeeds from Mount Sinjar were crucial in shaping public Western 
opinion about getting involved and starting the air rescue campaign. Many 
Yezidi women were able to hide their mobile phones in ISIS captivity and 
convey messages and coordinates to their families. Moreover, while the 
past massacres against the Yezidis went almost unnoticed, the latest one 
was brought directly into the living rooms of the entire world by television. 
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The Yezidis f inally caught the world’s attention, but the consequences 
were brutal. While the Western world started a campaign to free some two 
hundred abducted Nigerian pupils, the number of kidnapped and enslaved 
Yezidi women and children reached almost ten thousand. Over the past three 
years, about half were eventually rescued, freed, ransomed, or managed to 
escape, which still leaves several thousand in ISIS captivity.
ISIS’s campaign against the Yezidis has been qualif ied as genocide.1 It 
follows a common pattern as the genocides in Armenia, Bosnia, or Rwanda: 
forced conversions, separation of men and women and children, mass execu-
tion of men above twelve, enslavement of young women and children, 
looting and destruction of property, and training and indoctrination of 
young Yezidi boys in ISIS camps.
Moreover, while ISIS indiscriminately and brutally attacks Sunnis, Shias, 
Druze, and Christians, they make special efforts to eliminate the Yezidis.2 
It must be noted, however, that this is not a new phenomenon. Intolerant 
and violent attitudes among the Muslim population in northern Iraq were 
observed long before the August 2014 attacks. ISIS is just the latest addition 
to the group of anti-Yezidi perpetrators. What is new is the methodology, 
justif ication, and technology of the genocide. ISIS is very transparent about 
their intentions and goals, one of which is the eradication of Yezidis from 
the area.
In their off icial publication, Dabiq, self-styled ISIS clerics try to explain 
the Islamic rationale that justif ies the sexual enslavement of women from 
communities determined to be of ‘pagan’ or ‘polytheistic’ origin. Here, ISIS 
speaks of greater efforts to exterminate Yezidis; differentiates between 
People of the Book, apostates, and polytheists (Yezidis); justif ies the enslave-
ment of polytheist women as a custom of the early Muslim community; and 
describes the ‘benefits’ of having a relationship with a slave women over a 
prostitute (Dabiq 2015, pp. 14–17). A female ISIS writer providing scriptural 
and historic justif ication for the term saby (‘female captive’) further clarif ied 
this (Dabiq 2015, pp. 45–49). In addition, ISIS released a Q & A memorandum 
detailing the interaction with and treatment of the sabaya.3 Finally, ISIS 
f ighters and supporters use social media to share their experiences. At one 
1 See the report ‘They Came to Destroy – ISIS Crimes Against the Yezidis’, published by the 
UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Syria at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf.
2 While Christians were given three options by ISIS – to convert, to leave, or to pay a special 
head tax – Yezidis had to choose between conversion and execution.
3 ‘Islamic State (ISIS) Releases Pamphlet On Female Slaves’, 4 December 2014, http://www.
memrijttm.org/islamic-state-isis-releases-pamphlet-on-female-slaves.html#_edn1.
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point, it was reported that Yezidi women were sold online, and manuals 
and flyers of appropriate customer behaviour were circulated.
Considering the traditional character of Yezidi society, with their unique 
interpretation of honour and shame, one could assume that the crimes 
committed against Yezidi women would tarnish their reputation, and that 
they would not be allowed to return to their communities. This was the 
common reaction to similar incidents prior to the Sinjar massacre. Yezidi 
women have been kidnapped, converted to Islam, and married off to Muslim 
men in the past, and their ties with their Yezidi families were frequently 
completely severed (Kreyenbroek 2009, pp. 40–45 and pp. 50–55). However, 
despite the massive group and individual trauma, the community reacted 
differently in this case and welcomed back the women freed from ISIS 
captivity. Moreover, while the Yezidi religious leadership with the Mir, the 
Baba Sheikh, and the Spiritual Council have been rather silent or perhaps 
overwhelmed and paralyzed by the atrocities, they did make one important 
public announcement: the off icial and religious embracing of the Yezidi 
women into the community with special blessings, baptisms, and off icial 
decrees.
Yezidi women themselves, however, were the real activists for Yezidi 
women, refugees, and justice. Often traumatized survivors, they reached 
out to the world to publicize their horrif ic stories in an act of def iance 
towards traditional values and customs. Talking about rape and other sexual 
crimes used to be taboo; however, sharing their stories was not only an act 
of great personal courage but also ignited a campaign to raise awareness of 
the crimes and awareness of the great number of women still held captive 
by ISIS. Many Yezidi men have been killed, but Yezidi women continue to 
live with the ordeal, and some Yezidi women use social media to advocate 
for them. With this increased publicity, they have taken on new leadership 
roles in the community, certainly not in a religious capacity, but with great 
impact on gender roles and hierarchies within Yezidi society.
Vian Dakhil is the most prominent among these women activists. A 
member of the Iraqi parliament and from an upper-class family in Sinjar, 
she has used her elevated position to raise awareness about the genocide 
inside Iraq and around the world. Other women, such as Nadia Murad, Lamia 
Bashar, and Farida Khalaf, are survivors of ISIS sexual slavery.4 By bravely 
sharing their experiences with the world, they broke taboos and the barriers 
of ignorance and social hierarchies. Bari Ibrahim is a Yezidi advocate from 
the diaspora group, and she has managed to raise awareness and aid for the 
4 Murad and Khalaf both published their accounts 2017.
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community in Sinjar. These f ive women symbolize the new Yezidi woman 
who represents the community from within and to the world.
Building New Hierarchies
Before August 2014, Yezidi society in Iraq was known for its strict religious 
observances, marriage rules, and patriarchies. As mentioned earlier, secular 
education did not spread among the villages until the 1960s. Furthermore, a 
religious education for the masses had not even started yet (with exceptions 
in the diaspora). It was only in the 1970s when young Yezidi academics (from 
religious families) started to collect oral histories and texts with the aim of 
releasing them and spreading the information among the Yezidi masses. 
Pir Khidr Suleyman and Khalil Jindy from Iraq, and Celil and Celile from 
Armenia, were among those pioneers who recorded the f irst poems, hymns, 
psalms, and religious chants and later transcribed and translated them 
(Celil and Celile 1978; Suleyman and Jindy 1979). With increasing publication 
opportunities, these texts eventually made it into the f irst textbooks on the 
Yezidi religion. However, they were not allowed to be used in Syrian, Turkish, 
or Iraqi schools, so it was left for the diaspora community to organize the 
f irst lessons in Yezidism. Yezidis in Germany were also among the f irst to 
publish newspapers, journals, and books in the 1990s when Yezidi studies 
was still in its infancy. The writers, publishers, organizers, and activists 
mainly belonged to the laypeople’s caste, the mirid. Frequently, the clergy 
debunked, criticized, and rejected these works. However, in groundbreaking 
work, this new, second generation of Yezidi emigrants opened up the debate 
and included various stakeholders, including women, youth, and laypeople.
Two other facts contributed to the formation of a new leadership: f irst, 
their higher educational level and media savviness, and second, the absence 
of a new generation of active clergy. Thus, the new leaders f illed a gap and 
provided the community with long sought-after answers to their identity 
struggle. As such and for the f irst time, Yezidis were reimagining their life 
and religion with input from the entire socio-religious spectrum. Religious 
instruction and intellectual debate were no longer restricted to a particular 
group, but allowed for the inclusion of every member of Yezidi society.
Eventually, this debate travelled back to the home countries, where new 
political realities helped the Yezidi communities to receive this message with 
open minds. Increased technological connectivity as well as increased mobil-
ity triggered a vibrant dialogue among the different geographical regions, 
generations, and religious castes, including attempts to ‘highjack’ certain 
292 SEbAStiAN MAiSEl 
religious dogmas or rituals and other attempts to disqualify nonconformist 
communities and opinions. While each side held their own conferences 
and meetings, it was in the online world where they were able to meet and 
discuss directly, including in forums, blogs, news sites, and social media.
Mapping the New Yezidi World
Both Arab and Kurdish nationalists have used maps as an instrument of op-
pression. In their discourse to instrumentalize the Yezidis, they have relied on 
other forms of (mis)representation such as the census and museums. Benedict 
Anderson singles out maps as instruments of power that profoundly shaped 
the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion – the nature of 
the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of 
its ancestry (Anderson 2006, pp. 163–164). In the new Yezidi world – the one 
after genocide – Yezidis have turned the tools against the former master. Now, 
Yezidis use maps and other forms of representation to self-consciously control 
their discourse and define their domain. Like other indigenous peoples, they 
try to reverse histories and geographies of dispossession and discrimination, 
establishing what Coombes calls ‘indigenous histories and geographies’ to re-
conceptualize their participation and action (Coombes et al. 2014, pp. 845–854).
It appears that the Yezidi attempts to do that reveal several underlying 
trends. The current Yezidi media landscape reflects the political, spiritual, 
and social division among the many Yezidi communities in the homeland 
and in the diaspora. Although we have noted a process of reimagining Yezidi 
theology and a concurrent, ongoing debate over values and dogmas, this has 
not translated into the emergence of a unified Yezidi identity. Political calcu-
lations, strategic considerations, economic interests, and power struggles have 
made it impossible for the minority to rally behind a common goal. Instead, 
competing geographical backgrounds and party aff iliations dominate the 
daily discourse. Each interest group has access to and is represented by 
influential media outlets, which diligently report one-sided stories and 
accusations, and claim the sole status of representation and victimhood.
Various inf luential outlets are omnipresent in today’s Yezidi media 
landscape; among the most popular are two sites that operate from within 
the Yezidi homeland: Bahzani5 and Lalishduhok.6 Both sites are, however, 
extremely partial to Yezidi events inside Iraq and only rarely report on affairs 
5 www.bahzani.net.
6 www.lalishduhok.com.
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from Syria or the diaspora, and never from Armenia. Lalishduhok is also the 
mother company for well-known Yezidi journals and newspapers, including 
Majallat Lalish, Denge Lalish, and some other publications by local branches 
of the Lalish Cultural Centre, which receives most of its funding from the 
KDP (Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê). The small number of printed hard 
copies is now substituted by a complete and free online version.
A recent addition to the online news sites is Ezidipress, which was 
established after the August 2014 attacks and which established itself in 
the f ield due to its in-depth, less partisan reporting from all geographical 
and social angles of Yezidism. The people working at Ezidipress are mostly 
young professionals with little religious background but a sincere interest 
in those topics. The fact that Ezidipress has off ices and staff in all Yezidi 
territories contributes to the positive popular opinion of the agency.
The diaspora community is largely at odds with itself, or to be more 
precise, the diaspora organizations are divided and have failed to reach 
a consensus on religious, political, and social issues. They have also been 
unable to unify under one central organization. In Germany, for example, 
Yezidis congregate in small, local associations and try to trump the others 
in political activism, aide campaigns, and media representation. However, 
their activities mostly cancel each other out. When each organization tries to 
organize a meeting (and picture) with the German chancellor Angela Merkel 
and gain political and f inancial support from the German government, the 
results are negligible.
However, efforts are made by Yezidi organizations in the homeland and 
abroad to use digital media to their advantage because they recognize the 
broad audience they can reach. In the following, I would like to introduce 
three mapping projects in which apps, social media, GIS data, and other 
solutions are used to enhance the understanding of Yezidi history and 
religiosity.
Mapping Historic Genocides
The f irst project started on 15 August 2014, immediately following the f irst 
attacks on Sinjar. A team of journalists, academics, and activists described 
the long-lasting history of anti-Yezidi genocides and the fact that the current 
one was a continuation of these repeated attacks. Through interactive maps 
and infographics, the visualization traces those attacks back to the twelfth 
century. It also shows the usual Yezidi response to the attacks, which is to 
migrate to nearby or distant areas of safety. By doing so, they have often 
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established permanent homes in new territories and had to abandon their 
former, ancestral homeland.
The collaboration with a major US newspaper allowed for more vis-
ibility of the Yezidi discourse of discrimination and migration. The Yezidi 
community in the United States is still small: perhaps two thousand indi-
viduals. However, as Krajeski (2018) shows, reaching out to the strongest 
political and military power in the world created positive connections 
and responses. The decision by the Obama administration to rescue the 
Yezidis from Sinjar Mountain and to bomb ISIS positions is one of these 
immediate benef its.
The other outcome of this project was for the Yezidi community to 
contextualize their multilayered history and identity. One of the main 
obstacles to the development of a strong, unif ied Yezidi identity is the 
distribution of Yezidi communities across a number of countries. Here, the 
community reflects on the notion of a sacred homeland and the loss of it 
due to the continual impositions of their enemies. It also helps to establish a 
geographical depository of former and current Yezidi locations, which allows 
the community to appreciate their geographical diversity and historic depth.
Mapping Yezidi Territory
The second project is a collaboration between Yezidi activists and scholars 
from Turkey, Syria, and Iraq with the goal of mapping local Yezidi migration 
in eastern Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia. This multilayered outcome 
illustrates where Yezidi communities used to live in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq 
at specif ic points in history: 1832, 1892, 1918, 1961, 1975, 1992, 2007, and 2014. 
These dates coincide with major attacks on the Yezidi communities and 
subsequent population movements. The f inal graph shows which com-
munities moved into the former Yezidi territories.
Since the days of independence of their nation states, the ancient com-
munities in the borderland between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have experienced 
periods of large-scale population movement, often involuntarily due to 
displacement, ethnic and religious violence, and government interventions. 
Under the new circumstances, with the rise of radical Islamist movements, 
the Yezidi community and other minority groups will be forced out of their 
traditional spaces, which ultimately will lead to a remodelling of the region’s 
identity landscape.
The mapping of Yezidi migration is signif icant because it identif ies the 
former and current population development in an understudied area, and 
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it will ultimately increase our understanding of the region’s ethno-religious 
diversity. The project aims to trace former and recent Yezidi communities 
in their homeland and the diaspora by mapping routes of migration and 
identifying causes and consequences of the movement. It highlights the 
ongoing process of de-territorialization and identity transformation of the 
Yezidi community.
Mapping Mass Graves
This project run by Yazda, a Yezidi NGO in Iraq (unaff iliated with the 
religious and political leaders), uses satellite and GIS data in addition to 
local oral sources to locate and identify mass graves around Mount Sinjar.
It was estimated that 3100 Yezidis were killed during the attacks, with 
nearly half of them executed and the other half dying on Mount Sinjar 
because of the ISIS siege (Cetorelli et al. 2017). Those who were executed (shot, 
beheaded, or burned alive) were largely males, but many females – especially 
older females – were among the victims too. Survivors reported mass execu-
tions in many Yezidi villages on both the northern and southern sides of the 
mountain. After the areas were liberated from ISIS occupation, those reports 
helped in locating the grave sites. However, technology such as drones and 
satellite images were needed to physically f ind the exact locations, because 
the graves have been ploughed over. They were left for three years, and some 
areas were further damaged during the military campaigns.
Yazda composed a detailed, interactive map with the location of the sites 
and information about the victims in an effort to document the genocide 
against the Yezidi community. Their focus included the collection of survivor 
testimonies, the identif ication of mass graves in the Sinjar region, and the 
recording of the physical destruction of Yezidi material culture and towns 
to try to prevent them from returning to their homelands and effectively 
erase their presence from the region. The stated objective was to preserve 
the memory of what befell the Yezidi community, preserve knowledge 
about Yezidi culture as it existed in Sinjar prior to the attempted genocide, 
provide the international community with a detailed and accurate account 
of the genocide, and collect evidence of crimes against the Yezidis in the 
effort to secure genocide recognition for the Yezidi case (Yazda 2016, p. 3).
The project is ongoing as more grave sites are discovered. As of now, 68 
mass graves have been identif ied. Efforts to secure and investigate the sites 
are underway, and survivor accounts from all Yezidi groups and castes are 
being collected and analysed.
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ISIS Usage of Technology to Enslave Yezidis
It should be mentioned here that ISIS, too, is very competent in using up-
to-date media technologies. They have used devices, technology, and social 
media to recruit new members, to reach out to their constituency and the 
larger world, and to sell and trade Yezidi sex slaves. The latter have been the 
focus of this chapter: ISIS members are thought to have used WhatsApp or 
Telegram to post portfolios of Yezidis girls, women, and families in order to 
trade or sell them to other ISIS members. The Associated Press reported on 
these accounts: a girl for sale is ‘Virgin. Beautiful. 12 years old […] Her price 
has reached $12,500 and she will be sold soon’ (Hinhant et al. 2016). They also 
viewed an advertisement on WhatsApp for a mother with a three-year-old 
and a seven-month-old baby, with a price of $3700. ‘She wants her owner 
to sell her’, read the posting, followed by a photo (Hinnant et al. 2017). 
Apparently, ISIS maintains a thorough database with a photograph of the 
Yezidi women and information about their owners. This knowledge can be 
shared among other ISIS members who want to purchase a Yezidi slave or 
who work at the checkpoints, preventing the Yezidis from escaping. The usage 
of encrypted apps cannot be prevented; Yezidi activists trying to liberate 
the women can only monitor these transactions. However, sometimes they 
manage to ‘win’ an auction and pay the ransom to free their women.
Conclusion
Technology has had a massive impact on the life and culture of the Yezidis. It 
has affected their communication, representation, education, and interaction 
with the non-Yezidi world. As shown in these examples and the arguments 
brought forward in this chapter, the approach to seeking knowledge in 
Yezidism has changed dramatically away from a discriminative, elitist process 
towards a mass culture of learners and contributors. Concurrently, the oral 
nature of the sacred knowledge has been altered and scripturized, reflecting 
a higher standard of education and higher awareness of religious topics. This 
supports the process of reimagining religiosity and historiographies, as it gives 
voice to previously ignored or silenced groups such as youth, women, and 
laypeople. Ultimately, this will lead to a transformation of social and religious 
structures. Allison claims that ‘Yezidism will change from an oral religion of 
orthopraxy to a scriptural religion of orthodoxy’ (2001, p. 50). However, the 
current process of transformation will extend beyond the religious realm.
New media and technology have triggered the changing of gender and 
generation roles as well as larger processes of identity building within the 
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Yezidi community. Apps and maps help the Yezid community to recover 
from trauma and the disruption of their livelihood. They recreate an image 
of the past, provide assistance, increase communication, and develop new 
norms and standards.
Additionally, as a by-product, tools have been created to better safeguard 
the community from future harm, as these mapping tools have increased 
our knowledge of how previous attacks were orchestrated. These tools may 
also help prevent future attacks as they visualize the spatial conditions 
and circumstances on the ground that have allowed the attacks to occur.
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Around the globe, colonized nations and indigenous peoples make use of 
colonial photography of the nineteenth and early 20th century to provide 
documentation of oppression, slavery, and extinction, as well as of resist-
ance and survival. In Iraqi Kurdish nationalist discourse, for example, 
this mode of representation can be observed from the 1960s and the f irst 
Kurdish modern guerrilla war. The digital age has multiplied the pos-
sibilities of translocating knowledge and has promoted Kurdish national 
aspirations for a nation state. Yet, this chapter will show that colonial 
images of the Kurdish bodies and of Kurdistan’s geography still have use 
value in identity discourses shaped by the aid of social media and mobile 
media, which bears witness to the simultaneity of modes of representation.
Keywords: Youtube, Kurdistan, cultural memory, nation
Marx wrote in 1852 that women and men ‘make their own history, but 
they do not make it as they please; […] but under circumstances existing 
already, given and transmitted from the past’ (1972, p. 115). As Marx is still 
popular in Kurdish nationalist discourse, at least among its left wing,1 I 
will take him as a point of departure to discuss aspects of nationalist space 
production in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Herêm-î Kurdistan), or as the 
Kurds alternatively call it, South Kurdistan (Kurdistan-î başûr). However, this 
1 Recently, Capital has been translated from Persian into Kurdish Sorani; to this day, Kurdish 
leftists, at least in Iraq, have relied on the Arabic or Persian translations.
Strohmaier, A. and A. Krewani (eds.), Media and Mapping Practices in the Middle East and North 
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chapter more or less leaves aside the conflicts over new borders established 
by the Kurdish movement, as well as over resources (oil, gas, and water, for 
example) and political power that usually preoccupy studies on Kurdistan 
in Iraq (Stansf ield 2003; Natali 2010; Zedalis 2012). Instead, this chapter 
predominantly deals with the discursive side of space-making and with 
representations of history and geography in discourses on Kurdish identity.
This chapter will f irst expound the problems of Kurdistan in geography 
– that is, ‘the Kurds’ place’ in metageographies (Lewis and Wigen 1997), 
on the one hand, and Kurdish representations challenging the hegemonic 
geographical order, on the other. The second section will provide some notes 
on the issue of colonialism in the context of Kurdistan, and it will shed light on 
the colonial heritage in imaginations of Kurdistan and the Kurds, shifting the 
analytical perspective from the ‘perceived’ to the ‘conceived space’ (Lefebvre 
1991). In the third section, I will discuss a YouTube video representing a Kurd-
ish anthem as well as photographic documents of Kurdish revolts between 
1918 and 1991. The discussion aims to identify and contextualize imaginations 
of geography and history in this particular discourse. The question is to what 
extent cultural heritage and colonial knowledge are constructed as opposition 
or to what extent these different corpora of ‘substantive assertions and ideas’ 
to ‘act on the world’ (Barth 2002, p. 2) become harmonized to conceive of 
Kurdistan as a geographical entity of historical legitimacy. The discussion will 
exemplify how those constraints resulting from pre-existing circumstances 
structure practices of representation. It will become clear that the specif ic 
experience of European as well as of internal colonialism in the context of 
Kurdistan resulted in an ambivalent relationship to European colonialism and 
its respective discourses ‘to tame’ the unfamiliar Oriental (Said 2003, p. 54).
Metageography and Dissident Geography
The number of Kurds in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, 
Caucasus, Central Asia,2 and the diaspora in Europe varies between 36 and 
45 million, depending on sources such as off icial state censuses, assess-
ments of human rights groups, or international organizations such as the 
European Commission. In their homeland, Kurds make up approximately 
85 per cent of the population.3 The problems of assessments in terms of 
2 For Kurds in the Caucasus and for deportations to Central Asia, see Müller 2000.
3 See: http://www.institutkurde.org/en/info/the-kurdish-population-1232551004 (last accessed 
17 November 2020).
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numbers predominantly result from politics of marginalization, oppres-
sion, and cultural assimilation pursued by the Iranian, Turkish, Iraqi, and 
Syrian states since their respective independence. In Turkey, for example, 
the existence of Kurds has been denied for many decades, whereas state 
politics in Iraq involved the vague acceptance of cultural difference to the 
Arab main population as well as genocidal persecution.4 In contrast to the 
statistical numbers and the relatively compact territory of settlement, Kurds 
are labelled ‘minority’ not only in the administrative logic of the states where 
they live but also in international political and academic imaginations of the 
MENA region. The term ‘minority’ is deeply embedded in legal discourses 
on the protection and rights of non-dominant groups within states, defined 
in terms of nation, ethnicity, religion, language, and/or indigeneity. Yet, the 
definition of majorities and minorities depends on scale (Derichs 2017, p. 35) 
as well as on the system of reference; namely, the geographical order of the 
world. Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen argue that there is a ‘set of spatial 
structures through which people order their knowledge of the world: the 
often unconscious frameworks that organize studies of history, sociology, 
anthropology, economics, political science, or even natural history’ (1997, 
p. ix). They call these imaginations about the segmentation of the world 
into continents, subcontinents, world regions, and states ‘metageographies’. 
These frameworks, however, are the result of historical processes – namely, 
capitalism, colonialism, and nation-building – and at the same time these 
frames persist due to geopolitical power relations, normalization, and educa-
tion; the prevailing Eurocentrism inherent to knowledge production; and 
the authoritative ‘myth of the nation state’ (Lewis and Wigen 1997, p. 7). 
From my perspective, it is striking that despite the constructivist turn in 
studies on nations and nationalism and the canonic status of Benedict 
Anderson’s Imagined Communities, inquiry in social science and the hu-
manities continues to rely on internationally recognized nation states as a 
system of reference. Consequently, when ‘minorities’ manage to establish 
command over areas of their settlement, these territories are still conceived 
of as anomalous, if not as a security problem or threat to the regional order 
(Nolutshungu 1996; Caspersen and Stansf ield 2011).
One such ‘anomaly’ is the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. This administratively 
and politically semi-independent unit is f irst and foremost the outcome of 
a decades-long struggle of the Kurdish movement, a movement that is in 
itself heterogeneous and conflictual, and at the same time transnationally 
entangled with strands of the Kurdish movement in Turkey, Syria, and 
4 For an overview of Kurdish history, see McDowall 1996.
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Iran. Governed by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) since 1992, the 
territory comprises 73,000 spare kilometres, making up 20 per cent of Iraqi 
territory. The borders of the region are disputed, under constant pressure, 
and subject to military conflict. These borders, however, are the result of the 
Kurdish uprising in March 1991 and the events that followed in that spring: 
brutal repression of the revolt by the Iraqi regime, international humanitar-
ian intervention, establishment of a no-flight zone under predominantly 
US protection, and negotiations between the Kurdish parties and the Iraqi 
regime (Cook 1995). In May 1992, the Kurds elected their own parliament and 
constituted the Kurdistan Region, whose borders coincide more or less with 
the borders of the governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniya. During 
the war of 2003, which led to the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, and during 
the war against the Islamic State since 2014, the Kurds have expanded their 
territory. In September 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government held a 
referendum for independence with more than 90 per cent of the votes cast 
agreeing to separation from Iraq. The Iraqi central government, as well as 
Iran and Turkey reacted promptly with embargo, political isolation of the 
KRG and military reconquest of Kirkuk and other parts of South Kurdistan.
Indeed, Kurds in Iraq speak about the area in question as ‘Kurdistan’, ‘region’ 
(herêm), ‘homeland’ (welat), or ‘South Kurdistan’ (Kurdistan-î başûr). This latter 
term partly results from British and French colonial partition of the Middle 
East. Kurdish geography describes the homeland of the Kurdish people as 
situated in West Asia (xorawe-î asiya) and segmented into North, West, East 
and South Kurdistan, with each of the single parts ‘under the command’ 
(bindestî) of Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, respectively. Alternative views add 
to Greater Kurdistan a Northeastern part; namely, the Kurdish settlements in 
the Caucasus. The territory comprises between 475,000 and 506,000 square 
kilometres, depending on the inclusion of exclaves in the Caucasus, Central 
Asia, and Central Anatolia (Zend 2001, pp. 9–10; Izady 1992, pp. 1–10). In fact, 
this specific geography hardly has an equivalent in Kurdish history before 1920. 
Instead, under Ottoman and Persian rule, borders cutting across Kurdistan 
were perceived in terms of provinces established by the empires or of the 
Kurdish emirates, such as the emirates of Bahdinan, Soran, and Baban in the 
south (Bruinessen 1989). As ‘phantom borders’ (Hirschhausen et al. 2015), these 
principalities recurred in the structuration of the Kurdish movement and 
the violence-loaded competition between the leading parties, the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
Without a doubt, the Kurdish nationalist movement has been challeng-
ing the order of the MENA region from the beginning of its emergence. 
However, at the heart of the Kurdish nationalist agenda lies the idea of 
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national self-determination with the nation state as model of reference. Yet 
as a ‘majority’ in their homeland, Kurds and Kurdish nationalist discourse 
themselves tend to construct minorities such as Christians of all denomina-
tions, Yezidis, Shabak, and Turkmens.5 Thus, reconfiguring geography in 
the context of Kurdistan and the Kurdish nationalist movement is both 
resistance to metageography and obedience to its logic.
Colonialism and Colonial Knowledge
British colonial politics in South Kurdistan during and following World 
War I ranged between, on the one hand, attempts to make representatives 
of the local elite allies against the Ottoman Empire and later the Turkish 
Republic (Mosul debate in 1926) and, on the other hand, the brutal op-
pression of insurgencies led by more or less the same elites. The Kurds, for 
their part, were motivated to rebellion by the regional wave of nationalist 
movements that claimed independence and the creation of nation states 
of their own, as well as by Lenin’s call for the right to self-determination 
and the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination of peoples. From 1918 
(complete British occupation of Mesopotamia) to 1920 (League of Nations 
confers British Mandate on Iraq), up to 1932 (formal acceptance of Iraq as 
a member of the League of Nations), the colonial power faced several local 
revolts; namely, the various insurrections led by Sheikh Mehmud Berzinci 
in Sulaimaniya (Edmonds 1957). However, British colonial rule over Iraq 
did not end until the Iraqi monarchy was abolished in 1958.
In Kurdish national historiography, British colonialism, along with the 
French, is identif ied as the principle reason for the partition of Kurdistan in 
the early 20th century and the missed historical chance to create a Kurdish 
nation state; the arbitrary colonial decisions and injustice are symbolized in 
the treaties of Sykes-Picot (1916), Sèvres (1920), and Lausanne (1923). However, 
in Kurdish historiography, colonialism started much earlier with the Battle 
of Chaldiran (1514) and the Treaty of Zohab (1639), events that established 
the territorial partition of Kurdistan between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Persians/Safavids (Baxewan 1999, pp. 56–63; Izady 1992, p. 51). In addition, 
Kurdish historiography and political discourse – under the given historical 
5 In the Kurdistan Parliament, eleven seats are reserved for minorities; in constitutional 
documents, others rank after the Kurds. See: Constitution Draft of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
2009, Articles 5–6; Charter of the Social Contract 2013. See also the contribution of Maisel in 
this volume.
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and present-day circumstances – are more preoccupied with later forms 
of colonialism imposed by the Iraqi, Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian regimes. 
In all parts of Kurdistan, the Kurds faced deprivation of political, social, 
cultural, and economic rights, denial of their cultural identity and even 
of their existence, and in addition, the appropriation of natural resources 
located in their territory. In this context, Ismail Beşikçi coined the notion of 
‘Kurdistan as international colony’, a notion in line with Lenin’s concept of 
internal colonialism to describe regionally manifested uneven development, 
structural dependency, and political injustice within states, a concept 
developed further for states based on settler colonialism and postcolonial 
nation states (Marquard 1957). For the South Kurdish context, collective 
suffering, especially under the dictatorship of the Baath regime (1968–2003), 
is the central feature of national identity. The key events of reference here 
are the annihilation of 8000 male members of the Barzani tribe in 1983, 
the chemical gas attack on Halabja with 5000 people killed, and the Anfal 
Campaign in 1988 with 182,000 men and women disappeared or murdered 
(Mlodoch 2015; Fischer-Tahir 2012).
Constantly faced with marginalization and oppression, the search for 
historical meaning is rendered in Kurdish nationalist discourse as a matter 
of cultural survival. At the same time, history and geography are constructed 
according to the hope for national self-determination while negotiating the 
‘horizon of expectation’ with the ‘space of experience’ (Koselleck 2010). Thus, 
Kurdish historians, geographers, and other symbol-handlers are in search 
of the historically proven spatial control over their territorial domain. In 
doing so, Islamic and Kurdish sources from past centuries are explored, as 
well as the works of British, French, Russian, German, or Italian scholars, 
travellers, or agents of the colonial apparatus. The most prominent narrative 
established by historiography and political discourse is the view of the 
Kurds as descended ethnically and linguistically from the Medes, a theory 
discussed by Orientalists in the 1920s (Minorski 1986; Nikitin 1956). When 
Kurdish intellectuals introduced a Kurdish calendar in the 1950s, they drew 
on that theory insofar as they took the destruction of the Assyrian capital 
Niniveh in 612 B.C. by the nomadic Medes as the beginning of the Kurdish 
time (Bohrmann 1991).6 Orientalists, however, also suggested that the Kurds 
6 The calendar is of political meaning for the Kurds, especially as it places – just like the Iranian 
calendar – Newroz as the beginning of the year. The KRG also experimented with the calendar 
in off icial affairs. However, when I worked in the Ministry of Higher Education in Sulaimaniya 
in 2005–2006, I could observe the confusion of my Kurdish colleagues when off icial documents 
came in for bureaucratic purposes, which state, apart from the date according to the Gregorian 
calendar, an Islamic and a Kurdish date.
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descended from autochthonous peoples such as the Corduene and Cyrti, 
as they appear in the reports of ancient Greek and Roman historians and 
geographers, and that the Kurds belong to the indigenous peoples of Asia 
Minor (Marr 1923). These theories were embraced very early by Kurdish 
historiography (Talabani 1971, pp. 23–49; Izady 1992, pp. 28–34), and inspire 
academic studies to the present (Bābān 1989; Pîrbal 2006, pp. 75–94).7
Deeply embedded in Kurdish nationalist discourse is the narrative that 
the Kurdish woman has a much better social status than the women of 
the ethnic ‘other’ (Turks, Arabs, Iranians). This narrative is often proved in 
reference to publications of British military off icers, who described Kurdish 
women as ‘comparatively free’ (Noel 1919, p. 67) or ‘practically as free as in 
any European country’ (Soane 2007, p. 268). These are statements based 
merely on the encounter with individual women of the notables and on 
reports by Kurdish men, but useful in arguments of distinction (e.g. Basīr 
1972, p. 108; Xeznedar 2012, pp. 5–6). Recent Kurdish feminist discourse 
hesitates to deconstruct these narratives. It tends, however, to correct these 
views in referring to later female European researchers (e.g. Hansen 1961) 
who indeed address in their work the gender inequality inherent to the 
Kurdish patriarchal society. Moreover, the feminist discourse emphasizes 
today’s problems of gender-based violence (Hardi 2013; Fischer-Tahir 2009).
From my own observations in Kurdistan over the last 20 years and based 
on the reading of Kurdish academic and other intellectual work, I argue that 
the identity discourse makes a sharp distinction between European colonial 
politics that led to the partition of Kurdistan on the one hand, and those 
colonial imaginations serving to prove the Kurds’ place in history and among 
the civilizations, on the other hand. The genuine problem with colonialism 
is not so much ‘the West’ but (the regimes of) Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria.
Imagined Geography in Lyrics, Photographs, and Revolutionary 
Marches
This section exemplifies geographical imaginations with the aid of a YouTube 
video uploaded under the title ‘We always will be Kurds’, or ‘Her kurd ebîn’. 
Based on the number of users and the fact that it has been reproduced 
several times, the video seems to be highly popular among Kurds in South 
7 For a critical discussion of Kurdish Studies, see Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray 2006; for studies 
on the Kurds in Tsarist Russia, see Alsancakli 2016; for a discussion on whether Soviet Kurdish 
studies pursued a view named ‘Orientalism’ by Edward Said, see Leezenberg 2011.
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Kurdistan, other parts of Kurdistan, and in the diaspora. From a social 
anthropologist perspective, I will contextualize, describe, and interpret 
this discourse fragment, paying particular attention to word and image 
to identify narratives and images as well as the strands of various and 
overlapping discourses on the past, present, and future of Kurdistan.
Encountering ‘We always will be Kurds’
I remember the days before the elections to the Iraqi Parliament on 30 Janu-
ary 2005. These elections were the first to be held under the Transitional Law 
imposed by the US occupation. The dominant Kurdish parties had formed 
the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, including the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the 
Kurdistan Communist Party, the Islamic Union of Kurdistan, and others. 
On the same day, elections were also to be held in the Kurdistan Region for 
reorganizing the Kurdish Regional Parliament, which was dissolved during 
the Kurdish militia war (1994–1997); former war enemies now worked to 
unify the administration after years of division. From a Kurdish nationalist 
perspective, the election day was important in two related directions: 
to prove to ‘the Arab’ political entities (be they Sunni or Shiite, religious 
or secular, partners or competitors) the power of the Kurds on the Iraqi 
national level; to prove the legitimacy of the Kurdish parties as they indeed 
governed the Iraqi north.
As elsewhere in the world, in Kurdish everyday life television is omnipres-
ent, depending on the provision of electricity. You watch and do not watch 
TV wherever you go: in the household, when visiting relatives and friends, 
in off ices of the administration, in political and cultural institutions, and of 
course in shops and restaurants. I remember one day I sat with some Kurdish 
colleagues in a restaurant in Sulaimaniya for lunch when ‘Her kurd ebîn’ 
was shown on TV. For a moment, my colleagues stopped talking, and one 
of them said reverentially ‘this is very beautiful’ (zor ciwan-e). Then the talk 
turned to the coming elections, and it was clear to my colleagues that they 
would vote ‘for Kurdistan’. The reason why I remember this scene so well is 
that I started feeling what they felt. I had watched the video several times 
at my brother-in-law’s house in Sulaimaniya, but I still found it exciting and 
touching, especially in the way it combined images of collective suffering 
with the folklorist images my colleagues had deemed ‘beautiful’. I also 
remember that moment because I envied my colleagues a bit for having 
the right to vote, and thus the chance to change something.
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The video ‘We always will be Kurds’ offers a journey through time: it 
strings together photographs documenting the struggle for the national 
liberation of the Kurds roughly between 1918 and 1991. The lyrics accom-
panying the photographs are based on a Kurdish poem and are displayed 
in Kurdish subtitles, accompanied by the blaring sound of a revolutionary 
military march. When the PUK Satellite channel KurdSat aired this video in 
2004–2005, it provided the following information: lyrics by Ibrahim Ahmed, 
composed by Shanaz Ibrahim Ahmed. KurdSat had started to operate in 
January 2000 as the off icial TV of the PUK, which, since semi-independence 
in 1992, had already operated a terrestrial TV station called Gel-î Kurd. After 
the KDP’s satellite channel KurdistanTV and the PKK-operated Med-TV, 
KurdSat was the third Kurdish satellite television station, and many fol-
lowed in the next years. KurdSat was based in the city of Sulaimaniya, the 
stronghold of the PUK.8
The poem’s author, Ibrahim Ahmed, was a well-known Kurdish politician, 
guerrilla f ighter, and intellectual from Sulaimaniya (1914–2000). He studied 
law at Baghdad University and started a career as a judge in Kurdistan, but 
soon turned to the political f ield. Over the next four decades, he significantly 
influenced the structuration and development of the Kurdish movement 
in Iraq. Inspired by Marxist-Leninist world views and theories of political 
practice, he became a leading figure of the KDP, established in 1946 (analogue 
to the KDP-Iran) as a socially and politically heterogeneous alliance. Left-wing 
ideas of progress and political organization brought him and like-minded 
leading f igures such as Jalal Talabani (1933–2017), who became his son-in-
law, into conflict with Mulla Mustafa Barzani (1903–1979), the tribal and 
conservative leader of the KDP. This conflict eventually resulted in the 
founding of the PUK in 1975. However, conflicts between the Ibrahim Ahmed/
Jalal Talabani group and the Barzanis arose not only from different views in 
terms of political decision-making, the role and function of the party and 
the Peshmerga forces. There were also different views of the relationship 
between Kurds and Arabs on the level of the Iraqi nation state (Brentjes 1964; 
McDowall 1996). Several decades later, Ahmed’s views on the necessity of 
an Iraq-wide democratization found their echo in the politics of negotiation 
and balance as pursued by Jalal Talabani, who acted as the president of Iraq 
between 2005 and 2014. At the same time, Mulla Mustafa’s sons, above all 
Masud Barzani, continued to prefer a rather radical nationalist stance towards 
Baghdad, visible in the referendum for independence in 2017. Apart from 
8 On Kurdish media and especially media in the Kurdistan Region, see Sheyholislami 2011; 
Reporters without Borders 2010; Fischer-Tahir 2017.
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his political influence, Ibrahim Ahmed is also well known (at least among 
Iraqi Kurds) for his work in the f ields of journalism and literature, having 
established several journals and published novels and short stories. He wrote 
his poem ‘Her kurd ebîn’ in 1981, during his exile in London (Berzincî 2004, 
p. 69). However, the poem did not become popular until his daughter Shanaz, 
herself a leading f igure of the PUK, directed the production of the KurdSat 
video, which has today gained the status as the unofficial Kurdish anthem.
Upon my request, a journalist from KurdSat provided me with the video 
in 2007, and I saved it on my computer in Berlin. Some months ago, I found 
my Kurdish husband at home cleaning our f lat with headphones in his 
ears and singing ‘Her Kurd ebîn’. His voice became especially loud and 
committed when he sang the refrain: ‘I am not an Arab, not an Iranian 
and not a mountain Turk’ – a rhyme which I had heard relatives, friends, 
or colleagues in Sulaimaniya say whenever this song on TV flushed into an 
everyday-life situation: ‘it has great power’ (zor be qewet-e). Searching for 
the video on the internet, I realized that multiple versions of the KurdSat 
video ‘Her Kurd ebîn’ were uploaded between 2006 and 2017, some slightly 
or more distinctively modif ied in the representation of images, but still all 
with a duration of four minutes and a few seconds, as long as the anthem 
lasts. In some videos, the subtitles are in Sorani, Sorani and English, and 
Sorani using Latin letters, Kurmanci, or Turkish. What happened to the 
KurdSat production is not spectacular in our times but still requires some 
reflection. If I accept the theoretical view in terms of ‘the “content” of any 
medium is always another medium’ (McLuhan 2001, p. 8), then it can be 
said that YouTube as a medium remediated ‘other, mostly older forms of 
mediation’ (Grusin 2009, p. 65) such as TV, radio, photography, and writing. If 
I tentatively draw on the idea that YouTube is ‘structured by a competition for 
attention’ and the ‘logic […] of exchange value’ (Schröter 2009, pp. 342–343), 
the material can be investigated under the question of how this exchange 
value comes into existence and why.
Geography of Disobedience and Distinction
Let me start with a representation of Ibrahim Ahmed’s poem as it most 
often appears in the video,9 translated into English and in Kurdish-Sorani 
9 For the video production, the original text was slightly restructured; see Berzincî 2004, 
pp. 68–69.
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(for simplicity, the reading is transliterated according to the Bedr-Khan-
Alphabet; the English translation is roughly taken from a translation 
circulating the web).10
we always will be Kurds her Kurd ebîn
hate filled invaders dagîrkerî dil pir le qîn
Savages without conscience dirinde-î bê wîjdan-û dîn
you can’t force us not to be Kurds Na tiwanî wa ekey Kurd nebîn
we have always been Kurds and always will  
be Kurds
her Kurd buyn-û her Kurd ebîn
before islam le pêş Musilmanêtî-da
before Fire worshipping le pêş agirperestî-da
during imprisonment and in victory be dîlî-u be serbestîda
we have always been Kurds and always will  
be Kurds
her Kurd buyn-u her Kurd ebîn
i am not an Arab, not an iranian and not a  
Mountain turk
Ne Arabim ne Îranîm ne turkêkî 
şaxistanîm
history will sing with me legel xom mêjûş her eleyt.
that i am a Kurd, a Kurdistani Ke Kurdim-u Kurdistanim
[…]
All peoples are my brothers gelan hemû bira-î minin
only my oppressors are my enemy her zordaranim dujminin
i am not demanding anyone’s land daway welat-î kes nakem
[…]
Even if you flatten the Mountains Qandil Eger Qendil-u Agirî-u Şirîn
Ararat and Shirin to the ground yeksan ekey legel ruy zemin
you can’t force us not to be Kurds Natiwanî wa ekey Kurd nebîn
we have always been Kurds and always will  
be Kurds
her Kurd buyn-u her Kurd ebîn
The rhymes clearly address anger, pride, and disobedience, and at the same 
time represent a vision of Greater Kurdistan. In the context of 1981, the lyrics 
originally echoed the defeat of the Kurdish movement in the war imposed 
on them by the Iraqi regime in 1974–1975. It can also be seen as a statement 
to the reorganized resistance, or ‘new revolution’ (şorş-î nwê), started by 
10 See: http://lyricstranslate.com/de/her-kurd-eb%C3%AEn-we-always-will-be-kurds.
html#ixzz4zAA8S1qP (last accessed 17 November 2020).
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the PUK as an alliance of three more or less leftist groups, including those 
of Talabani and Ahmed in 1975. I would also interpret the original lyrics as 
a comment on the cruelty Kurdish parties faced in Iran when the religious 
regime of Tehran intensif ied pressure on the opposition, as well as a com-
ment on the terror imposed on the Kurds (and Turkish leftists) after the 
military putsch in Turkey in 1980 (McDowall 1996). However, given that 
repression by the respective regimes did not end and that the struggle for 
liberation started much earlier and still continues, the remediated text 
flows through space and time.
These rhymes clearly address the colonialism under Arab, Iranian, 
and Turkish regimes, these invaders represented in metaphors of ‘hate’ 
(literally: ‘the heart f illed with hate’), ‘savagery’ (derinde), and ‘absence 
of conscience’ or ‘unscrupulousness’ (bêwîjdan). Without being explicitly 
stated, Kurds are imagined as the opposite of all that: they are kind-
hearted, civilized, and have good consciences. Interestingly, the argument 
turns to the historical legitimacy of the Kurds and Kurdistan: Kurds 
inhabited the land before the Muslim invaders and even before the 
Medes – who knew the f ire cult – settled down there. It is this histori-
cal rootedness of the Kurds in their homeland that dooms all invaders’ 
attempts of assimilation to defeat, even if they deny the Kurds in their 
existence, stigmatizing them as ‘Mountain Turks’. The invaders, with 
their politics of destruction and deportation, may raze the highest of the 
Kurdish mountains to the ground, but they will not destroy the Kurdish 
identity. The mountains Qandil, Shirin, and Ararat are addressed not 
only as topographical markers but also as places that played and still 
play a crucial role in Kurdish resistance, as refuge of the armed forces 
for survival and reorganization, and as spaces of desire and hope. Shirin 
(Barzan territory in Dohuk province) and Qandil (Iraq–Iran border, Erbil 
province) in the territory of Kurdistan in Iraq are connected to Mount 
Ararat in Turkey, so imagining Greater Kurdistan across national borders. 
To distinguish between (Arab, Turkish, and Iranian) ‘tyrants’ and the 
respective people (‘all peoples are my brothers’) might be interpreted as 
a merely rhetorical manoeuvre. It ref lects, however, Ibrahim Ahmed’s 
political views on the future of the Kurds within an Iraq based on solidarity 
between the popular masses and forces of progress.
Clearly, the lyrics are an expression of identity, resistance, and survival. In 
this way, they recall an older, prominent text of Kurdish revolution poetry, 
Ey reqîb (‘Oh Enemy’) by Younes Ra’uf, written in 1938. Ra’uf’s poem was 
composed to serve as the anthem of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 
1946, the Kurdistan Region as the off icial anthem adopted it in 1992, and 
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recently it was taken up by the Rojava cantons (West Kurdistan) in North 
Syria. Ey reqîb begins as follows:
Oh enemy! The Kurdish people live on
They have not been crushed by the weapons of any time
Let no one say Kurds are dead, they are living
They live and never shall we lower our f lag.11
Later, the rhymes state ‘we are the descendants of the red banner of the 
revolution’ and ‘we are the descendants of the Medes and of Cyaxares [king of 
the Medes]’. Ey reqîb positions the Kurds against the enemies more radically, 
without the socialist touch of international solidarity, even though the ‘red 
banner’ refers to communist revolutions. Both poems explore theories 
about the origin of the Kurds to highlight the denial of rights deriving from 
history and to legitimate the national liberation struggle. One reason for 
the popularity of ‘We always will be Kurds’ is surely that the audiences in 
both South Kurdistan and Greater Kurdistan were prepared for the song, as 
Ey reqîb is a long-standing and well-established representation in Kurdish 
national culture. What mainly constitutes the exchange value of the video 
within the market of attention is the refrain ‘I am not an Arab, not an Iranian 
and not a Mountain Turk’ – read by audiences as a powerful statement of 
distinction and disobedience.
Display the Nation
The original KurdSat video ‘We always will be Kurds’ includes more than 
50 photographs taken between 1900 and 2000 by a wide range of people. 
Many of these photographs originate from Susan Meiselas’s voluminous 
illustrated book Kurdistan: In the Shadow of History (1997). Thus, the KurdSat 
video reproduces that illustrated book, which itself is based on a selection 
of pictures from various sources: personal archives or public collections 
in South Kurdistan, museums and libraries in Western states, archives of 
Western photographers, and the international press. However, what is not 
‘old’ in Meiselas’s book has been ‘made old’ for the video production, and 
so the whole journey through Kurdistan appears in black and white with 
a touch of green. According to the rhythm of the song, the photographs 
11 See: http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?l=16&s=03010100&r=200&a=16878&s=010000 (last 
accessed 17 November 2020).
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appear in quick succession or as stills, with the camera moving upward 
and downward on a single picture, or zooming in and out.
Interestingly, the journey starts with a photograph taken by a French journal-
ist in 1974 during the war of the Iraqi regime against the rebellious Kurds after 
negotiations for autonomy had failed. The picture shows a pupil standing at a 
blackboard, turning attention to the words written on the board: ‘Kurdistan, 
Mort, Kurdistan’. A man in the background holds a kerosene lamp above the girl 
(Meiselas 1997, p. 271): ‘Mort’– death, a picture arranged for the French journalist 
to turn international attention to the war in Kurdistan. In the KurdSat video, 
with an expected Kurdish audience not likely proficient in French, the image 
serves instead to remind of experiences such as learning under conditions 
of war, discrimination against the Kurdish language, and punishment for 
using the word ‘Kurdistan’. At the same time, this representation echoes the 
developmental narrative of girls as both the target and the symbol of progress, 
a well-known narrative to Kurdish symbol-handlers. In addition, this picture 
as a starting point highlights children as the most vulnerable part of society.
What follows is a photographic narration of the Kurdish struggle for 
survival and the nation state, and thus of collective suffering and resist-
ance. In doing so, the journey crosses borders established by colonialism. 
Thus, we see Sheikh Mehmud Bernzinci in his stronghold of Sulaimaniya in 
1919 and Ismael Agha Simko, who led a rebellion in Urmia/East Kurdistan 
in 1919–1920. Several pictures tell the story of the Republic of Mahabad 
in 1946, from its foundation, its main f igures such as the president Qazi 
Mohammed, and his execution in March 1947 by the Iranian regime. The 
journey also recalls the memory of Iraqi Kurdish military off icers executed 
in 1947, revolutionaries executed by the Iranian army in 1979, and Kurdish 
civilians who were the target of the Turkish military in the 1970s. Other 
pictures document the genocidal attack on Halabja on 16 March 1988 and the 
dramatic mass escape of Kurds into the border regions of Turkey and Iran 
in March–April 1991, as the people feared new gas attacks to suppress their 
uprising in 1991. The journey also takes the viewer to the guerrilla war in 
South Kurdistan between 1961 and 1970 and its leading f igure Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani. However, as the video is a product of his rival, the PUK, the focus 
is mostly on the PUK Peshmerga and Talabani in 1975, including a scene 
showing a few women as part of the armed forces. At the end, the viewer 
can see – in slow motion – a Peshmerga talking to an (invisible) audience.
Several of the photographs from 1900 to the 1940s are taken by British, 
American, or German military off icers, diplomats, journalists, and profes-
sional photographers – among them the British Major E.B. Soane and his wife 
Lynette Soane, political off icer C.J. Edmonds, the British administrator A.T. 
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Wilson, US intelligence off icer A.B. Roosevelt, and the missionary Augusta 
Guthart. The latter is shown in a photograph from 1923 in which she – as 
a modern Western woman – is sitting in the middle of Kurdish men in 
tribal clothes; the picture was originally taken for a missionary newspaper 
(Meiselas 1997, p. 113). The video also re-establishes the narrative of the 
Kurdish woman as freer than that of the neighbours. Thus, the journey brings 
the viewer back to Adila Xanum Caf Begzade, who had temporarily acted 
as tribal leader after the death of her husband. The journey also brings us 
to Hafsa Xan Naqib, a cousin and sister-in-law of Sheikh Mehmud Berzinci. 
Both women represent exceptional f igures among the tribal and religious 
elites of Halabja and Sulaimaniya at that time.
To sum up, the video can be taken as a fragment of overlapping discourses: 
Kurdish identity discourse, political discourse within the Iraqi Kurdish 
political f ield, Kurdish historiographical discourse, Orientalist discourse, 
and Kurdish feminist discourse. At the same time, the symbol-handlers 
re-establish a geographical imagination of connectivity, belonging, and 
history.
However, the geography of Kurdistan is imagined not only with the aid 
of historical events but also through photographs representing what in 
Kurdish is called kurdewarî, or ‘Kurdish folklore’. This ranges from historical 
as well as present-day pictures of rural landscapes with people representing 
imaginations of Kurdish nomadic life to recent portraits of rurality taken 
by a photographer in Kurdistan of Turkey, and again the various parts of 
Kurdistan are rendered as one inseparable territory. At the same time, the 
pictures suggest knowledge about the essence of Kurdish cultural heritage. 
Interestingly, these latter portraits were coloured in the original (Meiselas 
1997, pp. 372–373). What is striking is that the journey through Greater 
Kurdistan leaves out the western part of the homeland, North Syria. This 
could be explained by the fact that in Meiselas’s illustrated book, Kurdistan 
in Syria has been left aside. However, according to my observations, in 
particular in Sulaimaniya, what happened in West Kurdistan did not gain 
attention before the uprising of Qamishli in 2004, whereas greater public 
interest in that far part of the Kurdish homeland started with the battle for 
Kobane in 2014. In this sense, the colonial partition of Kurdistan prevails 
even if the Kurdish symbol-handlers attempt to overcome those borders 
established by European colonialism and prolonged by the Turkish, Syrian, 
Iranian, and the Iraqi governments (the latter of which the Kurds have been 
a part of since 2005). Yet, the vision of Greater Kurdistan becomes more 
complete in some of the recent reproductions of the anthem. In response to 
the developments of the Rojava cantons, and in support of the Democratic 
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Union Party (PYD), YouTube users or producers highlight in their picture 
gallery, for example, photographs of armed women f ighting the Islamic 
State (such as Women’s Protection Units or the Yezidi women’s battalion).
Reclaiming Spatial Control
The makers of ‘We always will be Kurds’ act on the world under given circum-
stances, adjusting their practice to the technological possibilities developed 
in the meantime. The KurdSat anthem is a cultural representation of Kurdish 
identity, converging different discourses about Kurdistan’s past, present, and 
future. References to knowledge suitable to prove ancient history is part of 
the nation-building project. A coherent history of continued rebellion and 
suffering since the beginning of the 20th century is needed to provide the 
group members with meaning and a sense of responsibility. Representations 
of this kind also serve to legitimate the ruling political class of the Kurdistan 
Region. The ‘emotional geography’ (Derichs 2017, p. 154) re-established by 
the video works without an abstract map. Rather, the space production 
involves narratives and images that transgress the borders established by 
colonialism. Even though this geography only has validity within discourses 
of the marginalized, it challenges established metageographies.
The use of Ibrahim Ahmed’s poem in the KurdSat video, along with the 
use of photographs taken from different sources, also gives rise to reflection 
on the travel of representations and some more functions of the video. It 
ensures that these pictures not be forgotten in place-based archives and 
museums; now, the video itself functions as a de-territorialized archive 
and museum. Moreover, it accomplishes the function of a schoolbook: the 
educational mandate is played out in the lyrics, the photography-based 
lecture on history and society, scenes such as a school under f ire, and, at 
the end, the Peshmerga as the person who has the last word. In terms of 
representational aesthetics, the black-and-white design is striking. Yet, it 
perfectly f its the archival character and supports the argument of a dis-
tinguished culture as testif ied long ago even by outsiders. In this way, the 
video can also be seen as a part of a politics of cultural heritage – a concept 
which itself is a heritage of colonialism with its modes of representation 
(Daher and Maff i 2007).
However, if disobedience and the struggle for the nation are the topic of 
‘We always will be Kurds’, why the references to Orientalist knowledge? At 
f irst glance, the simultaneity of positive references to colonial photography 
and at the same time to anti-colonial struggles may appear contradictory. Yet, 
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using colonial photography within an agenda of resistance is a widespread 
practice among indigenous peoples around the world. Actors make use of 
respective representations from the nineteenth and early 20th century to 
provide documentation of oppression, slavery, and extinction, and they 
transform the colonial gaze into statements about survival, cultural achieve-
ments, and glorious histories, as well as into political claims. In addition, 
reconfiguring the landscapes of oppression into geographies of disobedience 
is a practice of exercising symbolically spatial control as well as a way of 
reclaiming spatial control over a defined territory. As for the Kurdish context, 
the experience with European colonialism has interfered with the colonial 
experience since the establishment of the national states of Iraq, Syria, Iran, 
and Turkey. Therefore, it is even easier to harmonize contradictions arising 
from politics of heritage.
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A few months into the popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region in 2009/10, the promises of social media, including its ability 
to influence a participatory governance model, grassroots civic engagement, 
new social dynamics, inclusive societies and new opportunities for businesses 
and entrepreneurs, became more evident than ever. Simultaneously, 
cartography received new considerable interest as it merged with social 
media platforms. In an attempt to rearticulate the relationship between 
media and mapping practices, whilst also addressing new and social media, 
this interdisciplinary book abides by one relatively clear point: space is a 
media product. The overall focus of this book is accordingly not so much on 
the role of new technologies and social networks as it is on how media and 
mapping practices expand the very notion of cultural engagement, political 
activism, popular protest and social participation.
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